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THE TWO-PARTY

system has been a feature of the American
scene
for
all
political
except a few brief periods in our hismost
of the last 130 years, the traditional
Yet,
tory.
during

two major parties have had in virtually every election at
one minor-party competitor. Despite this persistence,
there has been a continuing pattern of failure. Never has an
American third party been successful in displacing a major
competitor. (Both the Whigs and the Republicans grew and
came to power in two of those rare periods when a single
major party was dominant.)
The presidential campaign of 1948 was not exceptional in

least

it witnessed new
minor-party challenges to Democratic
and Republican supremacy. One of these movements took
shape as Henry A. Wallace's Progressive Party. The present
study attempts to examine the background, the leaders, the
organization, the campaign, and finally the disintegration of
this third party. It
attempts to present a history of the Wallace

that

a political history based to the greatest
Progressive Party
extent
possible
upon the firsthand accounts of those who
participated in a movement sufficiently distinctive to merit the
title of "crusade"
a quixotic crusade.

Why
this

is it

that
It

minor

parties have never been successful in
appears that there must be substantial rea-

country?
sons for the repeated pattern of failure that has greeted their
vii
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persistence.

some

of

.

.

Professor William B. Hesseltine

them
.

in

The

The Rise and Fall of Third

obstacles that line the

discouraging. In general they

fall into

had indicated

Parties:

... way
two

are indeed

classes, the prac-

and the philosophical, and neither can be dismissed
liberals must find
as unimportant. Both are imperatives
a base upon which to make a valid appeal to the reason
and conscience of the voters, and they must create a practical

tical organization to carry

out the program.

The practical handicaps which a new party must overcome fall into two groups: financial and legal.
can.

.

.

dor compels the admission that the barriers are formidable.

A

<
postscript might be added that a successful third party
also requires a fertile soil of crisis or a favorable climate of
unrest in which to flourish.
conditions
not,

Surrounding

may

of course, be created by the party; they may
only be utilized.
their
or
absence
Nevertheless,
presence
may spell life or death

a minor party.
In examining these factors to ascertain the role
they played
in the life cycle of one third
party, that of Henry A. Wallace,
streams both
inquiry will first be made into the currents
and
to
the
initial dephilosophical
political
contributing
to

embark upon such a ventureXsince the party was
essentially the creation and creature of one man, it seems

cision to

necessary to examine briefly his personal philosophy, characteristics, and attributes that were to play so great a part in this
undertaking. Attention must also be given to the "practical"
obstacles mentioned by Professor Hesseltine: matters of
party
organization the attempt to establish a new nation-wide
group able to compete on the ward and precinct level with
well-established party machines and the
attempt to set up a
structure sturdy enough to endure,
regardless of the fate of the
individuals connected with

it.

Part and parcel of these
prac-

ix

Preface

considerations are the dual legal-financial barriers referred to, including the statutory weapons so often used by
tical

parties
tition

in

power

to discourage or eliminate third-party

by keeping insurgent groups

off the ballot.

compe-

Included

meet
and
the tremendous
conducting a
organizing
machines
nation-wide campaign against well-entrenched
posthe need to secure funds to

also are fiscal obstacles

expense of

sessing established donors as well as patronage favors to dis-

pense.

In addition, there are numerous other obstacles that conthe traditional adherence of the Amerifront a third party

can voter to the party of

his forbears, the loss of popular

to major-party "thunder-stealers," the feeling that
policies

pressure group activity

may be more

productive, defeatism

rebuffs at the polls, and the opinion that more
resulting
if more restricted
certain
benefits will accrue from workframework.
Virtually all of these
ing within the two-party
a
considerations played
part in the yearlong 1948 campaign
of the Wallace Progressive Party, its rejection at the polls,
and its subsequent attempts to carry on into the following

from

years.

Besides these customary barriers to minor-party success,
the Wallace venture was subjected to certain additional and

handicaps attendant upon the nature
very special handicaps
of the Party's underlying doctrines and its attempts to introduce what might be described as tolerant politics into a period
of intolerance. These special disadvantages must be inquired
into
particularly as they were reflected in two aspects of the

1948 campaign: the Philadelphia Convention and the Communist-domination charges so persistently hurled at the party
by a hostile press.
Ultimately, an evaluation must be made of the party's performance in carrying out the announced objectives of its
founder Henry A. Wallace and of its impact on the

American

political scene.

Acting upon his basic faith in and

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948

x
desire to assist the

"common man," Wallace

felt this third-

of carrying his
the only means
party venture was a means
of the
of
the
President
head
"fight for peace" over the
the
For
camUnited States to the American people.
Wallace,

paign battle reached far beyond America's shores; it was a
battle for a war-free world in which the common men of
nations might live and prosper. If both major parties
failed to give the American voter an opportunity to urge
peaceful alternatives upon his government, then a new party
all

must come into being eventually to supplant one of them.
"The people," said Wallace, "must have a choice."
But, beyond the immediate hopes and expectations of its
founder and its followers, what was the party's impact? What
were its ultimate effects on the American political scene, upon
the conduct of American government? Here the additional
perspective provided by the passage of time and the policies
of succeeding administrations
at a more balanced picture.

may prove

helpful in arriving

Much was

written about the 1948 Progressive Party
at
columns of the press at the time but little systematic attempt has been made to inquire with any measure
least in the

of objectivity into the many facets of its
history. Accordingly,
has been necessary to rely in great measure
upon sources
other than written for the present

it

study.

The primary

sources

employed have included materials

contained in the

files of the
Progressive Party (to the limited
extent that party officials were willing to make them available), reports filed with the Clerk of the United States House

of Representatives (for financial matters), and data
gathered
by the author and other persons during the course of the

1948 campaign

such as party press releases, letters of inand other official communications.
However, more important than these documentary sources
of information have been the
personal interviews with officials
of the Progressive Party and others connected with the Waistruction to local affiliates,

xi
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lace campaign.

On

the basis of firsthand reports from the

people actually involved in the organization of the party, and
from others who observed from points of vantage, it has been
possible to

fill

in

many

of the gaps that otherwise

would have

existed.

This interview method of research,

it should be noted,
posboth advantages and disadvantages. Persons close to
events in which they played an important role are sometimes
reticent, sometimes intent on proving a special point or on

sesses

justifying their own actions. Other individuals, muted by the
social climate in which our investigations were conducted,

proved unwilling to admit even an
participation, in the Wallace party.

interest, let alone actual

On

the other hand, sec-

ondhand reports, hearsay, and unsubstantiated allegations
must be evaluated for their worth and credibility. Consehas been necessary for the author to make judgments concerning the relative merit of many conflicting
claims. In instances where there has seemed to be substantial
support for contradictory positions, an attempt has been made
to indicate both sides, as well as the author's own opinion.
Inasmuch as this study constitutes a political history, it
seems wise to keep in mind the telling remark attributed to
the late Charles A. Beard: "History may be objective, historians never are." The author does not claim exception to
this rule. In fact, had a sympathetic interest in this third-party
venture of Henry A. Wallace's not existed, it seems unlikely
quently,

that this

it

work would ever have been undertaken. But

this

very sympathy, coupled with the author's own participation
(slight as it was, as chairman of a student group
Republicans for Wallace
at Colgate University, Hamilton, New
in the campaign, may have served to qualify him for a
better understanding of the problems faced and a clearer
judgment of the solutions adopted by the third party.
Because the interviews, research, and preparation for this

York)

book covered an extended period of

time, the author finds

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade
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it difficult

of

all

to

those

1948

acknowledge in a brief space the contributions
given assistance at one stage or another

who have

of the project.
Nevertheless, gratitude must be expressed to some whose
contributions have been most substantial. Foremost of these

Moos of the Johns Hopkins
whose
under
guidance the work was planned, orUniversity,
to completion. Indebtedness
and
carried
ganized,
ultimately
must also be expressed to those members of the Progressive
Party who gave their wholehearted cooperation particularly
to the Honorable Henry A. Wallace, former Vice President
of the United States, and to the Honorable Glen H. Taylor,
former United States Senator from Idaho. Ladies and gentlemen of the press also provided many worthwhile suggestions. Thanks must be
expressed to all of them who aided
to
Miss
Helen
Fuller of New Republic and to
particularly
Mr. Barney Conal of National Guardian, who gave most generously of their time and personal recollections.
has been Professor Malcolm C.

For the
others
his

assistance rendered

by these persons and the many

who must remain unmentioned,

appreciation.

the author expresses

For any errors of fact or interpretation

which may remain, he accepts

full

responsibility.

KARL M. SCHMIDT
Syracuse,

New York

Summer, 1960
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CHAPTER

New
New York

Currents

casts

1

Forming

23 votes for Wallace,

Truman, Y2 vote for Barkley.
Ohio casts 24% votes for Wallace,
man.
Pennsylvania casts
for

46%

69%

19%

votes for

votes for Tru-

votes for Wallace,

23%

votes

Truman.

THE TIME

Chicago. The occasion
July, 1944. The place
the Democratic National Convention. This extract is a portion
of the roll call of the states to select a running mate for

Franklin D. Roosevelt in the

fall

campaign

a vice-presiden-

candidate destined by fate to become President of the
United States. And with this vote there came to the surface

tial

the swirling currents that only four years later were to culmia new Progressive
nate in the organization of a third party

Party

the Wallace Progressive Party of 1948.

On this first ballot, the roll call noted above, Vice President
Henry A. Wallace received 429% votes and Senator Harry S.
Truman 319% votes, with the balance some 428 votes
among fourteen favorite sons and local choices. Since
589 votes would have given him the requisite majority, Wallace had fallen short, by a margin of some 160 votes, of redivided

gaining the candidacy for Vice President at this strategic
On the second ballot, the band wagon of the bosses

moment.

1
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thence
sweeping Truman to the nomination,
House.
election, and ultimately the White
What lay behind the scene just described? What significant

began to

roll,

undercurrents contributed to

it? First,

there

was a growing

in the Democratic Party organization apparent in the
votes of the major state delegations. Second, there were
split

rift

sections of the nation in which streams of third-party sentiment
and tradition existed and were rising. Then there were the

that was to emerge
wellsprings of an ideological discontent
in the midst of the Truman administration and completely

divide the Democratic camp. It is our task to survey these
various streams that were to flow into the third-party chanto explore the ultimate
nel and to measure their velocity

diversion of others originally expected to swell the Wallace
tide, thus emerging with a clear chart of the new currents

forming the 1948 Progressive Party.
At the outset, what were the contending forces within the
Democratic Party?
v

^In the 1940 Democratic Convention, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt had virtually dictated the selection of Henry A.
Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture, as his fellow candidate, threatening to refuse the third-term nomination for
himself if his wishes were not met. The reluctant delegates

had to accept as Roosevelt's running mate a
anathema to many, a "renegade Republican"
an unwanted candidate to practically all.

By

man who was
to others,

and

1944, however, the situation was nearly reversed. De-

spite the majority popular support indicated in the polls

and

the political strength exhibited on the convention floor, Wallace received what amounted to a kiss of death from Roose-

velt^Instead of giving to Wallace the
strong support of 1940,
or the clear-cut endorsement that would have sufficed in

1944, the President saw fit to send a letter to Senator Samuel
D. Jackson, permanent chairman of the
Chicago National
Convention, in which he announced that he "would vote for

New

him [Wallace] personally
had "no desire to appear

A

3

Currents Forming

few days

later,

he were a delegate," but that
to dictate to the convention."

if

with Wallace

still

he

in the thick of the

the nomination, despite this lukewarm endorsement,
fight for
a second letter was sent by Roosevelt this time to National

Committee Chairman Robert Hannegan, who was
ager of the

Truman

forces

stating that either

also manTruman or

William O. Douglas would be an acceptable running mate.
The original order of preference in the letter had been

"Douglas or Truman," but the two names had been reversed
1
The Presidential communication
prior to press release.
proved decisive. Although the personal appearance of Wallace on the convention floor, together with his speech seconddemonstrations that aling Roosevelt's nomination, created
the
most turned the tide,
opposition strategy of postponing
the vice-presidential balloting overnight prevailed.
It
impossible to hold together for a second ballot

proved

the jerry-built Wallace convention machine. Commitments
were too weak to keep the delegates in line. So confident had

he been of the President's support up to the time of the convention letter, the Vice President had not deemed nechim to office. Indeed,
essary an organization for returning
a
floor
to
secure
he had even neglected
manager. Wallace
the convenas
before
the
late
that
as
has observed
Friday
tion, the President, seated at his

had put

his

desk after a cabinet meeting,
pulled his head down

arm around Wallace and

to whisper, "Henry, I hope
team." Only after arriving in

make a

it's

going to be the same old

Chicago did some of the Wal-

attempt to fill the gap,
aging Pennsylvanian Senator Joseph
prevailing upon
battle. But the power of the big
to
lead
the
last-ditch
Guffey
and the Southern
the
bosses,
politicians,
lace supporters

last desperate

the

professional

city

Conservatives
1

working

behind

the

scenes

proved

too

Wallace has ascribed the change to Hannegan, but Raymond
it was done at Roosevelt's request.

Moley has claimed

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade
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much. The house of cards collapsed. Led by Mayor Ed
Ed Flynn and Paul Fitzpatrick of New
Kelly of Chicago,
York, and Frank Hague of Jersey City, with an assist from
the National Committee Chairman Hannegan, the opposition forces which had seemed hopelessly divided at first finally
as an available candidate who
agreed on Harry S. Truman
would, in the words of Ed Flynn, "offend no one" and be
"acceptable" to almost all the contending groups.
This decision, however, was not made until the Political

Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, under Sidney Hillman, had effectively vetoed "Assistant
first choice of the Southern
President" James F. Byrnes
Conservatives. In this action Hillman had been supported by

convert from Catholicism to
Flynn's protests that Byrnes
Protestantism during his youth would lose the votes of his
over, Byrnes possessed
voteirs,

liberal

New

York. Morenumerous Negro
whose support the Democrats hoped to retain. The

former coreligionists in the crucial
little

state of

appeal to the

Douglas, with his name relegated to second place in
letter, was never seriously in contention, since

Roosevelt's

he was most acceptable to those groups preferring Wallace.
The excuse advanced that Wallace was sacrificed for fear
of costing F.D.R. votes in November is not supported by
polls taken at the time. Far from a people's choice in 1940,
he had nearly a majority of the rank-and-file Democrats
supporting him by March of 1944, and by June this following had swelled to 65 per cent according to the Gallup surveys. At best, his abandonment may have led both southerners
and city bosses to a stronger support of him than would
otherwise have been forthcoming.
The results were succinctly expressed in an editorial in the
Manchester Guardian:

The party
tives of the

the machines, and the conservaSouth could not stand Mr. Wallace who in the

bosses,

.

.

.

New

Currents Forming

5

popular mind embodied the New Deal and racial equality.
So they turned to the colorless Truman who has never upset anyone's prejudices.

Nor does it seem likely that the nomination of Wallace
would have caused the Southern Conservatives to break
completely with the administration or secede from the party.
Unlike the situation four years later, the promise of victory
and the magic of the Roosevelt name were insurance of at
least nominal support.

For our purposes, however, the bitter floor fight over the
Wallace nomination not only emphasized the basic division
in the party but also made clear the specific cleavage of inand ideologies temporarily bridged by the personal
appeal and magnetism, as well as the vote-getting ability, of
the "Chief." On one side were the five principal groups of

terests

Wallace supporters:

first,

the old line

New

Dealers

Rex

Claude Pepper, Helen Gahagan DougTugwell,
to
a
mention
las,
few; second, the CIO Political Action
Ellis Arnall,

Committee group, as evidenced by the CIO's top leader,
Sidney Hillman, and by Richard Frankensteen of the United
Auto Workers, who singlehandedly had almost kept Michigan
in line for Wallace; third, the

Negro leaders who feared the

Byrd-Byrnes drive and were at best lukewarm to Truman;
fourth, a small group of professional politicians
particularly
those with strong union constituencies, such as Senators
Joseph Guffey of Pennsylvania and James Mead and Robert
Wagner of New York; finally, the Communist fringe of the
party the fellow travelers and "daily workers," noisy though
feeble, with their line of

wartime "cooperation."

Against these Wallace supporters were arrayed three main
groups: first, the big city machines and Conservative Northern Democrats, such as Flynn, Kelly, Hague, and Farley;
remnants of a slow-dying
second, the Southern Bourbons
southern conservatism Byrd, Byrnes, Bankhead, and the

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade
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Virginia and South Carolina machines, among others; finally,
the Anti-Wallace Liberals, more difficult to define but includ-

ing those who desired to make haste more slowly. Counting
in their ranks men like Justice William O. Douglas, Thomas

Corcoran, Harold Ickes, Representative Estes Kefauver, and
Senator Alben W. Barkley, as well as some of the Southern
Liberals,

and

third

this

group considered Wallace impractical

visionary.

Senator Truman's great virtue was that all groups could
and would accept him, since Roosevelt would be the name on
the ballot. Thus, the breach had been closed, at least on the
surface, and the rather motley array of the Democratic Party
closed ranks for the election battle with a common
Republi-

can enemy. As Arthur Krock so aptly put it in the New
York Times, Henry A. Wallace had been "sacrificed to expediency."

Despite the convention rebuff, Wallace, with the opening
of the fall campaign, began
working actively for the Democratic ticket. Speculation
began about the role he might play
in a

new Roosevelt

administration.

With the

election issue

undecided, there came a rumor that he was to succeed
the aging Cordell Hull as
Secretary of State. In fact, this restill

port gained such widespread circulation that the President

saw

to deny it
publicly.
Following the election,
fit

word reached the press that, in
return for his "sacrifice" at
Chicago, the former Vice President had been offered his choice of Cabinet
with the
posts,

and that he had decided
upon Commerce. Wallace himself has stated that, late in
1944, he had
heard rumors of the
impending retirement of Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones and that since he was not anxious to "push
anyone out" of the Cabinet, he requested the Commerce
sole exception of State,

On

name

post.

January 22, 1945, President Roosevelt submitted the
of Henry A. Wallace to the Senate to succeed Jones
in

this position.

After a bitter battle on
Capitol Hill, in the

New

Currents Forming

1

course of which the post was stripped of many of its powers,
including that of control over Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds, the appointment was finally confirmed. Wallace, after a four-year interval as Vice President of the

United

States,

resumed

his place at the

head of an executive

department.

As

Secretary of Commerce, Wallace weathered the advent/"
S. Truman to the
Presidency in April of 1945 and,

of Harry

in contrast to his usual accompaniment of controversy, settled down into relative
obscurity for nearly a year. However,

during this period significant changes took place within the
ornate walls of the Commerce Building.
strong friend of

A

small business was

now

in power. Expansion of technical and
other assistance for small firms from $300,000 to $4,500,000

per year was initiated.
In addition to performing his administrative duties, Wallace found time to oppose strenuously Republican attempts

undermine the reciprocal trade agreements in favor of
higher protective tariffs. Citing the unemployment of the
1930's as an example of the ill effects caused in part at
least by previous tariff policy, he argued that there could be
no stability of employment without continued export-import
agreements of the Cordell Hull pattern. While such views
intensified the enmity of certain business
groups, they seem
to have left the general public apathetic.
Finally, to culminate the period of calm before the storm,
to

Wallace's

postwar

doctrine

of

socio-economic

planning

book form as 60 Million Jobs. But, with rapid reemerged
conversion and business boom making this figure reality in
short order, the author was spared much of the customary attack on his "impossible dreaming."
in

This discussion summarizes the situation of the
cratic Party in late 1945.

The

Demo-

revealed at the Chicago
Convention the previous year had indicated the deep and
basic divisions within the party. But those had been healed
rifts

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948
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on the surface. Liberal Left and Conservative
more been reconciled. Viewed from Washonce
Right had
over

at least

ington, any possibility
mote indeed.

of a third-party

movement seemed

re-

background of Henry Wallace,
this man of
standing on the verge of the most
whole
career? What had been his govin
his
fateful decision
his popular role?
was
What
ernmental experience?
been the first of his family
had
not
Henry Agard Wallace

But what of the

earlier

peace now

head the sprawling agencies of our largest peacetime instrument of government the Department of Agriculture,
His father, lifetime Republican Henry C. Wallace, had filled
this same post during the 1920's in the Cabinet of Warren G.
Harding. But along with so many other midwestern Republicans, the son had found long-standing political adherence
challenged by the farm problems of the twenties and thirties
and the failure of the GOP to move far enough or fast enough.
He had become a Democrat, a public supporter of Franklin

to

Roosevelt in the pages of the family journal, Wallace's
Farmer, and had gone on to become one of Roosevelt's first
Cabinet appointees.
his many years in
first as Secpublic service
of
then
as
Vice
President Wallace had
retary
Agriculture,
found himself the target of unprecedented abuse and the ob-

Throughout

ject of unrestrained praise, with the former clearly predominating in the pages of the press. During the period of the
Deal and the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wal-

New

had become much more than just another Cabinet
politician. He had become a symbol for those Americans con-

lace

scious that in the midst of the
plenty, the means of producand
the
know-how
in
the
midst of all these riches
tion,
one third of their nation was still ill-fed,
and illill-clothed,

housed. Liberal groups, labor
groups, and groups of the

New

9

Currents Forming

common

people had rallied to the Wallace

call "for

a better

world right now." Despite the unending press campaign of
vituperation waged against him as a "visionary," a "radical,"
a "mystic," and an "idealist," Wallace had remained unswerving in his devotion to the common man. As he remarked
cheerfully on one occasion, "The people who are fighting
against

me know

that they are not fighting a starry-eyed

liberal or mystic. If they really

thought that, they wouldn't be

worried."

Confident of the rightness of his position, Wallace had

and had seen
pressed the fight throughout his public career
his popularity with the American public climb slowly but
convensteadily to the high point recorded prior to the 1944
With the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, many

tion.

of these persons

came

to feel that the true spiritual heir to

New

Deal had been passed over. Pointing to the administration's handling of domestic and foreign affairs, those
close to the scene concluded that Henry A. Wallace, rather

the

than Harry S. Truman, represented the legitimate line of
descent for the policies of the late President.
This description represents the man and the scene in

Washington in late 1945. Although the crusader may have
been mentally testing his armor, he was scarcely prepared for
embarkation, nor was there yet any indication on that shore
of the flood tide appropriate to the launching of a thirdparty venture.

What

political

of the nation?

attitudes

were prevalent in other sections

What were some

of the

movements outside

the Democratic Party that were to furnish tributary currents
of varying size for the main stream of third-party sentiment
in 1948? There were two regions of primary significance
the Middle West, traditional seat of third-party unrest, and
York, home of an existing balance-of-power third

New
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The year 1946 witnessed important developments

party.

in

both areas.

There was the final dissolution of the Progressive Party
in Wisconsin. Although founded as late as 1934, its roots
went much deeper, even beyond 1912 and the Teddy Rooseall these years it had been linked
velt movement.

Through

name

to the

of

La

ard-bearer in the presidential
sons,

old "Fighting Bob," standrace of 1924, and later his two

first

Follette

and
replaced his father as Senator,
became Governor of the state.

"Young Bob," who

who

Phillip,

built up a substantial following for itself and
ideas of governmental reform, becoming, indeed, one

The party had
for

its

of the state's two major parties.

By

1944, however,

it

had

fallen to third place at the polls, receiving only 5 per cent of
vote. And in 1946 it seemed that even the magic
the

popular

La Follette name would be insufficient to re-elect
Bob
to the Senate on its slate. Practical politics dicYoung
of the

tated a merger with one of the major parties.
Secretary of Commerce Wallace addressed a personal letter
to the Senator, urging that the Progressives "with their great
tradition of liberal action come home to the party of Roose-

than return to the party of Hoover." But, impelled by the desire to see La Follette re-elected, in state convention the party overcame the protests of a minority that
wished to remain independent and decided to rejoin a revelt, rather

luctant

GOP.

Labor groups within the

party, however,

had

battled for

acceptance of the Wallace invitation. Defeated, they withdrew from the Progressive-Republican coalition and entered
their candidates in the

proved

fatal for

La

Democratic primary. The defection

Follette in his

for the Conservative wing

ment with a

Republican primary race,

was busy engineering

his

replace-

state circuit
judge, Joseph R. McCarthy, dishis
tinguished chiefly by
youth (the youngest person ever

New
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elected to the state's circuit court), his political brashness,
and his wartime service as a marine, rather than by his

or behavior

had been censured

(he
by
judicial competence
the state bar association for unethical practices). The loss
that
of the labor votes
particularly in Milwaukee County

had previously given Robert M. La

Follette his

margin of

in the Senate.
victory cost him the primary and his seat
For the first time in years, no member of the La Follette

But
family held a high post in the Wisconsin government.
the
for
crusaded
who
had
even more important, leaders
a long tradition of indeProgressive banners, voters with

now felt that they had no place to go. Seemingly,
was fertile soil for a new third party in the state of Wisconsin, and the state convention had revealed substantial

pendence,
there

Wallace support particularly among younger segments of
the old Progressive Party.
At about the same time there came significant rumblings

from the neighboring state of Minnesota, where, according
to Malcolm Moos and E. W. Kenworthy, "Greenbackism and
Populism and Bryanism are still slogans that awaken memories, and where 'Wall Street' and 'malefactors of great
wealth' make the eyes see red and the blood pound in the
veins."

In Minnesota, a Farmer-Labor Party had grown in the
I from the merger of urban
years following World War
labor sentiment represented by the Socialist Party and rural
unrest stemming from the Nonpartisan League. For two

in state politics, but with
it had been
highly important
the advent of a progressive Republican organization under

decades

Harold Stassen, it had gone into decline. A deathbed wedhad been arranged in 1942,
ding with the Democratic Party
but now this uneasy alliance showed signs of splitting. As in
Wisconsin, there had been many persons including former

Governor Elmer Benson

who had never been

completely
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reconciled to operating within the confines of a major party.
And Benson's sympathy with the Wallace movement was
clearly emerging.
Further indications of a right-left split in the

Democratic
In
its
traditional
were
Farmer-Labor alignment
present.
for
candidate
the
DFL
Congress
stronghold, the Iron Range,
was the pro-Wallace John Blatnik. Within the state organization,

power seemed

to rest with the malcontents.

They prom-

ised sturdy roots for the grafting of a new nation-wide third
was in order the Moos-Kenworthy
party. Only one caution
warning that "despite the agrarian radicalism of Minnesota

farmers, they want no truck with communism, and have an
abiding fear and distrust of Russia."

Turning from agricultural to industrial America, the year
1946 marked significant developments in New York State.
Evidence of growing support for a third-party movement
can be traced to two parties there the American Labor
Party and the Communist Party both centered in the New

York City area.
The American Labor

Party, a product of the 1930's, had
already achieved a balance-of-power position for the entire
state on the basis of its strength in the metropolitan New
York City area. Despite the fact that it had already been

by one anti-Communist fission the departure of the
Liberal Party group headed by David Dubinsky and the powerful International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
it had
rent

survived, and even thrived. Although this group had become
the second party in only a small number of New York

City
possessed a solid regularly-voting core of some
350,000 to 400,000 a turnout large enough to spell the

districts, it

difference between
victory and defeat for the Democratic
candidates that the party tended to
support.
The American Labor Party, after a running battle between

and right wings for many years,
lized itself in 1946 under the

left

appeared to have stabi-

chairmanship of Representa-

New
tive
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Vito Marcantonio ("Marc").

A

protege of Fiorello H.

La Guardia, Marcantonio had at various times been the conas of the
gressional nominee of both major parties, as well
American Labor Party. He had also earned for himself the
title of "Communist party-line follower" by such tactics as
his rapid shift from anti- to pro-interventionist with the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that Marc's leadership was based on a very solid
foundation of precinct- and ward-level organization that had
gained

and

him

GOP

the respect,

if

not the admiration, of

Tammany

workers in his district.

Having established his control over the state American
Labor Party machine, Marcantonio left little doubt about his
a new third party, or the number of votes
position on forcing
he expected to be able to deliver in New York. Following
Wallace's dismissal from the Cabinet, he was to tell a Transport Workers Union Convention:
marks the beginning of the disintegration
of the two American parties. I don't know which will go,
This

crisis

.

.

.

of a
is
present for the creation
and
of
the
new party resolving
peace
progress on
question
the side of the people.

but the historic condition

500,000 votes on Row C, the American Labor Party
line, will be the forerunner of leadership given to the great
movement for a new political party in America.2
In

much

the same vein, he repeated this call to a meeting

of the American Youth for Democracy, saying, "We must
build now for the establishment of a new political party in the

United States. We must move now and not when it is too
late." It should be noted, however, that not all of the
American Labor Party membership was in accord with these
sentiments. Jacob Potofsky of the
3

New York

Times, September 27, 1946.

Amalgamated Clothing
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Workers Union consistently opposed tying the party to a national Wallace third party and eventually walked out when
the decision was made to do so.

Nor had the Communist Party yet determined its new
course of action. During the war years, under the leadership
of Earl Browder, the Communist Party line had been one of
cooperation with the Democratic Party. It had attempted to
employ

infiltration

tactics,

nique, as evidenced at the

the

boring-from-within

tech-

1944 Convention.

Finding this tactic ineffective, the Communist Party, in
1945, suddenly changed its line and replaced Browder as
chairman with William Z. Foster. This emergency conven-

late

tion action to adopt the "popular front" approach
successfully
employed in Europe was reportedly in response to the inter-

national policy directives of Jacques Duclos from abroad.
Later evidence suggests that the Communists based their
strategy
party, in

upon the hope of developing a balance-of-power
which they would be able, by virtue of bloc cohesive-

ness, to exercise disproportionate power.
Many other ideas have been advanced

concerning their
reasons for supporting the Wallace
party. It was suggested,
the
particularly in labor circles, that they desired to
split

Democrats to insure the election of a
reactionary Republican President, thus making inevitable their
predicted "capitalistic
depression" and gaining them converts faster than any
device of their own making. Another
possibility was that the
Communists desired to force the Democrats so far to the
right that all Liberals would then flock to a new major party,
in which the Communists,
by being in on the ground floor,
would have an important role. Quite
realized
possibly they

that their endorsement of Wallace

for

him and

might

would be the

kiss of death

by tagging him with the Red label, they
eliminate the moderate reform element so

that,

effectively

feared by them in
European countries.
However, in view of their own

writings,

and

in view of

New
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American political experience, it seems more
reasonable to credit them with attempting to follow the observed pattern of New York State rather than with formulat-

their limited

ing any supercrafty strategic concepts.
As Robert Minor wrote later in the Daily Worker:

The

Communist party ... is to help
the
broadest
forge
people's anti-monopoly and peace coalition, in which the working class must play the leading
role .... It is to curb the war-mongers and
central task of the

and break once and for
tem of the monopolies.

all

pro-fascists
the reactionary
two-party sys-

a correct picture of the New
Party [is] as the beginof
a break up of "The Two-Party System."
One
ning
of the most dangerous mistakes we made [was] when we

...

.

.

.

accepted the anti-Marxist theoretical proposition made by
that the political struggles of the
country could be
out
within the two-party system. 3
fought

Browder

of the

reasoning behind the decision, the
to be one of the
strongest advocates of third-party activity for the 1948
campaign. They
may have wavered in choosing their candidate, but never in

Regardless

Communist Party continued

planning their strategy.

Having thus surveyed some of the

significant

developments

outside the Democratic Party and outside the Truman administration, let us now return to the Washington scene

where, for our account, the most dramatic single incident
since 1944 was being prepared. The central character was
again the same

Henry A. Wallace.
The year 1946 marked the development of two broad

areas

'Robert Minor, "Lessons of Past Third Parties," Daily Worker
(New York), August 2, 1948. Italics supplied.
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discontent with
of discontent with administration planning
the administration's shift from the policies of Franklin D.

Roosevelt. First, there were signs of increased questioning
of the altered policy toward the Soviet Union. Second, there

was growing unrest with its changed handling of labor affairs
at home. At first, it was the foreign policy opponents who
favored continued action within the Democratic Party, while
the disaffected labor segment began to demand third-party
action.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes,
former "Assistant President" and vice-presidential hopeful
of 1944, there was a perceptible change in foreign outlook;

Under newly appointed

the previous Roosevelt attitude that the United States and
the U.S.S.R. could live together in peace despite their different political and economic systems was gradually replaced
by a firm policy toward Russia.

groups in the nation viewed the worsening relabetween the former allies with misgiving, especially as
the United States initiated steps interpreted as by-passing
the United Nations. There were
pacifists, religious leaders,
scientists, and old-time midwestern isolationists in this criti-

Many

tions

cal category, as well as the
professional friends of Russia. All

were spurred on by the threatened devastation of a third
world war. Mankind, they agreed, possessed the means
of exterminating itatomic, chemical, and bacteriological
self

now

tion

by

build

up

in

any new

conflict.

Consequently, any course of ac-

the administration tending to increase tension
public acceptance of the inevitability of a future

and
war

with Russia was to be
deplored. These dissenters viewed the
as leading
inevitably to hostilities.
the other hand, the administration defended its course

Truman-Byrnes program

On

as the only road to
peace. The Russians, they said, could be
deterred from plans of world
conquest only if the American

government took a firm stand to contain communism.
Thus, a broad cleavage began to
over
develop

foreign

New
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policy, with an ever increasing tendency
to interpret all criticism of American
affairs

as

communism

17

on the part of some
conduct of foreign

or following the party

line.

Thus

Mississippi Representative John Rankin was one of the first
to trot out the Red label for Wallace, while a number of his

fellow southern Congressmen
conspicuously absented themselves from a Jackson Day dinner at which the
Secretary of

Commerce was

to speak. These incidents followed a series
of speeches and press releases early in 1946, in which Wallace decried the talk of war with the U.S.S.R. and
urged a

foreign policy that would build the United Nations as the stepping stone to an eventual world federation.

Notwithstanding his increasingly critical attitude toward
the Truman-Byrnes conduct of American foreign
policy,
there were, at this time, no signs of his splitting
completely
with the Democratic administration. In fact, on May 25,
1946, in a speech to the American Labor Party in

New York

Wallace stated his opposition to any third-party move.
As he phrased it, "Because of the election laws in any states,
City,

would give a reactionary victory by dividvotes
of
the
the progressives."
ing
The fact that such a rebuff was necessary indicates that
it

[a third party]

some new current

of sentiment favorable to the creation of

such an organization was already

stirring on the extreme
However, most foreign policy critics, including Senator
Claude Pepper of Florida, agreed with Wallace that the most
promising course was to work within the framework of the
Democratic Party.
There had been a shift to the right in the domestic policies
of the administration. Labor dissatisfaction was growing,
stoked most of all by President Truman's threat to draft the
striking railroad workers. The President's veto of the Case
bill, which would have restricted labor's right to strike, had
been interpreted by many as an attempt to stay on the
fence
a last-ditch effort to avert a complete withdrawal of

just

left.
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the labor segment of the Roosevelt coalition and the formation of a new third party. In addition, Truman was accused of
to high office large numbers of
responsibility for appointing
men representing Wall Street, big business, and the military

to replace the Roosevelt New Deal team.
Indications of the growing labor-liberal dissatisfaction

were
be found in the statement of the National Citizens Political Action Committee, at this time allied with the CIO Political Action Committee. While placing its hopes for 1946 in
the Democratic Party, the National Citizens Political Action
Committee came out with a stinging statement that the party
was in need of a rebirth. At about the same time David
Dubinsky, speaking from both a labor (International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union) and a third-party (liberal) viewto

point, called for a

union of labor forces behind a

The boring-from-within technique

of labor in

new

party.

major parties

was inadequate, he said, since it would never create the necessary machinery for an organized labor party strong enough to
run its own candidates for office on a national scale.
Thus by the summer of 1946 there were two main currents of unrest brewing under Harry S. Truman
one, which
was critical of foreign policy, led by the Secretary of Commerce, who urged action within the Democratic Party; the
second, critical of domestic policy, headed by labor leaders
thinking in terms of a new and powerful labor party. Although scattered geographically, there was already a longenduring undercurrent of third-party sentiment among groups
as diverse ideologically as midwestern isolationists and Union

Square Russophiles.

CHAPTER

2

"The Fight for Peace"
THE SMOLDERING

unrest finally erupted with Henry A. WalMadison Square Garden speech on September 12,
1946. This incident, more than any other single
happening,

lace's

served to crystallize third-party opinion, to widen the
split
between Conservatives and New Dealers within the Democratic Party, and to confuse the ranks of the Liberals themselves. What were the events that launched the Wallace
"fight
for peace"?

The Secretary of Commerce had personally presented to
President Truman the text of a speech on foreign policy to be
delivered at an anti-Republican,
anti-Dewey rally to be held in
New York City, actually reading the complete address to the

President so that there could be no possible misunderstanding
through misreading, or omission. After covering the speech,

sentence by sentence, in the course of a private White House
a
conference, the President suggested only one alteration
strengthening of one section. Following this change, and in

advance of the speech's delivery, according to James Reston:

Truman said in his press conference today that
he approved the speech [to be] delivered in New York
tonight by Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace and
that he considered it to be in line with the policies of Sec1
retary of State James F. Byrnes.
President

*New York

Times, September 13, 1946.
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Concerning the speech itself, next morning the New York
was hissed and
Times reported that "Secretary Wallace
heckled at several points in his speech when he talked of
the need for Russian understanding of American aims." Wal.

.

.

lace interpreted this unfavorable reception as being caused
by the fact that the speech "followed a straight American
it was "neither
pro-British or antinor anti-Russian." Although Wallace en-

line." In his estimation,
British, neither pro-

dorsed the stated administration objective of seeking peace
through United Nations cooperation, he presented three main
points of departure: (1) a warning against allowing American foreign policy to be dominated by the British; (2) a warn-

ing that "the tougher we get with Russia, the tougher they will
get with us"; and (3) a tacit acceptance of a Russian sphere
of influence in Eastern Europe, much as the Monroe Doctrine had implied an American
sphere of influence in Latin
America.

Since the speech attacked the firm policy of the
Secretary
a policy which Mr. Byrnes was even

of State toward Russia

then outlining to a Paris meeting of the United Nations

and since the President had so definitely approved the speech
was immediate speculation about a possible
shift in American
foreign policy. Strong repercussions were

in advance, there
felt in Paris,

although in this country the speech was interpreted as being primarily political and designed to secure the
campaign support of dissident leftwing elements in New
York elements of major importance in the coming state
election.

From

Paris, the American delegation protested immeand
diately
strenuously. Senator Tom Connally of Texas put
it this
way, according to the New York Times, "If the United
States is to speak with an influential voice, there must be no

division behind the lines." Senator
Vandenberg, the

Michigan

Republican, complained, "We can cooperate with [only] one
Secretary of State at a time."

As

a result of these protests, President Truman back-

"The Fight for Peace"

21

stating that he meant to approve only Wallace's
to
right
speak, not "the speech as constituting a statement
of the foreign policy of this country." He then announced,

tracked,

following rumors of Wallace's forced resignation, that the
Secretary of Commerce would remain in the Cabinet under an

agreement that no further foreign policy speeches would be
until after the Paris
meeting had adjourned.
But this solution was not sufficient to appease the Secretary
of State. Byrnes, maintaining a public silence, delivered to
the President in a private teletype conversation a Wallace-

made

goes-or-I-do ultimatum. Denied at the time, the report of
communication was later confirmed by Byrnes himself

this

book Speaking Frankly. It was Wallace's belief that
Senator Vandenberg, more than anyone else, influenced
Byrnes to take this stand. However, Bernard Baruch, the
elder statesman who had recently
participated in a public
exchange with Wallace over their respective plans for conin his

trol of

atomic energy, also reputedly played a considerable

part in putting

on

the pressure.

been forced, he reversed

The

hand having
announcement and, in

President's

his previous

a telephone conversation, requested the resignation of his Secretary of Commerce. Wallace complied, promising at the same
time to continue his "fight for peace, in which I am sure that
I have your full and continued support." Thus the last of
the original New Dealers left the Cabinet.
An overt realignment of political forces began to take place.
With Wallace's departure, many of the radical and leftist ele-

ments in the Democratic Party

those antagonized by the

President's foreign or domestic policies
intensified their battle against their titular head. The split that until now had been

more or less concealed came fully to the front and was
widened by publicity.
The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen., headed by A. F.
Whitney, still smarting from his earlier encounter with the
President over the threatened draft of striking railroaders,
issued an invitation to Wallace to address the union's forth-
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coming convention. At the same time Whitney condemned
Truman for having "removed every progressive appointed
that "Secretary Walby Franklin D. Roosevelt," and declared
lace is now available to lead a movement for sound and proSince Whitney and the Trainmen had
gressive government."
in 1924, this
supported the La Follette Progressive candidacy
seemed not just an idle threat but the promise of substantial
labor support for a third-party venture.

National Citizens Political Action Committee spokesmen
Frank Kingdon and C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin labeled President Truman's action hi dismissing Wallace a blow to peace,
charging the abandonment of F.D.R.'s foreign policy. Jack
Kroll, director of the powerful CIO Political Action Committee, was quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Wallace now has the opportunity to bring the real facts on this

American people." Grant Oakes, president
United Farm Equipment and Metal
Workers Union, alleging that Truman had chosen the path to
war, declared that "he leaves the people no alternative but to
crucial issue to the

of the leftwing

CIO

organize a third party of their own in 1948."
In New York, the American Labor Party went on record
as supporting Wallace's position, as did such diverse groups
as the

American Slav Congress, the Executive Committee

of the Methodist Federation of Social Service, and the
Council of American Business, Inc. Vito Marcantonio,

New
ALP

spokesman, termed the Wallace dismissal the beginning of disintegration of the Democratic Party and called for a new
party backed by labor.

The Communists,
and

taking advantage of the furor created
and dislike of the

realizing that their initial interpretation

speech must have been erroneous, reversed themselves abruptly to praise the Wallace stand. Their Daily Worker had
been highly critical the morning after its delivery. Their news
columns played down the Wallace role in the rally with no

mention of
itorially

his

comments

until the ninth

they complained:

paragraph, while ed-
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While expounding the peace

ideals of the late President

Henry Wallace defended the policies which are
undermining those ideals.
Roosevelt,

He

advanced views, however, which covered up Ameri-

can imperialism's aggressive

... he

role.

implied the U.S. was innocent in this struggle

between Britain and Soviet Russia. 2

But with the growing furor

that the speech

was kicking up

three days later, they tempered this statement in their early

Sunday

edition, saying:

Unfortunately, Mr. Wallace didn't do [the] job of showing
American foreign policy
although he did say a lot

up

.

.

.

things in his speech at

of

good
Thursday

Madison Square Garden

3

night.

Then, with President Truman's disavowal of the speech and
impending dismissal, this second opinion

hints of Wallace's

was

altered, in later editions for the

same

day, to

lukewarm

praise:

Henry Wallace's speech, last Thursday night despite all its
which
shortcomings, was a repetition of the deep worry
the present war trend of the adover
our
pervades
people
ministration.
.

.

.

the desires
Despite inconsistencies, Wallace expressed

of the people.
.

.

.

Wallace and Pepper should

fight for their policies.

4

the Communists had adopted Mr.
Finally, by Tuesday,
Wallace completely for their own, declaring:
3
3

Daily Worker, September 13, 1946.
Editorial,

Worker (New York), September

15, 1946, 1st edition.

Editorial, Worker, September 15, 1946, later edition; also
1946.
printed in Daily Worker, September 16,
*

re-
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... As

for ourselves

we

declare frankly that the

1948
main

Mr. Wallace's represented a criticism which we
have long been making in our own modest way. The
things
on which we disagree with Mr. Wallace, though
important,
are secondary to the main areas of agreement. 5

features of

While some Liberals, such as Senators Claude
Pepper and
Glen Taylor, supported the Wallace position,
many others
condemned the speech. The American Liberal
Party assailed
his

acceptance of spheres of influence as inimical to world
unity as well as to the United Nations and declared that he

had

"forfeited support of Liberals

working for one world, not

two."

were equally critical, Norman Thomas
Wallace
the
"heir to the
calling
policy of appeasement disfollowed
and by Roosevelt
astrously
by Chamberlain
and Truman at Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam." HowSocialist leaders

.

.

.

ever, they, too, agreed that the Wallace
episode marked "the
beginning of the crack-up of the Democratic party."
The Conservative wing of the Democratic
Party was far

from unhappy

Wallace's departure. Men like James
Farley,
erstwhile party
strategist, and Jesse Jones, Wallace's predecessor in the Commerce
wholeat

post,

supported Byrnes

The New York Times was able to
quote numerous
prominent members of both House and Senate,

heartedly.

unanimous in their approval of the President's
A broad range of political
^

tion of Wallace; the United

virtually
action.

thought expressed condemnaMine Workers commented ed-

on Wallace as an "impractical dreamer," while Harold J. Laski,
writing for the Nation, assailed not the content
of the
speech but its timing. In his opinion, it should have
been delivered some three months
earlier, prior to the Paris
talks, to have had any chance of
being effective.
itorially

'Editorial, Daily Worker,
also reprinted

September

Monday, September

17, 1946, later edition, p.

16, 1946.

1;
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With respect to new party currents, it can be said that the
Madison Square Garden speech stirred up a maelstrom of
conflict: Those who accepted the Wallace views on
foreign
policy were not agreed on the relative advisability of creating
a third party or of working within the Democratic Party.
Those who were strongly committed to minor-party endeavor,
such as the Socialists, the Liberals, and the American Labor
Party, found themselves split over the foreign policy issue.

The

first

tangible political event to

come out of this

turmoil

was the Conference of Progressives held at Chicago two weeks
later
September 28 and 29, 1946. This meeting, called by
the National Citizens Political Action Committee and the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions,

proposed to "discuss

common

political strategy for

independent progressive organizations." Specifically, it aimed
at a showdown over the Wallace ouster and at the formation

compact power bloc by those Democrats espousing the
Roosevelt New Deal traditions, which, they claimed; the Truman administration was gradually deserting.
of a

The conference

set as its goal the task of getting out a
in
vote
the 1946 congressional elections so that
50,000,000
liberalism might be reinforced in the coming Eightieth Con-

For the more distant future they set their sights on the
selection of Liberal delegates to the 1948 Democratic Nabroad segment of Liberal thought was
tional Convention.

gress.

A

Chicago assemblage. The speakers inrepresented
cluded Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury
under Roosevelt; former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes;
Florida Democratic Senator Claude A. Pepper; Phillip Murat this

ray and Jack Kroll of the CIO; James Patton of the Farmers
Union; Clark Foreman of the Southern Conference for Hu-

man

Welfare; and Walter White of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People.

Morgenthau attacked
falling

into the

"trap

talk of forming a third party and thus
set by reactionary elements of the
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while Walter White
Republican and Democratic parties,"
it would take six years to get a third
out
that
party
pointed
listed in all the states. Nonetheless, the

vehemence of

their

remarks in trying to quell the ardor for a third-party move
of considerable
strongly suggests the existence
action.
such
for
the
delegates
among
just

sentiment

was suggested by former Secretary of
it was
highly improbable that their
either
be
able
to
major party, he urged
capture
group would
to
cross party lines and
the self-proclaimed New Deal heirs
elect Liberals wherever they were to be found.
Unable to reach agreement on the broader aspects of political strategy, the meeting did unite on some of the minor
details
building from the ground up, ringing doorbells, and
working on the precinct level. Moreover, the conference arrived at an acceptable platform
twelve domestic planks
based on the 1944 Democratic stand and seven foreign policy
ones based on the views of Henry A. Wallace, as outlined in
a letter to President Truman in July of 1946. This accom-

Another

alternative

the Interior Ickes. Since

plished, the group adjourned, but not without Phillip Murray's attempt to read out of the movement "and out of

pro-

gressive

and

Communist persuasions."
Democratic campaign was getting under

liberal ranks those of

Meanwhile, the

way. Representative John J. Sparkman announced that WalPepper had been dropped from the congressional

lace aftd

Speakers Committee as a result of their foreign policy views.
After a six-week quasi-retirement from the political scene,

however, Wallace was summoned by James Roosevelt, son of
the late President and chairman of the California Democratic
State Committee, to deliver a series of
speeches in behalf of
Liberal West Coast candidates whose
congressional seats were
in danger. Wallace followed this California
trip with a brief

ing in

New York,

He

wound up the campaign speakthe
despite
disapproval of the city machine.

tour of the Middle West.
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Here, while urging the election of Democratic candidates
James Mead and Herbert Lehman in the 1946 New York
State races, he joined Senator Pepper in issuing a call for a
candidate for President in 1948.
progressive
This last-minute visit seemed to many a clear-cut threat

Democrats of leftwing withdrawal and organization of
a third party, if necessary, for the 1948 campaign. But, while
National Citizens Political Action Committee leaders Frank
Kingdon and C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin declared that
to the

Unless the national administration changes

its

course, the

bonds of allegiance and form
progressives
a new third party in the next two years,
will sever their

Wallace declined to commit himself
I don't

mean

form a

third party, but I

that the

day

definitely, saying:

after tomorrow we are going to
do say that new currents will be

6

forming.

Immediately following the Republican landslide in the 1946
elections, in which candidates supported by the CIO Political
Action Committee won in only 73 of 318 races, the Continuations Committee of the Conference of Progressives met
to discuss strategy in view of the disaster at the polls. The
decision was reached to continue work within the frame of the

major

parties.

Former Secretary

of the Treasury Morgenthau
"had not been discussed."
was a matter of only a few weeks

told the press that a third party

Despite this disavowal, it
before the leftwing elements of the conference were again
on December 30, 1946 this time to organize the

meeting

Even though the

Progressive Citizens of America.
that
6

its

immediate object was

New York

Times,

November

to

5,

make

1946.

PCA stated

the Democratic Party
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"out and out progressive," others felt that this was the first
serious step toward creating the independent nucleus of a
third party. The new group adopted the Wallace foreign policy

plank of "peace, prosperity and freedom in one world" and
called for widespread domestic reforms.
Thus, by the close of 1946, new currents

were

to lead
eventually to a

new

party.

were running that

The Madison Square

Garden speech had provided the

catalytic agent for translating discontent into political action. It now seemed possible

that the divided forces of the Liberals might unite
on both
to carry out the Wallace "fight for
policy and strategy

peace."

Inasmuch as the Progressive Citizens of America had been
formed with the Political Action Committee of the CIO as
one of its main advocates, there was reason to believe that its
political endeavors would receive considerable labor support.
However, events soon took place that were to eliminate this
possibility. First, a group of Liberals and New Dealers, including Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, banded together to reorganize the existing but feeble Union for Democratic Action
into a stronger non-Communist left which would
oppose the
Progressive Citizens of America. They said that their new
group, Americans for Democratic Action, would further
Liberal aims through the medium of the Democratic
Party.
It would bar from
the Communists and fellow

membership

claimed, dominated the PCA. Significantly,
Walter Reuther, President of the CIO United Auto
Workers,
was among the founders of the Americans for Democratic
travelers

who,

it

Action.

A
with

rift

in the ranks of the

CIO

CIO

itself

now seemed imminent

President Phillip
Murray listed as vice president of
the Progressive Citizens of America, and the leader of one of
his strongest unions enrolled in the Americans for
Democratic
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It
may well have been this threat of internecine strife
CIO that led Murray to withdraw his name from the
PCA and at the same time urge the CIO to disassociate itself
from both PCA and ADA. In this manner, a split
officially

Action.
in the

within the union was averted, but the Progressive movement
was effectively deprived of the strong organized labor support
without which any attempt to establish a third party was fore-

doomed

to failure.

Meanwhile, the Progressive Citizens of America continued
to support the Wallace foreign policy, sponsoring a series of
speeches hi which the former Secretary of Commerce assailed
the Truman doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey as inviting
a fatal arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
and dividing the world into two armed camps. At the same
time, Vito

Marcantonio of the

New York American Labor

Party continued to call for the formation of a new third party.
Whereas a year before certain members of the Democratic
Party had walked out on him, at the annual Jackson Day
Democratic festivities, this time it was Wallace who absented
himself.

In the midst of the American debate on foreign policy, the
former Vice President now embarked on a tour of Western

European democracies. In a series of speeches delivered in
England, Sweden, and France during April, 1947, he was
highly critical of administration policy, accusing it of undercutting the U.N., which he termed the world's "best, perhaps

hope for peace."
These speeches, warmly received in some circles abroad,
became the immediate target of attack at home. Representative John Rankin, chairman of the House Committee on unAmerican Activities, urged that the Logan Act of 1799 be
invoked to prosecute the former Vice President for "dealing
only,

with foreign nations to defeat American measures." In this

argument, Rankin received the warm support of many southern Congressmen. Similarly, the Veterans of Foreign Wars
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1948

urged that Wallace's passport be revoked. On the other hand,
the Americans for Democratic Action contented itself with
opposing the Wallace views but not his right to state them.

With the

upon the Trurumors
administration, third-party
began to fly in
disclaimed
earnest. Wallace, however,
any ambitions for
himself, suggesting that Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, a
firm supporter of the United Nations, would be the ideal
choice to head such a movement. Senator Pepper immediately tossed the ball back to Wallace, stating that he would
"remain in the Democratic party as long as it is truly liberal."
Upon his return from the controversial European tour,
Wallace embarked, under sponsorship of the Progressive Citizens of America, on another American tour continuing
to urge economic aid to
Europe (still some weeks prior to the
enunciation of the Marshall plan 7 ) and to
oppose what he
termed "war preparations." In his own words, the purpose
of the tour was to "liberalize the Democratic
party." Stating that he did not know whether he would back Truman in
1948, he continued to urge that the President meet with
Premier Stalin to settle American-Russian differences.
increasing strength of his attacks

man

the

first of June, this
stumping tour of the country was
beginning to have noticeable effects. Cabell Phillips remarked
in the New York Times:

By

As Henry Wallace stumps

the country in
advocacy of his

program for altering the course of American foreign
policy, he is leaving in his wake a recrudescence of that
familiar form of
political rebellion that seeks its ends
8
through the formation of a third party.
Wallace's speech to the French Chamber of
Deputies in which
he proposed a fifty-billion-dollar world reconstruction
program was
delivered April 23, 1947. Under
Secretary of State Acheson's speech
at Cleveland,
Mississippithe forerunner of the Marshall plan was
7

delivered
*

New

May

8, 1947.

York Times, June

1,

1947.
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same time there were

serious obstacles in the

the lack of
any cohesive organizational
the
control,
difficulty of securing a place on the state bal-

party

greater than in the days of

La

Follette,

and the

belief that the "balance of

power technique [would] yield
more practical results in the next few years at least." Moreover, while the movement was acquiring perhaps a few supit was
making many enemies.
porters,

The

persistence of the Wallace attacks on foreign policy
fire of those who had
opposed his Madi-

continued to draw the

son Square Garden speech. In New York David
Dubinsky
again attacked the Wallace position, while former Under
Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr., urged Wallace to leave
the "Appeasement Party," as he termed the
Progressive Citizens of America. Socialists Norman Thomas and Louis Wald-

man

continued their barrage, as did the old Democratic
Party

war horse Jim Farley.
A suggestion by Wallace that

"liberal Republicans"
might
be willing to support a new alignment drew a
sharp rebuff
from Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon), who at this time still
maintained that "the only hope for sane and sound
progres-

sive politics is

through liberalizing the Republican party."

The only new

accretion to the strength of the

movement

during the first months of 1947 came with announcement
that Dr. Francis Townsend and his
old-age pension group
would support a third party because they had "lost faith in
the sincerity of both of the old
parties." Wallace continued
to urge that organized labor, small businessmen, and farmers

cooperate within the Democratic Party to end the "feudal
leadership" of the Southern Democrats, while he parried all
suggestions that a third party was in the making. His, he insisted, was a struggle to make possible the survival of the

Democratic Party by persuading
and disarmament.

But

at the

same time

it

to adopt a
policy of peace

his followers in the

Far West were
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posing a

A

much

congreater threat to party harmony.
segment of the California Liberal wing of the
Democratic Party, led by Robert W. Kenny, former Attorney
General and candidate for Governor, met at Fresno on July
siderable

move to elect Wallace-pledged dele1948 National Convention. If this move failed,

19, 1947, to organize a

gates to the

they said, they planned to launch a third party with the former
Vice President at its head.

And when the Southern Democratic bloc in Congress combined with the Republicans to pass the Taft-Hartley Bill in
June, it again seemed possible that large groups of organized
labor might bolt their Democratic traces. The General Executive Board of the International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union called for action leading to the ultimate organization

of a third party. Their doubts concerning the
advisability of
such a move had seemingly been dispelled by the
possibility

of President Truman's
signing the measure, or of its becomlaw
over
his
veto.
ing
They urged that it was time for the

AFL

to

abandon

its

traditional

nonpartisan role in favor of

positive action.

The

seriousness of this latter threat, however, is rather to
light of their actions once the measure

be doubted in the

passed over the Truman veto. As with the earlier Case antistrike bill, it seems
possible that much of the force was
directed at pushing a decision
upon a wavering President.
While it is difficult to determine the amount of influence that
such declarations had in
about the
there is
bringing

veto,

doubt that the Truman message, couched in
strong
terms, proved one of the greatest blows to the
possibility of a
new and strong third-party
It turned the labor
less

alignment.

tide that

had been receding from the Democrats and

inter-

mittently threatening independent-party action. Despite the
fact that a large number of Democrats
joined with the Republicans to override the President, his waning prestige with
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labor and with Liberal groups was considerably restored

by

his action.

One immediate

effect was that A. F.
Whitney, who just a
had
been
to
raise a "millionthreatening
year previously
dollar slush fund" to defeat Truman, now in July, 1947, advised his Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen that the Taft-

Hartley veto "vindicated [Truman] in the eyes of Labor." He
went further to state that a third party would be "suicidal"
as it would merely serve to
help
This
declaration
was a damaging blow, since
the Republicans.
for three years, ever since the 1944 Convention fight, Whit-

and "out of the question,"

ney's

Trainmen had been firm supporters of Wallace, and

their organized support, to say nothing of their financial assistance,

would have been

significant in

any attempt to create

a third party.

At

the

same time

it

was observed

that while

many

Liberals

thought that a "third party will ultimately be necessary," they
added that "it must have a grass roots origin, not now considered possible," according to Clayton Knowles in the New

York Times. Coupled with the backing off by labor leaders,
came a sudden waning of strength in California, with
the announcement that James Roosevelt, who had earlier
been highly critical of the Truman foreign policy, was now
there

back in the Democratic

fold.

in September, Wallace announced that it was his
"intention to work within the Democratic party realm" and

When,

President

Truman rebuked Gael

Sullivan,

acting national

chairman of the Democrats, for singlehandedly reading Wallace and Pepper out of the party, it seemed that threats of a
third party had nearly vanished.
Yet, at the same time that Wallace

was expressing Ms inDemocratic
the
within
Party, he was also
working
in
a
for
door
the
change
plans "if the Demoopen
keeping
.
cratic party is a war party
[and] continues to attack
tent of

.

.
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Furthermore, he went on to say, "If both
for
stand
high prices and depression, then the people
parties
must have a new party of liberty and peace. The people must
civil liberties."

have a choice." And while most of the labor support for a
was withering away, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, a leftwing CIO affiliate
headed by Harry Bridges, came out in open support of a third
party to be headed by Wallace. This was more than counterbalanced by the final decision of the CIO Political Action
Committee, as announced by Jack Kroll on October 16, that
this group would not lead in the formation of any new
party

third party

organization.

Thus

it

can be seen that by the

fall

of

1947 most of the

third-party agitation stemming from the domestic labor policies of the first Truman administration was beginning to

The

subside.

sole

main current

still

running strongly in

favor of a third party was that impelled by groups in
opposition to its foreign
policy. During this period, with many
of his supporters wavering and returning to the Democratic
ranks, Wallace embarked upon a three-week visit to Palestine
to survey at first hand the situation in the infant state of

Nor was

Israel.

this trip

devoid of political significance in

view of the large numbers of Jewish voters
be attracted to the Wallace banners.

By

who might thereby

the time he returned, the situation in California had

become
velt

increasingly critical. The withdrawal of the Roosesupport and the desire of many Liberals to work

only

within the Democratic Party left the
newly formed Independent Progressive Party in the hands of
Hugh Bryson, president
of the Marine Cooks and Stewards (CIO)
some
,

seventy

supported by

CIO locals and a few AFL affiliates. The Independent

Progressive Party had the support of the Townsend organization, but the Southern California chapters of the
Progressive
Citizens of America had
adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Owing

to stringent California
requirements

on nominat-
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9

ing petitions, a total of 275,970 signatures would be required
by March 18, 1948 only three months away if the party
were to have a place on the November ballot. While it was
still hoped that
Wallace-pledged delegates to the Democratic
Convention could be elected, there was an immediate neces-

to establish contingent

machinery should that plan fail.
with the reluctance of Wallace to announce his candidacy, the task of obtaining the required signatures seemed
hopeless. Word was received from the Coast that unless a
sity

And

positive commitment was forthcoming
lace drive would have to be

Spurred on by this

by January

1,

the

completely abandoned.
deadline, the National Executive

Wal-

Com-

mittee of the Progressive Citizens of America announced on
December 17 that it had decided to support Wallace for the
Presidency and urged the immediate formation of third-party
machinery to place the name of its candidates on the ballots
of

all

the states. This decision was arrived at
only at the

cost of a complete break within the
Progressive Citizens of
America leadership. According to Wallace, during 1947 co-

Frank Kingdon had "put more pressure on" him than
anyone else to form a third party. But now Kingdon, his eye
on the Democratic senatorial nomination in New Jersey, announced his resignation, stating that while he supported the
Wallace foreign policy, and would have worked for the Democratic nomination for Wallace, he was
opposed to the at-

leader

tempt to organize a third party.
Kingdon' s resignation was followed by that of Hartley
as national vice-chairman.

Crum

Of

the original substantial leaderin
the
Citizens
of America, only a shadow
Progressive
ship
now remained. The potential third-party ranks were further

diminished by the
*

announcement that the Amalgamated

According to California law, 10 per cent of the number of votes
in the last gubernatorial election must be secured as
signatures to any
nominating petition prior to both the state primaries and the na
tional conventions.
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Clothing Workers was ready to withdraw from the American
Labor Party if, as anticipated, that party should become the
vehicle for a Wallace candidacy in New York State.

Wallace himself remained silent while all these maneuvers
were taking place during mid-December, but his acceptance
of sponsorship by the Progressive Citizens of America for an
upstate

New York

speaking tour indicated probable recepnow tendered him. Hence, his declara-

to the formal bid
tivity
tion of candidacy on
prise.

put

As

J.

December 29 came as no great surHoward McGrath, Democratic national chairman,

this

it,

announcement merely served to "clear the

at-

mosphere."
In a radio address to the American people, Wallace explained the reasons for his decision:

Peace and abundance mean so much to me that I have
.... "If the Democratic party continues to be a
party of war and depression, I will see to it that the people have a chance to vote for peace and prosperity."
said

When the old parties rot, the people have a right to be
heard through a new party .... The people must again
have an opportunity to speak out with their votes in
1948 ....

A

new party must stand for a positive peace program
of abundance and security, not
scarcity and war ....

... I have fought and shall continue to fight programs
which give guns to people when
they want plows ....
Those whom we buy politically with our food will soon
desert us.

They will pay us in the base coin of temporary
and
then turn to hate us because our
gratitude
policies are

destroying their freedom.
.
are acting in the same
way as France and
land after the last war and the end result will be the
.

.

We

Engsame

confusion, digression and war.
It just doesn't

need to happen. The cost of
organizing for
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peace, prosperity and progress
ganizing for war ....

Thousands of people
asked
the

me

march

all

is

infinitely less

over the United States have

to engage in this great fight.

The people

are

on

....

By God's grace, the people's peace
10
tury of the common man.
It

than or-

will

usher in the cen-

should be noted, however, that in the same speech Walopen to a possible reconciliation with Demo-

lace left the door

cratic leaders prior to the election, provided that they would
drop their proposal for universal military training and get

rid of

what he

called the "Wall Street-Military appointees"
administration toward a war with

whom he saw as leading the
Soviet Russia.

With this final definite announcement, the new currents
had been swirling about for so many months now entered
straighter, narrower, and more discernible channels. Of the
five main groups that had composed Wallace's chief support
the old line New Dealers, the CIO
at the 1944 Convention
that

Action Committee, labor leaders, the Negro groups,
the sprinkling of professional politicians, and the Communist
now remained
the Communists
fringe
only one group
Political

and firmly behind the third-party candidacy. Wallace
had declared his opposition to any and all forms of Redof any and
baiting and his willingness to accept the support

intact

with the
every group working in the interests of peace,
would
avoid
the
Communist
that
passing
Party
hope
any resolutions of support for him. The Communists pro-

wistful

ceeded at once to offer him their firm support.
The old line New Dealers split over the Wallace move, with
such as Rexford Tugwell and Elmer Benson
only a few
the
new-party decision. The balance Harold
supporting
10

Text of Wallace's Address,

ber 30, 1947.

New York

Herald Tribune, Decem-
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Leon Henderson, Wilson Wyatt, Chester Bowles, and
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt had returned through the Americans for Democratic Action into the Democratic fold. Their
belief that only through an immediate victory in the 1948
election could the cause of liberalism be advanced was soon
Ickes,

to be exhibited by their myopic espousal of the presidential
nomination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower a man whose

unknown, and the known few
1948 he seemed the only nominee with enough strength to carry a lagging Democratic

political views

conservative

were

virtually

since in early

Party to victory.
Labor, too, was now divided; only a few leftwing CIO
national unions
the United Electrical Workers and the International Longshoremen's and

Warehousemen's Union
were openly supporting Wallace, although it appeared that
some locals as well as many of the rank and file might cling
to his banner. The great
power of the CIO, with its Political
Action Committee, was gone from the camps of the third
party. The Railway Brotherhoods were gone. In re-electing
Walter Reuther as its head the United Auto Workers had
evidenced that it too was in the camp of the Americans for
Democratic Action rather than that of the Progressive Citizens of America.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, through Secretary Walter White, seemed similarly in the ADA lineup, although here again there were
indications that

many individuals would continue to support
Wallace. Finally, the professional
politicians, quick to sense
the trend, stayed
away from the Wallace camp in large numThe task of organizing the new
party would be left almost completely in the hands of the amateurs,
except in
New York where the American Labor Party was well es-

bers.

tablished.

Of

the groups outside the Democratic
Party,

only the

American Labor Party and the Communist
Party could be
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counted upon for complete support. The American Labor
been greatly weakened by the withdrawal of its
Party had
constituent group
greatest single

the

Amalgamated Cloth-

ing Workers. Communist Party support was of dubious value
at best. Indeed, Wallace estimated later that its 100,000 votes

would probably

him 3,000,000 non-Communist
Progressive Party had expired in Wisconsin,
supporters.
and the remaining independent threads sustained by the
Progressive magazine would soon endorse the Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas. It should be noted that at this time,
however, there was still some substantial hope of capturing
the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota.
(or less)

cost

The

Elsewhere in the agricultural areas, farm support for the
onetime Secretary of Agriculture was almost completely lackthe National Fanners Union, through President
ing. Even
James Patton, announced that it would take no stand on his
candidacy, although they realized that "undoubtedly many
fanners of the
[would] support Henry Wallace for

NFU

President,"

Communist Daily Worker and "Jess"
Gitt's York, Pennsylvania, Gazette and Daily promised supwas one of those who had earlier placed
port. Publisher Gitt
"If you don't run, some one else
pressure on Wallace, saying,
will." Such liberal publications as the Nation and New ReAs
public took an exceedingly dim view of the proceedings.

Of the

press, only the

the Nation editorialized:

a gulf between the two [major] parties taking
them by and large, both in intention and in program

There

is still

.

[and]

by 1952

the fate of the

American economy may

.

.

well

have been sealed and the question of war or peace decided.
Never before has a serious progressive group in this couna third party without major
try even thought of launching
from the trade unions ... the only result can be
support

to confuse

enough Progressives

to assure a Republican vie-

40
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tory without establishing a mass base for a future third
11
party movement.

Small wonder, then, that

political observers

shrugged

their

Henry A. Wallace, former
United States, announced that he had

shoulders and shook their heads as

Vice President of the
"assembled a Gideon's Army, small in number, powerful in
conviction, ready for action" and that he would "run as an
independent candidate for President of the United States in
1948." Small wonder that the whole scheme of the WallaceProgressive Citizens of America group was dubbed "quixotic
politics."

* Nation, 165
(December

27, 1947), 693.

CHAPTER

3

The Wallace-Taylor Team

WITH A new

Henry A. Wallace's deAmerican people might "have a choice," the immediate problem became
that of selecting his running mate. The Progressive forces
found themselves severely limited in the ranks from which to
choose in the numbers of the politically prominent willing
to stake their futures on the same principle
the all-important
party thus launched by

cision to run for the Presidency so that the

Wallace principle of opposing the bipartisan foreign policy
endorsed by the Republican opposition as well as by the

Truman

administration.

Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, prominent New Dealer
and firm supporter of the Roosevelt foreign policy throughout both prewar and World War II periods, had already
indicated his decision not to bolt. Although a severe critic
of the Truman doctrine of military aid to Greece and Turkey

and the sponsor of an unsuccessful Senate amendment for
routing economic aid to Europe through the United Nations,
Senator Pepper had finally voted for passage of the administration's Marshall plan. He now promised to continue to
press for policy modifications from within the ranks of the
Democratic Party.
Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell, former Wallace aide in
the Department of Agriculture and more recently Governor
41
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of Puerto Rico, was a possible nominee. But although Professor Tugwell was later to serve on the party's Platform Committee, he apparently received
the Wallace running mate.

little

serious consideration as

was O. John Rogge, an avowed candidate for
A lawyer who had served as Assistant Atof
United
the
States, Rogge was not well known
torney
outside the New York-Washington area. Moreover, like Wallace, he was a resident of New York State, thus posing the
theoretical if unlikely constitutional problem of electors from
a single state being unable to vote for two candidates from

Then

there

the nomination.

that state in a presidential election. Should the Progressives
carry the Empire State, their electors would be unable to

vote for their vice-presidential candidate.
\^ From the very beginning, however, the leading contender
for the second position was Democratic Senator Glen EL

Taylor of Idaho. Elected without strong state organizational

A

consistent supsupport, Taylor felt free of party obligation.
of
President
Roosevelt's
both
porter
foreign and
policies
domestic the Senator had indicated during 1947 his grow-

ing unrest with President Truman's

In late 1947 Taylor had

.

blatant publicity stunt

back

shifts.

made

the front pages with a
an attempted coast-to-coast horse-

According to the Senator, he had undertaken this
jaunt with a dual purpose in mind: publicizing what he
termed the "drift towards war" with the Soviet Union and
ride.

at the

same time attempting

this vital matter.

to discover
public opinion on
Taylor sensed that by employing this device

he was making

it
impossible for even the most hostile newspapers to ignore his tour completely. This ambitious plan,
however, had been cut short by a special session of Congress

November.

Back in the Capital, Senator Taylor had been
in close contact with both Senator
Pepper and Wallace. The
three were of a like mind about the need for
altering the ad-

in

The Wallace-Taylor Team
ministration foreign policy, lest

43
it

lead the nation into

World

WarHL
Publicly sympathetic to the Wallace views, Senator Taylor

had been prominent in much of the

third-party speculation that preceded the ultimate decision. Shortly thereafter
he was informally offered the
Considerable self-

candidacy.
searching ensued. The Senator's administrative assistant, J.
Albert Keefer, was dispatched on a sounding expedition to

Idaho.

He

that Taylor

cepted the

returned with the advice not to run, suggesting

would be committing
offer. Still,

political suicide if he aca principle in which Taylor believed

was at stake.
For more than a month the Senator stayed on the

fence.

Finally, however, at the behest of friends, advisers, and
family, he decided to decline the offer. In his own words:
I

wrote out a

letter of refusal,

put

it

in

my

pocket and

went down

to the office next morning,
intending to release
it to the
desk, the first thing
press. But when I reached
I saw in the morning paper was that President Truman had

my

good man another leading New Dealer
Jim Landis, from the Administration. When I saw that,
and started to thinV of all the other recent Truman dismissals and
appointments, I got so disgusted I changed my
tore
mind,
up the letter I had written, and decided to run

fired another

with Henry Wallace. 1
Plans were laid for a radio declaration of formal can-

didacy some weeks
1

On

later.

Referring to a 1940 speech of

the eve of the expiration of Mr. Landis* term of

Truman had announced

office, Presi-

would not reappoint him. Although the President failed to announce any reasons for his action,
some circles felt that he had been influencd by air-line operators who
had reportedly been angered by Mr. Landis "overstrict" enforcement
of safety rules. See New York Times, January 1, 3, 4, 1948.
dent

that he

1
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Roosevelt's warning the Democratic Party against political
suicide if it should "nominate conservative candidates
.

on a straddlebug platform," Senator Taylor said

.

.

in his ac-

ceptance speech:
I

am

not leaving the Democratic party, it left me.
no more than Roosevelt, could remain in the party

I,

which has betrayed the
I

am

going to cast

brave and gallant
I received a

principles in

my

lot

which

I believe

....

with Henry Wallace in his

fight for peace.

mandate from the people of Idaho to carry

out the policies of President Roosevelt in the Senate. I

pledged myself to support a world organization to pro-

mote peace. Our foreign policy of supporting reaction all
over the world on a unilateral basis has weakened and
undermined and almost destroyed the United Nations. I
would be untrue to the people who elected me if I took
any action other than the one I have chosen.
I believe the American
people will rise to the heights of
faith and sacrifice demanded at this most
demanding

moment

of

all

time

.... We

dare not falter because a

few steps farther down the road we are presently traveling
lurks oblivion. Not just another war
atomic and bac2
teriological oblivion.

Thus was formed the team to spearhead the "fight for
peace" the team of Henry A. Wallace and Glen H. Taylor.
Behind one a long career of governmental service, behind
the other a background as a
family fortune augmented by

cowboy

minstrel; behind

one a

personal discoveries in scientific
agriculture, behind the other a history of early want and
one-night stands; this was a team to behold, even on the
2

Text of Senator Taylor's Address,

was a

short-lived, liberal-viewed

lished in

New York

City from

PM, February

24, 1948.

daily newspaper which
June, 1940 to June, 1948.)

(PM

was pub-
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a team whose members warrant more

American scene

careful scrutiny than that afforded

them by the contemporary

press.

I believe in

God.

I believe in progressive capitalism.

Thus Henry A. Wallace prefaced

his

remarks on the occa-

sion of his "only meeting with known Communists" in the
course of the campaign. Completely comprehended, they portray graphically this man who had been Secretary of Agriculture, thirty-fourth

Vice President of the United

States,

and

Secretary of Commerce and was now the presidential candidate of a new party of foreign policy dissent.

So frequently stereotyped as paradoxical by press and
quasi-biographers alike, Wallace himself has provided the
most important clue to his actions the primacy of his emphasis upon religion, upon spiritual and moral values.
An incident which happened while Wallace was Secretary
of Agriculture is illustrative of both his rectitude and the difficulty of many in understanding one who practices daily his
a departmental conference, the Secretary
the
had terminated
arguments of a special interest pleader
him
that
"unless we learn to treat each other
by informing
religious tenets. In

fairly, this

country

is

going to smash." Paul Porter, a Wallace
a colleague and remarked in tones

aide at the time, turned to

of both

amazement and

a Christian."

Accepting

revelation, "Don't

it

beat hell? He's

3

this

Christianity, the

one basic

myth

the fact of thoroughgoing
surrounding Wallace tends to vanish,
fact

the paradox to clear. Henry A. Wallace's political philosophy
was rooted firmly in the precepts of the Sermon on the
3

I

As

related

Know,"

New

by Russell Lord, "MacDonald's Wallace and the One
Republic, 118 (March 1, 1948).
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the fundamental dignity of the individual and the inherent value of human life. Equally basic in Wallace's con-

Mount

was the corollary that all possible should be done to
improve the individual's brief stay on earth. As he phrased
cepts

this belief:

We

must

invent, build

and put to work new

social

ma-

.
.
that will carry out the Sermon on the
as well as the present social machinery carries
out and intensifies the law of the jungle. 4

chinery

.

Mount

What were

the Wallace policies stemming from this belief?
peace was an absolute essential. Without lasting peace,

First,

an overwhelming percentage of the world's raw materials, its
power, and its precious time would go into weapons of
destruction. As Wallace put it, "A quart of milk is cheaper
than a quart of blood." With lasting peace, the world could
turn to constructive activities, creating a better place in which
to live and assuring everyone
even the most common of
men of an adequate share in the fruits of their own labor.

man

"Peace," Wallace

said,

"must mean a better standard of

living for the common man not merely in the U.S. and England but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin America

not merely in the United Nations, but also in
Italy

Germany and

and Japan."

Second, Wallace persistently exhibited a concern for the
the man of whatever race, whatever religion,

common man

who has found

himself, through

no

to achieve all the goals of a fuller

fault of his
life.

own, unable

As Wallace

defined

him:

.

who
*

.

is

.

The common man
as

good

as

Henry A. Wallace,
cock, 1934), p. 11.

anybody

New

is

the forgotten man the man
but who never had a break

else

Frontiers

(New York: Reynal &

Hitch-
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because of being born in the wrong locality and having
education, poor food and no money landless, job-

little

less
is

and working for $30 a year

....

in the Orient

This

man whom

Jesus put at the very heart of his
gospel
blessed are the meek and poor in spirit. Now as Jesus

the

and the prophet Amos foresaw so long ago, those who have
5
been rejected are striving to come into their
[own].
.

.

.

These barriers, these road blocks, Wallace felt, must be
removed or at least smoothed out, with the welfare state providing a means to such an end, as could a "progressive capitalism."

.

.

.

Ever since 1929 the western world has been

totally

employment except by war or
for
Old
fashioned capitalism has been
war.
getting ready
state
the
welfare
for the simple reason that
replaced by
too
timid
was
to
flow in sufficient volume.
private capital
The welfare state is not socialism .... But it does in-

unable to bring about

full

volve planning to serve human beings both in the U.S.
and in the world as a whole. 6

Thus to reconcile the Wallace combination of vision and
realism

a

man

independently wealthy through his

own

ef-

and discoveries in agricultural experimentation and yet
a man advocating "a quart of milk for every Hottentot" it

forts

is

necessary to look only into underlying religious concepts
his
the practice of long-lived though seldom

which were
used ethical

principles.

In addition to these moral feelings expressed so frequently
5

From speech "Where I Stand," delivered at Brooklyn Jewish
Center, January 2, 1951 (supplied by Mr. Wallace).
6
From speech "A Century of Blood or Milk," delivered by Mr.
Wallace at the Community Forum, New York, N.Y., November 12,
1950. (Mimeographed.)
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with a complete lack of self-consciousness, there were other
traits stemming in part from Waltraits to be observed
lace's early

environment in Iowa, traits to be kept in mind if
is to be more
clearly understood.

the former Vice President

Henry A. Wallace was

raised in a typical midwestern

God-fearing, xenophobic, and not
too tolerant of dissent. This upbringing affected his social
outlook vitally, bringing this "Man of Good Will" perilously

Protestant environment

close to the brink of intolerance. Wallace stated bluntly his
view that Americans "don't want communism, Catholicism,
capitalism or colonialism to conduct themselves in ways
which provoke war." At the same time he noted that "those

who

profess the old-fashioned, common sense American religion ... are increasingly suspicious of the efforts of the

four C's to dominate the world."

7

Another facet of this outremark that the common
man "has been marching fast ever since America was discovered and the Protestants insisted on going to God direct

look

may be found

in Wallace's

instead of through priestly intermediaries."
This same background emerges in the overtones of isolation

found in many of Wallace's comments on the British. The
Anglophobia common to much of the Middle West had its
impact, even though Wallace channeled his public protests
primarily against "British imperialism."
Along with Protestantism and anti-imperialism, the ties to
the land of Wallace's Iowa days instilled in him an innate
conservatism quite contrary to the radicalism
regularly attributed to him. Along with certain
religious and interna-

Henry A. Wallace also acquired an abhorrence of both waste and radical
change. The way to cure
an ill, to correct an evil, was not by
destroying and building
anew, but rather by improving the old and tested. Thus

tional attitudes,

capi-

talism
7

was not

to

be discarded completely, with

all its

proven

Address to the Community Church of New York,
reported in the
Baltimore Evening Sun, December 5, 1949.
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to be made "prothe
common
man.
effectively
gressive"
An understanding of some of the seemingly contradictory
Wallace policies of New Deal days the "plowing under of

be improved upon

merit, but rather to

to serve

the

little

more

is aided
by a reference to those same traits
and conservatism. Wallace's writings demonstrate

pigs"

of frugality

unchanging principles despite such apparent inconsistencies
of policy. To him the slaughter program was essentially an
emergency measure necessitated by earlier failures to solve

farm problems.

... To have

to destroy a growing crop is a shocking

commentary on our civilization. I could tolerate it only as
a cleaning up of the wreckage from the old days of unbalanced production.

The paradox

of

want

in the midst of plenty

was con-

we proceeded with schemes like the
emergency hog slaughter .... To many of us the only
thing that made the hog slaughter acceptable was the
stantly in our minds as

realization that the

meat and lard salvaged would go to

the unemployed. 8

Nor were these temporary expedients

ever accepted as long-

range policies. For Wallace's earlier experiments with hybrid
corn and his later ones with poultry were both directed toward
the goal of increasing low-cost production for the hungry and
impoverished areas of the globe but not at the cost of the

American farmer's living standards.
Yet despite his conservatism, Wallace understood the
a willingpreservation of the old order to be dependent upon
to

fit

make

concessions, to adjust time-honored patterns
current needs. He foresaw that a continued stubborn re-

ness to

change can lead to but one result the use of
violence either to defend or overthrow the system. As Wallace noted on one occasion:
sistance to

8

Wallace,

New

Frontiers, pp. 174-75, 183.
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is not that
they are
minded
that
stiff
are
so
that
but
men,
they do not
they
to a changing world. Therefore they rely
actions
their
adapt

The

trouble with most reactionaries

evil

on force

9
.

.

.

.

his basic belief in capitalism as a system potentially
offering much more to the common man both in freedom

With

of action and in superior incentives, Wallace's fight was for
the improvements that would enable a "progressive capitalism" to endure. His was an approach best interpreted as

enlightened conservatism

making

the necessary adjustments

in the established system rather than making communism or
socialism inevitable by a stubborn refusal to reform.

Since laboratory experiments and controlled social systems
were out of the question as long as people common and

uncommon

were involved,

it

would be necessary to be con-

stantly willing to tinker, for only from life-size experiments
would come the necessary innovations. Wallace's pleas were

for flexibility, for open-mindedness.

As he pointed out

in

1934:

... It is important to remember that the supremely
important development [toward a new world] is not any
particular plan, but the willingness, from a social point
of view, to modify the plan as often as necessary. 10

Out

of his

Iowa background came Wallace's conviction

that in this experimentation the common man himself must
bear the brunt of the burden. He must be assisted, it is true,
but his self-reliance must be both depended
and

upon

strengthened in the process. Thus to Henry A. Wallace
8

it

was

"March of the Common Man: Constructive or Destructive?"

Speech to the Community Church of Boston, Mass., January 21,
1951. (Mimeographed.)
10

Wallace,

New

Frontiers, p. 201.
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the task of government to do no more than to remove those
obstacles large enough to be
unyielding to the earnest efforts

most self-reliant.
These, then, were some of the principles and policies upon
which Henry A. Wallace hoped to found a new American
a party which would become a broad
political party
party
of the people and which would in time supplant the Demo-

of even the

cratic Party as the standard-bearer of the

more meaningful two-party system of the
But Wallace

also brought to the

new

common man

in a

future.

party

for better or

own

special leadership attributes. One of his
a strength as well as a weakness
chief characteristics

for worse

was

his

his willingness to take a stand that

might prove unpopuwas never characterized by the
apocryphal remark: "There go my people. I must follow
them, for I am their leader." With Wallace it was, in fact,
nearly always the reverse. Quite consistently, he moved so
far ahead of his followers that he left them completely behind. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, possessed of considerably more political caution and acumen, made good use
of Wallace's trait. Throughout the New Deal period, the
Secretary of Agriculture was regularly assigned to exposed
number one target for press attacks on "radical"
positions
proposals. Notwithstanding the venom of the assaults on him,
Wallace's willingness to take a positive stand on new, untried proposals brought him a considerable measure of aceven
claim, both among the general public and privately
among the most vitriolic of his Washington assailants.

lar.

Wallace's

position

And yet, by comparison with the great political leaders of
American history, Henry A. Wallace's qualities did not place
him in their forefront. Indeed, he admitted both his own shortcomings and the fact that he "never felt at home in a political atmosphere."
attempts to build

He

laughingly referred to the last-minute

him up as a political operator at the 1940
Chicago Convention, when, he related, he was conducted on
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a table-to-table tour of the Democratic big city bosses by the
Harry Hopkins. The most lasting result, Wallace noted
was a series of photographs intended to convince party

late

wryly,

he was really one of the boys.
between Wallace's outstanding success as an
contrast
The
in
the largest peacetime department of the govadministrator

faithfuls that

a success acknowledged
even by anti-Wallace Washington observers and his failure to oversee adequately the organization of his New Party

ernment

as Secretary of Agriculture

seem explicable only in terms of this lack of interest. Wallace himself admitted to being "just not interested in political
organization."

Coupled with this general lack of interest in party maneuvering was a tendency to leave his own fortunes in the hands
of chance, of friends, or even of strangers. These traits proved
fatal to his vice-presidential hopes and led to the delegation
of the party organization tasks to a campaign manager, the
personal choice of the candidate, who was to prove almost

equally deficient.

And this became

a handicap from which the

party was never
Wallace's

to recover fully.
qualities were to emerge in the

campaign as

those of a religious rather than a political leader. As Dorothy
Thompson once observed, long before the 1948 campaign,

"There

is

a hard clear streak of biblical righteousness in

Henry Wallace .... With it goes humaneness and mercy."
The concept which Wallace entertained of himself as a crusader was not far amiss. While his designation of his band of
followers as a "Gideon's Army" was contradicted by his
expressed hopes that the

new

mass people's movement, the

party would rapidly become a
religious overtones remained

evident throughout his campaign addresses. The "fight for
peace" was to become a crusade a quixotic crusade with
Henry A. Wallace in the role of Crusader for the Common

Man.
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In addition to this major defect, several other traits that
undoubtedly cost him votes were to emerge in the course of
the campaign. Despite his years of political activity, Henry A.
Wallace remained a man for the people, rather than of the
with a liking for them in the abstract rather than as
people
individuals.

Reticent by nature, Wallace was far from the cold person
portrayed by so many journalists; rather he was almost comin both the ability and the desire to engage
pletely lacking
in small talk. Moreover, he seemed little aware of, and even
less

concerned with, the lack of

this trait

which

is

so helpful to

a candidate in almost constant campaign contact with the
reporters covering his activities. Making few attempts to
conceal his boredom with things he considered trivial, Wallace could become almost eloquent when the conversation
turned to those subjects near his heart. Still another handicap was the Wallace tendency to think in spurts, with periods

of intense concentration followed by times of near-lassitude
and resting, coasting, or wandering attention. Such characteristics

did not endear him to an already antagonistic press

corps.

Then, too, Wallace had at one time or another been interested in a broad range of experiments from plants and
poultry breeding to dietary tests, from his more publicized
corn and chicken work to vegetarian and fat-tailed sheep
diets.
Couple with this the streak of mysticism underlying
Wallace's basic Christianity, and some light may be cast

upon the former Vice

President's reported excursions into

areas of strange and exotic religious beliefs. Wallace

may

in-

deed have written, as Westbrook Pegler alleged, the socalled "Guru letters"
notes in which, it was claimed, Wallace had sought the advice of a Hindu mystic. True or not,
these claims of "deviant behavior" were seized
forth in great detail

by

the press.

upon and

set
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Moreover, a lack of caution cropped out in many of Walpress conferences, where he displayed a frequent

lace's

deep end in off-the-cuff responses to
unexpected questions. This behavior of the former Vice
President was not unlike that of his Democratic adversary
tendency

to

off the

go

President Harry S. Truman.
Wallace's press relations were

made even worse by

his

transparent impatience with those unable or unwilling to get
his views straight. Numerous jousts with reporters ensued as

a result of their insistence that Wallace repeatedly answer the
questions, such as his stand on acceptance of Com-

same old

He finally resigned himself by carrying in his
wallet a prepared statement which pointed out that he "was
not, had never been, and did not expect to ever become" a
munist support.

that he was willing to accept the support of
anyone who did not advocate violent overthrow of the Con-

Communist, but
stitution of the

The

United

States.

between Liberal and Radical,
or indeed between Conservative and Liberal, are seldom to be
found in the hurried stories of a political campaign from harsophisticated distinctions

ried reporters. And from his early days in
Agriculture, the
as
New
Deal
Secretary,
philosopher-advocate, had been con-

sidered fair game by opposition forces far more concerned
with destruction than accurate portrayal. Wallace was much
less concerned with
press reaction than with the response of
future generations, an outlook not
particularly helpful to a
political candidate.

Perhaps the best expression of Wallace's long-range phiof this concern for the future
is to be found in
New Frontiers, written long before he was to become a candidate. Therein he had noted:
losophy

For those who

see

now

that the

men who

chaos have nothing to give
except another

led us into

selfish fling

and
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new
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new
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beckon with meaningful adven-

ture*

To

...

gineers
[a

new

ered

it

spirit,

social machinery requires economic ento subdue the social wilderness . . . today

world] has to be discovered, and when it is discovmust be held onto. The problem is largely one of

but

it is

also one of

hard facts and definite action

continually accompanying the unfolding of the

spirit.

What we approach

is not a new continent but a new
and mind resulting in new standards of accomplishment. We must invent, build and put to work new

state of heart

social machinery. 11

Or, as Wallace put it so succinctly a year after the campaign, "I am not greatly concerned with the history of the

What I am interested in is that which still lies ahead."
In summary, Henry A. Wallace's shortcomings as a
politi-

past.

cal leader

stemmed from those same

traits

that lent

him

the moral note of religious
strength as an ideological leader
faith and even the
quixotic willingness to tackle the impossible. These were
this
Cruthings that made

up

sader for the

self-appointed

Common Man.

But what of his prospective running mate, Senator Glen H.
Taylor? Like Wallace, Taylor had been subjected to harsh
treatment at the hands of a conformist American
press.
Whereas Wallace had been portrayed
idealistic, impractical visionary,

as the fuzzy-minded,
Taylor was depicted as the

simple-minded buffoon, a sort of "Pappy O'Daniel on horseback," an uneducated and hence ignorant cowboy singer, a
"Left Wing Minstrel." However, the
of the
had

power

11

Wallace,

New

Frontiers, pp. 11, 281, 283.

press
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keep Taylor from election in Idaho, and he had
the
showman's attitude that "any publicity is good
adopted
it's
publicity;
only when the newspapers ignore me that I befailed to

gin to worry."

Glen H. Taylor was, for the mid-twentieth century, a
unique member of the Senate in that his formal education
had extended only to the age of fifteen and in that he had

come to that august body from the world of entertainment
from show business. Without the confining doctrines of either
professor or machine politician, Taylor had come up with a
working philosophy of politics and life both homespun and
penetrating, as well as distinctively his own
throwback to pioneer days in the West.

something of a

Born and

raised in Idaho as the son of an itinerant evangethe
Reverend
Pleasant John Taylor, the Senator, like
list,
his running mate, had been
exposed in early years to a combination of self-reliance, religion, and the realities of life. On
his

own

at

an early

age, Taylor

found himself during the

depression days of the late 1920's and early 1930's at the
head of a small touring cowboy troupe. Frequently unable
to obtain bookings in even the most humble theaters,
they
often found themselves miles from the nearest hamlet with

only their truck for a home and a jack-rabbit stew for supper. "In fact," remarked Senator Taylor, "had it not been
for those jack rabbits, we might well have starved to death.
But we sure did get sick and tired of them as a
steady diet."
Throughout all the traveling, this itinerant minstrel was

constantly reading

working on his

own

to

make up

for the

deficiencies of his abbreviated formal

schooling. Covering a
Plato and Aristotle to John M.

broad range from
Keynes
and Stuart Chase, he found himself attracted to economic
matters in general and the works of the latter in
particular.
Out of his studies and his own depression
experiences, Taylor
ultimately arrived at a confirmed point of view.
Moreover, in the course of his reading, the Senator

came
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that stayed with him: "The ultimate object of
action." As he toured the mountain ranges

is

singing for his supper, he began casting about for some practical use for his
self-acquired learning. Finally, one night,

standing in the rear of a small theater where he was to appear the next day, he found this same thought running through

mind as he watched the performance of another touring
troupe whose goal was the election of a state governor. Obhis

serving the politicos with a professionally critical eye, Taylor
arts of acting and stagecraft
played no

concluded that the

small part in their appeal to the audience. He reasoned,
"They're little more than amateurs who spend only part of
their time before audiences.
Why shouldn't I, a full-time professional performer, be able to do as good or better a
job?"
The thought was father to the action. With no little trepidation, the Senator has admitted, he entered his name as can-

didate for the Democratic congressional nomination in his
home district in Idaho. In the ensuing campaign Taylor in-

troduced the idea of rounding up votes with a cowboy band.
"Give the people a little entertainment," he reasoned, "and
the political pill goes down a lot easier."
But for Taylor the hour of victory was

still

in the future.

baptism of political fire (this was 1938) , he ran fourth
in a field of nine for the congressional nomination. "But at
In

this

least,"

he consoled himself, "I had found out that some peoactually vote for me. And that was a big step for-

ple would

ward."

Two

years

later,

undaunted by the

caravan again took to the road,
senatorial nomination.

"we

"And

this

the Taylor
time in pursuit of the
time," the Senator relates,
first failure,

this

really went back into the hills. Not only the one-horse
towns, but the places where the people were too poor to have
even a horse. We got into places where no candidate for any
office, let alone for the U.S. Senate, had set foot in the last
And this paid off on the primary election day.
fifty years.
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When

the

first city

returns

came

in, I

was

trailing.

I

1948

picked

up

a little in the smaller villages, but it was only when the returns from the 'backwoods' came in that I finally pulled up

even and was eventually nominated by a few hundred votes.'*
But because he had won the Democratic nomination over
the machine candidate, the party State Central Committee
to drag its feet, reasoning that the easiest way to

proceeded

get rid of this "maverick" was to let him go
at Republican hands in the general election.

down

to defeat

But the defeat, not long in coming, failed of this purpose.
For so close had he come that Taylor was irretrievably bitten
v
Two years later he entered the 1942
fry the political bug.
his
tactics
gained for him the Democratic
campaign. Again
senatorial nomination without machine endorsement, and
again he was defeated in the general election. Undaunted, he
returned a third time, again triumphing over the machine
candidate in the primary. This year
1944
aided by Roosevelt's presence on the ballot, the erstwhile cowboy singer was
not to be denied even by a reluctant state leadership. Glen
Taylor triumphed with the same 5,000 vote margin by which
Roosevelt carried the state. Again the hill people had responded to the Taylor appeal, and their votes with an assist from F.D.R.
had proved decisive.
Thus the newly elected Junior Senator from Idaho arrived
in Washington with the feeling that he was under "obligations to no one, least of all to the Democratic state committee" or to the professional politicians who had never
given him better than halfhearted support. The target of
every newspaper and every important industrial interest
group in the state of Idaho, he owed no debts there. Instead,,
he claimed, the only people to whom he was beholden were
those whose votes had elected him
above all, the people
back in the hills.
.

Senator Taylor's voting record in the subsequent six-year
period became one of the best measures of his independ-
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ence. His mission, as he
interpreted it, was to carry out they
mandate given him to support the policies of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal in both domestic and
foreign affairs. In the
early years of his term, Taylor's record of sup-

port of Democratic administration measures was one of the
an over-all average of 92 per cent
highest in the Senate

from 1945 to 1947.
policy shift that the

It

was only with the Truman foreign;

Cowboy Senator began

to vote against
the administration in these areas,
feeling that the Roosevelt
policies were being abandoned. His votes on domestic matters

continued to be strongly Fair Deal-New Deal and
ap-

parently free from special interest pressures. Only one measure of significance throughout his career indicated
any

unusual response to local groups. In his last Congress, Senator Taylor veered
away from the official Democratic position
to join a "potatoes for
soy beans" coalition on a farm bill
vote.

was

the political background and ideological
This, then,
orientation of the third party's
vice-presidential nominee. As>
far as personal characteristics, Glen
a

Taylor presented

marked

more reserved Wallace, Unlike the
the
Senator had gone hungry; he had
presidential nominee,
earned his living by the sweat of his brow first in show business and later as a welder in a California
airplane factory.
Such experiences, coupled with his warmer personality, gave
Taylor a closer and more direct link to the common man.
7
Unlike Wallace, Taylor was a man of the
people, as well as
contrast to the

for the people.
Also unlike Wallace, a philosopher

first and
only seca
was
aware
at
ondarily politician, Taylor
every step of politf

cal

actuality,

reality,

and the need for organization; his

thinking processes tended to be incisive rather than philo-

One

of his striking abilities was that of
putting
ideas
across to the average citizen in
complicated
personal
terms^-as in the lucid, simple phrase: "I just don't want
sophical.

my
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sons dying on some Siberian steppe in any war that I can

do

anything to prevent."
< Coupled with an innate

warmth and a liking for people as
abstract
as
well
as
individuals
concepts, Senator Taylor's
him
to
allowed
capitalize on his assets to the
stage
presence

utmost. Nonetheless, Taylor, like Wallace, often exhibited the
same overwhelming concern with broad problems of world
affairs that

on occasion made

it difficult

for

him

to engage

in small talk.

in

Perhaps one of the most unusual demonstrations by Taylor
Washington more spectacular, even, than his horseback
,

up the steps of the Senate Office Building was his willingness to admit quite frequently that he just "didn't know."
Indeed this may have been a deliberate device to capitalize

ride

on

his self-professed ignorance. "I'm all confused by this complex issue," he would tell his Idaho constituents, "I just don't
know what to do. I need your advice, I want your decision.

What do you want me

to do?"

In short, the Senator claimed to base his representative
theory on an advocacy of the people's wishes rather than

on

his

own

views. "I

was elected from Idaho

as a

Democrat,"

said Taylor after the 1948 election, "and I sit in the Senate
as one." And yet, when the chips were down in early 1948,

the Senator struck out on his own. In spite of clear indica-

tions that the people of his state were "not interested" in the
peace issue, faced with the imminent danger of losing the
"best job he ever had," Glen H. Taylor cast his lot with
Henry A. Wallace, uo him it was a matter of conscience; it
his duty to warn the American people, to do
everything within his power to halt the "increasing drift towards a

was

war and domestic fascism"
he feared, of administration policies

disastrous

the inevitable result,
at

home and toward

Russia.

In spite of tremendous pressure,
in his conviction that a third world

he remained steadfast
war was simply "un-
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necessary" and that American as well as Russian policies
were dangerous to world peace. Even after his reconciliation
with the Democrats had been effected in September, 1949,
with a visit to the White House, Taylor remarked publicly, "I

wish

I

could go along with the President [on his foreign

would be much more pleasant."
the eve of his departure from Washington followhis
defeat
in the 1950 primary, Glen Taylor remained
ing
convinced that his and Wallace's position had been correct,
even if the public had failed to rally to their support. As the
Senator put it, he had "done everything [he] possibly could

policy]. It

And on

to avert the drive to war." And, despite the "slowness of
public opinion to react," despite the "misinformation of the
press," he

still

retained his "basic faith in the ultimate good

judgment of the [American] people." Despite the fact that
his reliance on the courage of his convictions had, at least in
the short run, proved disastrous, Taylor retained his faith in
the ultimate common sense of the common man.

Given their backgrounds, philosophies, and fundamental
beliefs, what were the views shared by the Wallace-Taylor
team with respect to the specific problems facing the United
States in 1948? What were their hopes for their New Party?
First, and most important, was the view that the best interests of the common man, throughout the world as in the
United States, could be furthered only by a lasting peace between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Both men were convinced
that the drive to war would deprive the people of most of
their recent social advancements and would slow up or halt
future improvements. As Taylor put it, "We stand at the most
terrifying and cataclysmic instant in all history."
In line with this, both Wallace and Taylor felt that everything possible should be done to strengthen the United Naand pertions, which they both viewed as the world's best
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Truman
hope for peace." Both felt
was betraying, if unwittingly, the U.N., the
doctrines of Franklin Roosevelt, and the American people

haps

its

that the

last

administration

by

its

get-tough-with-Russia policy.

As for the party, unlike those Communist participants
who viewed the movement as beginning the breakdown of
the two-party tradition the beginning of a multi-party system in which they might possess the balance of power both
"Wallace and Taylor thought of it as an organization which

would attain major status, supplanting an old party which
had failed to serve the interests of the American people. As
Wallace observed, the third party was a "long range venture.
Neither old party stood for anything definite." He felt that
"both stood for an unrealistic foreign policy. There was a

need for the people

to

have choices on the basis of

issues,

not

of elements
parties were composed
personalities.
that couldn't act." A new party based on issues and composed
of elements that could act would provide the answer.

Both old

Senator Taylor was in wholehearted accord with Wallace's
views on the need for party realignment. Although he differed in feeling that this change was bound to come eventu-

not through a new party, then through a realignment
of the existing parties, he agreed that a completely new or-

ally,

if

ganization offered the best opportunity to be free of the dual
millstones so
long around the neck of the Democrats the big

machines and the reactionary southerners.
it was that these two
persons, so divergent in their
found
themselves
linked in their basic principersonalities,
city

J

Thus

in their sympathy for the common man,
ples and policies
in their advocacy of a reform program, and in their belief

in the necessity of peace for the attainment of a teuejself:are
_state. They were joined in their visions of a better world and
in their concept of a new party that could
present a positive
"for
a
better
world
now."
program
right

.

CHAPTER

4

The Fight Jor Peace"
Spring Campaign

UNLIKE THE usual preconvention campaigns of major

parties

with their routinized minuet patterns, the Progressives' spring
campaign was not devoted to formalized advances and retreats of hopefuls with their mincing
steps toward the prize
they must seemingly not covet. Nor was it a tune of maneuvera time in which diviing over issues for the fall campaign
sions of disputing factions might be aired, then buried in
anticipation of the compromises necessary for a party plat-

form.

For the Progressives, such matters had already been
clearly defined as they rallied to their self-declared presidencandidate with his openly avowed platform planks. In-/

tial

stead, their

tional tours

problems were an atypical

lot

a

series of

na-

by candidates already decided upon; attempts

to relate incidents, not always of their own
making, to their
newly adopted campaign slogan, "Peace, Freedom and Abundance"; as well as the multitudinous tasks of building and
financing a new party, of obtaining for it a place on the ballots of the forty-eight states.

peace" became a

The

story of alternate

story of their "fight for

and

hope
disappointment,
coupled with an engulfing tide of events far beyond their
or even their comprehension at the tune.
control
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The first blows came in New York State, where the American Labor Party its decision to support the Wallace can-

with the withdrawal of its
didacy imminent was faced
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amerlargest union
ica. Following closely upon this, the State Executive Board
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations met to consider
its relations to the third party and by a three to two margin
called upon all CIO unions to quit the American Labor Party

endorsed the Wallace candidacy. Calling the movement a "piece of political adventurism which can lead to
nothing but disastrous consequences to all the American peo-

once

it

ple," the State

Board

in its action clearly forecast the

com-

And

ing decision of the National Board.

the vote, closely
within
CIO ranks,
following the existing left-right cleavage
national
unions
indicated that all the major
except the United

Workers were lined up in opposition to Wallace.
Some two months later, in March, the New York State
Board took action by an even more decisive two to one margin to create a state-wide Political Action Committee to oppose both the American Labor Party and the Greater New
York Council of the CIO, which was favorable to the Wallace drive. Thus the division in state CIO ranks was solidified^
and Wallace's organizational suppprt neutralized.
But what of the national scene?^ While substantial backing from the American Federation of Labor had never been
indicated, and the course of the CIO's Political Action Committee had veered away sharply before the December decision,,
there had remained hopes of strong organized support from
the so-called leftwing unions? Even after the CIO's National
Board, in late January by a vote of thirty-three to eleven, had
Electrical

1

repudiated the third-party

movement

as inimical to the best

interests of labor, several dissenting union heads had seemed
determined to invoke the "autonomous rights" of their unions

and endorse the Wallace candidacy.

was generally anticion the board minority

It

pated that the ten unions represented
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under the banners of

New Party. 1

Now, however, strong pressure was brought to bear on
these leftwing leaders
the pressure of
Phillip Murray, Jack
Walter
and
others
to disavow the Wallace
Kroll,
Reuther,
candidacy. CIO President Murray, while acknowledging the
legal correctness of their position on autonomy, reminded
them that they had a "moral obligation to back the executive
board's
decision." Informed of this, Harry Bridges,
leader of the International Longshoremen's Union and CIO
regional director for Northern California, foresaw the future
.

.

.

accurately: "I think' that there will be punitive measures attempted and forms of compulsion resorted to that will be
resisted by our union." Within a few weeks, he found himself
forced to relinquish his post as regional director. His union
joined the resistance.

Moreover, the attempt of the New York Industrial Council
and of some California Political Action Committee groups
to remain neutral by neither
endorsing nor condemning a
third party soon became the
subject of a crackdown by the
CIO
Political
Action
Committee. Warned director
parent
Jack Kroll, "There can be no neutrality in fighting the idea of
a third party." He went on to threaten that unless the national policy of repudiating the Wallace
candidacy were folwould
taken
be
to
or
remove
lowed, steps
discipline the officers involved.

Nor were
1

The

these the only methods of persuasion employed

ten unions represented in the vote were: United Electrical

Workers (2 votes); United Office and Professional Workers; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union; Food, Tobacco
and Agricultural Workers; United Furniture Workers; Marine Cooks
and Stewards; Fur and Leather Workers; United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers; Transport Workers Union; and National Maritime Union (1 vote for, 1 against the third party). Two unions
the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and United Public Workers
abstained from voting. See the New York Times, January 23, 1948.
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to prevent labor endorsement of the Progressive Party. Rethat the United Auto Workers,
ports were soon circulating

under the energetic Walter Reuther, was planning a campaign
to take over locals and members of some of the leftist unions.
The United Electrical Workers, the United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers, the Transport Workers Union, and the
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers were the announced targets.
Despite the fact that

CIO

President

Murray

sent a letter to

Reuther reminding him that the "CIO never condones 'raid"
there was a strong threat of just such action. Nor did
ing,'
the threat appear an idle one, as a Hartford, Connecticut,
local of the United Electrical Workers was actually won over
to the United Auto Workers.
In the face of these tactics, some leaders were unable to
secure the Wallace endorsements expected from their own
unions. For example, even though Albert Fitzgerald and
Julius Emspak of the United Electrical Workers withdrew
their union from the Political Action Committee to form an
independent committee for Wallace and Taylor, they found it
inadvisable to seek outright board endorsement for the Progressive Party. The United Office and Professional Workers
Association also failed to take an official stand in support,
although it did pass a resolution praising Wallace and condemning both Republicans and Democrats, as well as reaffirming the "right of members and local unions to make
their

own

decisions."

While one half of the dissident unions

the Fur and

Leather Workers, the Longshoremen, the Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers, the United Farm Equipment and Metal

Workers, the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural Workers, and
the United Furniture Workers
proceeded with formal endorsements, the combined total of their membership was less
than that of the single powerful United Electrical Workers.

Meanwhile, the rightwing unions were not content to stop
with board action, pressure tactics, or a
positive stand for
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President Truman. Instead, the two largest Phillip MurAuto Workers
ray's Steelworkers and Walter Reuther's

voted overwhelmingly to oppose actively the Wallace camin an approximate three to one
paign. The smaller unions,
ratio,

followed their lead.

At about

the

same time American Federation of Labor

President William Green, never receptive to the third-party
idea, publicly recorded his opposition to the venture as "a
became a landslide when
great political mistake." Th6 trend
tiie

same Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen which

in

1946

had been promising a "million-dollar slush fund'* to defeat
President Truman now voted to raise money for his reelection.

there any significant counterbalance to the loss of
labor support; no important new groups indicated any inclination toward the Wallace banners. Negro organizations

Nor was

*

continued to veer away. Even some of the local Townsend
clubs indicated that they might not follow their leader, Dr.
Francis Townsend,

who seemed

certain to endorse the

Wal-

lace ticket.

But in the midst of
ray of hope
Isaacson in

all

gloomy portents there came a
following an uphill battle, of Leo

these

the victory,

a February special election in New York's
Congressional District. Here the Democratic

Twenty-fourth
intumbent, Benjamin

Rabin, had resigned to accept a
and Governor Thomas E. Dewey had called a
judicial post,
While the Twenty-fourth had always gone
special election.

Democratic in past

J.

elections,

it

had also constituted one of the

American Labor Party areas in the city of New
York. In the 1946 election the ALP candidate had run a
second in a four-cornered race, garnering some
fairly good
27 per cent of the vote.
This 1948 special election was given advance interpreta^
strongest

tion

and hence

ALP

sides as a significant test of over-all
strength
of Wallace support, since the party provided his

by both
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vehicle in the Empire State. Some expected that the ALP
would be hard pressed to equal its earlier performances. As
the New York Times remarked (January 15, 1948)
:

While these [1946]

figures indicate the virtual certainty

of the election of the Democratic

nominee

.

.

.

the ex-

pected decrease in the vote for the Labor party candidate
in the Congressional district generally will be accepted as

an indication of the measure of the loss of Labor party
by withdrawal of the anti-Communist unions

votes caused

from

On

affiliation

with the Labor party.

the other hand, John K. Weiss and

writing in

PM

Tom

O'Connor,

(January 17, 1948), pointed to a number of

offsetting factors.

Most

of the voters in the district are low-income families.

Roughly 40 per cent are Jewish and 25 per cent Negro and
Puerto Rican. Wallace's popularity with minority groups

presumably enhanced by his recent trip to Palestine and
South speaking before non-segregated audi-

his tour of the

ences

is

counted upon by the

ALP

to

weigh heavily,

.

also noted the ability of "left wing and labor groups
[to] make a much better showing in a special election than
in a regular election," citing the 1946
candidacy of

They

ALP

Johannes Steel in the New York Nineteenth District. Here,
despite a three to one Democratic enrollment, Steel had lost
by a narrow 4,000 vote margin to the joint DemocraticLiberal candidate Arthur O. Klein. "There was general
agreement," they concluded, "that the extraordinary ALP
showing could be credited to a new political technique; concentrating experienced political workers
in one district."

from the

entire City

This same technique was again employed in the Twenty-
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According to Morris Goldin,

New York

County

ALP

strategist responsible for the planning, there was, at the height
of the campaign, a total of some 7,000 individuals working

in the district for the Wallace candidate. Recruited

from the

ranks of the Progressive Citizens of America and from the
trade unions, as well as from the ALP itself, these volunteer
crusaders turned in a performance that put Democratic boss

Ed Flynn

to flight. Working nights, moving steadily from
to
door
door, they played up the issues most appealing to
in
the district. To Jewish constituents they talked Isvoters

and rent

control, to Negroes and Puerto Ricans, problems of racial segregation and minority rights.
While the Democratic mobilization approximated the ALP
aggregation in numbers, it lacked the latter's spirit and drive.

rael

Many Democratic workers

did

little

more than go through the

motions, with the result that they were unable to keep their
pledges in line on election day.

Both

sides

were lavish in

their importation of

ers to support the actual contestants.

name speak-

For the Democrats,

Mayor William O'Dwyer and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
the appeals for "continuing the

New

Democratic candidate, Karl

Propper.

J.

Henry A. Wallace was the leading

led

Deal tradition" with the

On

the

figure, assisted

ALP

side,

by Repre-

and singer Paul Robeson. Their
primary theme was the attack on Truman foreign policy and
on its inconsistency in
particularly in the Twenty-fourth
sentative Vito Marcantonio

dealing with the Palestine issue.

the other two contenders
Relatively little thought was paid
Liberal and Republican who had made the field a four-

cornered one.

The Liberals had advanced one

of their strong-

Dean
gubernatorial
active
Alf ange, but the Republicans did little or no
campaigning for their candidate.
est

vote

getters,

former

candidate

from the polls on February 17 showed, in the
words of the New York Times, a "sweeping victory" for the

The

results
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Wallace candidate, Leo Isaacson. Not only had he defeated
his Democratic opponent, but he had also received a clear-cut
cent of the votes cast, as against
majority, nearly 56 per
31 per cent for Mr. Propper. The Liberal candidate was a
A. De Nigris,
poor third, and the Republican nominee, Joseph
also ran.

Warren Moscow,

writing in the

New York

Times, noted

that

The

result

was an upset with

definite national political

connotations. In political circles, Mr. Isaacson never had
been considered to have a chance to win, but the percentage of the votes given to the third party forces was

be regarded as an indication of the potential Wallace
strength in November.
The result was regarded as certain to strike at
Democratic hopes for Presidential victory and to bring

to

.

.

gloom

.

to the

Truman

high

command. 2

Elation in third-party circles equaled the gloom and deoffered evipression in Democratic quarters. The results
dence that political miracles were not impossible and that
Henry A. Wallace's candidacy could be a major force in the

B. "Beanie" Baldwin, Wallace's
presidential campaign. C.
campaign manager, was quick to hail the election as "proof

Mr. Wallace has been saying for months that the people
party, a third party led by Henry Wallace,
dedicated to achieving peace, security and abundance." Isaacas

demand a new

son interpreted his victory as a "resounding repudiation by
the people of the policies of the Truman administration.,
policies which are leading down the road to war."
Actually, as both James Reston and Arthur

Krock

of the

'New York Times, February 18, 1948. The numerical totals were:
Isaacson (American Labor Party), 22,697; Propper (Democrat),
12,578; Alfange (Liberal), 3,840;

De

Nigris (Republican), 1,482.
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New York Times were now

quick to point out and as Weiss
and O'Connor had noted a month earlier, the Twenty-fourth
District was a rather special case. In the first place, the area
issues had been virtually tailor-made for the American Labor
Party. Discontent with administration fumbling and backtracking on the question of Israel was strong in a section so

predominantly Jewish. Moreover, this was a low-income, large
minority group area to which the domestic program of the
former Vice President was bound to appeal.
Secondly, the American Labor Party organization had functioned smoothly both in getting out the vote and in keeping its
pledges in line. It had mobilized effectively for the task and

had been able to get its issues across by dint of doorbell
ringing and house-to-house canvassing. On the other hand, Ed
Flynn's Bronx machine had fallen down on the job. He had
failed both in getting out the vote and in holding those who
did turn out. A staff writer of the Baltimore Sun suggested
only half in jest that Mr. Flynn "had better stop writing pieces
his esoteric craft and go back to
explaining the mysteries of
bossing."

But, making all due allowance for the special factors involved in the special election, the victory for the Wallace
forces was truly a sweeping one, and a very bright ray of light
in their preconvention campaign. They had scored at least
battle victory in the "fight for peace."

one

In spite of this triumph, speculation still continued about
whether Henry A. Wallace would actually go through with
the 1948 campaign or would, instead, abandon the fight at
some strategic time prior to the election. Arthur Krock, writing in the

New

declaration,

The

York Times
had observed:

just after Wallace's

that
possibility exists

December

Mr. Wallace may withdraw

his candidacy before or just after the conventions of the

two major

parties

.... Even

if

...

a

third

party
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and Mr. Wallace enters on
nominating convention is held,
is
a vigorous campaign, he still
capable of finding it expedient to withdraw "before the election."

now, close on the heels of the Isaacson victory, such
increased by a second open radio bid on the
speculation was
Democratic national
part of Senator J. Howard McGrath,

And

Even before the
McGrath had preferred

chairman, for Wallace's return to the

December
a

declaration of candidacy,

fold.

support of the former Vice
Mr. Wallace decided to support 'the

series of tentative bids for the

President, saying that "if
Democratic candidate' this support
"

would be

'received

and

welcomed.'

Wallace's reply to the renewed offer was brief and to the
"Whenever the Democratic party proves that it is the
point:
his ideas on military trainpeace party and Truman gives up
it. At the moment I see little prospect."
of the prodigal's impending return to the Democratic fold continued throughout the spring campaign, but
on foreign policy were ever
no concrete offers of

ing,

I'll

consider

Rumors

compromise

made by

actually
the "peace

the White House. According to Wallace, all
feelers" were based on his acceptance of the ad-

ministration's foreign policy as it stood. As such, they never
received serious consideration from the Vice President. For

the most part, the sources of these rumors were difficult to
locate, their sincerity even more problematical, since they
have been plants of Democratic strategists attempting

may

to discourage voters

from supporting a "temporary" Wallace

party.

But what of the course of events both in the U.S. and
elsewhere during the spring of 1948 that so vitally affected
the "fight for peace"? Three incidents stood out in the preconvention campaign period. The first, over which the Pro-
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gressive Party exercised no control, but which affected its^
fate strongly, was the Communist
coup in Czechoslovakia.
The second was Henry A. Wallace's open letter to Marshal

Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union; and the third involved
Senator Glen Taylor's brush with the police of Birmingham,

Alabama, over

To many
coalition

racial segregation.

the existence in Czechoslovakia of a postwar

government

in

which Communists and non-Commu-

could work side by side demonstrated the feasibility of
similar cooperation on an international scale between East

nists

and West. This Czechoslovakian bridge accorded with the
Progressive Party's basic contention about peaceful coexistence and served to demonstrate the
practicality of their

peace plank for lessening world tension.
Consequently, it came as a tremendous blow when, in
February, 1948, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia
staged a coup d'etat whereby the hitherto democratic government fell under a party dictatorship. Many who had felt it
possible for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to live as peaceful, tolerant
neighbors in a shrinking world were now convinced that

Russia, shelving her wartime alliance of expediency, had
resumed her long-range plans of world conquest, utilizing in
Czechoslovakia the same force and fifth column methods em-

ployed earlier by Hitlerite Germany.

Viewed

in this

new

light,

the Progressive Party's proposals

for a peaceful resolution of Russo-American differences
seemed futile to many a disasterous form of appeasement
to others. Potential supporters

who never

could have been

dissuaded by American Red-baiting tactics and anti-Com-

munist hysteria found these international

facts of life persuasive and compelling. Numbers who had already joined
now left the third party; many who were previously unde-

cided

now

stayed away.

There was no way of gauging precisely the ebb tide
ing from the Czech coup. But, judging by the polls

result-

at the
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the defections were sizable.^ Although no clear-cut
before-and-after surveys were made, a January Roper surwould receive 1 1 per cent of
vey had indicated that Wallace
vote.
the
June, the figure had fallen to 6 per cent.
time,

popular

By

so shatteritself
Coupled with the effects of the incident
of
came the reaction
presidential
ing to Progressive hopes
candidate Wallace. His first impulse, in a speech at Minneapolis,

had been

The Czech

to adopt a logically defensible position that:

crisis is

evidence that a "get tough" policy

only provokes a "get tougher" policy.
What is happening in Czechoslovakia
in a

a

vacuum. There

triangular

is

pattern

is

not a tempest

a clear pattern of cause and effect
connecting Moscow,

Prague and

Washington.

Every act under the Truman Doctrine is clearly labeled
anti-Russian. The men in Moscow from their viewpoint
would be utter morons if they failed to respond with acts of
pro-Russian consolidation.
The Czechoslovakia story will repeat itself so long as
our gun and dollar policies in Greece, China and elsewhere

on

3
Russia's doorstep are continued.

However, a few weeks

later in a

New York

press con-

ference Wallace jput himself out on a limb when asked about
the Czech situation. In response to a reporter's question, he
said he had commented on the Czech crises before he "knew

what Steinhardt [U.S. Ambasador to Czechoslovakia] had
been up to, before the rightists staged their coup." Queried
further, Wallace implied that Ambassador Steinhardt's actions supporting the rightist cause had provoked the Communist intervention that the Communists had acted in selfdefense to prevent a rightist coup. The press conference was
a tumultuous one, and it may have been that Wallace was
3

New

York Times, February

28, 1948.
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prodded farther than he intended to go. But, to many of his
earlier sympathizers, his remarks indicated that the extreme
leftists among his advisers had
gained his ear too well.
The end result of both the incident and the Wallace reac-

was a marked weakening of the peace plank's appeal.
some charged, the Wallace Progressive Party was
If,
nothing more than the American branch of an international
Communist conspiracy, it had received a tremendous jolt from
its home office. For
years the Stalin tactics shattered most
hopes of peaceful coexistence between the two major powers.
Two months later the second incident involving the peac^
issue had a much different orientation, with American origins,
and reflected a newly changed Moscow view with respect to

tion

as

the desirability of propagandizing her "peaceful" intentions
in America. The idea of addressing an open letter to Russian

Premier Josef Stalin originated at a midwinter conference attended by Michael Straight, publisher of New Republic,
Henry Wallace, editor of the magazine at the time, and Lewis
Frank, Jr., editorial aide and later chief speech writer for the
candidate. While no immediate action was taken, the idea
took definite shape some months later, prior to a major address scheduled for

May

11.

According to Wallace himself, "I

had been thinking abbut it for some time and when I got up
to the farm I decided to go ahead. Actually I wrote part of it
at the farm and I finished it on the train coming in from
South Salem."
Early in the morning on the day of the scheduled speech,
the story broke about an exchange of notes between U.S.
Ambassador to Moscow Bedell Smith and Russian Foreign
Minister Molotov

an exchange interpreted by many as indicating a more conciliatory attitude on the part of each nation in seeking new paths to a settlement of their differences.

felt that the incident made
propitious the publication of his letter. Despite contrary advice, he delivered in his
speech that night an open letter to Stalin. Before an audience

Wallace
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of 19,000 which jammed Madison Square Garden, he outlined the letter's six-point program for terminating the cold
war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

1.

General

reduction

methods of mass
2.

of

armaments

outlawing

all

destruction.

nation to any
Stopping the export of weapons by any

other nation.
of unrestricted trade [except for
the two countries.
between
to
war]
goods related
4. The free movement of citizens, students and news3.

The resumption

papermen between and within the two
5.

The resumption

6.

The

nations.

of free exchange of scientific information and scientific material between the two nations.

re-establishment of a reinvigorated United Naand Rehabilitation Administration [UNRRA]

tions Relief

or the constitution of some other United Nations agency
for the distribution of international

relief.

Having examined some of the problems creating friction
between the two nations, such as the German and Japanese
peace treaties, control of atomic energy, and the "ideological
competition between communism and capitalism," Wallace
concluded:

There is no misunderstanding or difficulty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics which can be settled by force or fear and there
is no difference which cannot be settled by peaceful, hopeful negotiation. There is no American principle or public
interest which would have to be sacrificed to end the cold
war and open up the Century of Peace which the Century
of the Common Man demands. 4
4

For complete

1948.

text of the Address, see

New York

Times,

May

12,
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The delivery of the speech itself created little stir in the
American press. Although the New York Times published the
full text, the Associated Press and other news services carried only brief resumes. The entire episode would undoubtedly have been quickly forgotten, consigned to obscurity as
campaign speech, had it not been for Stalin's

just another

decision to respond. Less than a week later, the Soviet
Premier broadcast his answer, declaring that the letter constituted a "good and fruitful" basis for discussion between the

two nations. Although he did not indicate acceptance of all
the Wallace proposals, Stalin labeled the six-point plan a
"serious step forward" from the Smith-Molotov notes and
called

it

a "concrete program for peaceful settlement of the
and the United States."

differences between the U.S.S.R.

Moreover, concluded

Stalin,

".

.

.

The U.S.S.R. Govern-

ment considers
systems and

that despite the differences in their economic
ideologies, the coexistence of these systems and a

peaceful settlement of differences between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States are not only possible but also doubtless nec5
essary in the interests of a general peace."
The furor created by this reply was immediate and lasting.
Wallace, apprised of the news just before a campaign speech

Oakland, California, was elated and remarked, according
Howard Norton in the Baltimore Sun, "If my letter has
served and can still serve to further international underat

to

standing of the issues and the practicability of peace, I consider that this past two years' work has been truly fruitful."
The reaction in Washington was markedly different, however. As had been the case a year earlier on the occasion of
Wallace's European tour, thqre were congressional calls for
prosecution for violation of the Logan Act of 1799. This time

was Senator Owen Brewster (Republican, Maine) who
alleged that the Progressive nominee was guilty of violating

it

the Federalist injunction against a private citizen's interfering
in the relations between this nation and a foreign power.
*New York Times, May 18, 1948.
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lasting import was the administration's reaction.
his scepticism regarding Stalin's sincerity may have

Of more

Although
been well grounded, President Truman's failure to follow
up meant that the offer was destined never to be tested. Once

itself open to charges of
having
avenue to peace uncovered by a
political rival. As the pro-Truman Washington Post ruefully
editorialized, "How much capital Henry Wallace collected

again the administration laid

failed to explore a possible

out of the Administration's maladroitness of last week
body's guess. But

we

feel

it

is

any-

was plenty."

Moreover, it is probable that this abrupt end to the "peace
scare" closed the door completely on any possible rap-

prochement between the Progressives under Wallace and the
Democrats led by Truman. To many this was convincing evidence of Wallace's accuracy in his contention that Truman
was absolutely opposed to even the slightest compromise on
foreign policy, and that only the third party offered an opportunity to protest the bipartisan get-tough-with-Russia program. If the "fight for peace" was to continue, there was only
the Progressive Party to wage the battle.

But once again the
theme was undercut as

potential appeal of the coexistence
Russian words gave way to hard

soft

Soviet actions. This time it was Berlin. Following a series of
moves and countermoves linked to German currency reform,
the U.S.S.R. began early hi June to
place increasing restrictions on Western supply lines
through East Germany into

The pressure increased until on June 24 all rail
was halted by their inspectors. It became intolerable
when, on June 25, all food shipments were stopped. Western
reaction was both immediate and vigorous, and on June 26
Berlin.

traffic

President

Truman

ordered planes mobilized to
supply the
air. Thus
the
famous
Berlin
Airlift
began
which was to become a monument to Western determination,

beleaguered city by

and the tombstone for Progressive hopes of an immediate
to
response by either Soviet leaders or American voters
the Wallace proposals for
tension.
lessening
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A

third incident of the
preconvention campaign saw the
of
focused
on the other member of the
spotlight
publicity

Wallace-Taylor team. This time their second issue freedom
and the protection of civil rights was involved in the Birarrest and conviction of Senator
Taylor.
Although the formal charge was disorderly conduct, the

mingham

actual question
clearly concerned racial segregation at public
meetings. Taylor was scheduled to address a meeting of the

Southern Negro Youth Congress an organization listed by
the Department of Justice as
Communist-inspired, according
to the New York Times. The Negro
had encountered

group

a meeting place after Birmingham City
Police Commissioner Eugene ("Bull") Connor had threatened, "There's not enough room in town for Bull and the
difficulty in finding

Commies." Eventually, arrangements had been made to hold
meetings in a small Negro church, but, on the afternoon of
Senator Taylor's scheduled speech, four of the convention's
had been arrested on charges of permitting unsegre-

leaders

gated meetings. Following

had been erected

this

arrest,

temporary barriers

and police officials had
designated separate "white" and "Negro" entrances to the
to separate the races,

church.

When Senator Taylor attempted to enter the church
through the "Negro" entrance, he was taken into custody. At
this point reports differed concerning whether the Senator
attempted to resist or whether the arresting officers decided
to rough him up a little, but the fact remained that the
Senator arrived at the police station in a disheveled condition.
There he was booked and posted bail for a court appearance.

At a hearing

held later the same week, Taylor was con-

and costs,
and given a suspended jail sentence of 180 days. Police
Court Justice Oliver Hall, according to the Associated Press,
"gave Taylor a profound tongue lashing for 'introducing* the
victed of disorderly conduct, fined fifty dollars

racial issue into the case," ascribing the matter to publicity

seeking and an "outside influence attempting to create dis-
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turbances between the white and Negro races in the South."
The Senator immediately announced his intention of apall the
way to the Supreme Court, if necesthe Alabama State Appeals Court
later
a
sary.
year
The
United States Supreme Court
conviction.
the
upheld
the case, with Justices Black
review
declined
to
eventually

pealing the case

More than

and Douglas

dissenting, being of the opinion that Taylor's
a
for
writ of certiorari should have been granted.
petition
then pressed for the Senator's extradiofficials
Birmingham

tion to serve out the

Folsom refused

jail

term, but

Alabama Governor James

to seek his return,

and the case was

finally

abandoned.

While other similar incidents occurred during the spring
campaign, such as the Baltimore tennis courts case, obviously planned to invite arrest for the purpose of testing the
validity of segregation ordinances, none received the same
nation-wide publicity. While the freedom issue was thus

emphasized, its net vote-winning impact was highly questionable, with many anti-segregationists deploring such
"publicity-

seeking opposition."

v Although

spectacular incidents and issues played a large
part in the preconvention campaign, the main device employed by the Wallace-ites to link together their party organi-

zational
tour.

and

publicity

work was the

traditional

These tours became a means of arousing

campaign

interest in the

various state founding conventions, of
attracting prospective
party workers, of spurring the drives for a place on the state
ballots, and of providing the focal stellar attractions for the
fundraising, paid-admission rallies.
Beginning in February with a blizzard-swept tour of Minnesota, timed to coincide with the attempt to capture the

Democratic Farmer-Labor nomination in that

state

be
Wai-

(to

discussed in the next chapter),
presidential candidate
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was almost constantly on the road. Despite the fact that
he "hated campaigning, and hated to get into it," the thirdparty nominee began the tours that were to set a new rec-

lace

ord, as of 1948, for mileage covered

American

by any candidate in

history.

February witnessed, in addition to stops in the Midwest en
route to and from Minnesota, a junket to Florida, where the
deadline for ballot qualification came early, and a series of

New York State Twenty-fourth Congressional
March was comparatively quiet, with the high point

speeches in the
District.

a Pennsylvania Progressive Party Founding Convention at
York. But the end of the month witnessed the beginning of a

New

England tour timed to coincide with organizational
and Massachusetts. This was followed
in April by a second
into the Midwest, which included
trip
the Chicago Founding Convention (to be discussed in the
drives in Connecticut

following chapter), as well as several speeches in Indiana,
where the Progressive organization was being perfected.
May, however, witnessed the peak of the spring campaign.

Kicking

off

with the Madison Square Garden speech at which

the open letter to Stalin was unveiled, Wallace embarked
on a transcontinental tour via chartered air liner that took

him four times

across the continent in the space of two weeks.
a
After
brief stop in Detroit, where he marched with the
picket lines around the strike-bound Chrysler Corporation
plants, Wallace arrived in Los Angeles, spent two days in

San Francisco, Oakland, and
south again to San Diego. The Pacific Northwest was next.
Arriving in Oregon in the midst of the torrid Dewey-Stassen

that area, thence continued to

Republican presidential preference primary, the third-party
candidate assailed both contenders. Continuing through this
area, Washington and Idaho were covered before Wallace
interrupted his tour temporarily, flying back to Washington
to testify before a Senate committee considering the Mundt-

Nixon proposals

for subversive control.
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continued throughout
Returning once more, the candidate

and the Southwest, appealing in Denver
state organization and speaking in
audiences in New Mexico
Mexican-American
before
Spanish
and Arizona.
in which he had covered
Finally, after twenty-five days
some 25,000 miles, Wallace wound up the tour and returned
to Ms South Salem, New York, farm for a brief rest before

the
for

Mountain

States

a broadly based

embarking on a second New England tour that immediately
preceded the Philadelphia Convention.
Throughout all of his speeches in these different states and
cities there was one unchanging theme: Only the Progressive
Party offered Americans a chance to vote for peace to vote
in opposition to the bipartisan drive of both Republicans
and Democrats toward a new world war. The third party was
the people's

weapon

in the "fight for peace," its candidates

their leaders.

There were, of course, many issues of national concern
an end to indealing with a third plank: "Abundance"
flation, economic planning to prevent a new postwar depression, and Federal aid for health, for education, and for housing. And in every locality there were particular vital issues of
local concern:

irrigation proposals in the

arid Southwest,

problems in Mexican-American country, and power
development and flood control in the recently devastated
Columbia River Valley.

racial

Thus the Progressives* candidate attempted to relate the
main issue to his audiences to link their immediate, closely
needs to his third-party platform to demonstrate that
was dependent upon solving the overriding issue
of peace. Foreign policy remained the dominant theme, since
all these
public projects, works, and improvements necessia peace which Henry A.
tated peace for their completion

felt

their solution

Wallace alone of the presidential
work and fight for.

Meanwhile

possibilities

his running mate, Senator

was pledged

to

Glen H. Taylor, was
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concentrating his endeavors in the nation's Capital and
throughout the South. Unremarked by the press, save for the

Birmingham

incident,

similar basis.

the Senator's tours were run

on a

Organizational meetings in North Carolina,

West Virginia, and fund-raising rallies everythese were the skirmishes in the Taylor portion of

ballot drives in

where

the crusade.

Almost everywhere he went, Taylor cast down the antisegregation gauntlet. Refusing to speak to audiences separated
by the color of their skins, Senator Taylor conducted his
southern tour to the accompaniment of a series of incidents
paralleling the Alabama case. The major exception came in
Macon, Georgia, where the issue arose at the Progressive
Party State Founding Convention. With both white and Ne-

gro delegates and the customary municipal ordinance forbidding mixed public gatherings, the party found it expedient to
bar the public, thus making the meeting technically private.
Although Senator Taylor's preconvention campaigning
reached as far west as California and included northern and
midwestern states, this southern tour was his most significant
contribution outside the Halls of Congress. Inside the Senate
Chamber, however, he did much to publicize the party's stand

on both foreign and domestic issues. An open letter to PresiTruman demanding the ouster of James Forrestal as

dent

Secretary of Defense exemplified the Progressives' attack
on the Wall Street-military team which, they alleged, controlled both course and conduct of American foreign policy.

Perhaps the most noteworthy congressional action revolved
around Senate consideration of the peacetime draft. Joined
by Senator William Langer (Republican, North Dakota),
Taylor undertook an eighteen-hour filibuster against the appointment of Senate conferees on the measure. Doomed from
the outset, this two-man delaying action provided a dramatic
means of highlighting the Progressive Party position on the
issue.

Congressional testimony also offered a vehicle for Pro-
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nominee apcommittees. In February, Wallace
numerous
before
peared
testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, op"as constituted." Deposing the European recovery program
Eaton
a
Chairman
(Republican, New Jersey)
ruling by
spite
barring newsreel, sound-recording, and television men from
the hearings, press coverage of Wallace's counterproposals
as their presidential
gressive Party publicity

was extensive although not very

detailed.

economic aid to Europe as
Noting
a "lend-lease program for peace," Wallace ascribed the reversal of position to his view that Europe was now being
his earlier support for

handed a "blueprint for war." In the face of hostile crossexamination, he defended strongly his eight points, which
he felt constituted a plan to end "the gnawing fear of war
and destruction." Keystone of the Wallace proposals was a
fifty-billion-dollar reconstruction fund to be administered by
a United Nations agency rather than by any single nation
or its big-business groups and to be supported by those nations "with appropriate means." He felt that aid should be
based on need, not political belief available for all wardevastated nations, with no strings attached (such as prohibitions against usage for nationalization of industry) save
to prohibit their employment in purchasing implements of

war and

destruction. Moreover, the United Nations should
a
world-wide ever-normal granary both to prevent
up
famine and to support world grain markets, thus aiding the
set

American farmer.

Finally, Wallace envisioned joint superviindustrial potential by Britain, France, Rusthe United States to insure that "its resources [would]

sion of the

Ruhr

sia, and
be used to reconstruct Europe."
While unsuccessful in convincing the committee that the
Marshall plan was little more than an extension of the earlier
Truman doctrine, Henry A. Wallace had, in the view of some
observers, emerged as one possessed of a clear and concrete
counterproposal which might serve as a basis for modifying
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the original administration plans. Although the unwarranted
action of the committee in barring full press coverage of the
hearings occasioned considerable protest, it curtailed public

awareness of his points.
Wallace's second opportunity came some two months later
before a Senate

Armed

Services

Committee considering the

universal military training proadministration. Ascribing a series of
"deliberately created crises" to the President, Wallace called
for a reversal of American policies that, in his opinion, were

peacetime selective service
posals of the

Truman

helping to breed a

new

war.

But the danger comes from
our own policies which will bring war unnecessary war
upon our country. The crisis lies in the war fever itself,

Our country

is

in danger.

not in the real threats of invasion, but in the synthetic
"threats of invasion" pumped out to support the arms pro6

gram.

a "peaceful foreign policy" were resumed, said Wallace,
would be no need for either inflated military budgets
or armed forces built up beyond a point attainable with
of opinion
voluntary enlistments. Once more, the consensus
If

there

was

Washington but that

in

had changed few minds
he had obtained a public forum for

that the former Vice President

the third-party position.
The third opportunity

mittee

hearings

control

bill.

came with Senate Judiciary Comon the Mundt-Nixon subversive activity

Dramatically interrupting his far-western tour,

Wallace flew back to Washington to testify that the proand undemocratic.
posed legislation was both ill-advised
It was contrary to traditional American freedom of expreshe said, and sought to impose restrictions on political
As quoted by C. P. Trusell in the New York Times, March 31,

sion,
6

1948.
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even going so far as to outlaw

thinking and ideas

Ms new

party.

As

the

bill is

framed,

its

penalties

can be

visited

upon

cause of world
every organization which espouses the
which
opposes the
peace and progress every organization
basic tenets of the bipartisan program.

name

In the

Mundt-Nixon bill

fighting foreign totalitarianism [the
seeks] to impose domestic totalitarianism.

of

In the name of saving the constitution, the constitution

is

7

destroyed.

But while the party thus received a ready-made, if specially
muted, national sounding board, it was changing few minds,
swaying few votes; for the crusade was under way in a
a climate
milieu which increasingly insisted upon conformity
of opinion learning to label as subversive all dissent and to

demand punishment

for the

dissenters.

Violence,

slanted

press coverage, and attempted intimidation all became a
part of the "fight for peace." The first actual bloodshed came
as a Wallace organizer was stabbed to death, apparently
for his third-party activities, in Charleston, South Carolina.

The

drive for the petition signatures in

West Virginia

wit-

nessed gunplay, midnight auto pursuits, and threats of bodily
harm for organizers, although fortunately no actual blood-

shed was reported.
Nor could all of

this

un-American display be attributed

to extremists or the uneducated. Violence of a different sort

intimidation to remain silent or risk losing one's job
broke out in an appalling number of colleges and universities
across the nation. At Evansville College in Indiana, Pro-

George Parker was summarily dismissed for acting as
chairman of a local Wallace rally and introducing the third-

fessor

7

As

1948.

reported by Rodney Crowther in the Baltimore Sun,

May

30,
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party presidential candidate. College officials frankly admitted that the reason for the dismissal was "Mr. Parker's
political activity,

both on and

off the

campus." At the same

time they claimed, according to the Baltimore Sun, "The
college fully subscribes to the principle of academic freedom
but believes that the individual who exercises the privilege

must assume the

when

responsibility for his utterances

and actions

they destroy confidence and faith in the institution of

which he

is

a member."

The

W.

following month a Bradley University professor, Dr.
V. Lytle, introduced Mr. Wallace to a Peoria, Illinois,

over the protests of university officials and soon found
that his contract would not be renewed. Although he did not
rally

actually lose his position, it was reported that pressure was
exerted on Professor Curtis MacDougall by bis university
(Northwestern) in an unsuccessful attempt to force the witl*-

drawal of his name as Progressive senatorial candidate in
Illinois.

In the South, pro-Wallace

were the cause for the
two other institutions. The
University of Georgia fired Assistant Professor James Barfoot,
proposed Progressive gubernatorial candidate, on the grounds
that "his political activities had become so extensive and involved that his effectiveness as a teacher was impaired." And
the University of Miami in Florida conducted a wholesale
purge, releasing three instructors who dared support the Walactivities

dismissal of four instructors at

lace candidacy.
At the University of

New

Hampshire, Professor John

who had

served as chairman of the state Progressive Party, suddenly found it advisable to move to Idaho,
despite the fact that his contract had another year to run.

Rideout,

A

second Wallace-supporting New Hampshire professor
seen promotion denied him because of his political

who had
activities

remarked that he might "be forced to resign to

save [his] career."

As a

result of its actions in these cases,
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New Hampshire found its application for
a Phi Beta Kappa charter tabled for three years.
Despite sanctions such as this and reprimands from the

the University of

American Association

of University Professors, the toll in
far higher than the reported

academic freedom ran high

On

firings.

too

many campuses

traditional

American free
and witch-

victim to short-sighted administrations
speech
hunting boards of trustees.
fell

Progressive campaigners found it increasingly difficult to
secure either auditorium or hotel accommodations in many

The Birmingham

incident involving Senator Taylor
was typical of the difficulty in finding a forum. Scheduled to
deliver speeches, Wallace and Taylor would find themselves
cities.

deprived of a meeting place with little or no notice. Registering at a hotel, they would find their reservations had been
mysteriously canceled.

And

again,

it

was not only a case of

machines denying the use of municipal facilities. University administrations which had in the past permitted the
presentation of divergent political views now found it inexpolitical

pedient to permit the voice of a third party. Thus Wallace
facilities of the Uni-

found himself barred from campus

versity of California at Berkeley, the University of Missouri,
the University of Cincinnati, and Syracuse
University, to

mention only a few.

At

the University of Washington, Wallace found himself
company as officials there simultaneously excluded

in strange

both him and Republican contender Thomas E. Dewey from
the campus, notwithstanding the fact that President Truman
was scheduled for later delivery of a "nonpolitical" address.
And in those more enlightened institutions where free

speech was sustained as more than a theoretical concept, it
often became impossible for
third-party speakers to make
themselves heard above the clamor of hecklers unversed in
or unwilling to abide by the American tradition of freedom
to present

all

points of view.
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The most damaging impact

of

all

this

was not upon the

the whole of Ameri-

Progressive Party itself, but rather upon
can society. As the campaign progressed, the pressure for
conformity and the unwillingness to permit any expression
of dissenting opinion increased rather than abated.
As John Stuart Mill had warned a century earlier:

... It is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated
most by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end
in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to
those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped and their reason cowed by the fear
of heresy.

There is always hope when people are forced to
both sides; it is when they attend only to one that
errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have
.

.

.

listen to

the effect of truth by being exaggerated into falsehood. 8

There was

made

it

still

another facet of the spring campaign which

increasingly difficult for the American people to listhe scanty coverage accorded the third

ten to both sides

party by both press and radio, save in a few metropolitan
Although large numbers of reporters accompanied
candidate Dewey on his western preconvention jaunt

centers.

and throngs of commentators traveled with the Truman
"nonpolitical" campaign train, only three newspapers saw
to give full coverage to Wallace's spring tours.

fit

And

the

objectivity of coverage by these three, the New York Post, the
Baltimore Sun, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, suffered con-

siderably

by comparison with

their handling of the

major

party campaigns.
Perhaps the most glaring examples, in the light of reputed
8

John Stuart

Inc.,

Mill,

On

1956), pp. 41, 63.

Liberty

(New York:

Liberal Arts Press,
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and expected full coverage, were the New York
the New York Herald Tribune. Although the
and
Times
Times did report in greater detail than other papers those incidents occurring in New York City (such as the Wallace letter to Stalin), it clearly allowed its editorial view that the
American Labor Party was "Communist-dominated" to per-

fairness

news columns. This bias emerged particularly in
coverage of the Isaacson campaign, for which objective

meate
its

its

treatment by the anti-third-party

PM offered

a basis of com-

parison.

nominee Taylor was given even more
treatment
by tie press than was Wallace.
pronounced silent
Only the Birmingham incident, played up for its sensationVice-presidential

alism,

showed that journals across the nation were even

aware of his candidacy.
few papers demonstrated even greater zeal

A

far as to attempt the intimidation of voters

sign Wallace nominating petitions.
be described in a later chapter,

going so

who had dared

The Pittsburgh

Press, as

was the leader in this reBoston, Milwaukee (the Milwaukee

will

spect, and journals in
Journal), and Cleveland, as well as others of the ScrippsHoward chain, were guilty of similar practices, according to

party

officials.

While radio commentators were on the whole scarcely more
objective in dealing with the Wallace Progressive Party, the
national networks, until the time of the Philadelphia Convention, provided considerable free time for the party's speakers. Thus the
Taylor acceptance speech, Wallace's reply to
an intemperate Truman attack on the party as a "Com-

munist front," and several other major preconvention addresses received full airings.
But on the whole, the American

mass media did little in this

preconvention campaign to disprove Senator Taylor's comment that "our modern means of communication do not
necessarily

mean

that the

American people are the best

in-
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formed in the world, only that they have greater access to
larger amounts of information and possible misinformation/'
As a first round in the "fight for peace," the spring campaign proved a losing one for the Wallace forces. Preaching
the virtues of peaceful coexistence, they watched the Czech
their only successful model, taking with it the
of
their
appeal
peace issue. Successful in a congressional contest where the Palestine problem was foremost, they saw the
Truman administration shift to a more consistent pro-

coup destroy

Labor and Liberal support,
witnessed
a
trend
to the left as President
they
pronounced
Truman, aided by the Americans for Democratic Action,

Israelite position. Still hopeful of

strove to muster the New Deal remnants into a Fair Deal army.
Then* arguments for abundance became less persuasive as the

Democratic Party once again took on

its

Roosevelt image as

And

before long their freedom issue
was to be undercut by the victory of the Humphrey-led integrationist forces at the Democratic National Convention

the party of the people.

and by the subsequent defection of the Dixiecrats.
Thus the Progressives had not only lost the first battle in
the "fight for peace," but their arms
"Peace, Freedom and
Abundance" had been captured by the enemy as well. For
the first time in American history, the thunder of a party of
discontent had been stolen, neither four nor forty years later,
but in the very midst of the campaign.

CHAPTER

New

Building a

ALTHOUGH THE campaign

5

Party

tours of the candidates, the

New

York

City by-election to fill the Bronx vacancy, and the inexorable press of events both at home and abroad formed

the major features of the 1948 spring campaign, they were
far from the only battles in the "fight for peace." But the

Wallace crusaders were faced with the multiple tasks of
building a new party. Three major problems confronted
them organizing party machinery, obtaining a place~6h the
ballots of the forty-eight states, and securing adequate financial support. From the standpoint of both importance and
timing, all three were integrated, all three were independent.
They form the subject of this and the two following chapters.

was to become a
was the first need

If this

tion

true party of the people, organizato build a machine possessing a

breadth of support, depth of organization, and endurance for
the future. As L. B. Wheildon had concluded in Editorial
Research Reports the preceding July, "Established party machines can be overthrown, if at all, only by new machines.
Electoral votes are created out of the votes in precincts,

wards and districts."
It was to the precincts, wards, and
lace followers

now

districts that

And

the Wal-

here, it soon
was not the same general degree of
agreement that surrounded the "Peace, Freedom and Abun-

became apparent,

turned their attention.

there
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Party

dance" issues already discussed. Of the three questions
whether the party was to seek "breadth or narrowraised
ness," whether the primary target was the 1948 or the 1952
to
campaign, and whether or not an attempt should be made
there was general agreement on
build from the ground up
only one. Whereas the divergent groups in the party accepted

most Wallace policy

decisions, they

were unable

to agree

on

his organizational views.

The first ideological cleavage developed over the question
of securing breadth of support for the New Party. Wallace
himself was very much aware of the importance of this factor.
In an April speech to the New York State Wallace-for-President Committee he warned:
I urge elimination of groups

party movement. This
itself.

urge that

I

movement

we

accept

all

and
is

factions in this

new

as broad as humanity
who wish for a

people

the United States and Sopeaceful understanding between
can get the support of these people
viet Russia ....

We

if

they realize that
If

we

we do

are going to

ing to be

many

not represent one group.

be a party of 20

million, there are go-

kinds of people in that party.

Keep the door

open.

On

the other

hand many within the party looked upon

it

as more of a pressure group for their particular viewpoint.
its organization narrow so that
were anxious to

They

keep
might express those views more vigorously. For example,
some of its labor leaders urged that the party de-emphasize

it

the international relations aspect, and play up Taft-Hartley
as the main issue of the campaign. Then there were those of

Communist

leanings

who

that all pretense of breadth
closely knit "cell-type" structure

felt

should be abandoned and a
established.

Closely related was the question of whether to build for
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the 1948 campaign alone, or for the future. The immediate
need for haste if election deadlines were to be met was in the

back of everyone's mind. But those who favored a narrow
organization argued that theirs would be the only type with
sufficient cohesiveness to endure. Again their premise was
based upon the idea of a small band of well-disciplined, loyal
workers whose continued support could be relied upon. Wal-

lace rejected this idea as well, telling the Colorado
Progressive Party:

People who want the party narrowly based say that a
broad base won't work. They want to go ahead with the
idea of winning not in '48 but in '52 .... But it's a hard
fact that we can't win the necessary votes in either
year

by a crusade among the principal groups of our
... the women's groups, the church groups, and
the young people in our schools and colleges.
unless

people

The only

organizational matter upon which there was
in
the ranks was the necessity of a strenuous atagreement
to
establish
tempt
machinery down to the ward and precinct
levels all across the nation. This, it was realized
by all, was

the only way to attract any sizable number of voters into
the Progressive
camp and to turn them out on election day.

Despite the fact that this was a new party, there existed,
even prior to the Wallace declaration, considerable nationwide machinery. The most important was that of the Pro-

The origins of PCA could be
maneuvers in the 1944 presidential campaign. In that
year the Political Action Committee of the CIO had formed the National Citizens Political
Action Committee in the attempt to broaden its
appeal out-

gressive Citizens of America.
traced to a series of political

Building a

New

95

Party

side the labor sphere.

The National

Citizens Political Action

Committee operated on a national basis in the 1944 campaign to raise funds for the Roosevelt-Truman ticket. In the
spring of the same year a New York City group led by Mrs.
Elinor S. Gimbel, Quentin Reynolds, and others, feeling that
Tammany Hall was not sufficiently active for the Roosevelt candidacy, had formed the Citizens' Action Committee.
This group of political amateurs, primarily Democratic but
with a sprinkling of Republicans, desired to work on the
local level, ringing doorbells and speaking to small groups,
thus actively entering into practical politics.

Shortly after the Democratic National Convention still a
came into existence, the Independent Citizens*

third group

Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions. An outgrowth of the earlier (1940) Independent Voters Committee,
tilie ICC-ASP had a much different orientation,
according to
Miss Hannah Dorner, its director. Its members from the
stage, from the academic world, and from professional life
generally were more interested in pressure group activities,
such as pressing for promotion of a National Science Foundation. But, here too, there were some seeking a broader political outlet for their specialized talents
from playwriting to
stage lighting.

The

first

joining of forces came
its local New

Committee merged

when the Citizens* Action
York City activities into

the broader National Citizens Political Action Committee

during the 1944 campaign, thus bringing together the well
to do, the middle class, and the labor segments of the origi-

Two years later, prior to the 1946 congressional
the
two main bodies, NC-PAC and ICC-ASP,
campaign,
to
form
the Progressive Citizens of America. With
merged
nal groups.

similar interests

would

and backing

effect greater strength

ever, once inside the

was felt that a combination
and greater efficiency. How-

it

PCA, many

of the

ASP members who
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had favored pressure-group activity alone began to
at ease. Many walked out when the PCA became the

feel

ill

vehicle

for the Wallace third-party candidacy.
chapter, both NC-PAC and ICCthe
Wallace
supported
position following the Madison Square Garden speech. In 1947, with the enunciation of

As

noted in an

earlier

ASP had
the

Truman

doctrine, the

PCA

embarked upon a broad cam-

paign of opposition to the administration's bipartisan foreign policy. Although Wallace was not a member, he became

PCA's

principal speaker at a series of rallies
across the nation.

At

this time,

C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin,

and meetings

who had

served un-

New Deal days, was the executive vice
PCA. He was already trying to kindle a third-

der Wallace in the
president of

party fire, despite Wallace's continued advocacy at that time
of action within Democratic ranks.
Finally, with the prospective candidate increasingly recepDecember, 1947, the executive board of the

PCA

tive, in

had voted with only three
Henry A. Wallace to run

abstentions and
as

one dissent "to urge

an independent candidate for the

Presidency of the United States." What contribution
prepared to make to the "fight for peace"?

was the

PCA

Organizationally, they possessed state and local chapters
of varying degrees of strength in
twenty-five of the fortyeight states. New York and Southern California branches

were well established, but elsewhere there was merely a skeleton framework. But the PCA also
promised a background
of political know-how. As early as 1946, Lew Franks and
Ralph Shikes had conducted studies and compiled a manual
of political organization aimed at the
proven house-to-house
type of campaign. Moreover, the PCA had originated a
"school for political action"
a Washington, D.C. seminar
for political workers. This school was the forerunner of those
later utilized by the CIO Political Action Committee, the

New
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Americans for Democratic Action, and eventually big business

itself.

In addition, the

PCA

had been perfecting new techniques
for gaining financial
support. Originating with the CIO Political Action Committee, the basic idea consisted of
paid admissions and voluntary contributions at
political rallies. To
these rallies, the ASP
from
group
Broadway had added stag-

and dramatization. The resulting presentahad proved themselves during 1947, when the PCA
garnered over one quarter of one million dollars from their
series of rallies
opposing the Truman doctrine and adminising,

lighting,

tions

tration foreign
policy.

PCA

Thus the
had already faced two of the three major
obstacles in the path of the New
Party at this time, and
promised aid in both.
In endorsing the Wallace
candidacy, the Executive Board
PCA announced that it would submit its decision to the

of the

second annual convention of the body at Chicago the following month. The 500 delegates to this January assembly
promptly ratified the board action in a resolution that permitted: (1) the state chapters to affiliate,
merge, or cooperate
with any Wallace party or committee, (2)
delegates to repre-

PCA at an April founding convention for a third
and (3) the National Board to determine whether

sent the
party,

PCA

should merge into or affiliate with the third
party, subto
ratification by two-thirds of the state
ject
chapters. Thus
the way was paved for the
to retain its identity or to
become the nucleus of the third party.

PCA

It soon became
apparent, however, that the new party
would require a much stronger central organization than
could be evolved from the semi-autonomous PCA branches.

As
ter

early as March, a threefold split into right, left, and cengroups was appearing among the Wallace committees.

State

and

local organizations

had proceeded

pretty

much on
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own, and

conflict with national policy began to emefge.
the
For example,
Independent Progressive Party of Southern
had
California
gone ahead with plans to oppose the re-

their

of the Liberal Democratic representatives Helen
Gahagan Douglas and Chet Holifield on the basis of their

election

This was contrary
support for Marshall plan aid to Europe.
Baldwin
of supporting
Beanie
announced
to the policy
by

incumbents with a predominantly "good" record. Baldwin, according to notes by Helen Fuller, in the files of New Republic, told the Chicago conference, "While we cannot and must
not judge any sitting Congressman by any single vote, there
are certain conditions ... to receive our support
.
supfull rights of organized labor .
...
of
the
the
.
port
.

UN

.

.

support of the constitutional civil rights of every person living within our borders." (Italics supplied.) Wallace, in a later
letter to

J. O'Donnell was even more
specific. "Canbe judged on the basis of their position on any

Mr. C.

didates will not

single issue such as the Marshall Plan."

In the meantime, plans were being formulated for a 700member National Wallace-for-President Committee, to be

headed by a brain trust composed of Baldwin as campaign
manager, Elmer Benson as chairman, and Angus Cameron as
treasurer. Its first meeting was scheduled to coincide with the
Chicago assembly called by the Progressive Citizens of America for April.

At

Chicago meeting the decision was reached to take
over the Progressive Citizens of America machinery and incorporate it into the new party. For policy planning the third
party, like the British Labor Party, would have an annual
this

National Convention, with representation based on individ-

members and

interest groups as well as state and local
For
interim meetings there would be a much
organizations.
smaller National Committee. Representation on the latter
was to be primarily geographical, with the number of state

ual

committee members proportional to population, unlike the
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major party pattern of two for each

state.

A

supplemental

"functional representation" for labor and other groups was
added later. Since it was expected that the large size of this

make it even more unwieldy than
major party counterparts, there were to be two smaller
a National Executive Committee to meet every
bodies
month and an Administrative Committee to carry out the
National Committee would
its

day-to-day tasks of policy planning.
For the execution of third-party policy, a board of national officers was projected
a chairman and several vice-

chairmen, as well as a party treasurer, secretary, and campaign manager. This panel would be responsible for carrying
out over-all policy, for establishing lines of communication
to the various state, local, and associated groups, and for insuring coordination in all the phases of a presidential campaign.

With a basic structure thus agreed upon, the delegates went
on to plans for a first national convention, at Philadelphia in
July. This summer assemblage would formally establish the
organization, adopt a name for the New Party, ratify a party
platform, and formalize the choice of the national candidates.
The national organization now faced its major problem

determining an organizational policy and transforming this
policy into a machine that would be both comprehensive and

The fundamental antagonism now began to emerge
between right and left between Wallace himself and those
he later labeled the "Peekskill Boys." l The candidate felt
that the actions of his more rabid followers of the extreme left
would result in a base far too narrow for the party following
of 20,000,000 which he anticipated.

enduring.

1

kill

Wallace's description of his more rabid followers as the "PeeksBoys" derived from the methods and tactics of leftists in the

series of riots

and disorders

at

a scheduled Peekskill,

New

York,

concert by Paul Robeson, in 1949. Although not overt antagonists,
some of the left-wingers displayed an attack-us-if-you-dare attitude.
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Despite his strong views on the subject, Wallace remained

from the organizational problems of the party. Having
delegated this function completely to Beanie Baldwin, he devoted himself to policy issues and campaigning an action
which was not solely the result of time pressures. Viewing
as a means to an end, Wallace, in
political organization only
his own words, was simply "not interested." He left the vital
aloof

organizational tasks almost completely in Baldwin's hands,

and Beanie was under constant, almost irresistible, pressure
from the New York City extremists opposed to Wallace's view
that this be made a broad party of the
people. When nonCommunist leadership and talent failed to respond on the
organizational level in adequate numbers, the left-wingers
were able by default to take over to a considerable extent. As
Wallace viewed the dilemma, "the broad mass is
always slow
to act, the narrow, rabid
mil
but
their
act,
group
by
very action, will

keep the others away."

Coupled with the failure of old New Dealers and eastern
Liberals to respond to the organizational demands of the
New Party was a similar lack of
from the midwestresponse

em

inheritors of the

La

Follette tradition.

As Rexford Tug-

well wrote in the Progressive a
year after the campaign:

had been a flood of Progressives [to the
Party]
determined, dedicated where would the
Communists about whom we hear so much, have been?
lost
They would have been lost as they were
If there

energetic,

.

.

.

always

when they tried to claim President Roosevelt, or ...
when they made approaches to old Bob La Follette ....
The reason Communist workers were so
in the
prominent
Wallace campaign was that the
Progressives were
sitting it out; wringing their hands, and wailing.

The

real

,

.

.

tragedy [was the] withholding of support [and]
leadership by those who should have offered it.
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Thomas

I. Emerson of the Connecticut
People's
the
and who
Party citing
difficulty of determining who was
was not a Communist, summarized the problem: "Com-

Professor

munist workers were undoubtedly involved and did much of
the work [of organization] .... There was a lack of non-

Communist
nists

.

.

.

talent

and leadership to submerge the CommuCommunists probably lacked the strength

[but] the

to take over."

Given the rift over organization and the failure of the
moderates to respond in greater numbers, what sort of organization emerged? To what extent was there coordination
of the various groups involved and integration of the various

The strategic design followed a pattern more closely
akin to British than to American major party practice, with

levels?

national

headquarters assuming supervisory powers over
those state and local organizations already in existence. In

unorganized areas personal contacts were established or reestablished by the campaign manager Beanie Baldwin, in an
attempt to secure a complete coverage of the nation. Field
organizers were dispatched from

where

local

know-how was

New York

lacking or

to assist in areas

deficient.

five of these trouble shooters, the chief of

There were

whom, Barney

Conal, had received his training in a research and organizational post with the American Federation of Labor.

One

of the most pressing problems was that of establishing
adequate communications. If there was to be national-local
coordination, a two-way transmission channel was a necessity so that local problems and policy could be forwarded
to

New York

and the decisions made there

in line with na-

tional strategy, then dispatched to the local groups for execution. Baldwin's remarks indicated that this formidable task

was never accomplished satisfactorily. As campaign manager
he was unable to get out into the field and had to remain in
the New York office to receive the emergency calls from local
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chiefs.

Time was

1948

so short and the local groups so pressed

their ballot deadlines that

by
no regular system ever emerged.

Chief reliance was placed upon reports of the field organizers

and upon sporadic phone

calls

from

local leaders.

Consequently, national headquarters remained poorly informed regarding developments and problems in the field.

The lower echelons, in their turn, failed in many instances to
receive adequate or timely tactical plans that accorded with
over-all strategy.

In any evaluation of organizational work, the conclusion

must ultimately be reached

that the Progressive Party was
not too successful. The policy determination split over the
broad versus the narrow approach was never successfully

dilemma whose horns could not have been

was

possibly a
avoided. Deliber-

resolved, although, as Wallace suggested, this

wound up with a fatal narrowness.
Although the national organization was able to establish
broad lines of authority over its state and local groups, it
failed to integrate them
through any successful control mechaately or not, the party

nism.

The major

withparties' ability to operate successfully
to rest on the
command

out any strong chain of

appears

power of their local and particularly their state committees.
These committees possess the ability to conduct effective campaign operations on their own. Being strong, they can afford
to be individualistic in manner and even in direction. However, lack of central control in the Wallace party was magnified
by the continued weakness of most of the Progressives'
state and local
organizations.
The Progressives had only one strong local party the
American Labor Party. Hence it was necessary for their
weaker units to operate along parallel lines if they were to
be at all effective. Central command was
necessary to insure
that
strength of unity would be afforded their endeavors.
Moreover, the weak links had to be located, so that they
might be given reinforcement. Had it not been for the vigor
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of the individual trouble shooters,

it

appears

would have been almost a complete lack of policy
coordination among state, local, and national bodies.
there

The
were

details of organization

on the

state

and local

levels

But out of
this myriad array of varying
problems, techniques, and degrees of success, an extremely broad classification of patterns
emerges that may be examined through the activities in only
as varied as the forty-eight states themselves.

five states.

where the party hoped to make
New York with its American Labor Party and Minnesota with its Democratic FarmerLabor Party. Second, there were those where organizing had
already begun during the previous year, such as California
with its Independent Progressive Party and Illinois. Finally,
there were the forty-four remaining states, where the task
would be to start from scratch and build organizations to
First, there

were the

states

use of existing party machinery

fight the petition battles for places

on

in the election campaigns. Connecticut

the ballots as well as

was a

typical

exam-

ple of building from the ground up, and Colorado exemplified a complete and open rift along the lines of the broad-

narrow

cleavage referred to above.
State, the American Labor Party had been
born of the 1936 campaign coalition of anti-Tammany Labor-

In

right-left

New York

Liberal sentiment mobilized for the re-election of President
Roosevelt. In the ensuing years it had built for itself a strong,
deep, and durable machine on the sidewalks of New York.

Never able

to attract any substantial following upstate
even
and
Lake
cities
of
the
Mohawk
Onin the industrial
Valley

the ALP's power in the metropolis was such
could regularly turn out some 400,000 votes in every

tario Plain

that

it

state-wide election.

What were

the foundations of

its

metropolitan machinery?
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First, there was, in the

Eighteenth Congressional District, the
of Representative Vito Marcantonio. In
personal following
an area predominantly populated by low-income groups of
Italian, Jewish, Puerto Rican, and Negro lineage, Marc had

employed an orthodox

if

modernized ward-level approach to
New York office he established

the hearts of his voters. In his

an amazing multilingual assembly

line for the efficient

mass

processing of myriad requests. Nor was the Representative
himself ever too busy to talk to the lines of constituents who
flocked there for advice, for favors, and for assistance. Cou-

pled with this were Marcantonio's steady and vocal espousal
of causes favored by these submerged groups and his
ability
to

keep the forces of Democratic and Republican opposition

divided.

But the American Labor Party machinery was
than the Eighteenth
its

far broader
even though Marcantonio was

District,

sole congressional representative until the Isaacson
victory.

The New York County (Manhattan) organization had been
building for many years
again on the traditional wardservice pattern. At the base of the pyramid were some thirty
local precinct clubs, with at least

assembly

districts.

Each with

its

one in each of the sixteen

own

headquarters,

officers,

and executive committees, these clubs formed the nucleus for
a multitude of personal services. For instance, at income tax
time these clubs would advertise free assistance in fining out
returns.

tempted

No

no indoctrination atthere was only a conimpress the voters that here was a legitimate

questions were

no party

sistent effort to

and a friendly

affiliation

political

asked

checked

group.

Numerous

other

errands

were performed

assistance to tenants in
curbing unlawful
landlord practices and aid in securing
immigration papers
for relatives or in arranging transportation for those
flying
in from San Juan, Puerto Rico. As Geraldine Shandross,

county committee executive secretary, put
was placed on the basis of principle
.

"This assistance

it,
.

.

and since the
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Democratic Party had begun to

fail in its

endeavors of a

ALP gained acceptance, if not adherents."
Within these local clubs themselves, monthly meetings were
held, policy discussed, and decisions arrived at. According
to ALP information, these meetings were open, and anyone
desiring to pay one-dollar-per-year dues could become a full
similar nature, the

member. Policy could originate at these lower levels and pass
up through the county committee to the state committee for
action. For instance, the party^ request that President Truman intervene in the 1949-50 coal strike on behalf of the
miners was said to have come from the club level.
This sense of participation on the part of the members
explained, at least in part, why they proved such valuable
workers in the 1948 campaign donating their services as

watchers at the

polls, as drivers of cars,

and

as ringers of

There were problems, of course, for this minority
the lack of patronage and favors to dispense, the lack
of free-flowing funds, and the strength of the propaganda

doorbells.

party

combined against them by both major parties. And with
no scrutiny of the political beliefs of prospective members,
infiltration to influence policy may have proved relatively
simple. For instance, in Albany County the O'Connell Demo-

forces

machine, with different motives, sent 1,500 infiltrators
dominate the 1948 ALP primary, nominating its own

cratic

to

then withdrew, leaving vacant the Row
C spaces on the ballot. Despite all these handicaps, the ALP
had, by 1948, established itself on the state political scene.

local candidates,

who

The preconvention

battle in

New York

revolved around

who would

the questions of who would dominate,
the Wallace candidacy, and what would be

its

support

campaign

As noted

in a preceding chapter, the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, with their claimed strength of 135,000,
had withdrawn early in January from the American Labor

vehicle.

Party, as
later,

it

Mike

backed the Wallace candidacy. Three months
Quill,

flamboyant president of the Transport
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Workers Union, earlier in the third-party ranks on the CIO
National Board, dramatically reversed his position
resigning
from the ALP he had helped found, with a denunciation of
"the screwballs and crackpots who will continue to
carry on
as if the Communist Party and the American Labor
Party
were the same house with two doors." These withdrawals
left Vito Marcantonio
clearly in command of the ALP
machinery with its
Wallace-Taylor ticket

ballot

place already promised the
soon as its state committee could
legally make the formal endorsement.
At this time there was, however, a question about whether

or not the
cle in the

ALP would
Empire

as

serve as the exclusive

third-party vehi-

When O. John Rogge, New York

State.

City attorney prominent in many Liberal causes, issued the
March for a New York State WaJlace-for-President
Committee that would include PCA and upstate

call in

components
was interpreted as the start of a
drive to place the Progressive name on the November ballot
separately. Marcantonio, however, was quoted in the New
York Herald Tribune as saying, "There will be no fifth line
on the machine!" (in addition to Republican, Democratic,
ALP, and Liberal lines) Although PCA delegates outnumbered those from the ALP at the
April Founding Convention
as well as

ALP,

his action

of the New York Committee, a
majority favored the Marcantonio position. 2 No
attempt would be made to qualify under
the Progressive label, and the
would become the exclusive vehicle for the crusade in the
Empire State. As Marc

ALP

had

dictated, there

was no

Events in the second
to utilize
2

an

existing party

The New York

on the ballot.
where the Progressives hoped
Minnesota will be described

fifth line

state

Times, April 14, 1948, reported that of 1,031

PCA had 310 from New York City and 121
ALP 159 city and 74 upstate, and the unions

delegates the
state,

the

with the balance divided
organizations.

among

youth, student,

from uphad 161,
Jewish, and Negro
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in greater detail in the
following chapter. It suffices for the
present to note that the left wing of the Democratic Farmer-

Labor Party under former Governor Elmer Benson met
defeat at every turn. In control of the state executive committee, but not the larger state central committee, this facwas unable to outmaneuver the

tion

rightwing Humphrey-led
group. Convention arrangements were voted out of its hands,
and county convention support failed to materialize. Finally,

refused seats in the state convention, the left-wingers convened a rump convention, whose choice of pro-Wallace DEL

was later invalidated by the state Supreme Court.
But what of the states where new organizations had begun
to blossom during 1947? In California, as noted earlier, the
third-party movement had started in a drive among leftwing Democrats to secure the Democratic presidential nomination for Henry A. Wallace. There was considerable dissatisfaction reported on the West Coast
particularly among
electors

labor leaders such as those of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, who condemned President

Truman's earlier actions concerning the railway strike. Moreover, it seemed possible that a large segment of the Liberal
whig of the party might back the Wallace movement. James
Roosevelt, eldest son of the late President and state chairman
of the Democratic Committee, was reported favorably disposed, as were such Liberal members of Congress as Helen
Gahagan Douglas and Chet Holifield.
This hope faded however, when Roosevelt ultimately decided to join his previous opponents on the state committee,
Edwin Pauley and William Malone, in an endorsement of
President Truman's policies. Nevertheless, union agitation
continued, and the decision was made to press for a third
party. The strategy was this: If the leftists could still force
the selection of pro-Wallace delegates to the Democratic
National Convention, they would do so, but in the event that

they should

fail,

the necessary machinery for a third party
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must be already in motion
a place on the ballot.

in

view of the early deadline for

a Joint Trade Union ConAccordingly, in August, 1947,
ference for a Third Party was held in Los Angeles. Although
3
discussed a new party, it took no action. But the
this

body

had adjourned, in a building just across the street,
many of the same personnel present, the Organizing
Committee of the Independent Progressive Party of California
was founded by some six hundred delegates and observers.
What were their hopes of success? They lay chiefly, ac-

day

after

it

with

cording to Progressive Party organizer Barney Conal, in the
"fluid politics" of Southern California. Party discipline was

rendered feeble by the state cross-filing system and by the
absence of political machines, except in San Francisco. There
were no clubs, no bosses, no precinct workers of the traditional

Democratic-Tammany

sembly

district,

type.

There were no ward,

or county committees with entrenched

as-

ma-

from precinct
chinery. Lines of party authority ran directly
committeeman to state committee to state executive committee at the higher level.
With many of the precinct leaders favorable to

Wallace

and no entrenched apparatus to overturn, a strong new movement seemed possible. Moreover, of the three main state
outside the Democratic Party, one had alpolitical groups
ready committed

itself to

the crusade, and the others were not

the Towncompletely unfriendly. These three main groups
sendites, the EPICS ("End Poverty in California") of Upton
had been linked with
Sinclair, and the "Ham and Eggers"
the Democratic Party
8

by Franklin D. Roosevelt

to

turn

There were 1,236 delegates representing 51 AFL, 116 CIO, 19
and 11 independent unions and 34 veterans', 22 youth, 205
Townsend, 45 Jewish, 13 Negro, 18 nationality, and 58 Progressive
Citizens of America groups according to Jack Young, "California
Started Something," New Masses, October 14, 1947.
railroad,
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California from the Republicans.
They were now somewhat
tied
to
it as a
even
loosely
"Radical," fringe. Dr.
Progressive,
Francis Townsend had announced in
1947, Ms

May,
support
of a third-party endeavor.
Another unusual factor in California stemmed from the
state's

"political fluidity." Progressive-Party strategists felt
that an ideological
approach would be possible. With party
so
weak
and
with a vast influx of foreign-born
loyalty

popuLos Angeles area, they felt they
could reach many independent and uncommitted voters
on the basis of Wallace's
especially Mexican-Americans
lation, particularly into the

program, as well as his Latin-American ties his earlier
tours, his link with the Good Neighbor Policy, and his ability
to speak Spanish.
In this favorable climate, the Progressive
began to

Party
broadest state organization. Participating in this construction were Townsendites, leftwing
CIO unions chiefly the International Longshoremen's and
build what

was

to

become

its

Warehousemen's Union and Marine Cooks and Stewards
the leftwing Democrats, and
eventually the Progressive Citizens of America. Of these groups, the Townsendites were the
best organized. They possessed clubs and
politically minded

members. Both had gone through many a campaign, many a
petition drive. Dr. Townsend himself had some practical suggestions to make: "Give your public a personal stake in the
outcome
top the opposition with a better organizer in
each district .... Women make better organizers than
men."
.

.

.

On

the other hand, union participation
proved disappointing. Although a considerable number of small locals pitched
in, it soon became apparent that the International Long-

shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union had the only really
effective organization. Nevertheless, there
lished, as Wallace announced his

was already estab-

candidacy, an active Cali-
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its strength concentrated in the Los
Angeles
about to be measured in the petition drive
success
area,
for a place on the ballot.

fornia machine
its

Among

the states with no third-party organization prior
was one of twenty-five in which there

to 1948, Connecticut

had been an active Progressive
ment during 1947. Even before

Citizens of

America move-

that, the Nutmeg State had
housed a branch of the National Citizens Political Action

Committee, the group which had tried to broaden the laborbased CIO Political Action Committee. Although there had
been new-party talk late in 1947, the actual tasks of organization did not get under way until the December announcement. With the decision to back Wallace, the Connecticut
Political Action Committee, as
happened in other state
committees, lost

many

of

its

members

as well as

its

director.

Regardless of these withdrawals, the majority was still enthusiastic and proceeded to organize a
provisional Wallacefor-President Committee with Professor
son, of Yale

The

first

Law

School, at its

problem was

Thomas

I.

Emer-

head.

to secure a

From Washington's

new

director for the

came Charles
B. Calkins, secretary to Senator Brien McMahon, to volunteer his services. Beginning a state-wide tour to establish contacts, in order to build a network of organizations in every
headless forces.

Capitol Hill

one of Connecticut's 169 towns, Calkins found considerable
indication of discontent in Connecticut
the two main issues of peace and labor relations being the same as elsewhere. Along with private conferences, a series of
open meetings was planned to keep public opinion informal on the

Progressive issues, and to keep discontent bubbling under
the Truman administration. Meanwhile, the
provisional committee proceeded with an interim organization. Constitutional,
finance, and campaign committees were established and operations started.

This preliminary work was

all

designed to lead up to an
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April founding convention. But the night before the convention was to open, Calkins, who had played such a leading
role, fell victim to his overexertion, dying of a sudden heart
attack.

The unexpected loss almost disrupted the delegates,
some confusion the convention began. Slowly a new

but after

machine

a People's Party

emerged for the Nutmeg State

battle.

Organizations were planned for each of the state's five
congressional districts. Each district was to have a finance and
a campaign committee which would supervise the work of the
existing town organizations and which would in turn report
to corresponding state groups. The task of organizing down

ward and

precinct levels was delegated to the town
groups. Actually, according to Professor Emerson, not too
many of these groups were successful in this respect, and it

to the

was here that the party mechanism broke down.
It was hoped that the lower levels would be stimulated
by
two factors personal appearances of the candidates and
preparations for the drive to get on the ballot. As in most
states, the link between organization and petition drive was
expected to aid both these aspects of the party's work. But
in Connecticut, reported Emerson, this "didn't
well." While Wallace's appearance at a

pan out too

New Haven

rally

was successful from the financial viewpoint to the tune of
some $35,000 or more it did not appreciably help the
task of organizing on lower levels.
The next step in the campaign was a state nominating
convention at which a platform was adopted, the WallaceTaylor slate endorsed, and candidates for state and local
decided upon. District organizations selected their own
congressional candidates, but the convention chose the repre-

offices

nominee as well as a six-man slate for
nomination for governor went to Professor
Emerson on the understanding that he would withdraw later if
sentative-at-large
state offices. The

the Democrats put

up an acceptable candidate. Only Chester
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Bowles seemed to fit this description, and when he later
received the Democratic nomination, Emerson did in fact
withdraw. In addition to these matters, the state convention
selected delegates to the national convention and discussed
the problems of organizing for the petition campaign.

On

appeared that Connecticut had set up a combut such was not the
prehensive state-wide establishment,
case. In this state, as in so many others, there were two main

paper

it

the failure to convert an impressive superstructure
into precinct-level reality and the failure to secure organized

failures

labor support. In Connecticut, the nonparticipation of the
United Electrical Workers, powerful in the Bridgeport area

was most damaging. The People's Party
mained for the most part a top-level white-collar affair.
particularly,

In Colorado, the failure to

achieve

re-

adequate breadth

stemmed from

the difference of opinion between the right
and left wings of the party concerning the type of structure
to be built. Broad-base organization was desired by the

center and right wings, led by Charles A.

Graham, a Denver

lawyer serving as state Wallace committee chairman; a narrow base was sought by the left wing, under Craig Vincent.
Despite the fact that Wallace made a personal appearance to
urge strongly the broad position, the leftists won out in a bitter
all-night convention session. Having lost the decision, the

moderates walked

out,

and Graham refused to accept the

chairmanship of the newly formed Progressive Party of
Colorado.

The Colorado

action threw

into

bold

relief

both the

contrasting opinions and the groups holding them. Those who
wanted breadth cited the American Labor Party in New York
as a successful

Only in

example of party membership open

to

all.

they argued, could the party build
rapidly enough for the 1948 campaign. The advocates of
narrowness urged a well-disciplined party core a
compact
cohesive group which would be able to build for their
this

fashion,
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primary goal, the 1952 campaign. The similarity of this
remarked at
position and that of the Communist Party was
at
time
least one reporter
Howard Norton in the
the
by
Baltimore Evening Sun. The narrow-base advocates won,
despite Wallace's entreaties to make this "a broadly based
party of the people."

The

examined reveal the general organizational
by the Progressives elsewhere. The preinitiated late in 1947 or early in
liminary organization
consisted
of a series of local committees for
1948 usually
states

pattern followed

Wallace,

who

The

then established a state-wide Wallace com-

having set up a provisional apparatus,
a state-wide convention, at which the party
would be officially launched, a platform adopted, the national candidates endorsed, and local candidates decided
mittee.

latter,

would summon

upon. Then, employing the twin techniques of petition drives
and mass meetings with name speakers, the dual task of getwas intertwined with
ting on the ballot and obtaining funds
the attempt to set up a real party machine. Although fine on
the party
of failure
paper, the over-all outcome was one
neither gained the breadth of support, nor did it organize
down to the ward and precinct levels. The sole exceptions

and

at that
qualified exceptions

were in

New

York, where

the American Labor Party provided some depth,

at least in

the city area, and California, where a degree of breadth was
attained. In no instance where the party had to start from
scratch hi 1948 was it able to achieve either of these goals.
And within a few short years both the American Labor Party
and the Independent Progressive Party would have comvanished following Wallace's withdrawal from the
pletely

party of his creation.

Whereas the

state

organizational ventures of the

New

work to line
Party followed established political paths, their
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up various functional groups was something of a departure
from the American geographical norm. These "associated
groups," including the National Labor Committee for Wallace
and Taylor, Women-for-Wallace, the Progressive Youth of
America, the Nationalities Division, Farm and Veteran
groups, and Businessmen-for-Wallace, were designed on a
functional basis to appeal to the specific voting segments
sug-

gested by their tides.

Unlike attempts made previously to garner the support
leaders, the National Labor Com-

and endorsement of labor

mittee for Wallace and Taylor was established to promote
The committee consisted of some one

rank-and-file affiliation.

thousand trade unionists

all across the nation.
Although
United
Electrical Workers president,
Fitzgerald,
was the chairman, the bulk of the actual work of the committee rested on the shoulders of Executive
Secretary Rus-

Albert

J.

sell Nixon.
During the campaign, Nixon, on "loan" from the
United Electrical Workers, was paid in part by the union
and in part by the National Committee.

Early in 1948 UE strategists formulated plans for an
organization that would reach "all branches of the labor
movement." Nixon submitted to the Chicago Convention
a "Report on Organization" in which he
expected that:
Labor's support for Wallace and Taylor [would be] based
in the trade unions on a grass roots rank and file basis

.... The

foundation of this support

is

found among

the local union officers, grievance men, stewards, and active

rank and

filers.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to secure
leadership endorsement, the Progressives would attempt to carry the campaign
directly to the workers and to the locals, in the hopes of

wooing them away from their chiefs' political direction. A
complete hierarchy was blueprinted. On the lowest levels,
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shop committees were planned for plants and

locals.

Their

was to distribute literature, raise funds, register voters,
and get out the vote. On the next level, there were to be state
and area committees. These were to coordinate the work of
the shop committees in their respective areas, as well as to
prepare literature adapted to local conditions and arrange

task

mass meetings. One of their most important duties was
to see that the relatively weaker areas of organized labor
would be covered. For example, it was hoped that considerable Wallace support could be recruited from among the

for

comparatively unorganized workers of the Baltimore industrial area.

on the industry
planned. As Nixon explained
Finally,

level,
it

a dual approach was

in his "Report

.

.

.":

In the industries covered by several unions, it was possible because of leadership sympathetic to Wallace for

"New

Party" supporters to work within the trade unions
themselves ....

Where

not feasible, the organization of supto be] orport for Wallace on an industrial basis [was
internathe
ganized, not on a basis of competition with
this [was]

union leadership involved, but merely as a campaign
organization of the workers supporting Wallace and Taylor
tional

in these industries.

The four main

areas in which this second type of organizaattempted were the automobile, railroad, Maritime,

tion

was

and

steel industries.

textile

Less attention was paid coal miners,

and garment workers, and

printers.

In the auto industry, a National Auto Workers for Wallace
Committee was established, which proved successful in form-

committees across the
ing approximately one hundred shop
was
set
similar committee
nation.
up among railroad

A

workers at the outset of the campaign and was reported to
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have distributed about one million pieces of literature.
Along
the territory of the Nathe water fronts of the East Coast
an attempt was made to establish
tional Maritime Union
both shore and ship committees to spread propaganda and
to conduct fundraising drives. And finally, among the steelworkers, a concerted effort was made in western Pennsylvania
to found a steelworkers' conference. This conference called
a convention, attended by several hundred delegates, and set

up a

national Wallace committee for the steel
industry.
this broad framework, what were the
techniques
employed? The strategy stressed action on current issues.

Within

For

instance, the Progressives actively aided and supported
strikers in various plants and localities.
They allied themselves with the Packinghouse Workers in
and the

Chicago

Chrysler employees in Detroit. They set great store by the
distribution of literature
total handouts were estimated at
more than three million. The main emphasis in this literature

was placed on portraying the New Party as the only true
playing up the Taft-Hartley Act and the

friend of labor

Truman

threats to draft railroad employees as evidence of a

bipartisan big business coalition. "The collection of campaign funds in small sums from large numbers of workers"

was

also a

cc

basic organizational task."

And

finally, the

labor

committee placed emphasis on the task of getting the workers
to register and turn out to vote.
On paper this added up to an impressive campaign

among

organized

labor,

but in

reality

the

committee's

accom-

plishments were limited. Even among those unions whose
leaders were friendly to the
Progressives, it never succeeded
in working
up enthusiasm among the rank and file. There

were three major

factors that made the labor committee's
task a hopeless one: First, there were the
general conditions
of prosperity high wages and full
employment that made
labor unwilling to change horses. Second, there was the
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Communist label that rightwing labor leaders
pinned on the heads of those unions supporting

successfully
the Progres-

sive Party. Finally, there was the fear of a
Republican victory.
felt that Wallace had
any real chance of victory, and

Few

Truman seemed by

far,

from the labor viewpoint, the

lesser

of the two evils.

Among the unfriendly unions a fourth factor entered into
the outcome. This factor was intimidation
the use of threats
keep union members from even attending third-party meetings. One such example emerged at a
western Pennsylvania Wallace rally. Here, Barney Conal, an

and even violence

to

on-the-scene organizer, reported that a steelworkers' local
stationed checkers at the door to count off on union lists the

names of those attending.
But what of the ladies?

How did they respond to the peace
banner borne by the Wallace crusaders? A major attempt
to organize their endeavors came in the Women-for-Wallace
group.
Prior to the declaration of the Wallace candidacy, several
local women's clubs had been established in favorable localities

New York

City and Southern California

under lead-

such as Elinor Gimbel and Elinor Kahn, to plan a
women's program that would be integrated with the naers

Formal organization of the national
Women-for-Wallace movement, however, was deferred until
the April party conference in Chicago. The emphasis was
more than twenty-seven states,
placed, by these delegates from
tional party organization.

altering the traditional secondary role accorded women
in the major parties. In the Progressive Party, they would
as "leaders, as candiachieve
filling roles
equality

on

complete

and as door to door campaign workers." Informing the
group that their "major job was to organize the millions of
women voters behind the New Party," Chairman Elinor
Gimbel also promised that "for the first time in our political

dates,

.
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going to be a new party which will have
not only as organizers, but have them in at the
very

history, there

women

beginning

...

to give

it

guidance."

The women's appeal was aimed

at
groups all across the
but
in
the
smaller
towns with the Walnation,
particularly
lace foreign policy views
expected to strike a responsive chord

minds of wives and mothers. Party leaders
anticipated
would prove much more difficult to Red-bait a woman,
since the average member of a women's club in a small midwestern town seemed unlikely to be called a Communist. Mrs.
Gimbel herself embarked upon a nation-wide tour of the
East Coast, West Coast, Middle West, almost
"whistlestops"
in the

that

it

everywhere except the Deep South. Countless luncheons and
other affairs served to raise both funds and, it was
hoped,

women's support. Although the Women-for-Wallace
group
was successful in obtaining a great deal of
political action
from women leg work and doorbell
ringing on the house-tohouse level and although it was
quite successful in raising
funds,

its

successes were largely localized
in the
metropoland Southern California areas where the

New York

itan

women's groups had the advantage of
pre-existing support as
well as superior
leadership. Despite their hopes, the small
towns and the "whistlestops" never seem to have
responded

to the
rallying cry of "Peace,

Freedom and Abundance."

Was

there a greater response from the
potential leaders of
the youths and students
brought together in a
third association, the
Progressive Youth of America?

tomorrow

The

organizational pattern here was not markedly different
that of the women's
groups. Active and well represented
in New York and other
metropolitan areas such as Philadel-

from

phia, Baltimore, and Los Angeles, the Young Progressives
failed to gain
any following across the nation as a whole.
The conservative cross section of
youth that constituted col-

lege

America

and progress

in 1948 exhibited far less interest in the
peace
issues raised

by Wallace than might have been
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expected from nonacademicians. There was general apathy
over the possibility of future war or depression and a much
greater concern over immediate job prospects. The few student political groups in existence were more attracted to the

pseudoliberal Harold E. Stassen, than to the allegedly radical
Henry A. Wallace. Few crusaders emerged from the Halls of
particularly in the midst of increasing pressures for in-

Ivy

tellectual conformity.

Perhaps the most interesting and unique contribution of the
Young Progressives was their July National Youth Convention at Philadelphia immediately following the Progressive
Party Convention. Modeled on much the same pattern as traditional party affairs, but with the platform rather than the

candidates holding the center of the stage, the young conven-

was almost equally big, noisy, and frustrating. While it
served to drum up enthusiasm among the already convinced
delegates, it boomeranged as a means of attracting converts to
the cause. The success of newspaper columnists in labeling this organization "Communist-dominated" undoubtedly
served to completely alienate any persons who were still
tion

politically

undecided.

Moreover, the
its

agenda

impression

inability of the youth organization to plan
sufficiently well to complete a platform left an
far from inspiring. The prolonged wrangling
late

into Saturday night

and

and

all

day Sunday

over

trivial details

minutiae was maddening. In two days the Philadelphia youth convention failed to act on a single matter of
importance. It wound up ignominiously in the dark of Conbits of

vention Hall

the lights turned out on

its

windmill battle of

semantics.

Another of the associated groups the Nationalities Diviwas pitched on the level of
sion of the National Committee
recent immigrant groups. Organized at the Chicago conference by some eighty representatives of twenty-four different
nationalities, headed by Zlatko Balokovic of the American
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Slav Congress, its announced purpose was to "devote itself to
the political and cultural problems peculiar to each group."

Accordingly, some eighteen subcommittees were formed representing major nationality groupings

Yugoslav-Americans,

Italian-Americans, and even Irish- Americans, as well as Poles,
Rumanians, Russians, and Greeks.
it had been formed, the Nationalities Division
almost
completely from sight. Only in the small
dropped
financial contributions traceable to it, did it emerge again

But once

this too was just another paper organization.
outcome was the fate of the Farm and Veterans
groups. Although preliminary committees were formed in
each of these fields, their activities proved untraceable either

evidence that

A

similar

in the press or through financial statements. Farmers, particuin evidence at Philalarly those of Progressive tradition, were
the
but
and
their numbers were
throughout
delphia
campaign,

not impressive. Similarly, the only liberal veterans group the
American Veterans Committee failed to respond to the Wallace crusade,

donned the

although some of

its

members undoubtedly

battle garb.

The National Businessmen's Committee

for Wallace con-

more

successful

New York

City area,

stituted another associated group, somewhat
than the foregoing particularly in the

A

where it had support in import-export circles.
carry-over
of sorts from the earlier Businessmen for Roosevelt groups in
the 1940 and 1944 campaigns, it included a core of Wallace's
personal followers, gained through speeches for the

Demo-

cratic Party, his tariff stand during the 1930's, and his
support of small business assistance while Secretary of Com-

merce. Additionally, a bloc of Jewish businessmen in New
York City had recently been attracted to Wallace by his position

on the

Palestine issue.

Although the contribution of the National Businessmen's
Committee to the Progressives in the realm of organization
was relatively insignificant, their financial support from vari-
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ous "businessmen's lunches and dinners" proved substantial.
The last of the major associated organizations was the
National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions. At an
earlier date, the

Independent Citizens Committee for the ASP
Citizens Political Action

had been merged with the National
Committee to form the Progressive

A

Citizens of America.
second group, the National Council of the ASP, was formed
in June, 1948 as an independent organization
primarily to
accommodate those who did not wish to identify themselves
completely with the third party. In their own words:

of the arts, sciences and professions, while basically
nonpartisan, have always supported candidates, of what-

We,

ever political

genuine program
ress

are

best qualified to carry forward a
in the best interests of humanity and prog-

affiliation,

.... Today
embodied

[1948] these hopes and achievements

in the

program and candidacy of Henry A.

Wallace.

The NC-ASP never affiliated with
Nor did its twenty thousand members

the Progressive Party.
in some nineteen local

councils enter into the organizational operation on the wardprecinct level. They were not interested in doorbell ringing,

house-to-house canvassing, and the other details of political

work. But they did contribute in their own respective spheres.
For example, Lillian Hellman and Norman Corwin brought
their talent to the preparation of radio scripts, while others

were responsible for stage techniques,

lighting,

and dramatiza-

tion of the party's rallies.

But what of the three tasks the party had
its

organizational drive?

From the

set for itself in

outset, the Wallace crusade

had seemed quixotic to many, inasmuch as it had been
launched without the broad base of support or of popular
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discontent so essential to success for any American third
its organizational work of building a new
party,
party. In
these deficiencies were brought home clearly. Starting from

an already restricted base, the party soon found itself divided
along broad versus narrow lines. Despite Wallace's support
of the former position, he failed to inject himself into organizational matters with enough vigor or sustained interest to imthe presence of the "Peekspose his views. Coupled with this,
kill

Boys" tended

to exclude the

moderates

who might

have

Yet only these leftists seemed
supplied the necessary breadth.
prepared to turn out, to work zealously eventually to attain
through default a position of prominence in a narrowly defined
organization.
Nor was the second task, of building in depth, any more
from the top and building
successfully accomplished. Starting
downward would have been difficult even under the most

favorable circumstances. In the face of public apathy to the
issues of "Peace, Freedom and Abundance," the task of or-

ganizing support on ward and precinct levels proved almost
became worse than
impossible. But the climate of opinion
neutral as anti-Red hostility served increasingly even to prevent public discussion of die serious issues raised, let alone

promote the building of a party machine. Only in New York
City was there much success along these lines. And here the
American Labor Party had enjoyed a twelve-year period in
which to fashion an effective organization.
Even here, time, world events, the insistence of Marcantonio on a narrower and narrower party, and the final departure of Wallace himself were ultimately to shatter the only
effective organization of the Progressives in their "fight for

peace." Elsewhere across the nation, the factor of personal
the former Vice Presiallegiance to and support of one man

was even more rapidly to prove fatal to party longevity.
organizational foundations laid down by those intent on
building a new party proved to have been built on sand.

dent
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Neither breadth, nor depth, nor permanence was attained in
the course of organizing the Progressive Party of 1948.
In 1947, Fiorello H. LaGuardia had predicted in a

PM

"The new progressive movement, when it comes, will
come from the Main Street of thousands of Prairie Junctions,
and not from Union Square in Manhattan." Unfortunately for
the Wallace Progressive Party, Main Street had not responded
to its call to organize. Union Square had.
article,

CHAPTER

6

"The People

Must Have a Choice

THE THEME

running through all of Henry Wallace's speeches
in
was that the people must have a choice; they
1948
early
must be able to express their approval or disapproval of the

conduct of the government. With a bipartisan foreign policy
accepted by both major parties, it became the self-appointed
task of the new party to present an alternative to the people
for their decision. Moreover, claimed Wallace, in then* domestic policies the major parties were as Tweedledum and
Tweedledee, both representing identical militaristic-Wall
Street interests. They no longer offered the sharp contrast of
early New Deal days. Here too the third party would present
the people with a clearly defined alternative.
For the voters to make their choice, it was necessary not
only to build a new party but to make sure that the party's
candidates would have places on the ballots in every state of
the Union. Experts claimed this was
virtually impossible in
view of the increasing restrictions placed on third parties by

many
in

states, particularly

1924 Robert W. La

within recent years. They noted that
had been able to put his Pro-

Follette

gressive slate before the voters in each of the forty-eight
states, but that in 1936 the Union Party of William Lemke

had been

successful in only thirty-four.
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This point of view had been well expressed by L. D.
Wheildon during the previous year in Editorial Research
Reports:

Even

if

tradition
ing,

a third party overcomes the forces of habit and
in winning a large popular follow-

and succeeds

it still

faces formidable obstacles in state election laws,

which have been written for the most part by representatives of the established parties with an eye to discouraging
newcomers. Although minor parties are not forbidden as
such in any

most

becoming increasingly difficult in
to qualify for a place on the ballot.

state, it is

states for

them

The problem faced was a dual

one, for in addition to the

legal requirements imposed by state election laws, there were
also the political implications involved in interpreting and en-

forcing these laws.

The

Constitution of the United States has

left

to individual

power to determine the manner of choosing presidential electors (Art. 2, Sec. 1, Par. 2), and in 1948
the forty-eight states had established forty-eight different
methods by which electoral candidates might secure their
places on the ballot. Generally speaking, however, there were
two broad methods for both existing and new parties.
Several states had established definitions and requirements
for a "legal" party and then accorded such parties the virtually
automatic privilege of placing nominees on the ballot. For
example, the American Labor Party constituted a "legal"
party in New York State since it had received more than the
state legislatures the

50,000 votes in the last gubernatorial election. The
was thus already assured of the ALP's Row C
Wallace
on the Empire State ballot. In Illinois a Cook County Prorequisite

slate

gressive Party

had organized

prior to the

1947 election and
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entered a slate of candidates in the generally uncontested
nonpartisan judicial elections. Since its top candidate had
amassed a total of 313,000 votes, just short of a majority but
well over the 5 per cent legal requirement, the third
party
seemed assured of a place there.

On the other hand, a completely new party or an existing
one that had not achieved "legal" status had to employ other
methods. The most widely utilized procedure was that
requiring nominating petitions, with either a fixed number of signatures or a percentage of the total vote for some
designated
office in a
prior election. Several states required nomination

by convention, and there were

still

others with less formal

1

stipulations.
Those states requiring petition signatures

by a percentage
of voters ranged from South Dakota which demanded 20
per cent through Ohio at 15 per cent and California at 10
of 1
cent.
per cent to Indiana which required only

%

per
Georgia, Nevada, and Oregon required 5 per cent; Arizona,
2 per cent; Connecticut, Vermont, and West Virginia, 1
per
cent. The set of election returns on which these
percentages

was based also varied the last congressional election
being
used in Nevada and Oregon, last presidential election in Connecticut, last gubernatorial election in Arizona, California,

and
Vermont, while Indiana and Michigan used the vote for Secretary of State, and Pennsylvania the highest vote for a state
office.

In the states specifying a fixed number of
signatures, the
requirements again varied from 50 in Mississippi to 25,000
(with at least 200 from each of 50 of the 102 counties) in

and 50,000 in Massachusetts. But even the most strinof
these
states, Illinois and Massachusetts, were
gent
generally
more lenient than those requiring percentages.
The nine states employing the convention method had
rules ranging in
stringency from Nebraska, where 750 dele1
See Appendix, Table 1, for a detailed
listing of the
Illinois

requirements.
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gates

had

to attend,

on down
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to neighboring Iowa,

where only

2 (1 to sign the required certificate as chairman, the other as
secretary) were sufficient to constitute a legal convention.

New Mexico and Texas, the
were
formal
organization and filing of a
only requirements
South
the only compulsion was
electors.
In
Carolina
of
slate
at
the
and
ballots
at
distribute
to print
polling places, since
In three

this

states, Mississippi,

time the Palmetto State

still

employed the outmoded
Aus-

instead of an officially printed, or
party ballot system,
tralian, ballot.

Some

of the states provided alternate methods of nominatin California the 10 per
ing electoral candidates. For instance,
be
cent petition requirement might
replaced by inducing 1
to change their
per cent of the registered voters

affiliation

to

a new party.

With the exception of a few

such as California,
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota, the legal aspects of the
states,

task of securing a requisite number of signatures or delegates
might not have proven as difficult as commonly believed (the

being more nearly insurmountable). But
numbers was not the only statutory considerainvolved. There still remained such details as deadlines

political obstacles

the matter of
tion

and

filing fees.

the stiffest
Filing deadlines in many instances presented
it
been
had
unless
a
for
new
organized at
party,
legal barrier
described
As
the
to
election.
earlier, the
least one year prior
months
a
deadline
March
California requirement
eight
prior
to the

helped force Wallace's hand in
balloting
December of 1947. Elsewhere
as
as
a decision
early

November

making

the dates varied

March

in

New

Jersey; April in Pennsyl-

vania, Maryland, and Oklahoma; May in Michigan, West
June in Kentucky. A total
Virginia, Florida, and Alabama;
to
that
states
of fourteen
filing be completed prior
required
a
from
off
at
Aimed
the first of July.
any group splitting
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at or after a national convention, these deadlines
in nearly one third of the states
eliminated
effectively
any
Bull
Moose style split.
a
of
1912
recurrence

major party

While some

states provided write-in voting for those parties

missing the deadlines, the disadvantages were evident. To cite
one example, the States' Rights Party received only 2,476
write-in votes in Maryland, since they had been excluded

from a place on the
17, 1948 deadline.

ballot

by

their inability to

meet the April

much less important,
provision for filing fees proved
a
even in states with
relatively high assessment, such as
Maryland's $270. While this sum might have deterred indiThe

viduals

from seeking a

ballot position,

was

it

relatively insignificant in light of the other multitudinous expenditures for a
nation-wide third party.

Political

considerations proved far

more important.

A

major party, in control of state election machinery and determined to block a minor contender, may employ seemingly
innocuous statutory provisions to raise insuperable obstacles.
Challenges to signatures, court actions at every step, prolonged litigation, and other devices may serve in practice to
the April primary
nullify legal rights. For instance, prior to
in Cook County, Illinois, where they were seemingly entitled
to a place

on the

ballot

by

their

performance in the 1947

judi-

ciary elections, the Progressives found this right challenged
by the major parties. Despite a favorable court decision

(Progressive Party v. Flynn, 79 N.E. 2d 516), they never
received this place because the election officials then ruled
that the decision had been made too late to print new ballots

with the Progressive candidates included.

By the same token, techniques are available by which a
major party favorably disposed to a third entrant can assist
its efforts to secure a
place on the ballot. In the 1948 campaign, according to reports from Progressive Party field organizer Barney Conal, there was little doubt that had it not
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been for Republican assistance the Wallace
have been listed in the state of Kansas.

slate

would not

Thus the task facing the New Party in its drive to get on
the ballot in 1948 appeared highly formidable, but not completely impossible. Given an early start, which they already
possessed, the breadth of representation they were claiming,

a sufficient number of patient workers they were soon
to

acquire,

and an organization adequate to plan and
seemed reasonably

guide their energies, chances of success

good.

Moreover,

it

appeared that

political

circumstances would

operate at least partly in their favor. While it was to be expected that the Democrats would oppose the appearance of

Wallace electors in the states whose election machinery they
it also seemed
logical to assume that the Repub-

controlled,

lican party would aid the Progressives, at least behind the
scenes. This appeared to be no more than sound political

strategy in view of the expectation that 90 per cent of the
Wallace votes would be drawn from voters otherwise casting
Democratic ballots.

The

pattern, however, was not to unfold as anticipated. The
either lulled into a sense of false security by

Republicans

GOP

the polls predicting a
sweep, unwilling to admit the
Wallace-ites as allies under any circumstances, or led by men
who failed to assess the situation correctly until too late

hand in getting the Proon the ballot. On the other hand, the Democratic Party found itself split into Fair Deal and Dixiecrat
wings before the end of the summer. While the Truman wing
continued to oppose the third party, the States' Rights group,
as a fourth party, took an immediate hand in efforts to ease
the task of qualifying a new party in several states. Unable to
devise laws that would admit themselves, yet exclude the
failed in

many

instances to lend a

gressive slates

Progressives, the States* Righters wound up in inadvertent
support of the Wallace drive for a place on the ballot.
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With both the legal and political circumstances in view,
what were the Progressives' strategy and techniques, the
court battles in which they became involved, and the political
maneuvering in the more crucial states?
Over-all strategy, techniques, and timing of the ballot campaign were planned from national headquarters in New York
a significant
City. As noted in the preceding chapter, this had
impact on the New York State decision not to initiate a petition drive to list the Wallace-Taylor slate under the Progressive name. Elsewhere, however, the Progressives were faced
with the necessity of immediate positive action. With top-level
planning of the petition drives taking place in headquarters,
field organizers were dispatched to those states where success

As noted in the preceding chapter, overlink the petition drives to the organizational
activity in the various states, and to the campaign for funds
as well. Timing to meet the deadlines as they came due was

hung
all

in the balance.

strategy was to

an essential part of this strategic battle waged from New
York.
Within the states the field organizers analyzed the areas in
which to concentrate and then devised appropriate 'coverage.
Based on socioeconomic data, these analyses were aimed at
predicting the locations, such as

Former Populist

centers, in

which Progressive support might best be uncovered. For example, in Oklahoma, according to Barney Conal, this preliminary planning was so successful that the party was able
to acquire more than the necessary five thousand signatures
in only two days of actual collecting. Surprisingly enough, in
such states as Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia efforts
were concentrated not in the cities and towns but in outlying
rural areas.

Before the strategy planning had begun, even before Walhad formally announced his candidacy, the first political

lace

shot in the battle of the ballots had been fired

by the opposi-

had taken the form of a measure introduced on November 17, 1947 by Representative Cole (Retion in Congress. This
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publican, Missouri) and designed to bar "un-American parties
election ballot." (H.R. 4482, 80th
1st sess.)

from the

Cong.,
provided that no party would be allowed to participate in
an election if it was "directly or indirectly affiliated
.
with
,

It

.

the

Communist Party ...

any other foreign agency,

the

Communist

international, or

political party, organization

or gov-

ernment."

Hearings were held in January by a subcommittee of the
Committee on House Administration at which testimony was
offered to indicate that the measure would bar the Wallace
party because it had not repudiated Communist support. The
Attorney General was asked for a ruling on the constitutionality of the proposed measure and on additional hearings
which were held, but it was never reported out by the committee. The possible role of the
Republican House leadership
in halting the bill is virtually impossible to determine, but, in
view of the fact that party strategists were relying on the Pro-

gressive candidacy to cut into the Democratic vote, this is a
possibility that must be borne in mind.

This preliminary "sniping," however, was far less important
than the task of securing the necessary petition signatures in
the states across the nation as the respective filing deadlines

came up.
In California, work was already under way before Wallace's
had been announced. The Independent Progressive

decision

Party had begun the tremendous task of obtaining 275,970
10 per cent of the 2,759,700 votes cast
petition signatures
in the last

(1946) gubernatorial

election.

The burden was

being carried by the leftwing unions of the CIO and the
Townsendites. Sentiment among the Progressive Citizens of

America was divided on the

advisability of the petition drive.

Since Robert Kenny, PCA chairman, felt it would be impossible to obtain the requisite number of signers, he was still
urging a fight within the Democratic Party, retaining the
registration transfer procedure as a last-minute weapon to
put the Progressive Party on the ballot if necessary. Accord-
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Angeles

PCA

chapters, of considerable strength in the Los
area, did not join in the petition drive until after the

ingly, the

announcement of the Wallace candidacy. But when they
they turned the

did,

tide.

With unions, Townsendites, and

PCA

cooperating, volun-

teer crews inundated the Southern California area, in

which
campaign was concentrated. There were housewives and
student groups from the universities for house-to-house canvassing in all the suburbs and permanent crews for downtown
Los Angeles corners. The net result was an overwhelming success, even though toward the end of the campaign the party
found it necessary to pay its canvassers from 5# to 10# for
each name obtained and even though in San Francisco it was
necessary to hire a professional firm whose business it was to
the

obtain petition signatures for various causes

on a

regular fee

basis.

Aided by these deviations from amateur status, the assorted
groups amassed a total of some 464,000 signatures a full
month prior to the March 18 deadline. Fifty-seven of the
state's fifty-eight counties were represented
giving some indication of the campaign's breadth.

Hugh

Bryson, chairman of

the Independent Progressive Party Organizing Committee,
assigned the credit in a wire to Wallace that was quoted in the

Daily Worker:

The third party drive in California succeeded only
because of the active support of thousands of working people, including a large number from trade unions and other
.

.

.

organizations,
volunteers.

and the

active daily

work of thousands

of

The final total of 482,781 signatures was later certified by
the Secretary of State as including some 295,000 valid endorsements
15,000 more than the required minimum- The
Wallace campaign was off to a flying start in this
most severe test of its ability to get on the ballot.

first

and
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series of victories in

Maryland,

New

Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the Progressive Party moved almost
without untoward incident, except in the Keystone State.

In the midst of a drive to obtain the 7,974 signatures necessary in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Scripps-

Howard

Pittsburgh Press undertook an unconventional con-

tribution to public information: front-page publication of
lists giving the names, addresses, and occupations of those

signed Wallace nominating petitions. At the same
time the Press magnanimously announced that those "claiming they signed under misapprehension or through misunder-

who had

standing will have their statements printed the same day their

names are used."

2

Although newspapers had been generally hostile to the
Wallace candidacy, this policy marked an extreme in attempted broad-scale intimidation. The
hardly that anticipated

the Press.

result,

Of the

first

however, was
one thousand

by
whose names were published, only ten retracted, although there were reports that some twenty others had been
summoned by their employers and told to "repudiate or else."
On the other hand, the Press was flooded with letters from
both signers and sympathizers, the majority of whom opposed
signers

action, as the Press admitted near the conclusion of the
of this "matter of news." The American Civil

its

presentation
Liberties Union took a dim view of the proceedings,
menting in a letter to the editor that
.

.

only,

and
sons

.

com-

Publication of the Progressive Party lists, and those
effect of intimidating [free] discussion

must have the

inviting discrimination

and

retaliation against the per-

listed.

According to Professor Thomas I. Emerson, the New
Register used a variation of this technique, employing

Haven
2

See Pittsburgh Press, April 11-April 30, 1948. The direct quotawas printed April 13, 1948.

tion
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in an attempt to disprevious Communist petition signatures
from
signing People's Party blanks. Party pubcourage voters
Shikes
licist Ralph
reported that several other Scripps-Howard

and one Boston and one
papers, the Milwaukee Journal,
of
the Pittsburgh formula,
used
variations
Cleveland paper
these
incidents went unrethough less persistently. Although
ported in most journals across the nation, few of them saw
to attempt repetitions in their own communities.

fit

Other forms of intimidation were employed in West Virginia, and this state became one of the bitterest battlegrounds
in the petition fight. Despite the fact that the ballot drive

there received

little

or no publicity
demand so

requirements seemed to

perhaps because the
effort
the cam-

little

difficult and perhaps came the
any that the Progressives finally won.
In 1941 the Legislature of West Virginia had passed a law
clearly aimed at keeping third parties off the ballot. It provided that signing a nominating petition should be construed

paign was one of the most
closest to failure of

as legally binding the voter to the party assisted.

The

statute

established as the deadline for filing petitions the day immediately preceding the primary election. Wallace petition signers

would thus be barred from

participating in the highly

important West Virginia primary. Competition for such posts
as sheriff and constable has generally been bitter in West Virginia,

because of the fees and privileges that accompany these
had it that fifteen dollars per vote was not

positions. Reports

an

uncommon

offer.

Consequently, local politicians were

strongly opposed to the circulation of third-party petitions
which might disqualify any of their hoped-for primary supporters.

Moreover, in West Virginia it was necessary to purchase
on which the nominating signatures must
be obtained, and only certified gatherers were allowed to seek
names. In addition, these workers could operate only in the
petition certificates

specific district assigned them.
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In addition to these restrictive circumstances, there was a
virtually complete lack of existing organization within the
state to spearhead a
petition drive. It was necessary to build
from the ground up. Party headquarters scanned the various
letters of endorsement sent to Wallace and chose from them
persons who seemed interested and willing to do actual organ-

work. Field organizers, headed
by Barney Conal,
were then sent to canvass these prospects and build a ma-

izational

chine. It proved impossible to recruit a sufficient number of
workers within the two weeks allotted for the task, and crews

had

to be brought

from

New York and

other metropolitan

areas to aid in the work. Eventually, the number of workers
totaled between two hundred and three hundred.

A Committee for Wallace was established and a socioeconomic analysis of the state completed. The conclusion
reached from this analysis was that the Progressives should
concentrate their endeavors in the small mining communities,
five in the south,
particularly those within twelve counties
two in the central area, three in the Fairmount and two in the

Wheeling areas. The fact that the United Mine Workers had
recently been fined one and one half million dollars for contempt of court enabled the Progressives to employ a rather
deceptive,
signatures.

the

if

ingenious, technique in their attempt to gather

A petition to President Truman protesting

against

UMW fine was prepared and circulated by the Progressive

Appended to this were petitions for nominating
third-party electors. It was easy to convince miners to sign
the antifine petition, and, according to party accounts, this

workers.

document furnished an opening wedge for a sales talk on Wallace and Taylor. Obviously such a device may have easily lent
itself to abuse, with many a miner signing both
petitions rapidly,

without ascertaining their individual contents.

Another propaganda weapon employed in the West Virginia campaign was a speech of the late President Roosevelt
to a Union for Democratic Action meeting in which he had
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as a friend of labor generally and
praised Wallace highly
other pamphlets and mimeographs
All
miners specifically.

were discarded and only this one employed.
As the campaign progressed, feelings ran high, and violence
was near on numerous occasions. In Logan County, the sheriff

had made blunt statements

to the press, threatening violators
with
of the primary law
prosecution and implying that extra-

to halt the Wallace petition
legal means might be employed
drive. Picking up the challenge, party strategists planned a
for the center of this section. Acting on the

meeting

theory

good offense may be the best defense, they advertised
that they were coming in after signatures. The counterattack

that a

obtained

results,

but

it

also led to car chases, threats,

and

near-shootings. One of the third-party workers, after several
warnings that he was endangering his health by obtaining

business on his front porch.
signatures, finally set himself up in
There he sat, gun in hand, with a microphone and loud-

speaker hooked up, challenging all visitors, "Anyone coming
up here for anything but signing a petition is going to get it,"
and pointing meaningfully at the gun.
Not all the questionable tactics were on the side of the
Progressives, however. In fact, they seem to have been on the
defensive most of the time, for West Virginia was crucial to
the Democrats nationally, as well as to their local cohorts.
There were a few, such as U.S. Senator Matthew Neely, who
felt that the Progressives would
help rather than hinder state
Democrats by encouraging a larger turnout of citizens likely
to vote Democratic in local contests. But for the most part the
Democratic opposition failed to accept this view and remained
bitterly hostile to the Wallace-ites. Allegedly they were at the
bottom of much of the intimidation attempted threats of job
loss, landlord "hints" of eviction for tenants working or vot-

ing for the third party, and threats of retaliation against Negroes who might aid, as well as against ministers and university professors.

All of these tactics combined to

make

the task
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of the party highly difficult, even though Wallace received the
endorsement of approximately fifty-four mine locals.

The Progressives were never certain of ballot success until
the day the petitions were filed. It was a last-minute, touchand-go proposition with workers driving all night to bring in
completed blanks before the deadline. Last-second comof the totals was difficult, but when the smoke had

their

pilation

cleared,

the Progressives found they had submitted

10,189 names, including, as

some

proved, enough valid signatures
to meet the requirement of 7,155.
Although a later court ruling deprived them of their guberit

natorial candidate, the Progressives
in this, the "bitterest of any fight." 3

Other petition
none of them so

had come out victorious

states presented a variety of problems, but
a battle. In North Carolina the Pro-

fierce

gressives claimed success in stimulating Negroes to political
self-organization in that state for the first time since the Pop-

Negro students were organized into crews, and mixed
were also employed in the drive to secure petisignatures. This technique was reported by Barney Conal

ulists.

racial groups

tion
to

have been so successful that in the Eleventh Ward of Charnot a single qualified Negro turned down the party

lotte,

workers' requests.
As the continuing drive to obtain signatures in the petition
states went on through the summer, the party soon found its
filings

challenged in the courts of two states

Oklahoma and

Illinois.

In Oklahoma, the Democratic Secretary of State had accepted the Wallace petitions, with some eight thousand signatures, as satisfying the requirements of the state election
3

The state Supreme Court refused to accept the petitions of Henry
H. Harvey on the grounds that "a candidate of other than a previously
recognized party is not eligible unless nominated by petition prior
to the date of the primary election." New York Times, October 13,
1948.
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laws.

Not only had

they exceeded the legal requirements by

enough to compensate for challenged
but they had also beaten the April 30 deadline by

some three thousand
signatures
several weeks.

Suits questioning the validity of the Secretary of State's action were immediately filed. One of these was brought by the

neo-Fascist Gerald L. K. Smith, intent on saving Oklahoma
from this Progressive evil. In the Oklahoma Daily (Norman),
student newspaper at the University of Oklahoma, Smith

charged:

Oklahoma under the guise of the Progressive
would have gone
Party .... And the Communist party
had not
Crusade
on lie ballot if the Christian National
Stalin is in

and through the anti-communist league challenged the petitions of the Wallace party.
heard of

The

it

state election

board refused to accept the Wallace

electors for a place on the ballot, claiming that the Progressives did not constitute a political party, since the Secretary

the party's non-Communist affidavit prior to the final date for filing declarations of candiof State could not
dacy. According to statute, the Secretary
and
accept the non-Communist affidavit until May 2, 1948,

of State

had not approved

the deadline for filing was April 30, 1948. The Progressives
contended that they had come into existence as a party as soon
as their nominating petitions

had been

certified

and that the

non-Communist affidavit was a requirement for appearance
on the ballot, not for forming a party. They claimed in their
brief that the language of both law and affidavit supported
their contention.

Refusing to accept this position, the Oklahoma State Supreme Court denied the party's petition for a writ of man-

damus

to compel the election board to accept and

file

declarations of intention (Cooper v. Cartwright, 195 P.

the

2d
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290). By a five to two vote, the Court accepted the contention of die board that the Progressives had not actually constituted a party when they sought to file their declarations.

Thus the party was barred from the ballot in Oklahoma.
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was contemplated, but party counsel John Abt abandoned the plan because of the "difficulty of getting grounds for a Federal

suit."

The decision stood, and the party had met its first defeat.
Even the fact that Oklahoma possessed only ten electoral
votes could not fully temper the blow, since this meant that
in Oklahoma, at least, the people would not have a choice.

The second series of court decisions against the Progrescame in Illinois where the party had anticipated substantial support on the basis of their 1947 judicial election
turnout of some 313,000 votes in Cook County (Chicago).

sives

After a series of court battles, the Cook County Progressive
Party had finally obtained places for its local candidates on
the fall ballot.

But

in order to secure places for the national
it was
necessary for the

candidates on the state-wide ballot

party to meet the requirement of obtaining 25,000 signatures,
with at least 200 from each of 50 of the 102 counties. Al-

though more stringent than requirements in most of the
states, this demand seemed far from insuperable, and the
party set out to amass and file its petitions. There appears to

have been a

tacit

understanding that the Republicans in the
would look with favor upon the Progres-

state administration

sive drive. Accordingly, third-party officials underestimated
number of signatures likely to be invalidated in the down-

the

state counties.

At any

rate, the party filed petitions

bearing

signatures and claimed that they possessed the

some 75,268
requisite 200

in each of sixty-two counties. At this stage, the politics of
the Republican Party entered the scene. Administration forces
of the view that the Progressives would help defeat the Democrats in the

coming

election controlled the State Certifying
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4
Board, but not the State Officers Electoral Board. This latter
group was composed primarily of downstate Republicans vio-

opposed to the entrance of a third party. Confident of
Republican prospects for November, 1948, they felt the party
could win without splintering the Democratic vote.

lently

The

Board held that those persons
voted in the April primaries of either major party

State Officers Electoral

who had

could not validly sign third-party petitions. It ruled that the
the downstate counpetitions lacked a few valid signatures (in
ties)

of the required total.

(Unofficial reports placed the
Progressives objected, claiming that since
electors had been chosen in April, their signa-

figure at eight.)

no

presidential

The

had a right to sign third-party petitions for those offices.
Moreover, they claimed that the state law itself was invalid.
An appeal was taken to the Illinois State Supreme Court,
which ruled that it had no power to review the facts before
tories

the board.

The next move was to prepare a new case for submission to
a special three-member Federal District Court, where an injunction was sought on the grounds that action in ruling the
Progressives off the ballot was being taken under statutory
provisions repugnant to the Federal Constitution. The third

party claimed that the law deprived large numbers of Illinois
citizens of their political rights as guaranteed by the Four-

Amendment, since it allegedly discriminated against
Cook County (Chicago) and the remaining
most
forty-eight
populous counties, which contained some 87
of
cent
the
voters. The Progressives argued that it
state's
per
teenth

voters living in

*

Under Illinois law, the State Certifying Board, composed of the
Governor, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Secretary of
State, merely received the petitions. In the event of objections, the
State Officers Electoral Board examined the petitions and objections
and informed the State Certifying Board of
obligated to comply with the findings.

its

ruling.

The

latter

Was
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to rural areas, particularly the re-

maining fifty-three counties, containing only 13 per cent of the
voters, to prevent freedom of choice by the rest of the state.

The

District

Court refused

to grant the injunction

asked

Green, 80 F. Supp. 725), and an appeal
(MacDougall
was taken directly to the United States Supreme Court on
October 11, 1948. Acting with the speed required by the
for

v.

approaching election day deadline, the Court heard the case

on October 18 and handed down
later. It

its
ruling only three days
sustained the action of the District Court by a six-to-

three vote, thus keeping the Progressives off the Illinois ballot

(335 U.S. 281).
In a brief unsigned decision, Chief Justice Fred Vinson declared for himself and four others that

It is clear

that the requirement of

200

signatures

least fifty counties gives to the voters of the less

counties of Illinois the

power

from

at

populous

to block the nomination of

candidates whose support is confined to geographically limited areas. But the state is entitled to deem this power not
disproportionate.
To assume that political

power is a function exclusively of
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government.
Thus the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller

by giving in the Senate entirely unequal
of
representation
populations.
It would be strange indeed ... to deny a state the power
against the greater

to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as

between

and those having concentrated
thinly populated counties
of
fact
that the latter have practical
in
view
the
masses,

its

at the polls
opportunities for exerting their political weight
not available to the former. The Constitution a practical
instrument of government makes no such demands on the
states.
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1948

Associate Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote a separate concurthe constitutional problem,
ring opinion in which he ignored
the
to
order
he
felt
that
because
party placed on the ballot
at this late date

However,
Justices

might disrupt the

Illinois electoral

in a vigorous dissent

Hugo

procedure.

on behalf of himself and

L. Black and Frank Murphy, Associate Justice

William O. Douglas wrote:

None would deny that a state law giving some

citizens twice

the vote of other citizens in either the primary or general
election would lack that equality which the Fourteenth

Amendment

guarantees.

be as complete and

The

dilution of political rights

effective if the

may

same discrimination ap-

pears in the procedure prescribed for nominating petitions.
The fact that the Constitution itself sanctions inequalities in

some phases of our
allowing a

political system does not justify us in
state to create additional ones. The theme of the

Constitution

is

equality

their political rights.

among

citizens in the exercise of

The notion

that

one group can be

granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to our
standards for popular representative government.
Political considerations also
played an
to
the
appeal
Supreme Court, for the

this

important role in
Progressive-Party

position in the case was supported by the Republican
torney General of the state, a member of the

At-

pro-third party

Cook County

faction. He and the Governor
joined in urging
that the Illinois statute be set aside as unconstitutional. As

Arthur Krock pointed out in the New York Times, it was
Mghly unusual for two state officials to be appealing to the
United States Supreme Court for invalidation of their own
state's law,
particularly in view of the fact that the Republican
platform was at this same time appealing for a restoration of
States rights.
It is difficult to

account for

this

Republican failure to agree
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to the Wallace party, for the

GOP

to lose
absence of the third-party slate was to cause the
of
the
state
Illinois
to
Democrats
the
in the November election.

The latter

received a margin of only 33,612 out of nearly
The fact that the Progressive candidates

4,000,000 votes cast.

had garnered some 313,000 votes in 1947 seems conclusive
evidence that Henry Wallace would have siphoned off even
with a weak showing enough Democratic votes to swing the
state's electoral total of twenty-eight to Dewey and Warren.
Regardless of the factors involved, the Progressives had
suffered their second and most damaging loss. Their hopes
had been high in Illinois, and defeat came as a stunning blow.
Republican politics were also prominent in the Ohio court
battle, in which legal questions were markedly different. According to Helen Fuller in New Republic, Ohio was "the worst
legal headache of all," because the wording of a new election
law left doubt about whether or not a new party would be
able to qualify under any circumstances for a place on the
ballot.
Initial action to

bar the party in Ohio, however, was taken

singlehandedly by Secretary of State

Edward

J.

Hummel.

Hummel had

obtained his state post
Ostensibly a Republican,
of his adminisdemise
through the unexpected and untimely
was
and
tration-backed primary opponent
regarded in Ohio

Republican circles as "something of an accidental maverick." His motives, other than personal predilections, were
difficult to discern. At any rate, he announced on June 4
that the New Party had been denied a place on the ballot by

1941 statute barring "parties or groups engaged
in un-American activities." The Secretary of State announced
that an "investigation" had shown that the party was not
entitled to a place on the ballot. At no time had he held a
he specify exact testimony or
hearing, however, nor would

virtue of a

evidence that led to his decision.

appealed to the

Ohio

State

When

the case

was

later

Supreme Court, Hummel informed
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Henry A. Wallace's principal camCommunists."
were
paigners in Ohio
A storm of protest was stirred up by Hummel's one-man
verdict. The Toledo Blade, a Paul Block paper opposed to
the court that "three of

the Wallace party,

remarked

editorially:

Things have come to a pretty pass, indeed, when Ed Hummel starts saying who can run for the Presidency here in
Ohio .... Apparently our democratic processes have
been subverted more than we realize.

The Wallace backers carried the case
Supreme Court, and Hummel's ruling was

to the

Ohio State
But this

reversed. 5

the only aspect of the court battle in Ohio. Two methods of qualifying for a place on the ballot were specified in

was not

the Ohio election laws. First, it was possible, though barely
so, to organize a new party by employing a highly technical

and complicated procedure which entailed, among other
things, obtaining some 500,000 petition signatures. A second
method of qualifying independent candidates which necessitated far fewer signatures was also provided. However, a 1947
law, aimed at third parties, had so amended this provision that
it was now believed
impossible for a presidential candidate to
run as an independent. Despite this belief, the Progressives
had chosen the second method, that of qualifying
independent
electors, as the only feasible approach. Secretary of State
refused to certify the party's nominee,

Hummel, however,

claiming that the 1947 amendment

made no

provision for

independent candidates.
*

State v. Hummel, 80 N.E. 2d 899. The Ohio State
Supreme
Court linked into this one case and decision two
separate actions
before it: State ex rel Beck et al. v. Hummel, No. 31496 and Zahm

Hummel

No. 31498. The court ruled in this first
part of the case
Communist Party members among a total of
46,000 petition signers did not disqualify the Progressives under the

v.

that the presence of 3
statute.
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Progressive Party lawyers had uncovered a technical defect.
state legislature had neglected to amend the second of

The

two provisions in the

original statute pertaining to the matter.

The

party contended, and the court agreed (State v. Hummel,
80 N.E. 2d 899, Part 2), that the only possible consistent

interpretation of the statute as amended was that it permitted
the nomination of independent presidential electors, although

name of the presidential candidate might not appear. Thus
twenty-five independent electors for Wallace eventually found
their names on the ballot, but with no
party or candidate designation and with no provision whereby a straight vote might

the

be cast for the entire

slate.

was, of course, possible to vote straight for the Democratic and Republican electoral tickets. The inherent confuIt

sion in this situation led to an election ruling that favored the
Progressives. Made by an administration Republican, Attor-

ney General Hugh

S. Jenkins, the decision
may well have been
since
it ruled that all ballots found to
motivated,
politically
contain a straight vote for the Republican or Democratic slate

as well as

marks for one or more Progressive (Independent)

be counted for the Wallace candidate, rather
than being voided or counted as a major-party vote. Presumably, the Republicans expected that the Democrats would
lose more from this system than they would, and that the
votes thus acquired by one or two Wallace electors would
electors should

prove

insignificant.

With this one slim concession, the final outcome in Ohio
was far from favorable to the third party. The Progressive
electors were on the ballot without party designation, and a
citizen wishing to cast his vote for Henry A. Wallace was faced
with the necessity of making twenty-five separate X*s one
before each name. Thus, in two of the largest states
states
whose industrial populations had been counted on to turn

out a heavy Wallace vote

the ballot barriers had proved too

steep for the third party to hurdle.
But what of the states where means other than petitions
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were employed to get on the ballot? First, there was the failin Nebraska. Here
the third and final complete one
the party met the only defeat attributable to its own shortconvention at
comings. Nebraska law required an organizing
which 750 delegates must sign a new parry's filing petition.
a convention for
Accordingly, the Progressives scheduled
tire

instead of the large
September 10, 1948 in Omaha. But
turned out. The
283
delegates
exactly
anticipated,
assemblage
ballot position went by default, as the Secretary of
State later ruled that presidential electors could not be nominated by the alternative petition means provided for state

Nebraska

candidates.

The Nebraska

State

Supreme Court adopted

this

view, refusing to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of State to accept subsequent Progressive petitions.

At about

the

same time a more successful convention was

held in the state of Mississippi, where there were no requirements concerning the number of attending delegates. Here a
small group of Negroes and whites utilized the occasion of a
Wallace visit to their state, in the course of a southern tour, to

told their convention.
It

was a highly informal

luncheon

in Edwards,

affair

home

of a

actually no more than a
Negro college where Wal-

lace spoke. Following this, the presidential candidate himself
motored to the state capital to present his slate of nine
electors. Secretary of State

Heber Ladner received them

just

as informally, advising Wallace that he would
request a
ruling from the Attorney General about whether or not the

had been met, inasmuch as the state convention had not been preceded by the
customary precinct or
conventions.
in
But,
county
friendly fashion, he went on to
inform Wallace that, if the ruling should
unfavorable,

legal requirements

ttore

would

filing petitions

wbo

prove
be time to use an alternative
procedure
of fifty signatures each by October 15. Ladner,

still

was, coincidentalry, a Dkiecrat, summarized the state
procedure succinctly, according to the New York Times: "It's
very easy to get on the ballot in Mississippi."
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similarly informal procedure was followed the next day
in neighboring Arkansas, with Wallace again presenting perC. Hall, his slate of seven
sonally to the secretary of state,

C

The comment of this gentleman, a regular Democrat,
a somewhat different vein a suggestion that Wallace,

electors.

was

in

in accordance with state laws,

file

an

affidavit stating that

he

was not a Communist. And although no further objections
were raised by the States' Rights administration in Mississippi,
the regular Democratic machine in Arkansas insisted upon
barring the Wallace slate until the Progressive Party candidates signed the required affidavits. Far from conclusive, these

two incidents provided an indication of the relative receptivity
of the Dixiecrats and Truman Democrats from whose ranks
Wallace votes were likely to come.
But what of the sole attempt made by the Progressives to
that of the
capture an existing major-party mechanism
Democratic Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota? There had
been indications at the tune of the Wallace announcement in
December, 1947, that the dissident DFL elements in Minnesota, led by former Governor Elmer Benson, might, by cap-

DFL

organization, force President Truman to
turing the state
run as an independent. This actually happened the same year

Alabama, where the Dixiecrats gained control, and it almost happened in Minnesota with the Progressives. Wallace
backers were actually in control of the State Executive Comin

mittee of thirty-five, and, normally, arrangements for the state

group. But in FebruHubert
Humphrey of Minby Mayor
the
Wallace
tactics, forced an
neapolis, accurately appraising
unscheduled meeting of the 217-member State Central Committee in which they possessed a three-to-one supremacy. At
this meeting the Humphrey rightists were able to set all conditions and name all committees for the state convention,

convention would have been

left to this

ary their opponents, led

including
tials

all

seven members of the highly important creden-

committee.

The Benson group was unable

to

make

substantial head-
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in the series of county conventions that followed, al-

these assemblages (out of eighty-five)
though nineteen of
selected leftist delegations for the June state convention at

Brainerd.

The

Credentials Committee, however, refused to

a single one of these nineteen delegations, and the Benson group "took a walk" to an already prepared rump convention at Minneapolis. Meeting the same day, they named a
seat

DFL

ticket of pro-Wallace electors as "official
designees" and
this slate to Republican Secretary of State Mike

presented

Holm. On the advice
lican,

Holm

of the Attorney General, also a

certified this leftist slate

and refused

accept the pro-Truman slate that was put
convention.

Republater to

up by the Brainerd

Another court battle ensued, with the Minnesota State Supreme Court overruling the Secretary of State on the grounds
that the Brainerd convention had been legally called and organized. (Democratic Farmer-Labor State Central Committee
v. Holm, 33 N.W. 2d 831). Stating that intraparty matters
were not open to court interpretation,

it

ordered the eleven

electors pledged to President Truman placed on the ballot
and those pledged to the former Vice President withdrawn.

Having

failed in their capture attempt, the

Wallace organi-

now needed two

thousand nominating petition signatures for a place on the ballot. With an October 2 deadline
allowing adequate time, they had little difficulty, but the fact
that they were now the independent rather than the
party

zation

DFL

ticket
designees weighed heavily against them. While the
with Wallace at its head would not in all likelihood have car-

ried the state

on November

2, as it

did under Truman, the

third-party candidate undoubtedly would have received a far
greater number of presidential votes than he did as an inde-

pendent.

The

possibility of

a state Republican victory arising from

this situation lent considerable

support to conjectures that the
of
State
and
the
Secretary
Attorney General, both Repub-
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were guided
primarily by

political considerations in
accepting the Wallace rather than the Truman designees in
view of the obvious
invalidity of actions taken by the rump
convention. Despite the assist,
however, the Progressives
failed in this, their
only hope of getting on a state ballot

under major-party

listing.

Political considerations

played a pre-eminent role in sev-

eral other states

Florida, Georgia, and Missouri. In Florida,
early in the campaign, the Progressives had little real
hope
of securing a
on the ballot. The state law

posed a vir5 per cent

place

that of
tually impossible requirement
persuading
of the registered voters to
change their affiliations
in the
to the
With

New

closing in

only some

May

Party prior

primary.

and

enroll

the books

March and

April, the Progressives wound up with
7,000 or 8,000 instead of the 35,000
required.
manager C. B. Baldwin conceded that the

Campaign
party
had been defeated and would not
appear on the Florida ballot.
But, following the split of the States' Rights Democrats at
the

Philadelphia Convention in July, 1948, the Florida Legisfound itself under pressure to amend the statutes for

lature

qualifying new presidential slates. An amendment was passed
allowing electoral nominees to file without formality. With
the legislature unable to write a law that would exclude
the

Progressives while including the Dixiecrats,

Taylor

slate

the Wallace-

was suddenly handed a
place on the

ballot in

the state of Florida.
Similar politics were involved in
Georgia. Here the law required petition signatures from 5 per cent of all registered
voters, an estimated sixty thousand
signatures. Registration
books were reportedly in a condition
making it impossible
for a party to assume the burden of
that all

proving

were

Yet

its

was precisely the
ruling made
of
State
that
the Progressive
Secretary
Party must
prove all its endorsements had been made by enrolled voters.
Under the same Dixiecrat pressure found in
Florida, the
signers
by the

qualified.

this
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statute to permit merely
of presidential electoral candidates for

amended
Georgia Legislature
certifying the

names

the ballot. There

still

its

remained a non-Communist

affidavit

and it eventually became necessary for
requirement, however,
the Progressive Party to replace seven of its electors who refused to take such an oath. On the night of the deadline, it
substituted electors willing to sign and thus qualified for a
ballot.
place on the Georgia
The question of qualifying state candidates

was still pendas the pro-Dixiecrat amendment had
inasmuch
however,
ing,
affected only presidential electoral candidates. An appeal was
taken from the ruling of the Secretary of State to another
on the grounds that the
three-judge Federal District Court,
law, as interpreted, was unconstitutional. The special court,
however, refused to accept the Progressives' contention, and
there was no time to carry an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Their presidential electors were on, but their state candidates

remained

off the

Georgia

ballot.

Finally, in the ballot battle political considerations were involved in Missouri. In this court test, there were factors dating

back to the

that of
first
Progressive presidential campaign
Teddy Roosevelt in 1912. At that time a pro-Roosevelt Missouri State Supreme Court had ruled that a group desiring to
nominate presidential electoral candidates merely had to hold

a meeting,

call itself

names on the

ballot.

a party, and thus be entitled to place

The Wallace Progressives

called

its

upon a

lower State Court in Missouri to follow this 36-year-old case
law and grant them places without petition signatures. Finding

a distinction between the 1912 and 1948 cases, the court refused to certify the party's nominees. No
appeal was carried
6
Supreme Court, since in the meantime the Prohad qualified, much to their own surprise, by the

to the state
gressives
petition
*

method. Despite objections lodged by the Pendergast

Later, the Socialist Party appealed a similar case to the Missouri
Slate Supreme Court, where its
position was upheld.
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in Kansas City, the pro-Pendergast Secretary of State
that
the Progressives had filed well over the minimum
certified

machine

number of signatures
In

required.

this instance at least, the
Progressives

seemingly received
honest and impartial treatment from a state election official
who might have obstructed their petition filing. Some of Wal-

remained skeptical, suggesting that President
have brought pressure to bear, assured that the

lace's followers

Truman may
was

safely his. Regardless of the motivation involved,
the Progressive Party had achieved a place on the ballot in
state

the President's

home

state.

Thus the Progressives wound up the 1948 battle to give the
voters a choice with their candidates, under one party label
or another, on the ballots of forty-five states. 7 Three significant conclusions emerge from this phase of the crusade. Once
again politics had indeed produced strange bedfellows, for
here were the parties of the campaign which were at opposite
poles

Dixiecrats and Progressives

finding

accommodation

through their mutual necessity for a place on the ballot and
their similar expectation of taking votes

away from the comsome state seg-

enemy. On
ments of the Republican Party emerged as

mon Democratic

the other hand,

less

than politically

astute or farsighted. Not only did they grossly overestimate
their own political appeal, they also failed to take all possible

weaken the enemy by a thorough, if sub rosa, supthe
Wallace petition drives that might ultimately have
port of
given them the electoral support of Illinois. Only the Demosteps to

crats reacted as generally anticipated

opposing the ballot

appearance of the Progressives with

the strength lent

7

all

by

of the Presidential and Congressional Elections of
1948, comp. from official sources by William Graf
under the direction of Ralph R- Roberts, Clerk of the U.S. House
of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1949), lists only forty-four
states, but the Progressives also appeared on the ballot in New
Statistics

November 2

Mexico

y

as the

New

Party.
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the conviction that theirs would be the ranks decimated
defections to the

New

by

Party.

Although the Progressives' few failures cannot be easily
those in Illinois and Ohio being particularly
they had been successful beyond all expectations in
costly
getting their candidates on the ballots of forty-five states. With
an opportunity to cast their votes for Wallace-Taylor electoral
written off

slates

all

November

across the United States,

of 1948, have a choice.

the people would, in

CHAPTER

Costliest
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Campaign

FOR A tMrd

party that has successfully hurdled the bars of
organizing its machinery and of getting its name on the ballot, there remains perhaps the most difficult barrier of all
securing adequate finances. The task of conducting a nation-

wide campaign in a land as vast as the United States has
always been difficult and expensive, and in 1948 costs were
marked
higher than ever before. Since 1944, there had been a
inflation, and there were new and costly campaign media to be
a
employed. While television had not yet come into its own,
cost
a
network
time
on
national
of
radio
half-hour
single
some $17,000, air travel by chartered plane between $1 and

was clearly
parties involved this campaign
as
of
the
the "costliest in the history
nation,"
Clayton Knowles
$2 a mile. For

observed in the

all

New

York Times.

What were

the implications of this high cost of politics for
the Wallace party? In the past, with only normal expenditure
had come to grief. In
heights to hurdle, many a third party

Kenneth

"The

MacKay,
1924, according to party historian
financial efforts of the Progressives had been such a dismal
failure that there were insufficient funds to carry the candibeyond St. Louis." In the light of 1948's even
encounter tremendous diffihigher costs, would the new party
date's train

sufficient funds or find
culty in securing
153

it

necessary to cur-
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What were the Progressives'
expenditures drastically?
the
did
Where
money would come from?
they expect
goals?
Ea y in 1948, party strategists concluded that it would
cost about $3,000,000 to finance Wallace's candidacy. They
tail

and the
unions
chiefly CIO
expected that the leftwing
bear the brunt of their
would
of
America
Citizens
Progressive
that a program of paid
fundraising efforts. They anticipated
and
rallies
Wallace
admissions for
speeches would raise about

$1,000,000, with another $1,000,000 expected from individual members of leftwing unions, as well as substantial individual contributions from theatrical and other sources.

In the light of these expectations, what

was the actual per-

formance of the Wallace forces? To what extent were these
contribution goals achieved? What techniques were utilized
for gathering the funds?

And how was

the

money

ultimately

spent?

The highways and byways of party finance are dark and
devious for all American parties major as well as minor.
Following them is no task for the uninitiated. Yet the exploration must be made if the above and other questions are
to be answered. Although federal statutes
the Hatch
Practices
acts
set
limits
on
Corrupt
purportedly

and

campaign

contributions and spending and although
they require the reof
all such monies,
have
porting
they
proved less than effective in
all
practice. In the first place,

they exempt
political
groups operating in a single state unless such an organization
is a "branch or
subsidiary of a national committee, associa-

tion or organization." While
they limit national group expenditures to $3,000,000 and individual contributions to

$5,000, they fail to spell out any prohibition against
multiple
organization or multiple donation. Thus it has been customary
for the major
parties to organize as many separate groups as
necessary to encompass the anticipated funds. And individual

donors have found no restrictions on the size of their

gifts to
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state organizations or the number of their grants to separate
national groups.
With respect to the reporting provisions of the law, there

has been ignorance, doubt, and even outright evasion, with
or no attempt to punish violators. The resultant impos-

little

sibility

of formulating any exact picture of the amount conby any party whether major or minor,

tributed to or spent

Republican, Democratic, or Progressive has led informed
observers to a double-the-visible rule of thumb as a minimal
estimate of actual contributions or expenditures.
Consequently, the reported contributions of the two na-

groups of the 1948 crusade the Progressive Party and
the National Wallace-for-President Committee
have been
tional

measured against newspaper reports and party officials' estimates in an attempt to arrive at an answer to the question,

"How much did the third party actually receive in contributions?" Party leaders' comments were particularly important
in view of the accounting system adopted for the reports filed
with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives a system that caused such an experienced reporter as Clayton
Knowles of the New York Times to report a deficit for the
1
party groups at a time they were actually enjoying a surplus.

and
carefully negotiated the intricate report paths
the necessary adjustments along lines pointed out by
party leaders C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin and Ralph Shikes, it
may be reasonably concluded that the two national groups of

Having

made

the Wallace campaign reported net contributions of approximately one and one quarter million dollars ($1,280,279.49).
Campaign manager Baldwin himself apparently applied the
double-the-visible rule in setting his estimate of over-all con-

New

1

York Times, October
See reports of "$320,000 deficit** in
22, 1948, and correction by Ralph Shikes to "$7,525 surplus" in the
Times, October 23, 1948. (These reports covered the period ending
October

16, 1948.)
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tributions at $2,500,000, although he admitted that his figure
might be off by 25 or 30 per cent.

But where did the money come from? To what extent was
the financing left to the people, as
anticipated by Henry A.
Wallace? In announcing his candidacy, the former Vice

President had indicated his
expectation that the common
and
workers, housewives,
professional people all across
America would bear the financial burden. He had remarked

man

wryly, "I certainly don't know any other way. I don't think the
corporations will finance it."

On the basis of the reports filed, it is possible to reach a
threefold classification of
Progressive Party contributions:
(1) individual contributions, both under and over

$100; (2)
paid admissions under $100; and (3) organizational contributions, including direct and indirect through the
purchase
of campaign material at cost.
Although it is obviously impossible to determine whether the
organizational contributions
originated with large or with small donors, an over-all pattern
in total
giving can be discerned.
If the known national
pattern is assumed to hold true for
the organizations,
57 per cent
slightly more than one half
of the Wallace contributions came from those
less

donating
than $100 each. The figures for each
grouping are shown in
the table which
appears on the opposite page.

By way

of contrast, the
reported figures for both major
1940 indicate that their contribu-

parties from 1920 through
tions came far more

from large-scale contributors.
Democrats reported only 18.4 per cent of their funds came from donors
heavily

For the

six presidential
years involved, the

of less than $100, the
Republicans only 11.8 per cent. In
area at least, the 1948
Progressive candidate's expectations were
fairly weU realized. Far more than the
major
parties of his competitors, his
Progressive following was in
this
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TABLE A
SOURCES OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
AND THE NATIONAL WALLACE-FOR-PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
1.

Individual Contributions

41.1%

Under $100.00
Over $100.00

a.

b.
2.

Admissions under $100.00

3.

Organizational Contribu-

from State, Local,
and Associated Groups

19.3%
21.8

$247,717.99
278,494.73
120,883.27

434,982.87

9.4

tions

49.5

a.

Direct Contributions

34.0

b.

Purchase of Campaign
Material at Cost

15.5

100.0%

198,200.63
$1,280,279.49

terms of financial contributions, a "party of the people."

Topping the

list

of those

who

Wallace venture was the

presented large-scale gifts

Mrs. Anita McCormick
Elaine of Chicago, heiress to the International Harvester
fortune. Available reports disclose contributions of at least
to the

late

$28,500 to one third-party group or another $20,000 donated to the Maryland Progressive Party, $6,000 to the
Montana Party, and $2,500 to the National Wallace-forPresident Committee. Wallace, however, has estimated that
Mrs. Elaine's contributions ultimately reached a total of more
than $100,000. Two other women were represented by substantial sums
Mrs. Elinor S. Gimbel, one of the party's vice-

chairmen and organizer of the Women-for-WaUace
group,
and Mrs. Luke Wilson, mother of the Washington, D.C.,
Progressive Citizens of America leader. Both were listed as
maximum of $5,000 to both the

having donated the legal

Progressive Party and the National Committee.
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was well represented among the
with
names
such
as Paul Draper (listed tomajor donors,
with
his
wife
for
a
contribution
of $100 to the Walgether
lace Committee), Libby Holman Reynolds ($500 to the
theatrical profession

same committee), Lillian Hellman (two contributions of
$500 each), and E. Y. Harburg ($1,000). Names with social
connotations were also to be found Margaret and Corliss
Lamont, Mrs. Marjorie Sloan, Mr. and Mrs. J. B. Sloan, as
well as

Lady Pascoe

From

the

left

Rutter.

wing were millionaire Frederick Vanderbilt

who in 1938, according to the
House Committee on un-American Activities, had been in
Field and Miles Sherover,

charge of the Soviet-American Securities Corporation, an
organization engaged in selling Soviet bonds to the American
public. Another repeat donor was Dan S. Gillmor, of New

York, who gave at least $3,500 two $1,000 contributions
and one of $1,500 to the National Wallace Committee.
Although most of the party officials C. B. Baldwin, Ralph
were listed as having conShikes, and dark Foreman
tributed on several occasions, Wallace himself was listed
only
once for a $1,000 sum
Ms
wealth. This

despite
personal
substantiated the earlier
prediction in the New
that "Mr. Wallace is noted for his careful

York Times

personal spending
not expected to contribute himself." In all fairness, however, it should be remarked that the
physical contribution involved in a
campaign such as Wallace was to wage
transcended any
donation he could have made.

...

[he

is]

monetary

Senator Glen Taylor, frank to admit that his
congressional
post was the best job he ever had, was not among the contributors, but, again, his share was in the strenuous labor of
a national campaign rather than in its
financing. His earlier
remark, "If I do accept the offer [to run], it will be the first

time in

my life that I have had any money with which to
campaign," was significant.
What motivated these individuals to contribute such
large
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sums? Certainly they had few expectations of any quid pro
quo in a party whose chances were as slender as those of the
Progressives. In fact, for many, mere listing as Progressive
Party contributors led to immediate investigation by the

House Committee on un-American

Activities and to publication of the results of previous digging into their records by
that august body.

In an interesting partnership, the Americans for DemoAction compiled and Representative (later Senator)

cratic

Karl

Mundt

Record a

list

of South Dakota inserted in the Congressional
of contributors of amounts greater than $1,000

to Wallace groups together with their House Committee on
Activities dossiers. Although the committee's

un-American
evidence

may have

indicated that Frederick V. Field, donor

of $5,000 to the National Wallace-for-President Committee,
had Communist leanings, most of the information was as

nebulous as that about Mrs. Blaine. Of her, the Committee
reported, "The Daily Worker of January 11, 1938, p. 2,
listed Mrs. Anita McCormich [sic] Blaine as a signer of the

Union of Concerted Peace
front

1944."

organization

by

a Communist-

Efforts, cited as

the

Committee

.

.

.

March 29,

2

What, then, were the reasons

that persuaded them, despite

the likelihood of attempted intimidation, to support the crusade? Wallace himself had several suggestions to offer. First,

he

felt,

many

in the export-import trade contributed because
would aid their business and be-

party international policies

cause they had agreed with Wallace's position during the
1920's for expanding the United States's imports as a creditor
nation. Second, he conjectured that large numbers of Jewish families contributed to the party because of their general

"awareness of the international position and of world poliTo which might be added parenthetically, and because

tics."
*

U.S. Congressional Record,

plied for the significant dates.

May

5, 1948, p.

A2S87.

Italics sap-
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Ms

party's position

on the Palestine

issue.

The

1948

final factor,

Wallace suggested, was personal friendship for himself or
agreement with his over-all views. There were businessmen
attracted

by

his

work

as Secretary of

Commerce and

a liberal

group in a general agreement with his expressed foreign and
domestic policies. Mrs. Elaine's contributions, said Wallace,

came

"absolutely out of the blue." She had read his book
Statemanship arid Religion, which had so impressed her that

she wanted to give directly to its author. Wallace advised a
party contribution as the best way of promoting his ideas.

Factors other than those suggested by the candidate
may
have been involved. For instance, the well-to-do ama-

also

wanting to get into politics such as the theatrical
people could do so easily by contributing financially. More
difficult to
explain was the mass phenomenon of the volunteurs

tary contributions from the more humble. The fervor leading
workers in New York City's garment
industry to shower the
Wallace caravan with dollar bills from their windows, in the
course of a district street
It
have been
rally, was

may

typical.

the desire to belong

crusade
dig

down

that

the desire to merit

moved them,

as

it

moved

membership

so

many

in

a

others, to

into slim pockets for a last handful of
change to

place in the collection
thing akin to "getting

box

at

a

religion"

rally.

In short there was some-

on a political

level.

Although there are

relatively satisfactory sources for measuring individual contributions to the Wallace crusade, the
material available on the associated
groups is much less re-

vealing.

For example, it is clear that the
goal of $1,000,000
adopted by the National Labor Committee for Wallace and
Taylor was never attained.
individual union-

member

Although

contributions were not taken into
account, the reported organizational labor contributions of only $9,025
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demonstrated conclusively the failure of the Progressive
Party to achieve financial support from union sources.

The only

definitely identifiable labor contribution of size

was that of the Fur and Leather Workers Committee for
Wallace, Taylor, and Progressive Candidates. This group,
under the admittedly Communist leadership of Ben Gold, reported total donations of $21,230.99 "voluntary contributions of less than $100 each from members of affiliated
locals."

The word

facturers

who

"voluntary" was disputed by fur
before a subcommittee of the

testified

manuHouse

had been employed to secure contributions.
union
committee
The
reported expenditures of some $19,822.44 including a lump sum donation of $5,000 to the

that coercion

Progressive Party.

The Independent Political Committee of the Greater New
York Council, relied upon to produce large sums from the
metropolitan New York area, contributed only $1,425 to the
national groups, although

doubtedly more
able, that of

its

substantial.

direct expenditures

were un-

The

campaign manager

best party estimate availC. B. Baldwin, indicated that

organized labor barely approached the halfway
its minion-dollar goal.

mark toward

Contrast with this the estimated labor contribution of $1,500,000 to the Truman campaign chest. Of this sum about

$600,000 came from the

AFL

Labor League

for Political

Education, while another $500,000 came from the CIO
Political Action Committee groups at one time expected to
carry the Wallace banners. In

New York the American Labor

more
Party split proved costly, as David Dubinsky gathered
WorkLadies'
Garment
International
from
his
than $250,000

Union and its affiliates, which also went to President
Truman and the Democrats.
Since much less was expected of it, the Nationalities Diviers

sion turned in a relatively better, though hardly substantial,
sources
performance, primarily from East European
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SloGreeks, Lithuanians, Romanians, Russians, Serbians,
but
venians and Yugoslavs (all "hyphenated Americans")
and
Irish-Amerialso including Armenian, Italian-American,
can Committees. The Armenians and Slovenians were the

most successful groups, contributing some $3,500 of the
$5,407.20 total reported under the Nationalities banner.
Women-for-Wallace was credited with identifiable contributions totaling only $782.85. Yet a cursory glance at
newspaper accounts of

their dinners reveals that

New York

led by the indefatigable Mrs.
City branches of this group,
Elinor S, Gimbel, secured at least $27,000 (net) from only
three such affairs. The figures for the national groups also
reveal a rather high proportion of women donating sums over

$100

31.2 per cent of those giving to the National Comis virtually impossible to evaluate the

mittee, for instance. It

women's organization played in producing this
Mrs. Gimbel, however, ascribed feminine support to
two main factors. First, she said, women were vitally interested in the "peace and home issues" that the Wallace party
a woman to conespoused, and second, it was possible for

part that the
result.

tribute without fear of Red-baiting or of causing economic
losses that might have accrued to her husband's business, had

Ms name been
The

listed as

a donor.

contributions of the

Young

Progressives of

America

were negative. Theirs was the only subsidiary organization
that had to be supported by monetary transfusions from
various state organizations. Of their $18,993.66 total income, about $12,000 came to the YPA from state bodies,
less than $7,000 from individual contributors. The National
Council (A the Arts, Sciences and Professions was
strong only
in New York and in California, where it
expended directly
a total of some $38,000 ($1,500 more than it took in) on
behalf of the Wallace-Taylor
candidacy.
The role of the Progressive Citizens of
to determine, for

midway

in the

America

is difficult

campaign they merged into
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the National Wallace-for-President Committee. Prior to that,
their financial support

had likewise been concentrated

in

New York and California, with only scattered strength elsewhere. The PCA spent approximately $82,000 and contributed identifiable amounts totaling $4,104.90 to the national groups.

On

the basis of available information,

discover either

any

direct contribution

it is

the

by

impossible to

Communists

to

more

the Progressive Party or,
importantly, any possible
diversion through individual contributions. The Communist

Party reported a fund of some $20,000,
tributions

from ten

state

parties,

for

made up

its

1948

of con-

National

Campaign Committee. Committee expenditures were
only $11,982.02, with the balance of the $20,000 being
turned back into the parent organization. Judging by this
total, the Communists may not have been as well-heeled as
they had been in earlier campaigns or else their supporters
gave directly to the Wallace party. The Communist Party in
for its own candithe United States had spent $162,040.45
in 1936 and $89,548.26 in 1940. But, in view of the
dates

Election

magnitude of Wallace financing in 1948 and the relatively
modest Communist spending of previous years, it is evident
that the party, while working actively for the Wallace candidacy, could have played no more than an exceedingly minor
financial role.

Were
cial

there any significant geographical patterns of finanlocal
support revealed in the contributions of state and

groups to the two national organizations? Although donations
were reported from groups in twenty-eight states as well as
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, it is dear that four
New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California,
states
in that order

the party.

constituted the major financial strength of
these four contributed well

Not unexpectedly,
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over one half of the total organizational gifts that the national groups received. This pattern was in keeping with both

and ultimate ballot strength, except in the
where springtime dollars ran well

early expectations
case of Pennsylvania,

ahead of November votes. It is impossible, however, to determine whether this situation in Pennsylvania was the result
of high average contributions or last-minute allegiance shifts
who had donated to the Progressives and

by Pennsylvanians

then voted for the Democrats

or had perhaps supported

the Republicans.

A

few other states ranked unexpectedly high in financial
Texas in
strength in view of the Progressives' platform
and in view of the relatively small populations
sixth place
Colorado in eleventh. On the other hand, the
of these states
weakness of financial support from Wisconsin spotlighted the
Wallace failure to capture the public allegiance earlier given
the La Follette Progressive Party. Ironically, in both Texas

and Missouri, supporters gave the Progressive Party almost
four times as many dollars as they ultimately gave votes.

But what of the means whereby the Progressive Party was
able to obtain such sizable contributions? What were its
and techniques of fundraising

strategy
local?

Few

both national and

of the various techniques employed on national and

local levels sprang into being during the 1948
campaign itself. Their origins were in the devices
employed by the CIO
Political

Action Committee as early as 1944, when a one and

one-half million-dollar fund had been raised to
support the

Roosevelt-Truman

ticket.

The

Political

Action Committee

voluntary-contribution methods, including the paid-admission
political rally, had been taken over and perfected by the

Progressive Citizens of America during the preceding year.
series of speaking tours undertaken
Wallace in

A test-run

by
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1947, utilizing both paid admissions and voluntary contributions, had netted some $265,000, according to Howard Norton in the Baltimore Sun. The PCA had also employed direct

mail appeals, social functions such as dinners and breakfasts,
and small house parties always with the inevitable moment
for passing the hat.
In 1948 the nation-wide tours of both presidential and vicestand-bys both
presidential candidates employed two

PCA

and the multiple-dollar-per-plate
the paid-admission
dinners. Two sources reveal the magnitude of the amounts
realized by these methods: first, a "consolidated surplus
rallies

statement" prepared for party headquarters; and, second,
scattered newspaper reports during the course of the campaign, primarily in the New York Times and Baltimore Sun.
Party reports indicated that gross national cash income

from "Tours (Wallace, Robeson, Taylor)" and "Fundraising
Events" was $561,591.70 more than one half of one million. National expenditures were reported for the same
items totaling $269,324.77, leaving a net income for the national groups of $292,266.93. With national and local groups
sharing a fifty-fifty split, the combined over-all totals were
approximately $1,120,000 gross and about $580,000 net
income. Admittedly incomplete newspaper sources revealed
a total of some three quarters of one million dollars from rallies

and dinners, thus suggesting the accuracy of

this million-

plus figure.

While $100-per-plate dinners had been common to both
Republican and Democratic fundraising in the past, the idea
of charging admission to a political rally had been generally
held to be out of the question. The Progressives were the first
to try it on such a wide scale. The sums received demonstrated that it was as successful as it was unique. Instead of
keeping audiences away, exacting an admission price had
the opposite effect, according to party officials, leading to a
much greater turnout than might otherwise have resulted.
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workers

entered

enthusiastically

into

ticket-selling
in a ticket to
drives, "and purchasers who had invested $2.40
hear Wallace had a financial stake to insure their attendance.

Party

What were

the details of this rally technique

worked out by

the Progressives in the 1948 campaign? All across the nafrom New York to California the series of name
tion
rallies
employed
meetings, campus assemblies, and ball-park
the same general scheme to swell third-party coffers. Admission prices ranged from a low of 10# at student gatherings

to a high of $3.60 for choice seats at Yankee Stadium in
For most events the range was from 60# to

September.
$2.40.

What was the

audience's reward in return for the admission

contribution exacted from

it

on the

basis of the drawing

power of the national candidates Henry A. Wallace and
Senator Glen H. Taylor? The Progressives acted on the
theory, simple but previously untested, that a political rally
can be just as well staged, well lighted, well timed, dramatic,
and entertaining as a Broadway hit. While the exact role of
various playwrights, theatrical directors, song writers
and others from the legitimate stage was difficult to assess,
the end product of their cooperation exhibited all the finish
and skill of a professional presentation. By comparison, the
traditional Republican and Democratic meetings seemed dull,
long-winded, and amateurish. And, above all, this new stag-

the

ing brought results

At a
munity
its

at least financial results.

typical rally, the festivities
sing as the audience was

seats.

Then

would

start

with a com-

gradually finding its way to
followed an invocation
often by a Negro

and introductory remarks by some local figure
the party's candidate for state or local office. The
script kept these remarks brief and pointed, just enough to
set a
pattern of urgency in relating the national campaign to

minister

maybe

locally important issues

Palestine partition for a Jewish

audience, segregation and discrimination for

mixed

racial
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gatherings, peace and

nine audience.

Many

home

issues for

a predominantly femi-

times the local speaker would be a

professor from a near-by university, perhaps a scientist portraying the immediate need for carrying out Progressive Party
foreign policy to avert a

new and overwhelming atomic world
all
designed as warm-

war. These preliminary remarks were
up for the audience.

Once the party's ties to the community its interest in
and proposed solutions for local issues had teen exhibited,
the scene was shifted gradually to national levels. A well-

known
this

actor or artist usually played the preliminary part in

transformation. Paul

two who

Robeson and Canada Lee were

the spot frequently. With their professional
histrionic
and vocal talent, and, above all, thentraining^
sense of timing, these seasoned performers would skillfully
filled

dramatize an important current

issue,

something out of the

day's headlines, perhaps, to prepare their listeners for the
actual fund drive.

The

stage

was now

set for

what came to be known as the

pitch. This phrase, borrowed from carnival lingo, admirably
described the performance of William Gailmor, who always

occupied a spot on the bill. During the 1947 Progressive Citizens of America tour, Raymond Walsh had been the performer, but he had parted from the troupe when it took to
the third-party road. Gailmor, a former radio newscaster,

proved a natural for the role

At

a born pitchman.

the rather stocky, almost completely bald, too
attired
Gailmor would let the audience down from its
nattily
first,

previous peak, even arousing latent antagonism, especially
New York attitude and manner of

in rural areas, with his

speaking. This first unfavorable impression, however, would
soon be counteracted dispelled by sheer oratorical ability.

Linking personal anecdote to world problems, Gailmor had
the knack of bringing remote affairs right into the room and
of surrounding them with an air of urgency, a feeling of need
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for immediate action that
only a third party

the Progressive
could successfully undertake.
By this time, generally a matter of some fifteen minutes,
the audience would be well charmed
completely in hand.

Party

Then would come

the climax:

America needs a

people's party. The Progressive Party
Each of you needs a people's
party
the Progressive
Party to carry the story of the people's
needs all across this broad land of ours. But
.
that
takes money,
money to buy radio time to refute the lies beis

that

people's party.

.

ing spread about the people's party,
tising space in the hostile press,

money
money to

to
let

.

buy adverpeople

all

across the
country see and hear Henry Wallace and Glen
Taylor just as you are seeing them tonight. The Progressive
Parry lacks, and is proud that it lacks, the wealth of Wall
Street and the
gold of the industrialists. This party is not
backed by the power of the militarists, the vested
interests
of both old
parties. This people's party depends upon each
and every one of you. Isn't it worth
your while to help such
a people's
a party that
party?
represents no cliques, no
organizations of wealth, no combines of
monopolists and

but

does represent you
cartels,
people, of America.

the

little

people, the real

"It ought to be worth"
then a planned
pause, an overlong pause for "reflection" or receipt by mental transmission
of an amount
already carefully determined in advance
"it
ought to be worth $1000 to someone here in this room to

help carry the words of Henry Wallace the
length and breadth
of America, to
print his speeches, to buy radio time
And with the request
carefully tailored to fit the audience
there would be an almost
immediate response. The drive
off to a fine start.
.

.

As

the

amounts asked for were

progressively lowered
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.

give
.

?"

$50
a

to

buy radio time,

to

print

pam-

new segment would be encouraged

to dig

pockets for the party, for its party, for the peothat
depended upon it for financing. And finally,
ple's party
when the last ten- and five-dollar contribution had been
into

its

milked out, there would come the exhortation for everyone
in the audience to take a dollar bill out of his pocket. "Even
can't give a dollar, take one out and hold it
wave them around, let
for the cameraman.
if

you

Now

lace,

up in the air
Henry Wal-

who's waiting in the wings to talk to you, see that you Ye

with him 100 per cent. Hold them up and wave them high!
Higher still! Wave them around!" Then would come the payoff:

"All right, ushers, take the

bills

away before they have

time to put them back in their pockets."

About

to leave the stage, Gailmor would dash back to the
microphone to add, "A people's party depends on the dimes

and nickels

as well as

down

on the

dollar bills of the

little

people.

and bring out the loose
have
there.
Wouldn't
change you
you rather have it go toward
own
your very
party your people's party instead of for
beer on the way home tonight? Well then, put it in the conJust reach

into your pocket

tainers that the ushers will pass among you."
The audience that had fay these rites proved

its

worth

and been accepted as partner in the "people's party" was now
allowed its long-awaited glimpse of the candidate. The house

would darken and a single spotlight pick out the figure
of Henry A. Wallace making his way to the center of the
With a
stage, or down the aisle to the speaker's platform.
stride
he
would
of
burst
sudden
out, greeting them
vitality
with the familiar Wallace smile and waving recognition while

lights

with
waiting for the tumultuous reception to subside. Finally,
the audience restored to order, the speech of the night for
which they had paid so handsomely would commence.
success of the pitch can be judged from the incomthe only ones available
indicating voluntary
plete figures

The
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contributions at the

mately $116,000

amount

rallies.

The

was probably

1948

identifiable total
less

approxithan one half of the

the total take
actually realized, since

was shared with

local sponsoring groups. No wonder that hardened political
writers remarked that the Wallace tours had something of the
air of a Billy Sunday revival meeting about them, with so many
"converts" ready to part with dollars to promote their "new
on the success
religion." As Milburn P. Akers, commenting
of a Minnesota tour in the midst of the winter's worst

weather, wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times, "It's one way of
few politicians other than
financing a political campaign. But

Henry could

get

away with

it."

with their inevitable pitch, held the
center of the fundraising stage, the secondary feature of all
tours was the series of dinners at which the
Wallace

Although the

rallies,

campaign

Here the technique was copied
presidential candidate spoke.
after the traditional major-party affairs, with the tariff varied
a
according to the local situation. In April, 1,400 attended
each
at
while
425
New
$25
dinner
in
York,
paid
$100-a-plate
a Philadelphia banquet in October, and several hundred had
contributed $12.50 each to a Hollywood session earlier the

same month.

At

these dinners, the touch for additional contributions

was the main Progressive Party variation. Early in the campaign a "bed-sheet" technique was briefly employed in which
four pretty girl volunteers carried the comers of a sheet into
which cash, pledges, and checks were tossed. This approach
enjoyed marked success in Chicago, where it netted some
$35,000 at two meetings. However, it was later abandoned in
favor of tactics similar to those employed at the rallies. Combining all these techniques, the series of luncheons and dinners brought to the party tills at least $202,000, and
probably well over the quarter-million-dollar mark.

Party reports, newspaper accounts, and personal attendance all substantiated the conclusion that in their rallies

and meetings the Progressives had been
highly

successful,
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going well over their $1,000,000 goal set early in the camto
paign. While the future applicability of such techniques
other campaigns and other parties was doubtful, their value
to the Wallace-inspired groups in

1948 was tremendous.

While the pitch and the multiple-dollar-per-plate dinner
were the mainstays of the parent bodies, with a percentage of
the receipts diverted to state and local groups, there was a
wide variety of devices employed by the latter directly. The
range was almost as broad as the groups employing them,

and then* success almost as hidden as some of the localities in
which they were used.
There were lunches and dinners similar to those noted
above, but with less prominent guest speakers and smaller levin the homes of local
ies exacted. There were house parties
on the precinct level, for which a canned version
backers
of the Gailmor pitch was available on phonograph records, as
were speeches by Wallace and Taylor. A series of twenty-five
home movies with sound was also produced for use at these
smaller gatherings. The latter device was sufficiently unusual
to merit discussion by the theatrical editor of the Sunday

New York

Times.
All of these media, in addition to presenting the program

of the party, emphasized the need for funds. Form letters
for direct mailing to selected lists were employed. One of these

urged contributions to the Progressive Party on the occasion of Wallace's sixtieth birthday, October 7, 1948, "to buy
more radio time, print more leaflets, hold more meetings, mail
the truth to

more

voters."

There was also an attempt to imitate the remunerative
Christmas and Easter seal drives of health organizations by
the letters, these were mailed
utilizing "Wallace seals." Like
to select lists in the expectation that 90 per cent would return the expected donation ($1 for a sheet), 8 per cent would
return the seals, and onlv 2 per cent would fail to do either.
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no evidence concerning whether or not these optimistic goals were attained.
A four-page pamphlet was prepared to set everyone up for
a contribution at the parties and meetings. Titled Not a R

There

is

Cent, this was, according to Publicity Director Ralph Shikes,
"slanted to show that while General Motors, the DuPonts,
Wall Street and Standard Oil don't give a cent to the Wallace-

Taylor campaign fund, housewives, veterans, clergymen,
steelworkers, farmers give their hard-earned dollars
.

because
all

it's

their Progressive Party."

the other printed materials, were

These pamphlets,

made

.

.

like

available to the

local groups at cost. After June 1, 1948, the provision was
added that "all orders from local groups will be for cash

only."
tional

Some

of the groups

committee for the

had been slow in paying the na-

literature supplied, and the national
any local groups, even to the extent

did not intend to carry
of supplying them with gratis publicity material.
Other devices, such as auctions, raffles, and theater benefits,

were also employed by
metropolitan New York

local

groups, particularly in the

Again, however, data for evaluthe techniques
ating their success are lacking. On the whole,
the
local
levels were remarkable only for their
on
applied
most part they were evolved at headquardiversity. For the
ters level

area.

and transmitted

to local

the total funds thus obtained

groups for execution. While

may have been

substantial, they

were small in comparison with those from the national techniques that had proven so effective.

But what was the total cost of the Wallace campaign, and
what was the pattern of expenditure? With funds coming in
strongly and regularly, how were they employed? How did
the national and state organizations share the burden?

On

the basis of

known expenditures in those states where
known contributions from such

such reports are available and
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groups to the national committee and party,
arrive at

an estimate of the

total

amount

possible to
expended on the
it is

for the Wallace-Taylor candidacy
an amount
between one million and one and one-half million dollars.
state

To

level

sum must be added

a less firmly based estimate for
the associated groups, derived from the few known figures and
from a sense of expenditures resulting from long work with the
this

finances. Bringing in Campaign Manager Beanie Baldparty's
win's estimate of $500,000 spent by the leftwing unions, an
estimated $50,000 by the women's groups, and $30,000 by

Youth of America, farm, and business groups,
total of some
possible to arrive at an over-all expenditure
the best practicable
three and one-third million dollars

the Progressive
it is

TABLE B
OVER-ALL ESTIMATE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES OF THE 1948
WALLACE-TAYLOR CANDIDACY
National Group Expenditures
Progressive Party, National Wallace-forPresident Committee (from reports filed
with the Clerk of the U.S. House of

$1,260,102.91

Representatives)
State

and Local Expenditures

Exclusive of Contributions to National

Groups (estimated)

1,325,000.00

Associated Group Expenditures
Reported (reports filed with the

169,029.79
500,000.00

Clerk of the House)
Estimated: Labor

Women-for-Wallace

50,000.00

Miscellaneous (Farm, Business, Student, Veterans)

Over-all Total

30,000.00
$3,334,132.70
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estimate. This total

is

clearly in

1948

keeping with Baldwin's mid-

September estimate of $2,500,000 of expenditures through
that time and is likely to be less, if the total is
substantially

different,

than the actual

figure.

Information about where the

money went proves even

more
is

elusive than that concerning its sources. Full
accounting
available for only the million and a quarter

reportedly
spent by the national committee and party, with only scattered
reports to suggest state and local spending. Both committee
and party records indicate that the national groups
expended

very

little

for local purposes, while substantial state funds

were used on the national campaign.
Major national expenditures were for fundraising events

($207,624.5018.2 per cent), tours ($61,700.275.5 per
15.0 per cent), and
cent), campaign material ($171,589.46
budgetary expenses

($583,484.25

51.0

per

cent).

The

money expended on fundraising events and tours was more
than balanced by the income received at these events. The
national groups listed gross income of $561,591.70 for a net
income of $282,266.93 from such sources.
Campaign material was also on a better than
self-sustaining basis for
the

national committee and
party, with nearly $200,000
($198,200.63) realized from sales at cost to local

groups,

leaving an apparent profit of

more than $25,000 on

this item.

Travel expenditures were
remarkably low especially in
view of the extensive
campaign tours undertaken by both
Wallace and Taylor,
many by planes chartered at high rates.
Incidentally, the reports listed disbursements to Senator
Taylor for travel but none to Mr. Wallace. This, however,
does not indicate that Wallace
paid his own expenses as he
had in the 1944
for
Roosevelt and Truman. The
campaign
lies in the fact that the Senator traveled on an
account
expense
basis, whereas headquarters paid Wallace's
travel bills
directly rather than reimburse him later.

explanation
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fact that the national
group

lumped more than one

half of their total expenditures under an unrevealing budgetary
expenses item makes it impossible to ascertain such items as

salary expenses, the cost of office overhead, and the amounts
expended on various advertising media. There is no precise
to determine just how much was spent on radio advertisin the later phases of the fall campaign. Waling, particularly
lace radio talks formed an important part of party strategy

way

in the last six weeks, with

some seven

fifteen-minute ad-

dresses going out over a national network. At an estimated
$17,000 per half hour, this represented approximately $60,000 for this project alone. And, in addition to national broad-

were many local ones employing transcriptions
and records. Toward the end of the campaign, the party was

casts, there

so anxious to press the increased use of radio that it agreed
to pay 30 per cent of the costs incurred by state and local

groups for air time.

For the most part, however, the state groups were expected
to contribute to the national, and they did so. Only a very
small amount, some $43,000 (3.0 per cent) went from the
national to the weaker state parties. According to the recollection of C. B. Baldwin, "most of this money was sent to the

southern states for petition campaigns in order to get on the
ballot. Also, some funds were sent to West Virginia, for
the same purpose." And while an $1,800 contribution was
the national to the Georgia Committee for Wallace
and Taylor, the Georgia Progressive Party contributed $3,000

made by

to the national Progressive Party. In contrast, $14,000 or
cent of their total money was contributed by the
39.4

per
bodies.
Washington, D.C. organization to the parent
Professor T.
the

I.

Emerson estimated

that

And

some 40 per cent of

Connecticut People's Party expenditures of approxi-

contributions to the national
mately $75,000 went for similar
the major-party pattern of nareversed
This
practice
groups.
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tional assistance to

"weak

weaker state committees, for even the
Wallace camp gave more to national

sisters" in the

headquarters than they received.

What conclusions may be reached from this survey of
Wallace party financing? How successfully had this major obstacle been hurdled? The over-all
pattern was one of success.
The

party's national balance sheet was in the black, showing
(on the basis of the available figures) an actual surplus of
some $20,000, whereas a deficit is usually anticipated even
3

by major parties. The total monetary goals set earlier in the
campaign were achieved before its close. Unlike earlier minor
parties, no plans were abandoned because of insufficient
funds, no candidate left stranded through inadequate resources. The crusade had extracted the fiscal resources from
which to forge its weapons in the
"fight for

And

peace."

even though

had not emerged completely as the
mass
movement portrayed by party
popularly supported
it

publicists, the Progressive group
to being, in contrast to its

could legitimately lay claim
major adversaries, a party of the

people

a party of small contributors.
Possessing

its

share of

major contributors and first magnitude angels, the Wallace
band had relied heavily and
successfully on new and daring
on the voluntary contributions of converts to its
techniques
cause. This was a
on the
phenomenon
unique

scale

employed
lievers backed

certainly

American history, in which the true betheir faith and conviction with dollars and
in

dimes.

On
labor

the other hand, there

was the conspicuous failure of
both organization and individual alike to
respond

*In contrast, the Democratic National Committee

reported a
of $263,935.59 for the
campaign year 1948, and the Republican deficit for the same
period was estimated at $300,000. The
Dixiecrats reported a
surplus of $1,360.42.
deficit

Walt

Partymiller,

York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily

Reproduced from the Collections of the Library of Ccwgrrss.
Cartoon by Dotr/ing, Xev. York Herald Tribune.

Henry Wallace's

third party:

varying points of

vie\\.

"Lwteo! listen To

He People Cheering I*

Reproduced from the Collections of the
Library of Congress
Cartoon by Hcrblock c 1947 The
Washington Post.

u

Costliest

Campaign

111

1948
campaign went to the party and candidate that, lesser evil or
not, had a chance of winning. And geographically, financial
support for the new party proved extremely narrow limited
for the most part to the coastal, industrial confines and

to the call. Labor's million-dollar investment in the

never reaching the main streams of middle America, even in
those areas where political dissent had a proud heritage.
But measured by the most critical device of all, ultimate
strength at the polls, the Progressives' financial success was
to prove completely out of keeping. On the basis of the
1,156,103 votes received hi November, the Wallace party
an average of nearly $3 per vote the highest
had

spent
ever recorded in an American campaign. For even in the

infamous

1926

Pepper-Vare

Pennsylvania primary fight
where, according to Professor V. O. Key, "the Pepper supfor expenditure per
porters set the highest recorded figures
vote received," they had achieved an average level of only
$2.42. Certainly, if cost be measured in average expenditure
had come up with the costliest
per vote, the Progressives
4
reof
American
history. As one observer bitingly
campaign
marked, not without some measure of truth, "Back where I
come from, they could have bought their votes cheaper than
that."
of contrast, the States' Rights Democrats (Dixiecrats)
votes after their reported expenditure of only
$160,081.66 approximately 14 per vote.
4

By way

received

1,169,021

CHAPTER

8

"The Same Old
Merry-Go-Round'
BY THE

it
began to appear that the Walhad been waging a losing battle in the
spring campaign of its "fight for peace." Despite an occasional skirmish victory, it had been greeted with a discouraging lack of support on the part of an increasingly hostile
public, as well as an inexorable flow of world events, draining the vitality from its major thesis
peaceful coexistence.
And now with evidences of a renewed liberalism in the Democratic Party, it was faced with the imminent loss of
many of
its own
supporters and workers. Some had already departed,
and early in July many more were wavering.
In the light of these trends, and in view of the fact that the
third-party candidates and platforms were already decided,
party strategists were faced on the eve of their Philadelphia
Convention with a set of circumstances unusual to such

close of June, 1948,

lace Progressive Party

party assemblages
major or minor. The chief problem was
that of attempting to regain lost
ground of renewing public
interest, of reviving the failing spirits of party workers, and
of countering the
attacks that had
so
press

proved
damaging
no surprise, then, that
the Philadelphia Convention
ultimately became a propaganda
both
battleground more than anything else. The opposition
during the spring.

It

should

come
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recognized the situation and unleashed

their strongest broadsides against the
faltering crusaders.

With the Progressive seemingly accepting Professor
Dayton
D. McKean's thesis that a national convention is
rightfully
"a device of propaganda rather than a deliberative
assembly,"
what would they do to sharpen this image, to make more effective the publicity value of their
assemblage? Long before
July they had evidenced an awareness that propaganda, to be

must be well done, both convincing and, if possible,
entertaining. They had made good use of their adherents
from Broadway to revise drastically the traditional party
rally.
They had added the professional touch in their staging, lighting, and timing. And they had demonstrated the power of
the dollar the dollar exacted in paid admissions and volunto cement
tary contributions
support, to inject religious

effective,

fervor into their political crusade.

When

Beanie Baldwin announced that

this

would be a

"new, streamlined people's convention," it seemed that the
Wallace-ites were planning procedural
changes in the traditional structure to make their
Philadelphia meeting a profes-

produced spectacle. The hackneyed form would yield,
was expected, to their dramatic touch and become a more

sionally
it

effective instrument.

But, in addition to the publicity value of a national

convex

party strategists also hoped to acquire "morale value"
from their convention. As E. Pendleton Herring had so cotion,

gently outlined this aspect in

The

Politics of

Democracy:

The value of

the convention lies in permitting the rank
of the party to participate physically and emotionally in a common enterprise. Here are the men who must
carry the brunt of the campaign. Here they have a chance

and

file

to meet, to shout together, to act together, to feel together.
the turmoil of the convenion fulfill a

The excitement and
useful purpose. The

relationship of follower

and leader

is
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seldom an
a

intellectual

common symbol,

is

bond.
easily

A common bond of sympathy,
grasped and equally binding.

For a party in the process of formation, with little patronfactors seemed doubly important in
age at its disposal, these
the decision to meet at Philadelphia in July.

Who were these crusaders there assembled? How had they
been selected? The chief characteristic of the selection system
employed by the Progressives seems to have been an almost
included only one
complete lack of system. Party affiliates
well-established organization, New York's American Labor
such
Party, and only a few relatively well-developed groups
as California's Independent Progressive Party and Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut groups. For the most part,
even as late as July, the vast majority of state organizations
and Wallace committees were still in a rudimentary form.

In April a "Call to the National Founding Convention of
New Political Party" had gone out from the Chicago com-

the

all "state
parties supporting the Wallaceto all "state Wallace-for-President
and
candidacy"
Taylor
committees." It specified that each party or committee was en-

mittee meeting to

send two delegates for each state presidential elector
and might send additional delegates not exceeding four plus
one alternate for each elector. Later this provision had been
modified so that each state might send two more delegates per
a total of eight plus one alternate for each presidenelector
tial elector.
According to Campaign Manager Beanie Baldwin, this enlargement was made to accommodate a greater

titled to

in the populous states, such as New
York, who were anxious to attend the convention as delegates.
With such a large number of delegates provided for each

number of party workers

elector,

it

was not

surprising that

a

tended the Philadelphia Convention.

total of

some 3,240

at-
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State delegations were limited to a total vote equal to twice
the number of their state electors, regardless of the actual num-

ber of delegates sent, thus providing for fractional voting.
Unlike the major parties in recent years, the Wallace-ites

made no direct attempt to curtail
weak party support or to increase

delegations from areas of
representation from areas

of greater strength. However, this purpose was indirectly
served by a provision that members of the National Wallace-

Committee (a total of some seven hundred)
be
seated
as delegates by virtue of their office, although
should
they would not be entitled to cast a ballot in any roll-call vote.
Since this committee consisted hi part of "functional division"
officers from such groups as women, labor, nationalities, and

for-President

membership provided a degree of functional repto American politics.
resentation
selective
In the
process itself there was no mandatory profor
rank-and-file
vision
participation. These decisions were
a delegation no more
left to the state
parties and committees

veterans,

its

new

democratic than that of the major parties in a state like New
York, where selective power rests primarily with the county
chairmen.

What

of the products of this selective process? Gallery obConvention Hall had no difficulty in distinguishing

servers at

their major-party predecessors. The most cursory
glance revealed, as Helen Fuller noted in the New Republic,
that "the average delegate was about 20 years younger and

them from

GOP

Lighter than his Democratic or
counterpart/'
the
In fact,
average age of the Wallace delegates was not
much more than thirty, and only 40 per cent were over forty,

30 pounds

according to party questionnaires filial out by 1,247 of those
attending. Furthermore, nearly one third of the total number of delegates present at the convention were women, in

marked contrast with

the sparse female representation at
In addition, there was a much
conventions.
major-party
broader variety of professions represented. More than one
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third

were union members; one

World War

fifth

were veterans

1948
mostly

Professional people
doctors, lawyers,
constituted one fifth,
teachers
artists, actors, writers, and
cent were businessmen, and only 4 per cent were
while 9

of

II.

per

farmers. Although no racial figures were gathered, the easily
noted presence of large numbers of Negro delegates also set
the Progressives apart from major-party conventions. Instead
makof the professional politicians predominantly lawyers
these were amateurs from
the
conclaves,
major-party
ing up
all walks of life.

There was a sprinkling of familiar political names Representatives Vito Marcantonio and Leo Isaacson, Rexford
but the preponderance of
Tugwell, Paul Ross, and others
so evident at Democratic and Rehorses
wheel
usually
party
This fact,
publican gatherings was conspicuously missing.
combined with the youth of the delegates, led Luther Huston
to remark in the New York Times that the dominant atmosrather than the "smokephere was that of the "soda fountain"
filled room." Moreover, the delegates to this convention behaved with a spontaneity markedly absent from the funereal

Democratic assemblage a fortnight earlier. Staid Philadelphia
received an introduction to party songs as youthful delegates
to and from
joyously sang their way on buses and streetcars
Convention Hall. For, despite their slim hopes of victory at
1948 these Progressives seemed possessed of a sense
of mission and filled with the joy of "spreading the word."
But while most correspondents viewed these attributes of

least in

the delegates with equanimity and even approval, at least one,
Rebecca West, attacked what she viewed as "attempts to
sentimentalize the character of the convention

by pointing out
young people." To her, it was "as
unappetizing an assembly as I have ever seen in America."

that

.

it

.

consisted largely of

.

There were quite a number of young people who were
They were the ones who were embryo

very horrid indeed.

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"

183

Babbitts, having their fling before they settled

and narrow
stand

lives, stupid

down

young people, too stupid

to safe

to under-

....

...

I

never saw so

many boys

with the sullen eyes and

the dropped chins which mean a brain just good enough
to grasp the complexities of life and to realize that it would

never be able to master them. 1

Another distinguishing mark setting the New Party deletheir major-party counterparts was their
gates apart from
relative sobriety

in the alcoholic sense

in

comparison with

the earlier Republican and Democratic conventions. While not
generally the subject of public discussion, many observers

have pointed out, as has party analyst V. O. Key, Jr., that
major parties often attempt to launch then- candidates upon
a tide of liquid cheer. There may have been several reasons
a sense of fulfillment in the
for the Progressives' restraint
work of the convention needing no further outlet or perhaps
the simple economic fact that the majority could not afford
to indulge excessively, for the affluence of the major parties
was also conspicuous by its absence.

same time

that this "soda fountain" atmosphere,
exuberance,
provided a whiff of freshness after
youthful
"smoke-filled rooms," it also
Democratic
and
Republican

But

at the

this

demonstrated that the
political

skill

New

Party was markedly deficient in

and experience.

Practical

only through long years in actual

know-how

campaigning

acquired

was pos-

by very few. Most significantly, these delegates who
had abandoned major parties were only vaguely aware of the
important role of compromise in politics even third-party
sessed

politics.

1

Baltimore Evening Sun, July 27, 1948. Progressive Party sources
were even
reported that her columns appearing in British journals

more venomous.
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With the
ple's

1948

the "new, streamlined peodelegates assembled,
24, 1948, in

convention" opened Friday evening,

My

a profusion of traditional speechmaking. The keynote address
was delivered by Charles Howard, former Republican Negro
leader from Des Moines, Iowa. Following this, the Progressive
to
pinned on the New Party in response
the urgings of Secretary C. B. Baldwin:

label

was

officially

named
Thirty-one New Party organizations have already
themselves the Progressive Party .... It has a tradition
of independence. It expresses the fundamental spirit of
America,

I

propose that we adopt that name.

The following morning witnessed the election of the permanent convention chairman, Albert J. Fitzgerald, president

CIO United Electrical Workers. Following his address,
the Committee on Credentials reported, as did the Committee
on Rules.

of the

The
fight
tee.

report from the latter resulted in a significant floor

over proposed representation on the National CommitOnce the rules had been adopted, the Progressives fol-

lowed the time-honored

roll call

of the states for nominations.

Despite the fact that everyone in the hall already knew the
candidate, the usual parade of nominating and seconding
speeches followed, with every state present getting in at least

one address.

Finally, Henry A. Wallace was accepted as the
presidential candidate by acclamation. The same routine
started once more for the selection of the
vice-presidential

candidate. But, when California was reached in the call of
the states, Paul Taylor, the Senator's brother and a delegate
from that state, rose with a welcome motion. Inasmuch as the

hour was

and the candidates were waiting to make a brief
personal appearance, he urged that the nonsense (though his
phrasing was not so blunt) be dispensed with and Senator
late

Taylor's nomination proclaimed without further speeches.

The
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weary delegates were

all too
happy to accept this revolutionfor once at least, tradition went by the
ary suggestion, and,
boards in the New Party Convention.
The candidates, Henry A. Wallace and Senator Glen H.

a
Taylor, appeared briefly on the platform to be greeted by
tremendous ovation. For spontaneity, this demonstration
to those in attendance far more convincing than the
obviously staged affairs of the earlier Republican and Democratic assemblages. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm was interat least some of the reporters present.
preted as sinister by
To Joseph and Stewart Alsop, writing in the Philadelphia Eve-

seemed

ning Bulletin,

it

was a "macabre

spectacle" that

had

not even been entertaining, simply because the well-oiled
party machine allowed for no real surprises. The "demonstrations"

have had that quality of loudly spurious enthu-

siasm which prevails in eastern Europe.

However, the high light of the convention an open-air
was still ahead. This event alone, of all
rally at Shibe Park
the Philadelphia pr<s>ceedings, exhibited the professional touch
Hall.
expected but so conspicuously absent in Convention

Moreover, this rally at which the candidates formally accepted
the nominations tendered them (despite the fact that they had

marked several
already been campaigning for several months)
innovations for a national nominating convention.
Following their successful practice of charging admission
for political gatherings, the Progressives attracted a nearof more than 30,000 at prices ranging from
capacity audience
$.65 to $2.60. And once they had paid their way in, the
additional voluntary contributions.
spectators were tapped for
In this manner a total of some $60,000 was realized from the

Shibe Park rally. In return for their donations, the audience
was treated to a well-staged spectacle designed to entertain
as well as convert or further indoctrinate. First a few brief
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stalwarts as Vito Marcantonio and
speeches by such party
Paul Robeson. The Negro baritone, as befitting his professional stature, delivered one of the most moving addresses of

the entire convention, then wound up his stint with vocal selections called for by the audience. Hand cupped to ear, his
rich voice poured out his
I

most famous songs

"The House

Live In/' "Los Cuatros Generates" (of Spanish Civil

fame), and,

finally,

"Old Man River." Then came

War

the in-

evitable pitch, delivered by William Gailmor, with contributions commencing at the $1,000 level and gradually working

down through the loose change. Their participation nailed
down financially, the audience was now ready to hear from its
candidates.

Senator Taylor, speaking briefly and to the point, told the
with Henry
gathering that he was "proud to be associated
this new party" and "proud to be
on
the
mate
Progressive Party ticket." He promrunning
ised a fight against the "forces that would bankrupt America
by spending billions in a futile effort to bribe whole nations

Wallace in the founding of
his

a senseless struggle for
world domination." Concluding, he was joined by Mrs. Taylor
into

and

becoming our mercenaries

in

their sons in a touching family rendition of

Were Sweet Sixteen."
The stage was now

set for

"When You

Henry Wallace's dramatic en-

trance. Spotlights followed him as, to an accompanying ovation, his car circled the park and stopped before the rostrum.

The thunderous applause continued

as he strode to the stand
and began the feature address of the entire convention. Calling liberally upon the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wallace detailed his views on the desertion of the Roosevelt
position that

had

necessitated the formation of

a new party:

The party Jefferson founded 150 years ago was buried
here in Philadelphia last week. It could not survive the
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Pawleys, the Hagues, the Crumps, the racists and bigots,

A

the generals, the admirals, the Wall Street alumni.
party
founded by a Jefferson died in the arms of a Truman.

But the

which animated that party in the
days of
been captured anew. It has been
captured by
those who have met here this weekend with a firm resolve
to keep our tradition of freedom that we
fulfill the
spirit

Jefferson has

may

promises of an abundant peaceful

life

for

all

men. 2

Accepting the nomination of the Progressive Party "with
went on to acknowledge the commitments made
pride," he
in obtaining the nomination
commitments to the people of
America in hundreds of speeches across the land. These commitments he repeated pledges of working for the common

man, of seeking peace, and of making capitalism "progressive."

Thus concluded

the high point of the
Philadelphia ConvenBut before moving on to its

tion of the Progressive Party.

closing platform deliberations, a few
aspects of the staging

made on other

comments should be
employed by the

Party, as well as the atmosphere surrounding

its

New

delibera-

tions.

Above

all,

there

was the use of music. For

this

was a

sing-

ing convention

songs of the people, not only of a few star
performers, songs of the delegates, songs of the spectators,
and even songs of the reporters. Old folk and
popular tunes
were decked out in new lyrics extolling both party and candi-

and promising defeat to the old parties. "Great
Day"
was reworked to predict: "One of these mornings
bright and fair, Harry Truman won't be there." But the popular favorites were a
catchy pair composed especially for the
Wallace-ites
"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round" and "Evdates

for instance

3

Text of Wallace and Taylor Speeches, U.S. Congressional Record,

August

9, 1948, pp.

A5362-65.
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Wallace Everyone
eryone Wants Wallace Friendly Henry
Wants Wallace in the White House." The latter had a second
chorus which, casting logic aside, wanted Taylor in the White

House, too.

Nor did the delegates need any urging to join in the singing.
The spontaneity exhibited in Convention Hall and at Shibe
and into the buses and
was so cona
conservative press were
of
the
minions
even
that
tagious

Park bubbled over

into the streets

streetcars of old Philadelphia. In fact, the singing

observed joining the tuneful proclamation:
It's

the same, same merry-go-round.

Which one will you ride this year?
The donkey and elephant bob up and down,

On the same merry-go-round.
The elephant comes from the North,
The donkey may come from the South,
But don't let them fool you,
Divide and rule you
Cause they've got the same bit in their mouth.
If you want to ride safe and sound,
Get off-a the merry-go-round.

To be a real smarty,
New Party,
And get your two feet on the ground.

Just join the

Then

there

was the atmosphere of the convention. The

re-

porter who described it as that of the "soda fountain" rather
than of the "smoke-filled room" captured one aspect that

of youth. But coupled with this freshness, this spirit of optimism and hopefulness, there was a second and more serious
to be observed in the delegates.
Follette Progressives of an earlier
day, they,
too, felt themselves "bora to set it right." In terms of lifted

note

a sense of mission

Like the

La

morale, the convention was clearly a success, with the dele-

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"

189

gates publicly enjoying a sense of participation hardly equaled
at major-party assemblages.

But from the propaganda phase reflected in other
aspects of
the convention, the Wallace-ites were far less successful.
They
were consistently represented (or misrepresented)
by a hostile
press in such fashion as to convince the average voter that

Union Square headquarters

of the

Communist Party

in the

United States had been temporarily transferred to Convention
Hall in the City of Brotherly Love that the Reds and the
fellow travelers were completely
running the show. As the
Alsops interpreted

it:

The Wallace party contention here has not, of course,
been a convention at all. It has been, rather, a
dreary and
sometimes nauseating spectacle, carefully and quite obviously stage managed by the American Communist Party in
3
the interests of the foreign
policy of the Soviet Union.

.And with network
Americans had to

television coverage still in the future, most
rely upon similar biased reports for their

understanding of the crusade.

Primary target of many newspaper attacks was the platform
adopted by the newly titled Progressive Party. Formal work

on this policy statement had begun with Wallace's declaration
of candidacy. His December speech had designated the main
goals to be pursued. First was a secure peace, based upon
between the American and Russian peoThis
involved
American
ples.
repudiation of universal military
training and removal of "the Wall Street-military team
leading us toward war." Second, prosperity was to be attained
real understanding

,

by curbing the "growing power and
*

profits of

Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Third Party

Is

.

.

monopoly" and

Stage Managed
ieftwingers," Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, July 24, 1948.

by
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American living standards by proand
viding housing
lowering food prices. Third, progress was
to be sought in
curing some of American democracy's ills,

by taking

steps to preserve

such as racial segregation and curtailment of

With

this declaration as a basis, the

civil

4

rights.

New York

City headquarters staff had begun work under Lee Pressman, former
CIO general counsel. At the April Chicago meeting, the presidential candidate had further outlined his views, and a
platform committee bad been established to work
along these
lines in

preparation for the Philadelphia Convention. ProGuy Tugwell of the University of

fessor Rexford

Chicago

was named chairman and pressman
secretary of
mittee.

The New York group continued

to

this

work on

its

complat-

form, while in Chicago a second draft was entrusted to Pro5
fessor Richard Watt in consultation with
Tugwell.

The week before the convention, an
advisory group of some
members met in New York to resolve the differences
between the New York and
Chicago drafts. In addition to
sixteen

these two documents, the
group also had under consideration
two preambles, one
composed by Paul Sweezy and Leo
Huberman, the other by Scott Buchanan. From all these
sources, the advisory committee was to arrive at a
single
document to put before the full
committee in Phila-

platform

delphia.

The New York

draft
emphasized the "anti-monopoly" and
"drive to war"
in
terms that one observer, Professor
planks

John Cotton Brown, thought "doctrinaire." It was
brief
aimed at the man in the street, or, more
the

man

at the

factory gate.

On

relatively

specifically,

the other hand, the
Chicago

*Text of Wallace's Address, PM, December
30, 1947.
For a complete discussion of
Progressive Party platform considerations, see John Cotton Brown, 'The 1948
CampaignA Scientific Approach" (unpublished PhJD. Progressive
dissertation, University
8

of Chicago, 1949).
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was much more detailed, lengthy with economic analytone more moderate and scholarly.
The Sweezy-Huberman preamble was concerned chiefly

draft

sis, its

with the "growing concentration of economic power," but its
language varied considerably from that of the New York
draft. The Buchanan
preamble, patterned on the Declaration
of Independence, used eighteenth-century terminology to
attack a "20th Century tyranny of government" which failed
to heed the needs of the American people and infringed upon

their civil rights.

Inasmuch as all four of these documents were based on the
Wallace position, there was relatively little substantive difference among them. Nevertheless, the difference of phraseology,
of shading, and of intonation became the subject of dispute
in the Advisory Committee. Eventually, however, the first
three were compromised into a basic draft submission. Bu-

chanan's preamble received

little

support, but

was

filed

as a

"minority report."
The following week, still in advance of the opening convention session, the full platform committee met in Philadelphia to ready a final draft for the convention. There was now
essential

agreement between the extreme

on

leftists

and the mod-

major points. Regardless of press insinuations
and interpretations, firsthand accounts of the closed commit-

erates

all

was no "Communist domwas virtual agreement on
voters, as was to be expected

tee deliberations agreed that there

ination" observable. 6 Rather there

the issues to be presented to the
with the earlier defection of those not in substantial agreement with Wallace's pronouncements.

Public hearings were held but seem to have had

little

im-

*The sole written account that of Brown is in full agreement
with the recollections of "non-leftist" committee members interviewed by the author, including Professor Thomas I. Emerson and
A. Keefer, administrative assistant to Senator Taylor.

J.
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Dr. TugwelTs statement that
pact on the platform, despite
the third party wanted the "ordinary American" to aid in its
The sole modification was a more conciliatory plank
drafting.

regarding old-age pensions, resulting from the virtual ultimatum served by Dr. Francis Townsend: "If they'll [the
then I'll be for them.
Progressives] accept our whole program,

toward them just as I am toward
the Republicans and Democrats."
On the other hand, those groups irreconcilably opposed to
the policy which was,
the Wallace foreign policy position
Otherwise

after

all,

be

I'll

indifferent

seized
the reason for existence of a third party
to express their view that any opposition

upon these hearings
to the

Truman

nist inspired.

doctrine and Marshall plan must be Commusince this opposition testimony was played

And

press, the propaganda value of the public hearings
backfired against the third party.
Headlines heralded the "platform suggestions" of Americans for Democratic Action official James Loeb that "Mr.

up by the

Wallace's candidacy does not obscure the fact that the Communists and their collaborators guide the major policies and
word the major pronouncements of this party." Loeb's proposal that the party get rid of its "Communist grip" and
support the European recovery program became front-page
copy even in the Washington Post-Times-Herald. In all,

some seventy-five different organizations and individuals offered testimony, with fifteen
representatives of labor groups
and another fifteen from pacifist, world federalist, and related
organizations.

Ultimately, however, the most significant platform deviafrom the Wallace program came about as the result of
from the National
pressure outside the hearings
tion

Independent
Businessmen's Committee for Wallace. Whereas Wallace had
advocated a program of "progressive
this
capitalism,"

group

favored nationalization of basic American
enterprises suck
as railroads, merchant marine,
power utilities, and banks-

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"
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them

offered mild
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opposition to their

was a "little more timid-" He
had, however, agreed that there was no question of the need
to nationalize "all
enterprises that depend for their profits on
large Government contracts for arming the country," such as
the aircraft and munitions industries.
proposal, telling

that he

Nevertheless, Wallace exercised no pressure during committee considerations to
gain conformance with his own ideas.

Professor Frederick L.

Schuman brought up

the matter of

"progressive capitalism" only in the closing hours of deliberation. The committee members had
gone without supper;
the convention was
already opening; and, in the words of Professor Brown, "the great
majority of the tired committee

members [were] apparently ready

to nationalize as a sort of

panacea and anxious to get through with the platform as SOCHI
as possible." No mention of
"progressive capitalism" went
into the platform.
In contrast, there

were two instances in which the
presiden-

candidate actively intervened in the formulation of the
party platform. The first came when Dr. Tugwell and Reptial

resentative Marcantonio reached an
impasse over whether the
platform should declare for independence or self-detennination for Puerto Rico. This obscure
dispute finally reached the
stage where Tugwell was reported to feel "so keenly about it

the present wording
[independence] remains he wffl not
present the platform to the Convention." The quarrel was resolved only at Wallace's
urging of compromise language emthat

if

ploying both words.

The second intervention came on behalf of a
proposed
world government plank. Professor Schuman,
accompanied
by Scott Buchanan and two other
views in a personal

visit to

delegates, pressed his

Wallace's hotel

own

room on Sunday

morning immediately prior to convention consideration of the
platform. He was able to secure the endorsement of the presidential candidate,

who

then asked Campaign Manager Bald-
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Lee Pressman

win

to talk to

As

a result, this Wallace-backed plank

as "the only

one likely to object."
was accepted by the

Platform Committee and adopted by vote of the convention
that afternoon.

Once the committee had agreed on a final draft representing a compromise in tone and language between the militant
and respectable approaches of the New York and Chicago
drafts,

it

presented

its

findings to the convention for considera-

tion

and amendment. The ensuing session was both lengthy

and

.tedious

remarkable both for the number of minute

points brought up and for the fact that debate was unlimited
on all of them. Far from being railroaded through, the Progressive Party platform was subjected to a much more demoand exhausting floor scrutiny
cratic, searching, exhaustive

than is customary for any similar major-party pronouncement. Chairman Fitzgerald seemed determined that everyone
should have his say, even

at the sacrifice

which

skilled gavel wielder

earlier

Democratic delegates.

of the dispatch with
the

Sam Rayburn had handled

With the platform representing an already narrow viewpoint, most of the points at issue were too trivial to warrant
repetition. There were, however, two amendments of significance offered from the floor, only one of which received press
attention. This was the so-called Vermont Resolution that the
Progressives declare in their platform that it was "not [their]
intention to give blanket endorsement to the
foreign policy of
any nation." The Platform Committee had no advance warn-

ing that this proposal was to be brought forward. Its presentation caught committee chairman
at the time, by complete

Rexford Tugwell, presiding
Following a hurried con-

surprise.

ference

on

the rostrum with

Lee Pressman, Tugwell reached

a spur-of-the-moment decision to
oppose the resolution. Several pro and con speeches ensued, with the main criticism
be construed as Redbeing that this simple statement

might

baiting. Eventually, the proposal

was rejected on a very close

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"
voice vote.
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The

press, however, reporting the vote as "overwhelming," seized upon the incident to "prove" that the

"Communistniominated leadership" refused to permit any
no matter how indirect, of the Soviet Union. Actu-

criticism,
ally,

the

Communist

fellow travelers were not the ones to rise

in opposition to the Vermont Resolution
according to Ralph
Shikes, since this group thought the resolution harmless.

But, once again, it was the press interpretation rather than
the observed facts that caught the public
Professor
eye.

Tug-

snap judgment to oppose the Vermont Resolution was
clearly ill-advised rather than "Communist-dictated," but its
well's

on the party was just as damaging.
floor amendment
demonstrating significant disagreement in party ranks was that offered by the Pennsylvania

effect

The second

delegation. Unlike Wallace, they felt the party plank on indussocialization was too timid and offered a motion to

trial

include steel and coal in the

list

of industries to be national-

Their proposal generated little support among the delegates, however. After a brief discussion, it was decisively de-

ized.

feated.

Eventually, at the end of a marathon meeting $ome seven
and one-half hours long, the platform was accepted by a
weary group of delegates. From the staging viewpoint, this
was the deadliest session of the entire convention. With Chair-

man
to

Fitzgerald's reluctance to cut short any delegate wishing
at any length on
any subject, this was free speech

comment

to the point of exhaustion.
What was the net effect of convention consideration

upoa
announced program of Henry A. Wallace? A pointby-point comparison reveals few alterations. "Peace, Progress
and Prosperity" became "Peace, Freedom and Abundance."
But except for the spelling out of every point in fullest detail
and the inclusion of the nationalization plank, there were few
points which had not been specifically stated or clearly implied
the earlier

earlier

by the candidate.
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the platform
press, however, pounced upon
York
Times
headnew and radical. The

The American

New
as something
lined it as containing "Planks Like Those Foster

Group

Seeks" that had been adopted "With Communists in Control."
It devoted some four columns to an itemized comparison of
the Progressive platform with that of the Communists adopted
May 30, 1948 in the attempt to press home this point.

More

objectively, as

Susan

W. and Murray

S.

Stedman

pointed out later in Discontent at the Polls:

With the exception of their foreign policy planks, Waland his colleagues stressed the familiar fanner-labor
demands: curbing of alleged monopolies, changes in those

lace

portions of the law dealing with labor relations, public
ownership of various types of utilities, raising the income
of the "common man," extension of social security and

welfare legislation.
Virtually all of these "abundance" planks of the Progressive
Party antedated Wallace and Taylor as well as the United
States

Communist Party

by many years.
foreign policy planks of the party represented the
views of all those, including the Communists of course, who

The

had found it necessary to form a new party for their expression. As Helen Fuller commented in New Republic, "As an
issue in [the] convention, 'peace' drew strength from pacifism,
isolationism and religion as well as from pro-Sovietism."

A

more objective appraisal than that of the contemporary
press would conclude that at this particular time there was no
serious disagreement over substantive matters between the
fellow travelers and

non-Communist

liberals within the

Pro-

Once

the quibbling over details was concluded,
both groups willingly accepted the basic tenets laid down by
Wallace some seven months previously. Nevertheless, the

gressive Party.

press continued to portray the platform of the Wallace Progressive Party as the latest word straight from the Kremlin.

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"
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another "evidence** of "Communist domination" was

uncovered by reporters in a different aspect of the Philadelthe adoption of the rules for permanent
phia Convention
organization of the New Party. The comments of H. L.

Mencken

in the Baltimore Evening Sun, while

most, were

all

more

acid than

too typical.

After lurking in the catacombs and sewers of the hall
for three days, the Communists sneaked into the main
arena . . . this morning, and put the innocent delegates
to the Wallace convention over the barrel.
'

Tonight the rules of the New Party are precisely what
are sitting
they wanted them to be, and their trusted stooges

on almost every salient stool in the party organization.
The Communists are old hands at such tricks, and get
many with them almost infallibly. First they horn into
on the important committees, then they frame the
places
after the members have fallen asleep or
reports thereof
and
then they come in and bull the reports
home,
gone
through in a din of words.

But what was the truth of such charges? The groundwork
for the third-party structure had already been laid at Chicago
in April. Most of the plan had been generally accepted and

occasioned

little

in July.
dispute at Philadelphia

The

rules

a proposed alteration in the
manner of distributing representation on the National Comadversaries who have customarily
mittee. Unlike their
battle that erupted involved

major

for each state, the Proassigned two national committeemen
states be entitled to an
the
that
larger
gressives suggested
additional member for every five electors in excess of the
first ten possessed by the state. There was little disagreement
over this suggestion. But the report of the Rules Committee
embodied a proposal to establish a sort of corporative representation on the National Committee for the several func-
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Women-for-Wallace, labor, pronationalities, and youth groups. There

tional divisions of the party
fessional,

veterans,

be an additional forty members-at-large chosen from
these groups by the geographically
apportioned members of
the committee.

were

to

The purpose of this proposal was to encourage greater
participation on the part of the specified groups. It was reported
by Helen Fuller that "top party

strategists [were] aware that
the Progressives [were] to survive .
.
[was] to reinforce the shaky labor base." Then, too, there

their real

if

problem,

.

were well-known members of the arts, sciences, and
professions whose names would lend
prestige to the committee.
Far from being Communist-inspired, as the New York
Times claimed, the proposal for functional
representation,

according to firsthand observer Brown, was not favored by the
fellow travelers.

The

rule establishing this
arrangement
opposed in the Rules Committee ...

was

originally

by key left-wingers

like

John Abt

.

.

,

and Congressman Marcantonio, Chair-

man of the Rules Committee.
The
ple

real pressure for the rule

who were concerned over

came from the labor peoweak participation of

the

labor in building the
party.

Marcantonio's reason for
opposing the measure was obvi-

ousit would weaken

the state parties,
including his

own

American Labor Party in New York
making ward and precinct work
councils.
unnecessary for a voice in

policy
Finally accepted by the Rules Committee, the proposal ran
into substantial
opposition when it reached the floor.
recom-

A

mittal motion

was so closely contested on voice vote that a
show of hands was called for. On his
count, the chairman
ruled that the
a
proposal had been defeated,

who

ignoring

delegate

persisted in the attempt to secure recognition for a roll-
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the close of a turbulent session, with innu-

merable requests for minor modifications defeated, the convention, faced by its nominating session deadline, finally
accepted the rules proposed by the committee.

The

chief distinctions in the permanent
party organization
two.
were
First, there was the provision that a national convention be held every year rather than every four. This body
was to constitute "the highest governing authority of the

In this the Progressives adopted a plan similar to that
party."
the
Labor
of
Party in Great Britain for annual policy discusan
sions by
all-powerful national convention. Second, the

a large, cumbersome national committee
was
to
a national executive committee, meeting
choose
which
a
month.
once
In this manner, it was hoped that a
at least
would
small operating group
constantly guide party policy.
Finally, there was to be a slate of party officers with fuD-tnne
rules provided for

administrative duties chosen

by the national convention.
were
leveled
that this system must
Numerous charges

in-

evitably lead to leftwing control of the Progressive Party
under the assumption that the party-line followers would be
able to dictate the choice of the strategically located executive

committee.

On

the other hand, the plan was also open to

interpretation as an attempt to improve the haphazard national organization methods employed by the major parties in
the years between presidential elections. Democratic and Re-

publican national committees, consisting of only one hundred
members, have found it necessary to delegate most of their

who have

generally been hand-picked
rather than popularly secandidates
choices of presidential
the Progressives* strucwhile
In
lected representatives.
short,

power to

ture

officers

was open to

valid complaints of lending itself to potential
this risk is inherent in virtually

domination by a single group,
all
representative democratic

institutions.

Where

reliance is

placed upon popular participation, organized minorities are
often able to defeat apathetic majorities. Had the Waflace
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Progressive Party ever acquired the hoped-for numbers of

non-Communist supporters, it could never have been
subjected on the basis of its structure to extremist control.
Rather, it would have been possible for a non-Communist
active

majority to have completely excluded the left-wingers from
party councils, had they felt such action necessary to solidify
their control.

Nevertheless, to the average newspaper reader, the third

a "Communist
party had accepted "Marcantonio Rules"
Follower's Code." Its very organization offered proof
positive

that the Wallace venture

was "Communist-dominated."
To firsthand witnesses, other press distortions were glaringly apparent. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported the convention was distinguished by "apathy,"
"empty seats in the
galleries," and "an audience that walked out while Mr. Wallace talked at Shibe Park"
"facts" observed by neither those
in attendance nor television viewers. For the
average citizen,
relying on his daily newspaper, the Philadelphia Convention
became confirmation of the fact that the whole crusade was
only a Communist-inspired plot.
Consequently, from the propaganda view, the proceedings
actually had a markedly adverse effect. Instead of gaining new
converts, many previously inclined toward the Progressives
were alienated by the convention image of the
party. Exact
measurement of the effect is difficult, since there were no
polls taken on a before-and-after basis. However, the down-

ward trend

earlier detected

by the

polls continued unabated.

By mid-August the Gallup Survey showed only 5 per cent of
the electorate favorable to Wallace and
Taylor.
Moreover, the Progressives failed to adopt a salable platform

one lending

itself to

publicity purposes. Instead of a

wound

they
up with a lengthy,
far exceeding
major-party pronouncements
in verbiage.
Failing to realize the lack of any necessary con-

brief, hard-hitting exposition,

detailed

flict

document

between brevity and

specificity,

they nailed

down

every

"The Same Old Merry-Go-Round"

201

loose end in a

document immediately relegated to the limbo
of other party platforms.
In terms of building party morale, the convention was more

With few exceptions (the most notable
professor
the
Tugwell),
party delegates departed from Philadelphia in
high spirits, confident of their party and candidates and of
their own roles in a worthy venture.
successful.

On the other hand,

the convention failed to reveal
Progres-

improvements in the national nominating procedure. With
the exception of the Shibe Park
rally, staging and timing were
lost from sight. Party orators, as in
major-party conventions,
were both repetitious and long-winded. An archaic nominatsive

was adhered to rigidly, despite the fact that the
New Party already had its candidates. And "democratic" discussion of a platform already settled
upon deteriorated into
ing procedure

extended wrangling over minutiae with too

little

time for

major points. Possibly the most significant staging contribution of the Progressives was their use of music
the songs
composed for them, the mass singing by delegates and spectators alike.

On the whole, while the Progressives attracted a new,
young, enthusisatic, singing group of riders, they took them
onto the traditional carrousel of their older adversaries. Instead of blaring a

trail

to the promised "new, streamlined

people's convention," the

New

Party, too,
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CHAPTER

9

The Fight Jo r Peace"
Fall

Campaign

IN A sense, the fall campaign waged by the Wallace Progresa continuation of
sive Party in 1948 was but a second act
their "fight for peace" of which the spring campaign has
already been described. And yet, by comparison with that
earlier phase of the battle, this climactic drive exhibited markedly different characteristics. Whereas the spring campaign
had varied considerably from the customary major-party preconvention maneuvering, the fall campaign was much more
closely akin to the usual pre-election concentration on the
publicizing of issues and the attempt to gain votes for party

candidates.

Perhaps the chief distinction between the two phases of the
"fight for peace" lay in the fact that by the fall of 1948 the
Progressive Party was a going concern. Its organization had
been established, its ballot drives for the most part concluded,
and its workers already recruited. Thus its candidates were
free to concentrate on their campaign tours and the issues
they wished to emphasize. Save for the problem of finances
the paid-admission, voluntary-contribution
rally remained
the fall campaign
part of the third-party tours to the end
was, on the surface at least, almost an orthodox American
not too dissimilar to those of the past conducted by major and minor parties alike.

political venture,

202

"The Fight for Peace"

Fall

Campaign

203

Yet many difficulties encountered by the Progressives remained unique to this party. Events beyond their control
events that bore the stamp of an intolerant America or a
"made in Moscow" label continued to have a marked
impact
on their success, as much as their own efforts and those of
their adversaries. But first their
campaign tours held the center
of the stage.

On the whole, the pattern of the fall tours of Henry A.
Wallace and Glen H. Taylor was quite similar to that of their
earlier junkets. In both instances a constant
attempt was made
to link the over-all program of the
Progressive Party to the
more immediate issues of local significance.
This aspect was brought into clear focus in the
very first

speech of the fall campaign delivered by Wallace at Bridgeport, Connecticut on August 21. Speaking to a predominantly
urban labor audience, the presidential nominee
opened with
an attack on the "misleaders of labor [who] have found red-

and Russia-baiting just as useful as the reactionary
politicians have found it useful in covering their own failures."
Pointing up some of the unsolved problems found in the
baiting

Bridgeport area, Wallace remarked:

The

old parties promise to build houses

and erect barand arm you; to expand social
and draft you; to extend civil rights and put you
security
in a war
economy where all civil rights disappear.
racks; to curb inflation

From

here he found

it

but a short and logical step to an

exposition of the need for the third-party peace platform.
I

am sure that ...

the

common people of America will

reject the treacherous hypocrisy of the Democrats as they
will reject the more open reaction of the
Republicans.
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They will see

that the bipartisan foreign policy

is

matched

by an equally sinister bipartisan domestic policy.
The two old parties are, after all, the same. Given a
the common man all over
foreign policy directed against
the world, they must combine on a bipartisan domestic
common man in the U.S.A. 1
policy directed against the

Peace, then, was the underlying dominant note of the fall
campaign, as it had been of the entire spring campaign

peace coupled with the attempt to link

lofty

and rather remote

international theories to the practical bread-and-butter interests of diverse audiences all across the land.

In a series of four major campaign tours, the presidential
candidate blanketed the nation, while at the same time his
running mate was engaged on an equally extensive scale. In
the course of Wallace's tours, the South, New York and New
England, the Midwest, Southwest, and Far West, and finally
the metropolitan

New York-New

were covered by plane, by
miles in

car,

Jersey-Philadelphia areas

and by

train

some 25,000

all.

The first of these tours, through the South during August
and September, was in many ways the most significant. Declaring his intention of following his and Senator Taylor's
earlier precedent of addressing only unsegregated audiences
and of refusing to stay in hotels enforcing discrimination,

Henry A. Wallace embarked on August 24 on a tour that
took him into seven southern states and twenty different cities
in a single week. In Virginia, the

first
stop southward, all
a
state
law
peacefully, despite
banning racially mixed
assemblies.
Audiences
in
Norfolk,
Suffolk, and Richpublic
mond were not only unsegregated but quietly and courteously

went

attentive.

But with the candidate's entrance
'See the

New York

lace's Address.

into

"liberal"

North

Times, August 22, 1948, for the text of Wal-
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legal barrier existed, the fireworks ex-

ploded. A near-riot preceded the candidate's Durham

armory

speech. In the course of the scuffle, a Wallace supporter,
James D. Harris of Charlotte, was stabbed twice in the arm
and six times in the back. With order restored some time later,

the half-Negro audience of 1,500 witnessed the most dramatic
entrance of the presidential candidate's career far more sensational than

any conceived by his Broadway staging team.
While officials waited at the main entrance, a seldom-used
door on the opposite side was thrust open and in strode a
uniformed National Guardsman, pistol in hand, followed
by
an unruffled Wallace surrounded by four
plain-clothes men.
Admitting to the crowd that this was "the most unique introduction I ever experienced," he
proceeded with a speech, interrupted by the intermittent explosion of firecrackers and
almost constant heckling. In this speech the
third-party
inee outlined for the first time a "real states'
rights

nom-

program"

for the South, entailing a billion-dollar
development to end
the area's "economic bondage to Wall Street."

The next

day's tour of the Piedmont area in the same state
witnessed an end to the bloodshed but saw the
beginning of

barrages ranging from eggs and tomatoes to peach stones and
ice-cream cones, as Wallace attempted to address crowds in

Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and Burlington. While his physcourage proved equal to the abuse, the candidate found a
crowd of some 500 so completely out of "police 'control' "

ical

he had to forsake his speech in the latter city.
was only the following day, in Asheville, North Carolina, that adequate police protection was eventually furnished
by the authorities. For the first time in the Tarheel State the
third-party nominee was able to deliver a speech audible in
its
entirety. In it Wallace referred once more to the needs of
the South
needs for improved health, education, and housing which were attainable, he claimed, only with a peace
program such as his.
that

It
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But at Hickory, North Carolina, the same day, the egg and
tomato barrage was so intense that Wallace once more had
to give up entirely, remarking, "As Jesus Christ told his diswhen you enter a town that will not hear you willingly,
ciples,
then shake the dust of that town from your feet and go elsewhere."

While President Truman and Governors Cherry (North
Carolina) and Wright (Mississippi) issued public statements
deploring the violence against the third party and its candidate, local police officials often took a different view. Not only

some

refuse to furnish protection or prosecution (reportedly declining to arrest the Durham assailants of the party
worker) , but they instead accused the Progressives of delib-

did

erately provoking the incidents. The Salem, North Carolina,
chief of police alleged, according to the Americans for Democratic Action, that

director of the

the

it

was "Commie John Hunt

[publicity
started

CIO Food and Tobacco Workers] who

'down with Wallace'

cries."

This same suggestion, that the Wallace-ites wanted to incite

was played up by the Washington Star, whose reNeubold
porter
Noyes, Jr., quoted party official dark Foreman as saying, "If we'd had the same kind of quiet reaction
here [in Greensboro, North Carolina] as we had in Virginia
earlier in the day, then I wouldn't have liked it at all. This is
what we wanted." Confirmation of such views is lacking from
other sources, however, and while there
undoubtedly were
violence,

elements in the Wallace Progressive Party willing to resort
to such measures and methods, most of the
party's workers
and officials opposed them. The vast majority felt that the
prejudices and practices challenged in this southern trip were
such as to require no artificial stimulation.

Moving on

into Alabama, the Wallace
party was courtereceived
in
rural
areas
farm
ously
by
groups, but from Gadsden's mayor came a wire that Wallace was not welcome and
that segregation

would be enforced

if

he persisted in plans to
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the third-party candidate refused
speak there. Accordingly,
address
and moved on to Birmingham.
his
to deliver
prepared
another
brush
with Police Commissioner
awaited
There
the
central
"Bull" Connor,
figure in Senator Taylor's earlier

Connor now took action to insure that Wallace, if
would
address a segregated gathering. Retorting
he spoke,
not
would
that he
participate in an unconstitutional meeting
in free speech and free assembly without
"we
believe
because
or
restriction
police intimidation," Wallace and his
police
more
shook
the dust from their feet and went
once
crusaders
encounter.

elsewhere.

In Mississippi, Governor (and States' Rights vice-presidential candidate) Fielding Wright acted in accordance with
his earlier protest against Wallace's North Carolina treatment.

was the finest of the
a
"combination
of official courwas
tour; Wallace's reception
studied
public indifference," according to John N.
tesy and
York Times. As will be recalled, it was
the
New
of
Popham

Throughout the

state police protection

in Mississippi that the state convention of the Progressive
a highly informal luncheon gathering at Edwards

Party

was combined with the

visit of

the campaign party.

Following this, the caravan moved on to Shreveport, Louisiana. Here, on the advice of officials who reported the situation in their city "out of hand," Henry A. Wallace found
and speak
it
necessary to cancel a scheduled public address
instead

by radio. From Louisiana, the party moved westward

into Arkansas.

After another peaceful trip through that state IK> publk
addresses were delivered, but ballot petitions were presented
the tour moved on into Tennessee. Here,
at the state capital
in the heart of the Tennessee Valley Authority country, Wallace received the first southern welcome that could be de-

scribed as both

warm and

friendly.

In both Nashville and

Knoxville, according to the New York Times, the candidate
was applauded as he laughingly told audiences:
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I am expecting to see the day when every year, chickens,
bred by the new methods originated by my son and myself,
will return to the South 10,000,000 eggs for every one we
have received. I hope they will be used exclusively for food

not politics.

Then, in more serious vein, he remarked that he had been
hatred and violence exhibited, but
deeply affected by the
rather than losing his faith in the South, he had had it "rethe great, glorious and God-loving people of the
South." Concluding his southern tour in the Volunteer State,

newed by
the

nominee returned by plane

to

New York to

prepare for his

next jaunt.

But what of the significance of this trip through the South?
Brief though it had been, it had evoked the most violent response of the entire campaign. While Henry Wallace had chalof the
lenged, successfully in most instances, those violations
"freedom" plank of his platform practices dealing with
and discrimination he had also brought
forth showers of hatred, abuse, and vilification seldom heaped
racial segregation

upon a presidential candidate third-party or not.
But once again the most enduring damage was not to the
egg-bespattered candidate or to his party but to American political tradition. The
personal indignities were quickly forgotten. The damage to "freedom" was much more lasting.
The most devastated target of the southern egg-hurlers was
democracy itself, which to endure must be based on the accepted right of all to a full, free, and peaceful expression of
even when that opinion conflicts with the majority.
opinion
Senator Taylor personalized the issue, claiming that PresiTruman "started the whole thing with his remark 'Why
"
doesn't Wallace go back to Russia?'
And while the Presi-

dent

dent's tactics in getting out from under the Communist issue
by shifting the onus to Wallace may have seemed sound party
strategy for the immediate campaign, they

were to prove

ulti-
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mately disastrous to the Democrats themselves. For the intolerant wind sown in remarks such as these
ascribing

foreign
to a lack of
policy differences
patriotism was to be reaped
later in the whirlwind of emotion,
prejudice, and violence of
a McCarthyism directed against the administration.

Wallace, reviewing his southern experiences before a Madison Square Garden audience, pointed also to "the economic
basis of hate and segregation ... in the steel towns where it
is

profitable to

keep labor divided." According to him,

it

was

"the owners of mines and mills, the great
plantations and
newspapers who incite violence." As partial solution he called
for enforcement of the second section of the Fourteenth

Amendment

reducing congressional representation in states

where the right to vote was abridged.

The effectiveness of
number of votes

great

the southern tour in attracting any
to the Progressive Party remained

highly problematical, but the courageous battle of the candidates to make themselves heard attracted
widespread attention. Outside the
Deep South, even the bitterest opponents
found it difficult to take issue with the party stand on the
racial issue. The Americans for Democratic Action had to
admit that

In his escape to the South, Wallace

made a

visible effort

to bring conversation around to the non-controversial
topic
of Jim Crow. Liberals applauded his precedent-shattering

journey and denounced the attacks on his person and
?
erties, but .
.

lib-

.

Following the southern tour, there came a brief trip to
Baltimore and Chicago, then through upstate New York and

New England,

with the emphasis on the "fight for peace" and

"Americans for Democratic Action, "Henry A. Wallace the Last
Seven Months of His Presidential Campaign" (mimeographed, Washington, 1948). Italics supplied.
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In Buffalo and

New

Rochester,
relationship to local issues.
York, there were attacks on "spending for war" as well as
the war scares and crises allegedly whipped up by the

its

upon

administration "to help the industrialists." Taking his cue
from the title of Ms earlier book, Wallace told a Buffalo as-

semblage:

They have brought us 60,000,000 jobs, but their 60,000,000 jobs do not bring homes to returning veterans.
Their 60,000,000 jobs do not reassure our continuing prosdo not even create the illusion of security. For
perity. They
their

60,000,000 jobs are not 60,000,000 jobs for peace.

In Boston, the Wallace attack on the vested interests continued, this time linked to New England's need for low-cost
electric

power

a need that must, according to the candidate,

go unsatisfied as long as administration spending was for
"military aid to a Chinese dictator and a Greek king," and
not for the development of America's resources for America's
people.

This brief northeastern tour was prelude to the most exa "grand swing" around
hausting part of the fall campaign

some 10,000 miles in the next thirty days.
and
auto, the crusaders wended their way
By plane, train,
across the Midwest
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri.
Wallace was simultaneously on the attack and the defensive.
the nation, covering

Supporting his party against President Truman's allegations

"The

Communists are guiding and using the third
that
shows
this party does not
party
represent American
ideals"
the former Vice President retorted, "The Communists don't run the
Progressive Party and they didn't run the
fact that the

convention." Taking the offensive, he assailed Truman as a
"verbal liberal" who had only recently "grabbed at the coattails of the New Deal he did so much to kill." Furthermore,

he added, the major parties "as constituted" were
"merely
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wings of the same party, representing the same interests"
big business and Wall Street.
From the Midwest, the caravan

dipped once more into the

South, this time into Texas. Once more Wallace became the
target for eggs and tomatoes as he spoke in Houston. Nevertheless, he continued his attack on segregation and "recurrent

war

scares." Receiving courteous,
ceptions during the rest of its

if less than exuberant, refour-day Lone Star visit, the
party then moved on to a nine-day swing of the West Coast.
adHigh light of the Southern California tour was a

major

Los Angeles. Speaking at the same stadium visited a
earlier
week
by President Truman, former Vice President
dress in

Wallace attracted a paying audience of

more than were present

at least

4,000 persons

at the President's free one,

according

Gladwin Hill in the New York Times. Here Wallace outlined in detail a numerically reminiscent
fourteen-point plan
to

for peace.
1.

Eliminate from policy-making
power

have a personal financial stake
help

in the

all

men who

policy decisions they

effect.

2.

Take

3.

Make an

private profit out of the war industry business.
international agreement for armaments re-

duction, in order to strengthen confidence in peace and
produce for human needs and not for human destruction.
4.

Stop the exporting of weapons by any nation to any

other nation.
5.

Resume

unrestricted trade between nations
except in

goods related to war.
6. Reaffirm the free
exchange of scientific information
and scientific material between nations.
a vigorous form the United Nations
and Relief Administration or some other

7. Re-establish in

Rehabilitation

international agency for the impartial distribution of relief.
8. Put an end to the
exploitation of colonial empires.
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the prestige and authorpossible ways
of the United Nations.
ity
10. Remove occupation forces of all nations from Ger9.

Reinforce in

all

many, Japan, Greece, Korea and other countries

as

soon as

possible.
11. Announce a policy of refusing to use economic or
financial pressure in order to wield undue power in the in-

ternal affairs of other countries.
12.

End

the peacetime draft and plans for the establish-

ment

of universal military training.
13. Work for a United Nations rule prohibiting any nation from terrorizing or intimidating member states by

naval demonstrations, the massing of land forces or establishment of bomber bases within easy range of those states.
This rule should apply both to the United States and Russia.
14. End the increasing dominance of the military in
American foreign policy, thus invoking the wise policy of
Clemenceau who said war is too important a matter to be
left

up

to the generals. 3

Many of these points were similar to those contained in
the spring open letter to Stalin. Taken together, they indicated
both the approach to and the pre-eminence of the "fight for
peace" in the third-party position.
Another major West Coast address, this time in San
Francisco, was devoted almost exclusively to American forthis time in Asiatic affairs. Attacking administraeign policy
tion dealings with

China since the

failure of the

Marshall

misson, which he referred to as "the last gasp of American
liberal foreign policy,"

Wallace warned:

Great social changes are abroad in the world,

know

We
*

all

of us

that.

cannot stop them, not even by raising the cry of
in the New York Times, October 3, 1948.

As quoted
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"communism" and pouring money, guns and bombing
planes into the arsenals of Chiang Kai-Shek.
our position in China at the present time

is
morally
bankrupt and indefensible even from the standpoint of
.

.

.

practical

power

politics.

In Indonesia and Southeast Asia our support of the colonial system in opposition to native
peoples struggling to
free themselves of it seems
strange in view of our own
to free
beginnings as a colonial people who had to
struggle

from tyranny.
From Siberia to Siam

ourselves

there are more than a billion
people out there in Eastern Asia, just across the Pacific.
We and our children and our children's children need them

and heaven help us if through hysteria and
turn them into implacable enemies. 4

as our friends
stupidity

we

These two West Coast statements, constituting the third
and alternative to administration foreign

party's indictment of

climaxed the presentation of issues in the fall campaign. And the Los Angeles and San Francisco rallies marked
the high point in the candidate's air-stop tour of the nation.

policy,

While the "grand swing" continued, through the Pacific
Northwest, back across the Midwest, and on into Chicago, the
decision had been reached by party strategists that this
approach was falling short of the mark and that an increasing
use of radio speeches was urgent.

While Wallace had embarked upon a radio campaign in
mid-August and had continued a series of weekly talks since
mid-September, he had placed supplementary rather than
primary emphasis on this medium. However, in mid-October
a $100,000 project was launched to bring the candidate's
voice to the air twelve times in the brief weeks before election
day. While the grand tour continued eastward from Chicago
into Pennsylvania, it was no longer the leading device for
*Text of Wallace's Address,

New York

Times, October 5, 1948.
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attracting attention to the Progressives' candidate

and

issues.

With personal appearances de-emphasized, the final preelection days witnessed an abbreviated fourth tour to Phila-

New

New

New York

and

a
City
with thirty-three speeches, many to streetcorner audiences, in four days. Winding up the numerous ral-

delphia,

whirlwind

lies,

Haven,

Jersey,

trip

Henry A. Wallace concluded

the fall campaign of his

"fight for peace" at Vito Marcantonio's traditional "lucky
corner"
116th Street and Lexington Avenue in
York's

New

appearances, he was already
looking beyond the election returns and to the continuation
of the party, as well as backward over its accomplishments of

Eighteenth District. In these

last

the past year.

We have proved that the source of every American trouis the drive for war, that from this drive stems
scarcity
and high prices and shrinking wages and assaults on ancient American liberties.
Already we have accomplished much and we have just
begun. This campaign is but a single battle in a long war.

ble

Until the great issues facing us
peace instead of war,
abundance instead of scarcity, health before wealth, men

before

profit, are solved in favor of the American people,
the Progressive Party will remain the
great triumphant fact

of American

life.

And to this
now and in the
sel

and

all

my

continuing

fight,

to the Progressive
Party

future, I pledge all
life.

my

effort, all

my coun-

5

So ended the strenuous series of campaign tours, in the
course of which the presidential candidate had traveled more
than 55,000 miles 25,000 in the fall
campaign alone and
visited
5

nearly every state in the Union.

Text of Wallace's Philadelphia Address,

tober 31, 1948.

To

the utmost of his

New York

Times, Oc-
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carried tie "fight for
peace"

America.

Meanwhile, vice-presidential nominee Glen H. Taylor had
been engaged in a nation-wide tour of his own. Little
noted by press and radio and studiedly ignored by national
also

news services and metropolitan dailies, the Senator, too, had
taken to the road. Like Wallace, he soon found himself the
both vocal and vegetable. Only the menu
target of abuse
Florida
in
it was
varied
eggs, hi his native Idaho eggs and
peaches.

And just as his receptions paralleled those accorded Ms
presidential running mate, so the issues he presented were
similar in all respects. To Wallace's somewhat remote and
however, Senator Taylor added a much warmer
a folksier approach. As much at home on the plat-

lofty idealism,

appeal

form as on the

stage, Taylor delivered seemingly homespun
performances as professional and polished as the Progressives*
staging that accompanied them. And to Wallace's 25,000
miles, the Senator added a roughly equal amount as Ms con-

tribution to the fall

With

its

campaign of the

basic emphasis

upon

"fight for peace."

rallies

and

tours, did the

third-party campaign differ to any great extent from traditional American counterparts? The cMef difference in the
rallies lay in

the fact that the Progressives charged admission,
took up collections, and were able to get

to their events,

A

unorthodox method of fundraising.
second
distinction was that the third party brought to its functions a
measure of the professional Broadway touch in staging,
in the attempt to make good politics
lighting, and planning

away with

this

good entertainment as well. And while the presidential
up a new record for mileage covered in a
he
confined
himself to the more conventional
campaign,
means of conveyance air liner, special train, and auto carainto

candidate rolled
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van. There were no dog sleds or helicopters, and Glen Taylor
had abandoned his horse a year earlier.

In addition to

this

primary campaign emphasis on tours,

there was the increasing use of radio in the closing weeks of
the campaign. It may well have been that the Progressives
delayed too long and thus failed to reach a large potential

audience, the undecided who stayed at home listening to
candidates Dewey and Truman on the radio, while they were
attracting to their rallies only those already convinced.

Perhaps the most

distinctive aspect of tie third-party tech-

niques was the emphasis upon doorbell ringing both to persuade and to get out the vote. As Ralph Shikes, national publicity director, put it, "Because 99 % of the press and radio
is
against us, the best means we have of reaching the voters

with the real issues

is
through house-to-house canvassing."
In this work the Wallace-ites employed the same
techniques

developed earlier by Shikes and by Lewis Frank for the CIO
Political Action School in
Washington. Compiled into a
workers' manual,

Knock On Any Door,

there were such in-

structions as:
.

.

.

Concentrate in those areas where the natural Wal-

lace supporters live

.

.

.

working people, minority groups,

the
Negro people, farmers and small businessmen
people whose basic needs are met by the Wallace program.
.

.

.

They also went on to list some "Do's and Don'ts" for volunteer workers:
1.

Don't canvass too late, or too

2.

Canvassers should be neighbors

3.

Be "up" on local issues.

4.

Seek points of agreement, not argument.

early.
if

possible.

5. Secure hosts, hostesses for
meetings.

Highly effective for the Progressives in certain instances,
such as the February Isaacson election, the method
proved far
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less successful for the presidential
campaign

itself.

As

Shikes

remarked later, the house-to-house
emphasis was "both a
strength and weakness" of the third party. It had succeeded
in getting signatures for the ballot drives
a situation where
"legwork" was necessary. But when it came to changing
minds of citizens already decided for the
contest,
presidential
different story. The
technique evidenced the same
of the
bosses
shortcomings as the machine

it

was a

performances

had been designed to combat;

party

was best adapted to elections with small
participation* In the face of a large turnout
of uninstructed and
independent voters, it was subject to

it

it

swamping.
In addition to house-to-house methods, the
Progressives
also launched a virtual flood of
printed campaign material
an estimated 25,000,000 copies of some 140 different leaflets,
pamphlets, brochures, and other handouts. Printed in approximately seventeen languages, including Spanish, Italian, Ger-

man, Finnish, Croatian, and Greek, they indicated the various
minority groups to whom the Progressive appeal was directed.
The most ambitious of these was an tight-page tabloid
newspaper, the Citizen, which made its first showing at the
Philadelphia convention and then appeared sporadically until
the close of the
campaign. Another, These 15 Million, was a
four-page tabloid aimed at the Negro voter. Its approach was

by a feature story that the "Stevens Congress,"
denounced by President Truman as the "worst in history"
(the Eightieth Congress was only "second-worst"), had done
a great deal for Negro rights, whereas the Truman administration had allegedly done
nothing.
indicated

Much

of the printed material consisted of
locally mimeographed sheets which emphasized issues of limited scope.
According to Publicity Director Shikes, "We frequently
[found] such leaflets
5'
or radio talks.

more effective than

slick printed material

In addition to these direct party publicity devices, a new

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948

218

weekly newspaper, the National Guardian, was launched as
a result of the Wallace campaign. Originally planned as the
National Gazette by York, Pennsylvania, publisher Jess Gitt,
Progressive Party chairman in that state, the Guardian's mid-

,

October appearance was so belated that it had little, if any,
impact on the 1948 campaign.
Far more impressive than the deluge of words in apparent
effectiveness was the use that the Progressives made of music
and singing throughout the campaign. Carrying on the tradition set at Philadelphia, rallies and meetings invariably opened
with a period of audience participation in both folk and

campaign songs. "The Same Old Merry-Go-Round" and
"Everyone Wants Wallace'* were sung out coast to coast in
third-party circles with "several hundred thousand" song
sheets reportedly sold. In addition, transcriptions and recordings were prepared for broadcast use so that the radio audience might also be introduced to the Progressives'
singing
campaign. And of course the Wallace-Taylor raUies always
featured the rich baritone voice of Paul Robeson or the
guitar
and ballads of young Peter Seeger.

Completing the range of media employed, more than a
dozen films were turned out for the party "on a shoestring
by volunteers." These presented in cartoon, comedy, and
dramatic forms some of the political issues of the
campaign
for presentation to home
groups and small local gatherings
remote from the paths of the touring caravans.

The

Progressives

left

no stone unturned. They neglected

no possible technique or medium old or new, tried or unproven for publicizing their candidates and campaign. From
comic books to billboards, they
attempted to blanket the
nation.

But how were these efforts received? What
responses did
they evoke from the public? How did the
Progressives* politi-

cal adversaries react?
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In New York State the American Labor Party soon encountered political chicanery from two sources: in Albany
the O'Connell Democratic machine succeeded in infiltrating
the Albany County ALP to gain Labor nominations for
Democratic henchmen. These stooges then withdrew on the
last filing

day, leaving the ALP line devoid of all local canmanner the O'Connells expected to make it

didates. In this

impossible for backers of the third party to vote a straight
ticket and to create an impression of weakness by a nearly

Row C, thus inclining voters to the full Democratic
This
slate.
maneuver, however, was checkmated by New York
Justice Isadore Bookstein, who ruled with a
Court
Supreme
blank

closer eye to justice than legal technicalities that the ALP's
Committee had the power to fill the vacancies,

State Central

even though the September deadline for such action was a

month

past.

A second tricky maneuver came in New York City, where
Tammany Hall
ULP, hoping

organized a ghostly United Laborite Party, or
on the ballot for the

to gain a second line

machine's candidates and obviously expecting that

wary

ALP

voters

would

pull

down

the

ULP

many un-

lever instead

The courts rapidly rejected this transparent aton the grounds that it violated a state election statute
an
forbidding the adoption by a new party of any portion of
court
of
lower
was
the
view
This
name.
established party's
the
upheld unanimously by the State Court of Appeals and

of their own.
tempt,

ULP

died a-borning (Marcantomo

v.

Heffernan, 82 N.E.

2d,298N.Y.661).
In the realm of more violent attempts to suppress the third
in the South, where five Progresparty, further attacks came
sive Party workers were abducted from the Augusta, Georgia,
winter home of Pennsylvania chairman Jess Gitt. Despite the
fact that Augusta Chief of Police C. J. Wilson claimed ha was

unable to find "a single piece of evidence to support their
of Investigation Agent J. P. HiDen
story," Georgia Bureau
(identified

by party workers

as

one of the abductors, yet as-
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the case)
signed by the Governor to investigate
in the Baltimore Sun as saying:

was reported

incident undoubtedly occurred, but it did not hapafter its compen just as they stated it to begin with, and,
use
the publicity
to
in
these
tried
way
mission,
every

The

people

to their advantage.

Furthermore, said Hillen, the abduction had taken place
without, "any roughness whatsoever," and, anyway, the party
workers "have been
associating with the colored race

openly

in that locality." Such, then,
of 1948.
tion

was Georgia

justice in the elec-

campaign
But the South was not alone in witnessing violent attempts
to stifle dissent from the nation's bipartisan foreign policy. In
caravan of senatorial
Illinois, members of a Progressive Party
candidate Curtis MacDougall were stoned near West Frankwhile police refused to furnish protection. Maca female
Dougall reported being struck by at least ten stones;
worker was slugged; and all attempts to speak were sup-

fort, Illinois,

phone calls, one party
worker sought protection at police headquarters and was, acDesk Sergeant,
cording to the Washington Post, told by the
"We don't like you any better than they do. Get out of town."
Later, Police Chief E. B. Ragland said his reports indicated
"only that a bunch of fellows broke up the meeting because
So much
they apparently did not like what was being said."
for the First Amendment in Illinois, or at least in West Frank-

pressed. Following several unavailing

fort!

were employed, as in
a
detective
where
attending a Wallace
Youngstown, Ohio,
a
list of contributors to third-party funds or
rally compiled
as in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where steelworkers attending
Progressive gatherings were checked off on union lists as they
In

many

cities less violent tactics

entered the hall.
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But perhaps the most common method of harassing thirdparty workers was to challenge their usage of sound trucks,
public address systems, and street-corner meetings. Notwithin
standing a series of court decisions upholding their

rights
virtually every instance, the Progressives found their speeches
hauled down off rostrums.
in
interrupted and their

speakers
If,
the course of the arrest, a disturbance occurred or
police instructions were resisted, officials then had a

constitutionally

airtight case of disorderly

A

conduct against the offender.

report of one incident in the

New York

Times was

re-

vealing.

Some

city officials here [White Plains, New York] asserted recently that the police erred in
refusing to permit
public meetings on public thoroughfares if the meetings

would not

interfere with traffic. After conference, however,
agreed to support the position of the police in the
current cases, which involve disobedience of
policemen's
officials

orders. [Italics
supplied.]

This then was the atmosphere in which the faH
campaign
was waged an atmosphere which gave prudent individuals
considerable pause before announcing
open support for

Henry A. Wallace. Opposition forces were making the "fight
for peace" a war of attrition rather than a battle for men's
minds.

As

the fall campaign progressed, it became
increasingly apparent to all observers and participants alike that the
"fight for peace" was not going well for the third-party crusaders. Despite the exhausting tours of the candidates,
despite

and the myriad of methods employed to
both
candidates
and issues, it became obvious that
publicize
new adherents were not flocking to the Wallace banners in
the wealth of funds
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any appreciable numbers; in fact, it seemed that the substantial following of ten months earlier was continuing to fade
away.

Newspapermen accompanying

the

nation-wide caravan

were quick to herald the decline in attendance at Wallace rallies,

and, despite occasionally conflicting stories, they agreed
trend. So it was with the pollsters. Soon to be dis-

on the

credited in their final forecasts, their surveys nonetheless accurately indicated the Wallace ebb tide. Rather than building to a climax with the close of the campaign, Wallace
strength was slumping to an all-time low of only 4 per cent

of

American

As

voters

by mid-October.

Cabell Phillips noted in the

The preponderance

New York

Times:

of the available evidence suggests

that the chill winds of apathy have

Henry Wallace's

public.

begun at last to affect
The members of this group have

developed an observable tendency to shuffle their feet

and

to

sit

on

their hands.

Progressive officials publicly derided both the polls and the
reports, predicting the turnout of a huge hidden vote. Secretly,

however, they viewed with alarm the post-convention slump
in the party's fortunes, with the last-minute shift to a radio

campaign evidencing

their last-ditch

attempts to turn the tide

of battle.

What were

the reasons for the decline?

beyond the party's control or compass
Berlin,

Once again, events
events in Moscow,

and Washington

possible appeal of

its

destroyed almost completely the
"Peace, Freedom and Abundance"

planks. The remaining coffin nails were supplied by the party
itself in its failure to overcome additional internal
handicaps.
The final death knell to Progressive
hopes of peaceful coexistence was dealt
allies in the
by their

Kremlin. The

May

Truman-alleged
thaw of Joseph Stalin, reflected in the ex-
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letters with Henry A. Wallace, had hardened into
Blockade. With continued Soviet intransigence
Berlin
June's

change of

during the fall, the cold war had begun in earnest. While
Stalin's motives remain an "enigma wrapped in a mystery,"
his tough policies produced a clear impact on the American

and on the third party. Instead of creating public
on the administration for a relaxation of containpressure
voter

ment, his actions crystallized support behind the bipartisan
get-tougher-still approach of Truman and Vandenberg.

As

Cabell Phillips remarked in the New York Times, the
much of its zealous appeal, chiefly because of

party had "lost
the paradox of

Mr. Wallace's pro-Russian policy in the face
of
Russian conduct in Europe and the United
of the realities

From

the viewpoint of Howard Norton in the Baltiresult of "a growing and spreading
conviction among New Dealers and other liberals* that Wal-

Nations."

more Sun,

this

was the

or unwittingly is playing Moscow's game and
is hurting rather than
helping the cause of peace." And it was
undoubtedly true that Russian maneuvers during the spring

lace, wittingly

and now, during the fall, continued in Berstrengthened the feeling among the better informed that

in Czechoslovakia
lin

no conciliatory approach was possible. But newspapermen
were all too reticent in accepting credit for the role of the
mind both the view that
press in instilling in the public

Henry Wallace was,

if

unwittingly, a "tool of

Moscow** and

the concept that the Progressive and Communist parties in
the United States were only "two doors into the same house."

Nor were

the gentlemen of the press quick to assess the part
the
in
decline of third-party strength played by their own
constant insistence, direct or implied, that all questioning of
the bipartisan foreign policy clearly indicated either a lack of
American patriotism, an affinity for communism and Moscow,

or both. But, since the American public was acting on the
basis of the information most easily available to it, ratter

than on the

full facts in the matter, this

continuing smear
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was undoubtedly a

factor in the decline

a factor
sufficiently

a
important to warrant treatment in subsequent chapter.

And

may have been little noted and
many voters, domestic happenings

while events overseas

not long remembered by

began to

attract their attention increasingly. Earlier rent

by

the centrifugal forces of the Dixiecrats to the right and the
Progressives to the left, the Democratic Party finally began
to pull

remnants together as an

effective political organism
time since 1944. Roused from their funereal
lethargy by the newly found "give 'em hell" eloquence of their
its

for the

first

leader Harry S. Truman, they began to fight against the
inevitable loss to Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey.

Faced with disaster, the President began to shift his policies
to the left. Freed by the Philadelphia walkout from the Dixiecrat restraining influence, he began to invoke the politically
potent images of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal in

a dramatic "whistiestop" campaign.
Pushed by liberal Democratic Party elements led by Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey, the President adopted for
the first time an unequivocal position on civil rights. Whereas
only a few months before he had been attacking price controls
as "dictatorial" and had been threatening to draft striking
railroad workers, he now began to go "all out" to
prove that
his proposed Fair Deal offered all the features of the New
Deal and more. The Truman who, ten months before, had
been content to accept an anti-inflation measure virtually
identical with that
proposed by "Mr. Republican" Senator
Robert A. Taft (Ohio) now assailed in vigorous terms the
"no good, do-nothing Republican-controlled 80th Congress"
which had refused to accept his proposals.
Whether or not these were, as Wallace contended, only
words the mouthings of a "vocal liberal" remained to be
proven or disproven by history. But for the moment at least,
Harry S. Truman was talking virtually all the liberal domestic
policies so strenuously advocated

out the campaign.
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were indications

Missouri might be starting to yield. For in

the midst of the campaign, apparently hoping to detract from
the appeal of the Wallace "peace" plank, the President had
suddenly prepared to send Supreme Court Chief Justice Fred

Vinson on a new "Mission to Moscow" to explore ways of
the cold war with Russia and the Berlin
peacefully ending
Blockade. Although this peace scare had been rebuffed in no
uncertain terms by General Marshall and other State Department advisors, it seemed to indicate that Truman was abandoning the position of personal intransigence that had prevailed since the Potsdam Conference of 1945.
In the face of a third-party campaign which threatened to
him of the presidency, Harry S. Truman appeared to
deprive
be making concessions all along the line, attempting to steal
the thunder of the Progressives in the very midst of the campaign. And in so doing he was, in all except foreign affairs,
promising to effectuate their advocated policies. Thus, on
the domestic scene, regardless of the outcome at the polls, the
efforts of Henry A. Wallace and Glen H. Taylor seemed certain to be crowned if indirectly with a modicum of success.

But

in addition to the sweep of events outside the party,
work that may have

there were internal frictions and forces at

played a part in the decline. Veteran newspapermen like
Cabell Phillips, writing in the New York Times, felt that the
Progressive Party was "beginning to suffer a certain degree of
internal disintegration. Within its own radical constituency it
seems to be suffering from the classical and hereditary ailment of all political parties the incompatibility of right and

But while it was scarcely to be denied that the leftright cleavage had indeed seriously affected party machinery
in several states, this had remained fairly well hidden from
left."

public sight.

Such was not the case, however, with the widely publicized
argument that the party was "deliberately attempting to
split

the liberal vote" in order to elect reactionary candidates
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and congressional posts. Phillips argued that
the party's "belated withdrawal of opposition to other liberal
candidates cannot win back the independents who deserted
to senatorial

on this account." According
had been created "over the

to

Howard Norton,

efforts of

misgivings

Wallace earlier

this

year, to defeat such outstanding 'liberal' Democrats as Helen
Gahagen Douglas and Chet Holifield efforts which cast a

shadow on Wallace's claim
movement."

to

be the true prophet of the

liberal

Undoubtedly this belief, fostered by the
portant effect on Progressive support. For

press,

had an im"The

this threat,

third party is going to elect reactionary Congressmen
by
"
was the constantly repeated theme
'splitting the liberal vote,'

of such groups as the Americans for Democratic Action. In
the views of some, including CIO President
Phillip Murray,
there was a deliberate plot to elect purposely a
"reactionary
Congress" in 1948 so that the Progressives might benefit

from a countertrend in 1952.
While the exact degree of influence possessed by

this allegation in the decline of Progressive strength in the fall campaign of 1948 is difficult to assess, the truth of the charges

may be examined with some
the Progressives
five states

a

accuracy.

On November 2,

1948,

had in the congressional races of twentyof 114 House candidates of their own,
plus

still

total

a total of 9 senatorial candidates. In addition,
they had
formally endorsed some 14 Democratic candidates who carried both major- and
third-party designations on the ballot.
Prior to election day,
they had, however, withdrawn a number of nominees from various congressional races as well as

from the

crucial Connecticut gubernatorial contest.
Criticism of their "belated withdrawals" stemmed

from a
news dispatch of September 30 in which it was
reported that
the third
party was "withdrawing its candidates for thirteen
House seats in five states." Actually,
according to Ralph
SMkes, publicity director for the third party, Campaign

Man-
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ager C. B. Baldwin had released to the press a summary of
previous withdrawals at this time in order to counteract the

ADA's "splitting the liberal vote" propaganda. But in reporting this release, the press, he claimed, had
so distorted the statement as to make it appear that the with-

Democrats' and

drawals had been newly effected. According to Shikes, the
only "new" withdrawals had come some ten days earlier when
the national organization had finally been able to convince local officials in Southern California of the need for withdrawing
opposition to liberal Democratic candidates Douglas and
Holifield.

These two races had been a continuing source of friction
between local and national groups since early in the campaign. Following a discussion between Wallace and his campaign manager, the Progressive withdrawals were finally announced, but because of California statute, the third-party
candidates'

names

still

appeared on the November

ballot,

despite their support for the Democratic slate. And as noted
hi an earlier chapter, Connecticut gubernatorial candidate

Thomas

Emerson had been pledged from the first to withname if the Democrats nominated an "acceptable*'
candidate, such as Chester Bowles. As soon as Bowles re-

draw

I.

his

ceived the nomination, Emerson had withdrawn, although his
shift, too, was labeled last-minute.

Concerning the charges that there was a deliberate attempt
on the part of the Progressives to "split the liberal vote," an
both scholarly and objective was made by
excellent study
John Cotton Brown of ten different contests where this accusation had been made. 6 Brown's findings indicated conclusively that such was not the third-party purpose. Instead,
they showed that seven other factors singly or jointly seemed
to determine whether or not the Progressives endorsed a
Democrat or entered their own nominee in opposition.

"John Cotton Brown, "The 1948 Progressive Campaign:
tific

Approach," Chapter VI.

A

Scien-
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Democratic candidate was (1) reactionary by Pro-

matters as his vote
gressive standards, which included such
on the Truman doctrine, the peacetime draft, and the con-

tempt citations of the "Hollywood Ten"; (2) "unreliable"
concerning attitudes, receptivity to delegations, and liberal
no hopes of election, the
"leadership"; or (3) a liberal with
Progressives refused endorsement. On the other hand, if the
Republican candidate was a "moderate" or if he would
clearly

owe

his election to the third party's balance of

power

position and hence be likely to moderate his position, then
the third party also tended to enter independent candidates.

was actually a chance of victory for the Proparty power building considerations were involved (such as retaining Negro support with a Negro
nominee) , the third party again refused to endorse Democrats

Finally, if there

gressives or

if

and entered

its

On
tests,

own

candidates.

the basis of his examination of

New York

City con-

Brown found that
The conclusion seems unavoidable that in New York
ALP, by Progressive standards, did very little

City the

and then only for calculated
reasons aimed at increasing its political
evidence was uncovered that the ALP was de-

"splitting of the liberal vote,"

and

justifiable

power.

No

liberately trying to elect reactionary congressmen,
there was considerable evidence to the contrary.

and

In summarizing his findings on the matter of "splitting the
both in New York and elsewhere, Brown con-

liberal vote,"

cluded:

The 1948 Progressives faced a political dilemma. If they
endorsed "liberal" Democrats instead of running their own
candidates they were building Democratic rather than Progressive Party power. If they ran their own candidates
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against "liberal" Democrats they were "splitting the liberal
vote," hence risking the partial achievement of Progressive

programmatic objectives to which these Democrats, if
elected, would contribute.
This dilemma was confused in the public eye by a general failure to distinguish

between conflicting

ADA

and

Progressive criteria of "liberalism" and by unsupportaHe
propaganda charges that the Progressives were deliberately

attempting to elect reactionaries through "splitting tbe
liberal vote."

While

particularly aggressive, non-compromising personalities of "militant" local Progressive leaders got out

of hand, tactical decisions appeared to result more from
emotion than from cold calculations of strategy. Latter-day

moderation of militant Progressive opposition to "liberal*'
Democrats apparently resulted from a recognition that such
tactics were defeating both
programmatic and powerbuilding objectives.

On the basis of these findings it seems clear that this charge
of "splitting the liberal vote" was hardly substantiated by the
facts, although it may have gained some credence by the
sheer force of repetition and thus contributed to the Progressive decline in the fall of 1948.

But what of the press and radio coverage afforded the
crusaders? Reference has already been made both to the silent
treatment given the spring campaign of the Wallace Progresnation's press and to the distortions that
the
Philadelphia Convention as a Communist
stereotyped
field day. This same trend continued and ,was even intensified

sive Party

during the

To

cite

by the

fall

campaign.

one example, while the

ably increased

its

coverage,

it

New York

Times consider-

continued to relegate news of
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the party's tours and speeches to back pages, at the same time
devoting front page attention to Communist charges leveled
7
against the party or to stories of its decline. And while the
Times*$ accounts of the national tours were relatively ob-

jective, its editorial bias

continued to be exhibited in local

dispatches whenever the American Labor Party was mentioned. 8 But by comparison with some of the less responsible

and

less restrained
journals, the

both as to coverage and

The dangers inherent

Times was a paragon of virtue

objectivity.

in such a situation

became apparent

many who opposed the Wallace Progressive Party. Thus, anti-Wallace commentator W. B. Hesseltine felt compelled to protest in the
in the course of the fall
campaign,

even to

Progressive:

The conspiracy

of silence

among

the newspapers to
sup-

news of the party and its activities reveals a dangerous drift towards an un-American totalitarianism.

press

In addition to their
conspiracy of silence and their slanted
news coverage, many American papers
employed still a third

technique

the old device of the
deliberately selected un-

Taylor was a leading target
reporting, beginning with the shots accompanying the story of his decision to run shots suggesting

flattering photograph. Senator
for this method of

7

For comparison, the story of the abduction of
Progressive Party
workers in Georgia occupied a few inches on
page 35 (October 3,
1948), while a story of the CIO Political Action Committee's prediction of party decline
appeared on page 1 (October 17, 1948).
8
For example, the following excerpt from an October 21
dispatch
by Douglas Dales: "Fundamentally the difference between candidates
[in New .York's Twenty-fourth Congressional District] is the difference between the Communist
party ideas of foreign policy as expounded by Henry Wallace and other ALP candidates in New York
and the bipartisan foreign policy of the
Republican and Democratic

parties."
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that only a dolt with a vacant expression (and presumably
a vacant mind) would make such a choice. While Wallace
similar treatment ever since entering the Roosevelt Cabinet, with press attacks on his "dreamy," "visionary"

had received

schemes, Taylor

now received

trayed him

word and

in

the full impact as the press poras little more than a

pictures

a buffoon in high public office. This then
curtain"
with which the party had to contend.
the "paper
hillbilly jester,

How may

was

"fight for peace" be
the
Progressives themselves and
upon
a
vote
for
Wallace and Taylor, the fall
their hopes for
large
the
large-scale expenditure of time, effort,
campaign, despite

evaluated? In

the

fall

campaign of the

its effect

failed to gain any substantial number of converts
to the third-party fold. While the Progressives were untiring

and money,

in their efforts to get their views before the

American

public,

except on the part of those
public reception of these views
to
radio speeches or personally attending
listening directly
was another matter. The "paper curtain" proved
rallies

more than an imaginary

either preventing or making
of
either crusade or crusaders.
difficult an undistorted image
the
On the other hand,
campaign tours were successful in

barrier

focusing the spotlight of publicity on some of the things endangering American democracy particularly in the South.

And

Wallace and Taylor had the grim satisfaction of seeing
their Democratic adversary set forth for the first time a Fair
Deal program comparable in liberalism to the New Deal

even while

it

stole the

thunder of their

own "Freedom and

platform. But, just as in the spring, they were
the increasing
face of international events
the
in
helpless
that
Union
Soviet
of
the
completely debiliintransigence

Abundance"

tated the appeal of the plank encompassing their prime purtheir
pose the promise of peaceful coexistence underlying
for
"fight
peace."

CHAPTER

10

"Stand Up and Be Counted"
2, 1948, was to have marked the long
of
the Wallace campaign. Toward this
climax
anticipated
day all the currents of the preceding two years, all the intensive efforts of the past ten months had been directed. For on
this election day, the verdict would be rendered on the "fight
a verdict arrived at through the votes of jurors all
for peace"
across America. This was the day when the supporters of
Henry A. Wallace would have their chance to "stand up and

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER

be counted."
Actually the day proved something of an anticlimax. Although few Progressives had seriously anticipated victory at
this time, they had looked to other goals capable of attainment. Wallace himself had hoped to create the foundations
a broad liberal party all across the land that
for a new party
would serve the interests of the common man. The less ambitious had hoped at least to create a cohesive force without
whose support the Democratic Party would be unable to win
a national election. Thus their bargaining power for the
adoption of liberal policies would be substantial.
The immediate objective on which all agreed was the turnout of a substantial Wallace-Taylor vote
a protest vote which
would serve to indicate the strength of popular sentiment
against administration policies, most of all against the negative
Truman foreign policy of containment. To attain the minimal
*

1
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goals, the necessary vote was probably in the vicinity of five to
while a ten million turnout would have probably
six million

served to insure the party's future as a potent and enduring
force. Failing this, if the Progressives' votes
spelled the difference between success and defeat for the Democratic Party,
their party might then be in possession of a weapon by which
to gain policy modifications as the price of rejoining the

Democrats.

The
blow

verdict of the

to

American people came

these hopes.

The

as a crushing

popular vote cast for the
Wallace-Taylor ticket reached 1,157,140 just past the one
million mark. Moreover, the Progressives failed to capture
the electoral votes of a single state. Nor did they run second,
all

total

ahead of either major party, in any of the states. In only three
states, New York, Michigan, and Maryland, could they daim
credit for having shifted the electoral outcome from TruinanBarkley to Dewey-Warren. Despite the Wallace defection on
the left and the Dixiecrat defection on the right, Harry S.
Truman had led the Democratic Party to victory and had
achieved

the

impossible

re-election

as

President of the

United States.
Progressive defeat extended on down into
and
the senatorial
congressional races as well. Only in the
York
District were they able to elect a
Eighteenth New
Member of the House. And here the candidate was the incumbent Vito Marcantonio, elected for a seventh term
and following.
chiefly on the basis of his personal machine

The depths of the

The only other third-party Member in the Eightieth Congress,
Representative Leo Isaacson of New York's Twenty-fourth
District, was soundly beaten by a coalition candidate. And
"Marc" himself had acquired only a plurality a hint as to
the future should Democrats and Republicans decide to unite
on a single candidate. Hie completeness of the defeat was

by the fact that in only a few districts two in New
York City and several in California, Texas, and Wisconsin

indicated
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did the Progressive congressional candidates run second. And
in every such instance, the victorious candidate had either
received the nomination of both major parties or was unopposed by a major-party candidate. In both the Fourteenth

and Twenty-fourth New York districts, however, the American Labor Party (third-party) votes were greater than those
received by the coalition candidate on the Republican line.
The thoroughness of their rejection at the polls left little

consolation for the Wallace-ites. Nevertheless, an examinamay shed some light on the more

tion of the election results

prominent factors involved.

While surprising to Progressive Party followers, the magnitude of the defeat had been indicated earlier
by the pollsters.
Their sampling had shown a steady trend
away from Wallace

campaign progressed. But even they failed to gauge
completely the depths to which the party would actually
plummet on election day. From an early high of 11.5 per
cent in February, the pollsters had charted a decline of
popuas the

lar sentiment to 7.5

per cent in April, 6 per cent in June and
again in August, and to a final 4 per cent in.the final days of
the campaign. The actual
Progressive vote amounted to 2.37
per cent of the total cast.

Voluble in their

earlier explanations as to the
potential er-

rors in these
poll predictions, the Progressives
silenced by the returns that came in on election

midst of

all

the

gloomy

figures, there

were finally
night. In the

was but one

relatively

New York State, where the Wallace-Taylor slate
bright spot
received a total of 509,559 votes on the American Labor
While

this marked the
highest figure ever polled
candidate in the Empire State, it
represented the
result of continued
organizational strength, rather than any
substantial accretion of new voters. For in the 1944
presidential election, the Roosevelt-Truman ticket had
polled some
486,405 votes on the ALP line, and in 1946 the Labor

Party

line.

by an

ALP

Up and Be Counted"

"Stand

senatorial candidate, Herbert
votes.
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H. Lehman, had polled 435,846
total hi New York was less

significant, constituting only 8.12 per cent of the state's vote.
However, it was sufficient to transfer the state from the Demo-

cratic to the

Republican column, the eventual Dewey margin
being a scant 60,959 out of some 6*4 million votes cast.
By way of contrast, the Progressive performance in some
of the states where they had expected to make a creditable
showing, such as California and Pennsylvania, was highly disappointing. California had amassed a total of 482,781 petition signatures for the third party but delivered only 190,381
votes, a scant 4.73 per cent of the 4 million-plus turnout. Industrial Pennsylvania, expected to furnish a sizable Wallace

a paltry 1.47 per
following, actually reported 55,161 votes
cent. Thus the returns went
state after state filing negligible
returns for the third-party candidates.

Party

officials

were quick to

raise cries of election fraud.

The Progressives had, they claimed, been "counted out"
And, certainly, some of the discrepancies revealed by a comparison of ballot signatures and actual votes indicate some
this suspicion, even discounting the proportion
of persons who might have signed nominating petitions
without thus committing their votes. For instance, in Georgia

grounds for

the party

had obtained 60,000

to

80,000 ballot signatures,

according to party officials, yet were credited with only 1,636
votes. In Massachusetts a total of some 110,000 signatures
produced only 38,157 votes. North Carolina and West Virginia both indicated a "shrinkage" of about one third between petition and ballot. Missouri, with 53,000 signatures,

turned in only 3,998 votes.
The nature of some of the claims was indicated in reports
published in the Baltimore Sun. According to Wallace supporters, in

Maryland

Votes were being bought right out in the open wherever you
looked .... In most precincts the standard price was
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$10 per

vote.

Men

lar bills like they
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stood on street comers passing out dolwere propaganda leaflets or something.

And, even when Progressive
offers, finally

voters,

resisting all

these

got to the polls to cast their votes for

tempting
Wallace and Taylor, the party's

difficulties

were not over, they

claimed, as

Whole sheets of registrants' names were temporarily removed from loose-leaf registers. In Northwest Baltimore,
Dr. Camper [Progressive Party candidate for Congress]
lost thousands of votes through this kind of trick.
Party
lots

officials

were voided

estimated that in Ohio nearly 150,000 balas a result of the complicated voting
proce-

dure for the "independent" electors listed there.
In Michigan, some substantiation for Progressive complaints was revealed as a result of charges levied by Frank
E. Hook, defeated Democratic senatorial candidate. These
led to an inquiry by a field staff of the Subcommittee on

and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration. Hook had "reported that he was informed that election inspectors had not counted and he had
not been credited with
approximately 36,000 votes
Privileges

representing Progressive Party tickets split in his favor." Interviews by the Senate investigators revealed that a
large number
of election officials were ignorant of the law. Some had failed
to count split votes for Hook, as
alleged, while others had
voided completely every ballot so marked.
Third-party instructions had been to
their
votes
in
this
manner inassplit

much

as it had no senatorial candidate of its own. And while
was completely legal, the Progressives found it
necessary
to call
upon roving inspectors to prevent less informed officials
from completely voiding ballots so marked.
Complete surveillance had been impossible and
many valid ballots thus ruled
this

void.
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Other Progressive claims, lacking senatorial or other confirmation, involved a district in Missouri. Here, it was alleged
official Ralph Shikes, an estimated 5,000 votes had
been recorded as 500-odd. And according to party counsel
John Abt, numerous party workers in many states had reported voting for Wallace and Taylor in their own precincts,
only to find that their votes had never been recorded.
In spite of all these allegations, and even if one accepts
as valid every Progressive claim
and it appears that many
could be substantiated the maximum estimate of votes lost
in this fashion would not total more than 2,000,000. And
even were these added to the credited total, the net result
a little over 3,000,000 votes would still represent a dismal
showing, an insignificant percentage of the nearly 49,000,000

by party

votes cast.

Keeping in mind that the total Progressive vote was
minute on any absolute scale, there may nevertheless be some
significant revelations in a comparative examination. What
does a sectional analysis indicate? How did they run in comparison with earlier third parties? A marked geographical
pattern emerged in the percentage of state votes cast for the
Progressives, even though performance on any absolute scale

could be rated as only "fair" in the best of them New
York. (See Table 7, Appendix) In the top quarter there

was only one other eastern state New Jersey. All three
West Coast states, however, were included California,
Washington, and Oregon. Three Mountain States Monand three north central states
tana, Nevada, and Idaho
North Dakota, Minnesota, and Michigan were also near
the top. The twelfth and final spot was occupied, surprisingly,
by Florida sole southern state in the upper half of the listing.
At the bottom of the list, the lowest 25 per cent was occupied by four border and five southern states in addition to
the three states where the Progressives failed to secure a
place on the ballot. Of the eight states just above this quartile,
five were southern. Thus the pattern revealed strength -on a
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Far West and Mountain States and
weakness in the southern and border states. The latter was
hardly surprising in view of both these areas' recent "orthodoxy" and the Progressive stand on civil rights and segregation. Moreover both anti-Russian feeling and internal
relative basis

in the

anti-Communist hysteria were particularly marked in these

same areas at the time.
The failure of the Progressives to capture significant labor
or farm support was revealed by the relative showings. Industrial states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts,
and Connecticut were well down the list. And, with the exall
ception of North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
states historically strong in dissent
none of the rich farm

states of the

Midwest placed

highly.

A

comparison of their showing with that of earlier third
parties clearly revealed the weakness of the Wallace Progressive Party in failing to capture

"radical"

what might be

or "insurgent" areas of America

called the

states

tradi-

A

tionally responsive to the call of political dissent.
comparison of the state percentages of total votes cast for minor

from 1864 to 1936 with similar figures for the
is
revealing. (See Table 8, Appendix) Thirdparty planners had deliberately tried to enlist the support
parties

Progressives

of those areas throughout the
campaign. For example, in planning the strategy of the petition drives in Oklahoma, Kansas,

and West Virginia, the rural areas of 1890's Populist
support had been carefully charted and effort concentrated in
them rather than in the cities which, on the surface, might
have been expectedly more receptive to the Wallace
appeal.
The Progressives, however, were almost completely unsuccessful in their electoral
appeal to the areas of Populist sup-

A

port a half-century earlier.
unique geographical combination of mountain West and
agricultural South had made up
the 1890's revolt, the 1892
presidential candidate actually
carrying four states, coming within a hair's breadth in three

"Stand
others,
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at least
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10 per cent of the vote

in

eleven more

for a national
percentage of 8.63 per cent of
vote.
But in 1948 the best the Wallace-ites could
the popular
do in any of these was less than 4 per cent, and their national
figure

was only 2.3 per

cent.

Nor were

they any more successful in tapping the traditional discontent of those states where their earlier namesakes had run well. States like Wisconsin, Minnesota, the
Dakotas, the Mountain States, the West Coast trio, and

Iowa, where the vision of old "Fighting Bob" La Follette had
conjured up a substantial 1924 vote more than 30 per cent
in ten of these

remained unyielding to the crusaders'

call.

Only in California did their response exceed 4 per cent. And
while the La Follette Progressive ticket had carried only one
had doubled the Populists' national average, with
nearly 17 per cent of the popular vote against Calvin Coolidge
and John W. Davis.
state, it

Comparison with the Bull Moose venture of Teddy Roosevelt is less valid, since Roosevelt had carried with him much
of the organization of a major party. While not a third-party
movement, pure and simple, his candidacy received a national

popular vote of 29.6 per cent, with only three states where
the percentage figure was worse than Wallace's best state

New York.
In making these comparisons, it is necessary to keep in
mind that while the Wallace Progressive Party hoped to ap-

same groups reached by earlier farmer-labor
come into existence primarily as the result of
had
parties,
foreign policy dissent. Unlike the previous ventures, it was
not indigenous to the "radical" heart of the American West,
but to the "internationalist" East and West Coast. Even in
peal to the
it

the latter areas, however, its banners were ignored.
But were there any positive correlations with known party
votes to restrength? The relationship of Progressive Party
will be discussed in some
followers
Communist
Party
ported
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detail in the next
chapter, but a statistical comparison is inat
this
teresting
point. Ten of the twelve states containing the

largest numbers of known Communists were among the top
fourth of Progressive Party support at the
polls. And the top
twelve, which contained 91.23 per cent of known Communist Party members,
gave the Progressive Party
cent of their popular vote. Caution should be

drawing conclusions from

this close

correspondence, however,

since

Communist Party membership

of

per cent of the Wallace vote.

1

86.57 per
applied in

reflected only

one tenth

The presence

of both

Communist and

Progressive strength does not necessarily
indicate any causal
relationship, but it does suggest that the
same conditions, surroundings, or
population in these areas
furnished atmosphere
favorable to both.
relatively

Were

there any evidences of
presidential "coat-tail riding"
in the third
party? The figures for the congressional and
senatorial races are not
very revealing, inasmuch as the Wallace Progressives furnished
only 9 candidates for the 32
senatorial contests, and
only 123 House candidates for the

November 2

comes as something of
Nevertheless,
a surprise to note the number of states in which the
presidential ticket ran behind the local
candidates.
ballot.

it

congressional

There were

New York, Maryland,
Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia. By comparison, however,
of the 170
Representatives and 17 Senators elected by the
Democrats in 18 states in 1948,
only 24 Representatives and
5 Senators failed to run ahead of Truman.
six

such cases

California,

In New York, the difference (with candidates in
forty-four
of the forty-five districts) was not
appreciable (512,148 to
509,559), but in California, where there were
Progressive
candidates in only fourteen of the
twenty-three districts, the
congressional aspirants piled up a total of 228,180 votes to
only 190,381 for the national ticket. But examination of the
situation

reveals that in
every district where an IPP candidate
ran strongly, he was
opposed by only one major-party candi-
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Thus, under California's unique

cross-filing statute

then

in existence, the only opposition in seven districts to the
Democratic-Republican nominees was furnished by the Pro-

candidates. Consequently, dissidents had to vote
gressive
the IPP line if they wished to express their disapproval.

Even more

significant is the fact that in not

a single

dis-

trict were the Progressive Party votes crucial. Their ballots
were insufficient to defeat a single Democratic candidate

where they offered opposition, just as they failed, where they
to furnish him with his margin
supported a liberal Democrat,
his
Thus the threats of "splitdefeat.
or
to
of victory
prevent
ting

the

proved
the big

liberal

as

vote"

to

elect

a conservative candidate

in the congressional races as they did in
with the Progressive vote equally ineffective

unfounded

show

in both cases.
Little of significance

emerged from the

results of the sen-

atorial races, save in Virginia where the votes cast for the
like those for the nomiProgressive candidate for Senate,

nees for the House, exceeded the votes received by the presidential ticket.

Endless speculation would be possible upon some of the
facets thus revealed, or upon other possible conclusions, but
to the starting point
eventually one always returns
at
the polls.
the
party
showing made by

the poor

of the reasons that Henry A. Wallace
of the popular
insignificant percentage
under
summarized
be
causes
may
pertinent

What were some
received such an

vote?

The more

four broad headings. First, there were the handicaps under
which the Wallace Progressive Party was launched and
which limited its following at the outset. Second, there were

some

conditions
relatively constant

which prevailed through-

out the campaign and which prevented the accretion of any
delar<*e numbers of new supporters. Third, there were the
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veloping conditions throughout the campaign which caused
a considerable decline in numbers as 1948 progressed.
Finally.,

there were other causes which might be classified

as contributory rather than critical.
As will be recalled, the Wallace venture

was launched

without the support of any substantial segment of American
labor and with virtually no support from farm groups. Moreover, the basic disagreement leading to the Wallace decision

had centered about foreign policy a situation unique in
American history. For the Wallace Progressive Party offered
the sole instance in which a new party had been formed on
this basis, rather than borne in on some wave of
popular discontent with more closely felt domestic
problems.
Moreover, the socioeconomic climate into which the inwas brought was one hardly calculated to make

fant endeavor

it thrive.
Throughout the campaign, three main currents of
America remained relatively steady, none of which served to

sustain the Wallace endeavor. Quite the
contrary.
^ First
there were the conditions of economic
prosperity, full

employment and high farm

prices. Despite the inflation which
diminished
the
greatly
purchasing power of the dollar, there

was more money in circulation. Of greatest
importance to
labor, there was work to be had and wages were moving
upward even if prices were also moving
upward at an even more

From

the vantage point of the fanner, the world
voracious market, with resultant
high prices
for expanded
production. And for the future there was the
schemes would never allow
promise that price

rapid pace.

provided a

still

support

culture to fall again into the
despair of the late 1920's
early 1930's.

In short, with factories
humming and business good,

agri-

and

why

risk upsetting the
apple cart? Historically, the ranks of the

discontented and thus of
third-party voters, have always been
swollen by periods of economic crisis.
Regardless of the
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footing revealed only a year later, 1948

xxa period of prosperity rather than

was

crisis.

NSecond, there was the social climate of the times, best described as one of postwar reaction and mounting hysteria.
The seemingly inevitable moral letdown was evidenced by
increasing crime rates across the nation. Hostile sentiment
was being whipped up by both press and radio against our
recent wartime ally

the Soviet Union. Without
attempting
disentangle economic aspects of governmental contrd
the same
from totalitarian actions of a one-party
to

dictatorship,

Red brush was

applied to everything Russian, and "Comthe most vituperative of epithets. In such an

munist" became

atmosphere, as invariably happens, a premium came to be
a blind, unreasoning acceptance of
placed upon conformity
the dogma of the times. One who dared disagree with the
accepted norm became immediately suspect, unless perchance
the witch hunts he proposed were more violent than those al-

ready in

effect.

Obviously, such was not a time for dissenters to rally
adherents to a new party the more so when the party's candidates bent over backwards to avoid any appearance of the
intolerance that

had become part and parcel of the

era.

Con-

to tradition in voting was something
sequently, adherence

which stamped the

upon

the

La

citizen as "respectable." Commenting
Follette Progressive campaign, the Lynds had

observed in Middletown:
In 1924

it

was considered such "bad business"

to vote for

the third party that no one of the business group confessed
or after the election to adherence to
publicly either before

could discover the three people who disLa Follette/* declared one
graced our district by voting for
business-class woman vehemently, "we'd certainly make it
this ticket. "If

hot for them!"

we
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The United

States in

1948

1948 was Middletown multiplied a thou-

sandfold.
*

Finally, the war-fostered interest of the American people
in foreign affairs entered a new
a defensive phase. While
the traditional isolationism of the Midwest slowly regained

strength in

some

areas,

elsewhere the shibboleth became

"containment." Instead of further progress or a positive expansion of democratic ideals, the status quo was now to be
preserved against Communist iconoclasts seeking to demolish

a structure so laboriously erected and perfected.
Acceptance
of this doctrine also served to relegate foreign affairs to a
position of secondary importance for the average person.

Even though

it

and China were

might be "One World," Greece and Turkey
far away, and a show of
military might by

the admittedly greatest

power

in the world

would keep the

Communists "in
a peacetime

their place." Meanwhile, the transition to
economy at home offered the really pressing

problems. All sights were leveled on the maintenance of
productivity, employment and farm prices on the
new plateau to which they had climbed in the postwar era.
And since the areas of traditional "radicalism" were

American

among

the most contented and the least interested in
foreign policy,
the climate of 1948 America was
hardly an ideal one in

which to
as that of

cultivate

Henry

an internationally-oriented crusade such

Wallace.

But, in addition to these constants of the year 1948, there
were also numerous variables factors whose alteration with
the progress of the
campaign contributed to the steady decline in Progressive
Party strength.
One of the most significant was the "shift to the left" of the
Truman administration in domestic policy.
the close of

By

1947 the Democrats had moved
to the right of the Roosevelt

in action,

New

Deal.

if

not in words, far

They now espoused

many causes nearly identical with those of the Republican
conservatives, such as the administration's anti-inflation
pro-

"Stand

Up and Be Counted"

245

gram which was, in the words of one high governmental economic analyst, "99 per cent identical with Senator [Robert
A.] Taft's proposals for 'voluntary control,' which is no
control at all."
Linked to such programs, there came a succession of
Truman personal decisions the reliance upon the generals

and the admirals, the appointments of the Pawleys and the
Krugs, the removal of the Landises and the Ickes. All these
and also
suggested a marked change from the personnel
from the outlook of New Deal days.
With Wallace's campaign attacks upon these administration
tendencies there had come a marked reversal. First at the
therePhiladelphia Convention, and at every "whistlestop"
a
had
undertaken
Truman
S.
after, Harry
vigorous advocacy
of a Fair Deal program, as he attempted to don an outsize
been subRoosevelt-style mantle. A revitalized program had
mitted to a specially summoned session of Congress late in
had failed, as
July. When this conservative-dominated body
the Truman attack upon the
the
to

plans,
adopt
80th Congress"
"no-good, do-nothing, Republican-controlled
had begun in earnest. Forgotten in the attack were the President's own actions that had helped scuttle price control in
1946, his 1947 threats to draft striking railroad workers, and
his consistent series of "incredible" first-term appointments.
The Democratic National Convention had also marked the

anticipated,

onset of a

new and

racial segregation

vocal attack by the administration against
and other discriminatory practices. Led by

Hubert Humphrey in a spectacular floor fight, a liberal faction
had forced the adoption of a strong platform plank supporting
such controversial matters as anti-lynch and anti-poll tax

and promising a nation-wide fair employment pracWhile the close convention decision had led to the
immediate defection of southern delegates who proceeded to
form a fourth party the States' Rights Democrats, or Dixieit had also had a telling effect on the third party. For
crats

legislation
tices act.
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from under the
numbers of
Progressive Party's "freedom" pledge. Large
could
accomplish more by
Negro voters came to feel that they
working and voting for a Democratic Party which now promised just as much as the third party, and which, in addition,

this

new

position cut

much

of the ground out

elected to carry out its promises.
the words of this new
Regardless of the absence of action,
the
"vested
interests" and
dynamic Presidential attack upon

had some chance of being

a last-minute shift

of
practices brought
independent voters to the Truman banners too late, in fact,
to be caught by any of the pollsters. Faced with the imminent

upon discriminatory

threat of a Dewey-Republican victory, even Wallace supporters at the last minute held their noses, swallowed the
"lesser-evil" doctrine,

The

story

was

and voted to

re-elect

Harry

S.

Truman.

related in Progressive circles of the girl

who had labored strenuously
the
the
for
Progressive cause. On eleccampaign
through
so
the
tale
she
burst into tears upon retion morning,
went,
from
own
vote. Queried as to the cause
casting her
turning
worker-for-Wallace-and-Taylor
all

of her dejection (the returns were not yet coming in), she
replied that after she had entered the booth, pulled the cur-

and was alone with her thoughts of "the little man on the
wedding cake" Tom Dewey in the White House she simply
couldn't pull the Wallace lever but instead had voted for Trutain,

man. This episode was undoubtedly repeated many times over
on November 2, 1948, with thousands of voters ultimately
evil." Some of the pollsters, including
later
voiced
their belief that the vast
Gallup,
majority

choosing the "lesser

George

of their million-odd "missing Wallace votes" represented lastminute shifts that contributed to the upset victory of the
President.

Of

at least equal importance with the domestic "thunderstealing" by the Democrats that undercut the "abundance"

promises of the Progressive platform, there were the unfolding
events in Europe during 1948 that had vitiated the
appeal of
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The most

significant of these had been the
Czechoslovakian coup of March, whereby the Communists
had gained control of the previously democratic coalition government. This was a shattering blow to those who had hoped

the "peace" plank.

that

it

was possible

to permit

Communist cooperation and
it was also

retain Western-style
democracy. To many
convincing proof that the Soviet was embarked
still

upon a course
West

of world conquest and that no bridge between East and

was any longer possible.
This fact alone would have been

sufficiently

damaging to

Progressive proposals for United States-Russian negotiations,
but in addition Wallace had been caught off base when questioned by reporters. His remarks had seemed to indicate a

American intervention had been the fundamental
a conclusion highly unacceptable to most observers.
The combined effect of both the incident and Wallace's obser-

belief that

cause

had been

numbers of Progressive followers very sharply at a critical time in the preconventioo
campaign. Short months after this had come the Berlin Block-

vations

ade with

its

to reduce the

continuing reminder throughout the campaign of

the intransigence of the Russian leaders for any form of
coexistence implicit in the "peace" plank.
third factor of increasing importance as the campaign

A

progressed was the Communist link attributed to the Progressive Party. Early in the year, Gael Sullivan, at the time acting

chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had suggested that the Wallace candidacy wouki actually help the
Democrats, inasmuch as it would unload from their backs
the Red label with which the Republicans had so successfully
tagged them hi the 1946 off-year campaign. This prediction
was borne out to no small extent. Few serious and sustained
charges of communism were leveled against the Democrats,

and most were disregarded. Communism never became a votein 1948, as it did later and as
losing issue for the Democrats
it

did for the Progressives hi this campaign.
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estimated
The third-party presidential
that acceptance of Communist support probably cost his party
3,000,000 votes. But the matter became one of principle

candidate himself

from which no retreat was possible, and the Progressives were
on the defensive throughout the campaign. They failed to
adopt a clear-cut line of counterattack such as that offered by
Senator Glen H. Taylor. In his acceptance speech, the vicepresidential candidate had announced:
I

am happy to

have the support of

all

those

who go

along
with our program. But just let me say to the Communists
so there will be no misunderstanding, my efforts in the
future as in the past will be directed toward the goal of
making our economy work so well and our way of life so
will

and our people so contented that Communism
never interest more than the infinitesimal fraction of

our

citizens

attractive

who

adhere to

But with the

it

now. 1

follow up on this apProgressives'
the
of
the
third party as "Redproach,
popular impression
dominated*' continued to grow. By mid-July a
majority of
Americans (51 per cent) questioned in a public opinion poll
"agreed" that "Wallace's third party is run by Communists."

And

failure to

while the precise figure might be
suspect because of the
little doubt as to the
general senti-

loaded question, there was

ment

revealed.

Regardless of validity, the popular view of the Progressive
Party as little more than a Communist front had a damaging
effect

on voters and workers

alike.

lace

who had
1

Progressives (with a
the Wal-

who might otherwise have been attracted to
camp stayed away, and considerable numbers

small p)

gathered later departed

of those

both groups repelled by

Text of Senator Taylor's remarks
published in FM, February 24,
1948. Other journals failed to include this
paragraph in their excerpts.
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which the crusade's banners were bathed as

the campaign went on.

The
this

part played by the American press in the fostering of
conception was highly significant. As a member of the

New

Deal administration, Wallace had always been a leading
target for conservative attack. With his candidacy on a thirdthe vilification had assumed unprecedented
proparty ticket,
even some who privately admitted symportions. Reporters,

pathy to the candidate, turned out reams of bitter, sarcastic
copy playing up every remark, every shred of evidence
which could be manipulated to prove that the Progressive
candidate was (a) a dreamer, a visionary, and an idealist
completely devoid of practical knowledge, and (b) a dupe,
wittingly or not, of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union, and the

Communist Party in the United States. Little acknowledgment
was given that this "dreamer" had created fortunes, for others
as for himself, through agricultural developments, had served
as capable administrator of the largest branch of the peacetime government the Department of Agriculture and dur-

ing his term as Vice President had enlisted notable popular
support for the United States throughout the world parwas instrumental
ticularly in Latin America. Press coverage
in presenting a pink-hued, vote-costing version of the PhilaConvention to the American public. And this was the

delphia
constant portrayal throughout the campaign to discredit the
third party. An adequate method of response was simply not
available to the Wallace-ites.

Nor
tional

did they benefit in any marked degree from the tradi-

American sympathy

for the underdog.

For

theirs

was

upon a combination of moral and idealistic principles, rather than upon hope
of winning the election. And in 1948 the voters' emotional

indeed a quixotic crusade

a crusade based

and the candidate
response was to the battling underdog,
whose "just plain folks" approach was so clearly genuine,
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rather than to the hopeless if intellectual appeal of a Quixote.
rather
Finally there were many minor causes, contributory

than crucial, which played their part in the small vote received

by the Progressives. First there was the organizational failure.
The fact that no sound machine was firmly established down
to the ward and precinct level was evidenced by the weak
showing everywhere except in New York, where such a structure, that of the American Labor Party, had already been
built. The areas making relatively better showings were those
where relatively stronger organizations had been established,
as in Southern California. The other significant organizational
flaw was the failure to build a working labor organization
a defect clearly indicated by the weak showing in the industrial states. Second there were the ballot problems
already
discussed in detail. The two most damaging failures were
those in Illinois, which may well have cost the Progressives a
quarter of a million votes, and Ohio, where the necessity of
marking twenty-five separate Z's on a ballot to vote Progressive was estimated to have taken a toll of 150,000. Finally
there was the matter of election frauds, mentioned earlier in
the chapter. Difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy,
"counting out" undoubtedly deprived the Wallace ticket
many votes, though hardly the 2,000,000 estimated by

this

of

party publicist Ralph Shikes.
But what of the impact of this dismal performance? Nothing succeeds like success, and the Progressives had failed to
establish even a

working basis for the 1952 election. Their
was not only an immediate one, but it also posed increasing difficulties for the four-year period up to the next
presidential contest. Workers who had in so many instances
sacrificed time, money, social standing, and even
long-held
positions had little to look forward to on the basis of the genfailure

eral apathy exhibited their endeavors.
The vote was enough for Senator Glen

H. Taylor

suffi-

cient indication of the
complete lack of support for both party

9
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party secretary C. B. Bald-

win that it was not his "intention to quit politics," hence he
must leave the party. This attitude was typical of many moderates

who now

departed

candidate.

presidential
their departure

was

less

formally than did the viceof the ultimate effects of

And one

to give the extreme leftists increasing con-

trol of the organization

by default.
Moreover, the small vote achieved by the Progressives'

candidates indicated that the administration foreign policy
was accepted, if not endorsed, by an overwhelming majority
of the American voters* While the interpretation of the elec-

"mandate" in favor of the Truman gettough-with-Russia policy seems unwarranted, the fact that it
had failed to arouse significant opposition meant endorsement

tion

outcome

as a

of a negative sort. If the voters felt any great qualms over the
of President Truman's doctrine abroad, they had

wisdom

been calmed by the

tides of

economic pressure and the ground

swell for conformity at home.
Finally, the fact that the

Democrats had gained victory
without the Wallace forces meant that the Progressives had
failed to gain even a staying power, let alone balance of
power. Their unsuccessful quest for votes had openly exposed
the weaknesses of their position.
In short, then, Henry Wallace, having taken his "fight for
of the people, found himself
peace" to the highest tribunal
Those willing to "stand up
manner.
uncertain
no
in
rejected

and be counted" had proved disappointingly few.
The defeat at the polls suffered by the Progressive Party on
November 2, 1948, was such as to virtually sign its death wara major
rant, barring either of two possible contingencies
at home or an overwhelming defeat for the condepression
tainment policy abroad. Regardless of the complex causes,
there was little evidence in the election returns of sufficient
to allow the Wallace Progressive Party to endure in
vitality

such a hostile climate.

CHAPTER

11

Communist Bogey

"WALLACE'S COMMUNIST Front Party," "The Pink Facade,"
"How the Reds Snatched Henry Wallace" titles such as
and repeated epithets of "Communist-dominated,"
"dupes of Moscow," "fellow travelers" were indicative of the
invective hurled at the Wallace Progressive Party in 1948.

these

their high-water

Reaching

mark

at the Philadelphia

Conven-

tion as noted earlier, such charges constituted a
powerful
current all through the campaign.
valid were these

How

What

charges?

role did the

Communists play

in the party?

What was
The

the effect of their participation?
press generally reflected the opinion expressed

by the

professedly (and professional) "reformed Communist" Louis

Budenz in Collier's that "the Communists conceived the
idea of a third party
.
organized it, named it and chose
[Henry A. Wallace] as their candidate." This view was identical with that earlier voiced
by Americans for Democratic
F.

.

.

Action, the anti-Communist Liberal group which supported
the Democratic ticket. In a document aimed at
proving "It
All Goes Back to Frere
Jacques," (the reference being to

Jacques Duclos, French Communist leader) the
It is fair to
[sic] is

which

ADA stated:

say that the core of the Wallace's supporters
chiefly of those individuals and unions

composed

in the period of the Nazi-Soviet
pact
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were the spear-
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head of the Wallace opposition the only other time he ran
for public office.

The Communist Party itself, while not taking sole credit
for the Progressive Party, was far from modest in its claims
as to its role. In a draft resolution for its 1948 national convention, the National

Committee of the Communist Party adNew York Times, that

mitted, according to the

The Communist party, from the earliest days after the
end of the war, understood that its traditional fight for a

new people's

party directed against the two-party system of
the monopolies had once more been placed by events as an
immediate practical question before the American people,
and, acting upon this understanding, it boldly proclaimed
the need for such a new people's party.

Because of its correct line, the party was able to carry
effective mass work and make significant contributions
to the struggle for peace and democracy and to the forging
of the new political alignment and people's coalition.

on

On

the other hand, the presidential candidate himself as-

serted repeatedly:
I

am

not a Communist, have never been one and never

expect to

The

be one.

Progressive Party is not controlled by Communists
its convention or program dictated by them.

nor was

And Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell, who had reportedly
absented himself from the party's fall campaign because of
Communist domination, concluded some months later in the
Progressive that "no matter

how

lieve [the Progressive Party] to

not Communist."

it

may be

represented, I be-

be genuinely Progressive and
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these conflicting statements,

what meas-

ure of truth can be found? With the press so
universally opposed to recent third-party candidates, its reporting in 1948,
as in 1924, tended to
depart from objective standards and
include editorial material. It accepted as fact some of the more
violent claims of an
opposition united in trying to pin the
Red label on the Progressive Party. On the other hand, the

Communists were elbowing for a position in the forefront of
the new coalition. Hence
they might well exaggerate the extent
of their participation to better advance their claims within
the party. And from a third
viewpoint, non-Communists in the
party could be expected to play down as much as possible
the actual degree of Communist
participation, since common

knowledge of such support might prove costly in votes.
With all the available source material subject to these

many possible distortions, the obvious necessity is for a
valid criterion
by which to make an objective appraisal of
both sources and material.
Unfortunately, there seems to have
been no such

clear-cut standard in 1948. In the realm of
polthere
icy
simply did not exist, at the time, any sharply defined
differences within the Progressive
which to distin-

Party by
guish Communists and party-line followers from

non-Com-

munist Liberals. Both groups had
expressed their willingness to accept the "Peace,
and
Progress
Prosperity"

program

of Henry A. Wallace.
In 1941, it would have been
possible to separate isolationists and
pacifists from Communists on the basis of their
views toward World War II. The former
groups consistently
opposed hostilities, while the latter exhibited an overnight
in attitude toward the
"imperialist war" following the
invasion of the Soviet Union. And in
1950, it became

change

possible
to distinguish Communists and
"party-liners" from Liberals in
the Progressive
Party on the basis of their respective attitudes
toward the action of the United Nations to halt Red
aggres-

255

Communist Bogey
sion in Korea. Indeed

was

was the

it

division in the party over this

most of the
from
the
failure-thinned
non-Communists,
remaining
party's
issue that

finally to drive Wallace, as well as

ranks.

But

in

1948 no such

significant criteria existed. True, there

were some differences of opinion over policy, but these tended
to be of an inconsequential nature. Thus, as has been observed
in an earlier chapter, such matters as the Vermont Resolution

and the report of the Rules Committee at the Philadelphia
Convention found reputed "fellow travelers" on the unexpected side of the ideological fence, while persons obviously
non-Communist favored what should have been, in theory,

The underlying difference over the issue of
never came to the fore.
capitalism"
"progressive
In a dispassionate report of what actually went on "behind

the "party line."

the scenes" at Philadelphia, one firsthand observer, John
Cotton Brown, concluded that "there was no greater behavioral unity among those members of the Platform Com-

whose reputations and vocabulary suggested that they
might be Communists than there was among the others."

mittee

While seeking to prove his hypothesis that the Progressive
Party was "principally controlled by a minority of Communists and left-wingers," Brown, careful to avoid factual distortion, reported further:

Prof. Frederick L.
carefully

watched for

Schuman told me ... that he had
had
signs of Communist tactics, but

observed none.
I

thought

I

detected several instances of

Communist

tac-

during the four days of committee sessions, although
I must confess that on several of these occasions, though

tics

by no means

all,

certain evidences of

subsequently vitiated
pressed

me

Moscow

plats

by the behavior of those

as suspect-Communists.

were

who im-
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The same commentator, having attempted

to set

up

six

contrasting "Left-Wing" and "Non-Left-Wing" beliefs, finally
reached the conclusion that

A

"common left-wing system of beliefs" rendered the Progressive Convention behavior of Communists and nonCommunist

By

left-wingers indistinguishable.
it was not
possible to locate any sort of

contrast

right wing.

In short, the program established by the Progressives' presidential candidate had, much earlier, eliminated virtually all
those not in substantial agreement. Consequently, debate
over adoption of a platform at Philadelphia centered around
minute detail, language shading, and emphases, rather than

around fundamental policy disputes. Therefore, any criteria
Communists from non-Communists in the
1948 Wallace Progressive Party on the basis of policy were

for distinguishing

so tenuous as to be virtually worthless.
On the other hand, there were some organizational evidences that, as has been suggested, served a better means of
distinguishing between the Communists and their followers
and the moderates in the party. Thus the former were generally united in supporting and working for a narrow, re-

group with a hard core of support which could be
tightly organized and closely disciplined. The moderates, on
the other hand, believed in setting
up as broadly based an
organization as possible. To this a great mass of American
voters would be able to attach themselves
loosely, subject
stricted

to

little

discipline,

as

is

customary with American major

parties.

Despite early claims by A. B. Magil in the Communist
Masses that "Since we want a mass party and not a

New

we must operate through organizational forms that will
unite rather than divide the labor and
progressive movement,"

sect
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Communists and fellow travelers, once the Progressive
Party had been organized, apparently proceeded to operate
in given localities on an opposite
assumption. As noted, in
Colorado and New Mexico open rifts between the moderates
the

and the extreme

leftists

developed over this policy.

And

in

New York

the policy of exclusiveness was abetted
by the
adamant refusal of state ALP chairman Vito Marcantonio to

allow a "fifth" or Progressive Party line on the ballot. Moreover, scattered reports from local organizations with strong

Communist membership

indicated that similar tactics were

generally pursued by the "party-liners."
Opposition to these methods was voiced

by Wallace

at

various times, but he failed to take vigorous action to curb
the techniques of his more extreme followers. Consequently

mass action tactics, deliberate law violations to invite arrest,
and similar methods continued throughout the campaign.
They served in no small part to repel many prospective followers

who came

to fear a loss of "respectability" in third-

party participation.
Outside the realm of policy and organizational evidence,
there was little but hearsay, accusation (most of it undocu-

mented), and the admissions of self-confessed former Communists. Relatively little light was shed by these disclosures
on 1948 Communist Party policies, but some evidence was
thereby made available as to the earlier political
some of the party's leaders. Thus, Lee Pressman

affiliations

who

of

served

as secretary of the Progressive Platform Committee later revealed in 1950 testimony before the House Committee on
un-American Activities that at one time he had been a

Communist. Similarly, he claimed that John Abt, party counsel, had been a "member of a Communist group."
The attempt to identify Communists by means of their
"reputation and vocabulary" and their use of "Communist
tactics"

proved uniformly unrewarding to those who atmeans of examining third-party mem-

tempted to utilize such
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remarked that in all the meetings he
attended he had noted "no evidence of any Communist tactics, steamroller or otherwise." In his opinion there had in-

bers. Senator Taylor

stead been "complete freedom of discussion" and "scrupulous
adherence to the rules" of democratic procedure. Neverthe-

the fact that Communists were present was admitted
freely by all concerned. This being the case, what was the

less,

effect of their presence

on the Wallace Progressive Party?

What were the factional lines within the party?
At one pole were the extreme leftists, three
lated groups
party-liners

closely re-

admitted Communists, past and present; the

and fellow

travelers

who

failed to differ notice-

ably with the Communists as to either policy or principle;
and finally those non-Communists who, in the period under surveillance (1944-50), failed to take issue with the

Communists on policy, but whose underlying principles seemingly differed. Lee Pressman, Vito Marcantonio, and C. B.
"Beanie" Baldwin offered examples within the
party leadership of each of the three respective groups. It was to this
as a whole that Wallace later
applied the appellation,
the "Peekskill Boys," on the basis of their endorsement of the
mass action tactics similar to those employed in connection
with the Peekskill, New York meeting for
Paul Robeson

group

singer

which led to a

full-scale riot.

In the middle were grouped an
apparently large majority
of Progressive Party followers
the moderates.
Exemplified by both national candidates, these individuals were willing to accept Communist support, because they felt that it
was inconsistent, in the light of their ideals, to
oppose Redbaiting

by

others, yet attempt to read

Communists out of the

new party.
At the right were

arrayed those who, feeling that Communist support should have been disavowed in no uncertain
terms, yet were unwilling to adopt the
tactic of violent
attack on the Communists. This
would
have approved
group

ADA
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making the Progressives "non-Communist" rather than "antiCommunist.," excluding but not assailing the Reds. Most persons sharing this view had, like Max Lerner, completely
avoided the party, but others like Rexford Guy Tugwell joined

and stayed, if reluctantly, through the campaign. While few
in this group favored, as did Tugwell, the Marshall plan,
they were all agreed on the necessity for a third party in the
face of totally repugnant Truman-Dewey alternatives.
In the period following 1948, these groups tended to leave

the party in the order of their views from right to left. Most
of the rightists departed during or shortly after the campaign, accompanied by many of the moderates. And the
defection, so marked following election day,
a nearly complete walkout in the summer of
became
1948,
1950, with the policy rift over Korea and Wallace's depar-

moderate

ture.

Consequently, by the close of 1951 the few remaining

portions of the Wallace Progressive Party were composed
almost exclusively of the earlier extreme left group. These

were the ones who had favored a "narrow" organization; after
the Wallace break, they finally achieved this goal, with the
departure of almost everyone

else.

But while these may have been the facts with respect to
groupings within the party, they were ultimately far less important than the public image the stereotype projected by
press treatment of the issue. For what the puHk thinks is

more important than what is. And in 1948, 51 per
cent of the American public, in a poll conducted by the
American Institute of Public Opinion, "agreed that" the Wallace third party was Communist-dominated.
The tenor of the press portrayal was ffiustrated in many
publications, including the weekly news magazines. Journaloften far

ists

for Time, reporting the Philadelphia Convention in their
inimitable fashion, opined:

own
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Henry Wallace, the Iowa horticulturist emerged last
week as the centerpiece of U.S. Communism's most authentic-looking fagade. The fagade was Wallace's helterskelter following, assembled under careful Communist
supervision at a founding convention in Philadelphia and
brazenly labeled the Progressive Party.

A similar approach was employed by Newsweek:
The Communist

Party boasted that

it

had decided that

Wallace would run for the Presidency even before Wallace
did, and that Sen. Glen Taylor, the self-styled "Singing

Cowboy" from Idaho, would be his running mate. It had
done much to organize the party for them and even picked
the name.

The

position taken by these and other journals was that
the failure of Wallace to repudiate Communist support constituted

The

overwhelming evidence of Communist domination.

"No repudiation, therefore domination." Actually there were grounds for believing that even
had the third party denounced Communist support as strongly
as did Robert M. La Follette in 1924, large segments of the
conclusion was simple:

press

would have continued

to call

it

Communist-dominated,,

averring that the disavowal was merely camouflage. For all
during 1948 the ADA, despite the vigor of its anti-Communist
attacks, continued to be
tive

and irresponsible

branded as "pink" in both conservaIn short, a "status quo"
group

circles.

shortsightedly viewed all attacks upon its entrenched position as "Communist-inspired." The general effect of this
ap-

proach was noted by

sociologist C.

Wright Mills commenting
of Power:

on the labor picture in his The New Men

The

greatest success of the

Communist Party

in the

United States has been accomplished with the active aid
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and support of conservatives and reactionaries. Together
they have made the mass public think that "Communist"
is a synonym for "left" in general and "radical" in
particular.

In 1948 there were evidences of

this

same unwitting co-

both right and left extremists to impress upon
operation by
voter
the fact that the Wallace Progressive Party
the average
but
be
Communist. The candidate's own view
could
nothing

was that

this concerted attack indicated that the
press

was

"not after the Communists but after the whole Progressive
movement." Regardless of their motivation, these views and
their

"documentation" were much the same wherever found.

First

summarized by the

ADA in

mimeograph form, the op-

position "line" may be sketched as follows:
The idea for a third party originated at a meeting of the
Communist Party national board in 1946 a meeting whose

was variously described as West 12th Street, the
of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and "a mid-Manhattan

location

home

apartment near Bellevue Hospital." Unfortunately, such detailed (though conflicting) reports were not available for the
date of the meeting which was set at sometime in 1946. The
exact date, if provided, might have been significant, as will
be noted below.

At

this meeting,

so the version went, the decision

was

reached to form a third party for 1948 with Henry Wallace
at its head. This verdict was then communicated to the sev-

Communist-dominated unions of the CIO, ordering their
support for a third party. Following this, a group of progresall of which were subject to Communist
sive organizations
were directed to unite in the Communist-domidictation
nated PCA. The chief purpose of PCA was to be the building
of machinery and organization for a third party, without
eral

clearly revealing the intent.
Then, according to this

interpretation,

when

the time
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seemed propitious, the "heat" was turned on Wallace to
announce his candidacy. While "not a Communist himself,"
the former Vice President clearly became the tool of these
leftists when,
spurred on by their urgings, he announced his
intention to run for President on a third-party ticket. At the
same time he accepted, perhaps unwittingly, the entire pro-

gram of the Communist Party

in the United States as his own.

Third-party opponents also claimed that during the course
of 1948 the Communists used typical tactics
"going to meetings early, staying late"

to insure their control of local

Wallace groups and state parties. At the Philadelphia Convention, they ran roughshod over all opposition, forced acceptance of a platform virtually identical with their own, and
put through rules which would insure their control of party
organization in the future. Finally, according to these reports,
the Communists were quick to silence even the faint note of
protest emitted by a Vermont delegate hopeful enough to
bring to the convention floor an innocuous resolution

stating

that the party
platform was not to be construed as an endorsement of Soviet foreign policy.

In

according to this opposition view, Henry
Glen
Wallace,
Taylor, and the whole Progressive Party were
little more than muddle-headed
dupes of a Soviet plot organized through the Communist Party in the United States.
Unfortunately this view, while long on "interpretation,"
proved somewhat short of facts that would hold up under
brief, then,

investigation.

But what of the evidence supplied
by the Communists
themselves? Examination of their
writings makes it relatively
easy to plot their shifting course, but fails to shed much light
on the actual extent of their influence.
the Reds
Publicly,

claimed credit for participation in the
Progressive Party's formation, but disclaimed any intention of seeking a
"special
after the fact
position" within its ranks. They boasted
in
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Worker Magazine, July 25,

1948, that

The Communists had long known and stated publicly
new party was essential to America, if its people
were to move forward along the path of peace and security.
So it was that the Communists, armed with their Marxist
understanding of American history, renewed their traditional call for a new people's party at the time of Wallace's
ouster by Truman.
that a

fill

Discounting the inherent braggadocio and attempting to
in the important omissions, this was indeed a rather accu-

rate

resume of Communist action with respect to a third

party.

In 1944, as already indicated, the Communists had been one
of the firmest if weakest components of the vice-presidential
support for Henry A. Wallace at the Democratic National
Convention. At this time, it will be recalled, the Communist
Party in the United States, under the leadership of Eari
Browder, had been operating within the American two-party
system attempting to gain an influential position within the

Democratic Party. Ever since the attack by Nazi Germany cm
Soviet Russia in June, 1941, it had been vigorous in its support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
It should be noted, however, that this
position represented
the latest wartime reversal of a much older view of the Marx-

concerning American politics. The earlier policy, which
had enjoyed an off-again, on-again popularity in Communist ranks through the 1920's and early 1930's was that of

ists

the "popular front." As outlined by Georgi Dimitrov to an
assemblage of the Comintern in 1935:

The establishment of unity of action by all sections of
the working class, irrespective of their party or organiza-
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tional affiliation

working

class

is

necessary even before the majority of the
united in the struggle for the overthrow of

is

1
capitalism and the victory of the proletarian revolution.

In America, the popular front was to be advanced through
the medium of a new farmer-labor party which would challenge the inherently conservative position of both old major
had been shelved
parties. During World War n, this approach
in favor of accepting the Democratic Party, and trying to
influence its views from within. Consequently, when at the end

of the war, Earl Browder was ousted from his position as head
CPUSA, the party line seemed to revert to the earlier

of the

popular front orientation. As Robert Minor, writing in the
Daily Worker on the 1948 Communist Convention, re-

marked:

The

resolution [proposing

Communist support

for the

third party] gives a correct picture of the New Party movement as the beginning of a break up of the "Two-Party

System." This

is

a further development of the correction

made by our emergency convention

three years ago which
discarded one of the most dangerous mistakes we made

when we accepted the
made by Browder that

anti-Marxist theoretical proposition
the political struggles of the country
could be fought out within the two-party system.

Thus it seems clearly indicated that a 1945 meeting of the
party's national committee was responsible for resumption of
a policy calling for an attempt to break down the American
two-party system. The best

now

way

to achieve this, the

Commu-

was by introducing a third party with
both labor and farm support into the American political
scene. While this new party might not achieve immediate sucnists

1

believed,

Georgi Dimitrov, The United Front
Publishers Co., Inc., 1947), p. 29.

(New York:

International
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it still

might gain a balance-of-power position

in presidential elections comparable to that of the
Labor Party in
York State contests.

American

New

Nevertheless, there

was

little

evidence in party-sponsored
had been made that the

literature indicating that the decision

time was yet ripe for the actual formation of a third
party.

Eugene Dennis had remarked
Communists must proceed

in

February, 1946 that the

to lay the foundation now to establish in time for the 1948
elections a national third
a broad people's antiparty

monopoly,
it is

.... If possible and
toward
steps
forming a third party should

anti-imperialist party

preferable

be taken early in 1947. 2

But both the Daily Worker and New Masses had remained
reluctant to take up the cudgels, making
only infrequent references to a third party during the latter part of 1945 and the
eight months of 1946.

first

Yet during

were evidences of Communist
and of Communist tactics in organizations
not too far afield. One of the most significant was their operation within the American Veterans Committee. An article
concerned with this problem, "Why I Broke with the Communists," shed considerable light on CP organizational tactics.
Writing in Harper's, Julian H. Franklin described the operation of the Reds in forcing moderates and non-CommuHist
this period there

political activity

5

liberals

out of local

AVC chapters.

They said they were quite glad they were driving out
"the fascist opposition." They said they didn't care how
small
became as long as it remained ideologically

AVC

"Eugene Dennis, What America Faces (New York:
Publishers, 1946), pp. 37-38.

New

Century
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Rather a chapter of two members and a national
of 40,000 that would hew to the party line. "Then

correct.

AVC
when
"we

the depression comes," they predicted with relish,
will attract a vast following."

Comparison of these sentiments and techniques with later
reports from the Progressive Party indicates a striking similarand early 1946, there was no
ity of approach. Still, in 1945
board of strategy felt
positive indication that the Communist
the time yet ripe for a serious third-party attempt.
But, in September of 1946, with the delivery of Henry A.
Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech, came the overnight
shift to

a

new

more properly, the
with the belated observation of the

positive plan of action. Or,

transformation

came

Wallace speech on both Truman administration
and American press and public. It will be recalled that the

effect of the

Communists*

first

reaction to Wallace's remarks

had been one

of disapproval, or at best, of faint praise. It required several
days for the light to dawn that this event could be adapted
to their purposes, that it had elevated Henry A. Wallace into
a prominent position as potential leader of a new party. While
it

is

interesting to speculate

illumination,

F.

it is

on the sources of Communist

virtually impossible to pinpoint

them. Louis

Budenz

CP

in his Collier's article blithely ascribed the shift in
line to a Pravda dispatch of September 16 which re-

portedly supported Wallace. The fact of the matter was that
the shift in position of the CPUSA came in the Daily Worker

on September
(as

it

may

15. Hence,

if

the decision originated abroad
it was transmitted
by some

very well have done),

other and less public means.
Regardless of origins, the fact remains that the party line
did change, and Henry A. Wallace became the man to whom

Communists turned as the prospective leader of a new
party. Moreover the timetable was to be speeded up. Appearing in an article by A. B. Magil, published almost immediately

the
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after the shift in policy

the

new

October

8,

1946

in

New

Masses,

interpretation followed these lines:

The Wallace
tion with the

episode has widened popular dissatisfacparties. It has thereby provided an

two major

opportunity for accelerating a

political

realignment which,

under labor's leadership, can in the
post-election period
bring this simmering discontent to the point where it boils
up into a new vigorous people's party.

The

ALP ...

is

the

nucleus

monopoly party which on a

of

the

national scale

broad

still lies

anti-

in the

future.

Also establishing the party line for the 1946 election, the
went on to say, "To reject a Mead or Lehman because he doesn't talk like a Wallace is just as unrealistic as
to reject a Wallace because he doesn't talk like a WIBiam Z.
Foster." In other words, while Wallace
might be far from
article

the ideal party-line candidate, the Communists must be realistic and take advantage of the furor caused
by a speech
which they hadn't liked particularly. They immediately set
to work, as suggested, to build fires under the discontent

Party publications, not yet openly embarked on a third-partyin-1948 trend, began to throw broad hints in this direction,
with the emphasis on building a "coalition," a
"popular
front."

Henry Wallace [had] come to symbolize the fight
the
against
reactionary foreign policy of the Wall Streetcontrolled Republican Party which the Truman administration
"Since

made

own," according to Magi! one week later in
he
Masses,
might be accepted as the leader, "not that
the conference [of the Communist Party] committed itself to
his leadership or that its program was Identical with Ms."
This decision having been reached by the CP conference,
the party apparently then embarked upon the initial phases
[had]

New

its
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new

Conference of Progressives, held
The Communists, however, may
Chicago
said
to
have
dominated or even excessively inscarcely be

of their

tactics at the

in October, 1946.

at

assemblage, since its ranks included a far
greater representation of non-Communist liberal thought. Included in the Conference of Progressives were many individfluenced

this

uals later found in the ranks of the

cant leaders

ADA,

from American labor

as well as signifithe Political Action

Committee of the CIO and the Railway Brotherhoods. As
noted earlier, there was at this time substantial opposition on
the part of liberals of

hues to

all

many

aspects of both foreign

and domestic policies of the Truman administration.
It was
reported that the Communists were strongly represented at Chicago in such organizations as the NC-PAC and
the ICC-ASP. But objective criteria were lacking whereby
their actual influence in these
groups could be measured.
Subsequent developments failed to bear out the contention
these groups were nothing more than "Communist

that

fronts" as their opponents charged. When, shortly thereafter,
the NC-PAC and the ICC-ASP merged to form the Progres-

same problem carried over
any attempt to determine the exact extent of Communist
influence within the new
bbdy. Like its predecessors, the
PCA failed to bar Communists from membership as did its
sive Citizens of America, this

into

newly organized opponent, the
cepted

at face value the

munist control" dogma.

ADA.

This latter group ac-

"Communist presence, hence ComIt assailed non-Communist liberals

ADA

who

joined the PCA, ignoring the fact that
acceptance
of the Truman doctrine type of foreign
policy, even as modified by the Marshall
plan, left dissenters no place else to go.

Following the establishment of the PCA, the Communists
began, early in 1947, to work in earnest for a third party. It
soon became apparent, however, that they were moving away

from the broad people's
recently.

A

coalition of

narrowing influence

which they had spoken so
hold, and party

was taking
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spokesmen began to assail "the illusion that middle class
erals can be both the brains and
body of a broad

lib-

people's

movement. This illusion," so the new line ran according to
A. B. Magil in New Masses, January 14, 1947, "helped shipwreck the third party movements of the past and if allowed to
gain ascendance can have no happier results in the future. It
only the working class which
power of big business."

is

At

the

same

time, the

.

.

.

can challenge the

Communists were seemingly aware

that they could not rely solely upon those of socialistic
persuasion in "the political coalition that can become
and

should become by 1948

a

new

anti-fascist,

anti-monopoly

people's party." They entertained, according to the same
article, hopes of eventual conversion for these capitalistic infidels,

however, concluding that

One can be

critical

of Communists, as Communists are

of other progressives, and

still see that the two can
and must work together if reaction is to be defeated ....
In this fight the bonds that tie so many to faith in the capitalist
"promise" will loosen and the socialist truth will take
root in the minds of millions.

critical

By

the

summer

of 1947, the

Communists had become ab-

solutely convinced that the time for a third party was now at
hand. "When it is already so late, the new party that must

come cannot come too soon," said Magil on June 3 in the
same party organ. At the same time he more dearly indicated
some of their goals.
While [a new party] may not succeed in winning power
on its first try, [it] will nevertheless become a power capable of influencing whatever administration takes office and
in 1952.
capable, moreover, of achieving its highest goal
numa
substantial
is
5,000,000 votes to start with
very
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ber

.

.

enough

.

to

1948

be the balance of power in most na-

tional elections. [Italics supplied.]

Their decision finally having been made, the Communists
full attention to fomenting, as best they could,
action leading to a third party
trying to bring the discontent
of which they were aware "to a boil." The PCA, in which

turned their

they were permitted

to participate,

was one means of accom-

plishing their goal.

The exact

role of the

Communists in pushing the

PCA deci-

sion to support
new party
they exercised every possible means of enlisting support for
is difficult

a

to assess. Certainly

much of the
yet, in this formative stage,
the nonfrom
ranks
came
within
third-party pressure
Communist group. Testimony to this effect was given by a
the venture.

And

PCA

PCA

journalist who had opposed
Writing in PM, Albeit Deutsch

support for a third party.

commented:

PCA decision on the Wallace
was made by a group of sturdy

While I disagree with the
I

candidacy,

believe

it

Americans according to the dictates of their democratic
and patriotic consciences. To suggest that their decision
was made in Moscow is nothing less than irresponsible
balderdash.
I

am frankly dismayed by some of my shifty-eyed fellow-

liberals

who seem

without

first

unable to form a conclusive opinion
looking over their left shoulders to see what

the Communists

dutifully reading the Dally
should
they
oppose.
a cause seems right to [the true liberal], he does not

Worker to
If

find

think

.

.

.

what

discard it because others

may

follow the same path for

longer or shorter distances for their own reasons.

According to Wallace, non-Communist PCA leader Frank
Kingdon had "put more pressure on [him] to run than anyone
else." Nevertheless, when the decision was
finally reached,
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Kingdon conspicuously absented himself and in fact denounced the new party, in his New York Post column.

Who
record.

asked Henry Wallace to run? The answer is in the
The Communist Party, through William Z. Foster

and Eugene Dennis, were the first .... I was finally
convinced when the steamroller ran over me the night PCA
became the second organized group to demand the Wallace
candidacy.

According to Mrs. Elinor Gimbel, also a member of the PCA
Executive Board which made the decision, Kingdon submitted
a statement of his new position just prior to their meeting,
following which the sixty-odd members of the board voted,
with only three abstentions, to support the Wallace candidacy.

new

party had been launched, it became quite
Communists were participating fully in its ora place on the ballot, and in
ganization, its drives to obtain
Numerous
its
reports from moderate leaders atcampaign.

Once

the

apparent that

tested the fact that the extreme leftists, whether actual Communist Party members or not, were among those most willing
to get out and work for the Progressive Party, putting in
long hours for little or no compensation. Yet at this very time

Communists were working so vigorously in behalf of
the Wallace Progressive Party, there were significant longrange policy differences between them and the moderates.
Perhaps the most significant was the fundamental cleavage
over "progressive capitalism." Despite the fact that there was

that the

over

concept supported
open dispute during 1948
it was one to which no Marxist
the
by
presidential candidate,
could subscribe. As Adam Lapin wrote in the Communist

little

this

Masses and Mainstream, October, 1948:
.
free of the illusion
[The Progressive Party] is not .
that capitalism can somehow be made "progressive" and
subordinated to the interests of the people.
.
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Here

is

the measure of the difference between the Pro-

the Communists. It is a difference which
gressive party and
extends to some tactical questions, but even more to funda-

mental objectives. The Communists reject utterly the theory
of a "progressive capitalism."
Nevertheless, this fundamental difference of principle remained submerged in the short run of 1948. The general
most of all the similarity of
on immediate

agreement

policies,

views on foreign policy, meant that for

period at least,
and non-Communist were moving in the same

Communist
direction. With

the

Communists

this

willing to subordinate their
Party, narrow as it was, was

economic tenets, the Progressive
still broad enough to accommodate both groups. It should be
noted, however, that this era of agreement was to be relatively
short-lived. Those moderates who remained in the Progressive
soon found
Party after the disastrous 1948 election returns
differences increasingly difficult to resolve.
of
Early evidence of the growing rift came in September
1949 when, at a New York City Conference on the Bill of

Rights, Professor

Thomas

I.

Emerson

offered a resolution

favoring a pardon for a Trotskyite group convicted of violation of the same Smith Act under which the Communists'

own

leaders had been indicted. Opposition to the act

was

widespread in liberal circles, and party moderates, including
such leaders as Henry Wallace and Professors Frederick L.
Schuman and Harlow Shapley, felt that it should not be employed to suppress the civil rights of any group. On the other
hand, the extreme leftists opposed the pardon, feeling that a
selective application of the rights of free speech was desirable
to protect only Stalinists. Communist Benjamin Davis phrased
it

in

no uncertain terms according

public: "Free speech

is

to

not for those

Gus Tyler in New Rewho come among us as

disrupters."
Further indications of growing disunity

were observed

at
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the second national convention of the Progressives in February,

1950. Eventually, however, this assemblage
adopted a

position, accepting Wallace's lead to agree that
the foreign policies of both the United States and the Soviet
Union were subject to valid criticism. But the final split came

compromise

summer

of 1950, when the Progressive
Party failed to
Wallace's
accept
support of U.N. action against Red aggression in Korea. Here the Communist line could brook no comin the

promise. For the first time, the left wing in the third party
stood clearly apart on a matter of substantive policy. While
the Wallace position supporting American defense of Formosa

might have been open to non-Communist doubts, there were
few moderates who could go along with the refusal of the
extremists to support the United Nations action in Korea.

Party ranks, vitiated by continued failures which had discouraged most of the moderates, were now susceptible to
domination by the extremists. Wallace's position thus made
untenable, he withdrew from the party he had founded, accompanied shortly by most of the remaining non-leftist Progressives.

Not only had

the

Communists achieved

their nar-

row, ideologically correct organization, but in the process they
had also alienated virtually all the moderate elements which

had

earlier

been

willing to cooperate with them.

But what of the "Communist acceptance" stand taken by
various non-Communists in the Progressive Party's earlier
history?

What were

their views,

their reasons,

and

their

reasoning?
Factors both ideal and practical influenced the decision
of the moderates not to disavow Communist support. First, it

was, as Wallace observed, a matter of preserving one's
"fundamental integrity." While both he and Senator Taylor
that the Communists stay out of the
would have
preferred

felt
party, they

it

live
impossible to

up

to an ideal that op-
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tactics that smacked even
same thing. Any form of intolerance in an
organization based on the promotion of tolerance and understanding was to them both incongruous and deplorable. As
an official of the American Labor Party expressed it, there
could be no "loyalty test" for membership in the party.

posed Red-baiting by adopting
slightly of the

did not necessarily follow that adherence to
this ideal must automatically lead to Communist domination.

Moreover,

it

For, despite the stereotype of the Reds as political superMachiavellis, and their own claims to "superior understanding
of American history," the verdict of most who worked with

them was that they were, on the whole, "eager and willing but
lacking in political sense."
Party leaders were hopeful of creating a flood tide of majorand non-Communists
would swell new party ranks and completely dominate
it, submerging the Communist participants. As Rexford Guy
Tugwell commented in the Progressive, April, 1949:
party dissent

on

the part of moderates

that

If there

had been a

flood of Progressives [to the party]

dedicated where would the
Communists, about whom we hear so much, have been?
They would have been lost as they were always lost
energetic,

.

.

determined,

.

they tried to claim President Roosevelt .... The
reason Communist workers were so prominent to the Wal-

when
lace
it

campaign was

that the Progressives

out; wringing their hands;

As

it

were

.

.

.

sitting

and wailing.

turned out, the Communists, instead of being subsufficiently prominent, aided in no small part

merged, became

press dispatches concerning their prowess, to keep many
moderates away from the party. A spectral "Red domination"
became the bogey that had a greater influence on the destiny

by

of the Progressive Party than did the actual presence of the

Communist Party members.
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In this sense

it

to pursue a

proved unfortunate that Wallace did not

more vigorous

policy, completely disclaiming Communist support, or even, as Senator Taylor had done,
out to the Communists that their own long-run in-

see

fit

pointing
terests

would not be served by

his

program. Instead, the de-

fensive attitude, adopted in the face of constantly harrying
to be ineffective. Nor did the
press questioning, turned out
candidate inject himself sufficiently into the
presidential
domorganizational details of the party to avert Communist

ination in several localities. Admittedly, this would have
been difficult and might have deprived the Progressives of

some

of their most conscientious workers. Nevertheless, the

long-range effects of such a course would have proved benethe moderates
ficial
certainly in retaining the full support of

who had joined the party.

But, fuming from such speculation, what evaluation may be
made of the Communists* role in the crusade? What impact
did they have on policy, organization, personnel, and candidates of the Progressive Party?

In the realm of actual party formation, they undoubtedly
in getting the drive under way. But, notplayed an active part
the earliest exwithstanding the fact that they were among
a
constituted only
relatively small
ponents of the idea, they
in
an
with
early interest
segment of a broad liberal group
of
numbers
as increasing
action. It was
only
decided against this course of action
Progressives ultimately
that the Communists gained a more conspicuous position. At
no time in this formative period did they actually attain the

third-party

dominant position attributed them by the press.
It was Henry A. Wallace himself, rather than the Communists,

who

constituted the decisive factor in the determination

be a third Progressive Party. Had Wallace
not delivered his Madison Square Garden speech, with its

that there

was

to
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resultant repercussions, it seems hardly likely that the Communists would have united on a third-party drive as early as
mid-1947 or that they would even have entered the 1948

Wallace not eventually decided to run in December of 1947, it is even more doubtful that the Communists
could have agreed on any other national figure around whom

campaign.

Had

doubtful that
they might rally the discontented. It is equally
a course of action
they could have seriously considered such
had Wallace not decided as he did. Rather, the Communists

pursued an opportunistic course in attempting to employ Wallace for their

Nor does

own

it

particular purposes.
Communists exercised
likely that the

seem

any
on the decisions leading to Wallace's
Reds were not the instigators of the
1946 Madison Square Garden speech which they initially
found so distasteful. And while they contributed their voices

preponderant influence
activities. Certainly the

to the cries of "Wallace in '48," they formed but a small part
of a much vaster group non-Communists all which also

looked to the Wallace program of "Peace, Freedom and
Abundance." The audiences attracted by Wallace during his

"drummed
FCA-sponsored 1947 tour were much more than
left-wing demonstrations lacking in political significance,"
despite Carey McWilliams' label in the Nation. Admitting, as
seems proved, that the Communists were present en masse at

up

these meetings, whooping things up, there was also present
in far larger numbers a broad cross section of America
people

from

all

walks of

life

hopefully turning their faces to

new

answers to problems so long bungled by both traditional
parties.

Long after the campaign Wallace, realizing that he had
been moved by urgings less spontaneous than they had appeared at the time, still felt that his decision had been finally
swayed by real issues that could not have been answered, or
even compromised, within the framework of the two major
parties. It was his reluctant conclusion that the Truman ad-
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ministration could not have been forced to
budge an inch
upon the vital issues of foreign policy which led primarily
to the third-party decision. The
pressures exerted by labor

and progressive groups, and by friends and advisers,
especially Frank Kingdon and Beanie Baldwin, had been only
secondary in his decision. Personal antipathy toward the
President, said Wallace, had not entered into his decision. But
as non-Communist support for a third
party began to fade
in 1947, the Communists were
the
leaders in keeping
among
the facade of support intact.

They may not have built the
but they were persistent in
keeping the
candidate's attention focused on it.
Potemkin

village,

In terms of policy, there was

little

viable evidence of

Com-

munist influence actually resulting in basic shifts during 1948.
The original planks set forth by Wallace formed the platform
of the party adopted at its convention. "Peace,
progress and
became
Freedom
and
Abundance."
Re"Peace,
prosperity"
gardless of personality clashes (such as Marcantonio versus

Tugwell over Puerto Rico), minor semantic battles over
specific wording, and the omission of specific planning for
"progressive capitalism," there was

little

to indicate

Com-

munist dictation, or even domination, in the spelling out
of the Progressive Party's stand. Rather, 1948 was a period
during which Communists and non-Communists in tfae Wallace party could, without serious difference, advocate a single
program. The orbits of the two groups, divergent earlier and

the same plane for the campaign year.
Consequently, the greatest extent of Communist activity in
1948 was to be found not in policy but in the organizational

later, lay in

sphere of the Progressive Party. Extreme leftist victories resulted in the domination of several local groups. State organizations in

New York

and Colorado bore

tfae leftists*

stamp.

And Wallace's failure to intervene organizationally left Ms
New York headquarters subject to overly strong "party-liner"
influences.
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But perhaps the most significant conclusion concerning
the whole Communist issue was that reached by so many leaders
among them candidates Wallace and Taylor and Prowith apparent validity. These
fessors Tugwell and Emerson
moderates felt that the extent of Communist influence exwas prierted most particularly in the local organizations
of
non-Red-hued
marily the result of default. The failure
thus placing undue emprogressives to rally to the banners,
was the most significant
phasis upon the Communist role,
single factor.
Nor was there anything in the organizational structure of
that would have led to Comthe Wallace

Progressive Party

munist domination, had there been any sizable influx of
moderate support. Even as it was, domination by the extreme left did not occur, save in isolated instances, until 1950.
It was only then that the policies of a skeleton party, deciyears of continuing modercould be swerved from a strictly Wallace

mated by nearly two lean years
ate withdrawals

party

line.

then, the Wallace Progressive Party was Communistinfluenced but not Communist-dominated in the 1948 elecIf,

tion campaign,
its
it

what further conclusions may be drawn from

experiences? In attempting to make any over-all appraisal,
seems pertinent to recall the comments of Henry Wallace

new party must build upon a broad base if it is
to have any chance of success. It must be rooted in middleclass America rather than limited to any sharply defined or
himself that a

The experience of the 1948 party bore out
this view, yet at the same time it indicated the paradox
the two horns of the dilemma involved. The broad, amorphous group whose participation was vital to success failed
exclusive group.

to sense sufficient urgency or the imminence of any disaster
that would overcome their inherent inertia and bring them to

the point of action. On the other hand the narrow, rabid group
that sensed a need for action and responded to the Progres-
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sive Party, by its very response, and by Its vigorous action,
kept the others the moderates away.
In the light of Wallace's belated and futile attempts in

1950 to

finally rid the Progressive

Party of

its

Communist

more

decisive steps should have been
label,
taken in 1948. Substantiation is also lent this view by the
it is

clear that

conclusions of O. John Rogge in

New

Leaderf January 29,

1951, that

The

Progressive Party, by allowing a small organized
minority to have a voice in its councils, had too difficult a

time in trying to maintain

its

independence.

As Max Lerner had commented in PM there had been a
need for a non-Communist rather than an anti-Communist
a clear disavowal of both Communist support
party. With
and red-baiting, it might have been possible to temper some
of the hysteria of the times. Whlie it is unlikely that any
have ceased its
large segment of the American press would
attacks on the party as "Communistic," "radical,*' and "Reddominated," support from other sources might well have been
,

forthcoming.

Many

Liberals sincerely opposed the

Truman

like the
foreign policy and were unwilling to "go along,"
ADA, with what they considered a course toward war. Yet
the Communist bogey kept them from the new party.
And hi the final analysis, it was this Communist bogey,
rather than the Communist Party itself, that had the greater
influence on the destiny of the Wallace Progressive Party,

CHAPTER

"More Than a

12

Single

Campaign"

LONG BEFORE

election night brought the gloomy tidings of
defeat
to the camp of the Wallace Progressive
overwhelming
had
the
decision
Party,
already been made that this was not
to be a single-campaign party like so many minor contenders

of the past.

As

early as mid-September,

Henry A. Wallace

had

publicly declared that his party was "not going to die out
in 1948." In the final week of the fall campaign, the presi-

nominee had promised that this Progressive Party
and expand "until the war for peace and abundance is finally won." He continued, "We are not fighting
a single campaign. We have organized ourselves into a party
that will endure until the American
people control this land
dential

would

their

stay

work has

built."

And on

the eve of the election, the quasi-official party organ, the National Guardian, had pointed out editorially that
the "fight for peace" was more than a
battle, that
single

"the Progressive Parry, unlike the two old
organizations, had
its
sights fixed on Wednesday as well as Tuesday. 'First battle
in a long war'

was

the way Wallace put it."
when
Cabell Phillips, writing in the New
Consequently,
York Times some weeks after the election, remarked that

"the Gideon's Army that
Henry A. Wallace led through ten
months of spectacular campaigning is bivouacked
today on
the Plains of Indecision," he was
better
voicing
metaphor
than fact. The decision to continue the
"fight for

peace"
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after November 2, 1948, had
long since been reached. Nor
was there any apparent questioning of this decision. However,
Phillips was on much sounder ground when he observed:
It is widely
".
agreed that the Progressive Party will need
.

.

hidden springs of strength to survive as a factor four years, or
even two years hence." The final episodes of this particular
political saga

the "fight for peace"

were about to unroll.

last week of the
campaign, third-party manager
"Beanie"
B.
Baldwin had issued a summons to an immeC.

In the

diate post-election meeting of the party's National Committee
hi Chicago, saying, "the fight for peace and for an America

governed in the people's interest has just begun." It was intended that this conclave should plan both political activity
looking toward the 1949 state and municipal elections and a

program aimed at influencing the course of congressional action in the months ahead.
Assured of one senatorial seat (so they believed), the
Progressives had hoped also for a substantial House delega-

legislative

tion in the

coming

disappointment, as

Eighty-first

we have

Congress

a hope

doomed

to

seen, with the election of only

one third-party candidate, Vito Marcantonio.
Notwithstanding the party's repudiation at the polls, the
National Committee met as planned to see what could be sal-

vaged for the future. Presidential candidate Wallace made a
personal appearance to assure his associates of continued assistance, even to the point of again running for the Presidency
hi 1952 if that seemed "the best thing" for the party. Wallace promised:
I intend to continue to support the Progressive Party. I
don't know what form it will take. I will do anything that
will help. I feel that I

tively than in the past.

want to

fight

harder and more effec-
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On

the other hand, only a few weeks after the Chicago
Glen H. Taylor indimeeting, vice-presidential candidate
it was his "intention to quit
the party, not politics." And in a public statement Senator
Idaho as a Democrat
Taylor declared: "I was elected from

cated in a letter to Baldwin that

as one." Moreover, while he expressed a determination
on his attacks on American foreign policy at every
indicated that he would, as in the
opportunity, the Senator
with all the President's liberal
along
past, probably "go
And while his formal reconciliation with
domestic

and

sit

to carry

programs."

the erstwhile
delayed for nearly a year,
his
resumed
forward
time
from this
third-party nominee

President

Truman was

Democratic Party label.
While any precise numerical estimate is completely lacking,
there seems little doubt that many of the rank and file had,
with Senator Taylor, read the handwriting on the election
wall, and in the weeks immediately following the second of

November, moved

informally,

if

reluctantly,

toward the

re-

establishment of their major party ties. At the same time, however, segments of the right wing, as well as virtually the

wing of the Progressive Party offered renewed
of support in a series of state committee sessions
pledges
across the nation.

entire left

to meet at regular inmonths that followed. In the
on
course of these meetings various standing committees
civil liberties, housing, labor legislation, and
foreign policy,

The National Committee continued

tervals throughout the winter

were appointed to keep abreast of current happenplans were laid for the future; and continuing opposi-

the like

ings;
tion to the

Truman foreign policy was voiced.
in
Thus,
January, 1949 the Committee called upon President Truman to implement his statement that "peace is all

we want" by

concrete action. They urged that he meet the
Russian Premier personally to negotiate the differences separating the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and that he refuse to place the
United States in the North Atlantic Pact. This Progressive
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Party request for a top-level meeting received prominent
display in all the leading Moscow newspapers, and there were
indications that an American bid would be
favorably received
in the Kremlin itself.

President Truman's
reply to these unofficial advances was
characteristic of his previous comments on the
subject: "I
would be delighted to meet with Premier Stalin
time he

any

cares to

come

to Washington."
Negotiations leading to

NATO

continued unabated.
In response to queries by an American
newspaperman,
Premier Stalin replied that, on doctors' advice, he was unable to make sea or air
trips, but that he would be willing
to meet with the President at
any of five Soviet cities or in
Poland or Czechoslovakia. President Truman remained
adamant: "Washington and nowhere else not even Alaska."
And "nowhere" it remained.
To Secretary of State Dean Acheson's objections that these

Russian feelers were merely "political maneuvering" and that
the United States would not negotiate outside the United Nations, Wallace retorted:

was said

It

that

we

could not consider bypassing the

United Nations by engaging in peace talks with Russia.
This from a Government that has bypassed the United Nations with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Han and
is doing so again in
preparing a North Atlantic military
and
to
arm
Western
pact
Europe for war.
.

.

.

Section 33 of the charter

itself

specifically directs

that nations in a dispute threatening the peace shall
together to discuss and settle their differences.

meet

The rejection of the Stalin offer has been followed by a
new wave of hysteria against the so-called menace of
Communism.
In addition to voicing continued opposition to the cold
war, the Progressive Party also offered related proposals for

1948
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the solution of domestic problems. Their efforts to publicize
this aspect of their program were highlighted by the presentation of a Wallace "budget for abundance" as opposed to the

Truman "budget

for war."

The underlying premise

of

Wal-

lace's fiscal proposals was that slashing "cold war" expenditures of some 21.1 billions to 7.2 billions for "defense" would

make

for "better living"
possible to increase expenditures
atomic
energy for peace
housing, education, social security,
it

from 12.0 to 26.85

billions.

Moreover, the Wallace budget promised a "more equitable
distribution of the tax load"
outright exemptions for individuals in the lower income brackets (under $4,000 for a
family of four) and an increased burden on corporate incomes. While this budget had slim chances of adoption by a
its
presentation was designed to bring
the cold
graphically a more realistic idea of the cost of
in terms of services left unsupplied and the better living

Democratic Congress,

home
war

for all that might otherwise be had.

Throughout the spring of 1949 the Wallace Progressive
Party continued to make use of two of its proved devices of
the campaign a year earlier for propagandizing its position
congressional committee testimony and the national tour.
Thus in February, former presidential candidate Wallace
led off with testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
mittee opposing extension of the Marshall plan.

Com-

Wallace argued that the European recovery program had
failed in four
1.

main

points:

In the "barriers imposed" on trade between Eastern

and Western Europe.
2. In the lack of provision for
Europe's industrial capacity.
3.

a necessary increase in

In the "cold war drive" to rebuild

expense of Western European

allies.

Germany

at the
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4. In the "policy of cold war and the maintenance of
the colonial system" that are
"saddling Western Europe
with an intolerable burden of armament expenditures."

He

also concluded that the proposed North Atlantic Pact

would undoubtedly "provoke heavy counter measures" and
that in his opinion American policy was
demanding "unconditional surrender" on the part of Russia as the
price of
peace.

This attack on American foreign policy in general and the

Pact in particular continued in May before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Wallace again advancing as
alternative the points proposed a year earlier in his open letter
He continued to press for a Truman-Stalin meeting

to Stalin.

as the best possible method of initiating a new policy of
friendship toward Russia. At the conclusion of his testimony,
the following exchange occurred with Senator Brien Mc-

Mahon

(Democrat, Connecticut)

Senator

McMahon:

My

:

summary of what you have

really charged is that your country and my country is [sic]
in a gigantic conspiracy to make aggressive war upon the

Soviet Union.

Mr. Wallace:

We

are in very grave danger of getting into

that position. With the adoption of the Atlantic Pact we
would be in substantially that position. I do not use the

word "conspiracy" because that implies something subterranean. The pact is open. We are whipping up another holy
war against Russia.

Once again, as in 1948, this committee fonim produced
widespread publicity for the party's views, even though it
gained no better a press, nor even any marked abatement of
the smear tactics employed during the campaign. Thus C. P.
Trusell of the New York Times wrote of the hearings: "After
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several poses a photographer suggested that Mr. Wallace give
the closed fist salute of the Soviets. Mr. Wallace obliged."

While the Times two weeks

later publicly, if
inconspicuously,
for
this
misstatement of fact, other papers conapologized
tinued unimpeded in their presentations of the "fact" of

Communist domination

of Wallace's

mind and

A

party.

second substantial similarity to the spring campaign of
1948 was the nation-wide "peace tour" of the Progressives in
the spring of 1949. Focal point of this transcontinental
trip

was

their

vehement opposition to the proposed North Atlantic

Treaty.

The pact is proposed in the name of peace. In fact it
would lead to war. It is a flagrant violation of the charter
of the United Nations. It would replace the United Nations' concept of one world with two irreconcilable blocs
of nations.

The "peace

tour" was the Progressives'

this issue to the

method of taking
people of America. Planned along the basic

1948 campaign tours, this 1949 jaunt added an
international touch with the presence of members of two
European parliaments British Laborite H. Lester Hutchin-

lines of the

son and Italian leftwing Socialist Michelo Giua. Originally
had been planned that Pierre Cot from the French Chamber
of Deputies and Konni Zilliacus, like Hutchinson a
leftwing

it

M.P,, would also accompany the caravan. But the latter two
their entrance into the United States blocked
by a
of
both State and Justice departments which, for unruling

found

them "inadmissible."
questioned the wisdom of

disclosed reasons, labeled

The New York Times

this action

editorially:

The good words [about Communist Russia] and the bad
words [about the "Western Imperialists"] will be said,
any-
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how, by individuals who are Americans in the legal sense,
if not in other senses, and who cannot be excluded. No
further harm could have been done if they had been said
by Mr. Cot and Mr. Zilliacus.
Cot and Zilliacus were, quite naturally, enraged by this
open affront to legally elected members of the duly constituted parliamentary bodies of powers friendly to the United
States. The Briton, blaming the "outrage" on the "idiotic
arrogance of the State Department," was quoted in the Times
as saying:

The United

States claims to

be the savior of Western

democracy and civilization but the State Department deprives the American people of the right to hear both sides
and consider all the facts before making up its mind on
matters that are life and death issues for all of us.
Despite the exclusion of these two guest speakers, Wallace
embarked on his transcontinental peace tour with Hutchinson
and Giua. During a three-week visit to some fifteen cities,
the three presented their views to some 100,000 persons.

Reverting to the six points of his year-earlier open letter to
Stalin, the former Vice President offered Ms own plan as
a workable alternative to the North Atlantic Pact with "its
certainty of war."

To Wallace

As America becomes
lantic military pact,

be

there

was no doubt

that

the military arsenal for the At-

more and more

liberties

and

rights will

lost.

For every dollar spent for arms, for every dollar you lose
you lose its equivalent in human freedom.
Nobody gets the freedom, nobody gets the welfare and
the arms are a complete and utter waste.

in welfare,

The

reactionaries

know

that

if

the Administration wants
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an armed pact and an arms economy,

it

must demand the

right to control labor, the right to interfere with labor's
rights.

Under

the cloak of an anti-Communist crusade,

right that threatens our institutions

it is

the

and our most precious

liberties.

And

just as these

words of Wallace had a familiar ring to

them, so the techniques employed in the course of the "peace
tour" were similar to many utilized in 1948. As was the case

a year

earlier, this 1949 caravan was financed by the paid
admission-voluntary contribution method. However, with
audiences substantially smaller than during the presidential

year, their contributions were also markedly less. Whereas a
year earlier the pitch had usually opened with a call for

$1,000 contributions and had generally secured several of
that size, this year the starting
point was a more modest $100,
with relatively few donors at that level. Nevertheless, gross receipts from the fifteen-day tour totaled more than $150,000,
with an additional $25,000 realized from a
$50-a-plate dinner in New York and a $25-per-plate affair in Newark.

And

once again the same general staging technique was
preliminary speakers to "warm up" the audience;
Pitchman Gailmor again on hand to extract every possible
utilized

dollar; then the offstage voice, the

darkened

hall;

and

finally,

the spotlighted appearance of
Henry A. Wallace. While it
was Wallace's nominal task to introduce his foreign guests,
his address
actually remained the feature presentation of the
series of rallies, just as it had been a
earlier. However,

year

one marked difference stood out in
comparison with the 1948
mass meetings the general composition of the Wallace audiences. Whereas a year earlier
large numbers of teenagers had
been attracted by the third
candidate, this
party's presidential

year they were conspicuously missing. While numbers of

1'
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had
young people still attended, the average audience age
shifted upwards considerably.
And once again in 1949 the forces of intolerance were
abroad in the land. Dissent from the Truman-Vandenberg biwas more than ever before evidence
partisan foreign policy
was to be suppressed at
"un-American"
of
activity. Criticism
but
also
the North responded
the
Not
all costs.
South,
only
of
the
Bill
of
violations
to increasing
Rights. In one of the

more famous

cases, a Syracuse University student, Irving

member

Progressives, stood convicted
of disorderly conduct for having refused to heed a police
officer's request to cease his street corner attack on President

Feiner,

Truman

as a

of the

Young

"bum" and

the city's

mayor

as a

"champagne-

bum."
sipping
His conviction and

jail

sentence were upheld through the
by the Supreme Court, not-

courts of the state and ultimately

withstanding a bitter and eloquent dissent by Associate Justice Hugo Black, joined by his colleagues William O. Douglas
and Sherman Minton. "Even a partial abandonment . .
.

marks a dark day for
(340 U.S. 315).

civil liberties in

our nation," said Black

makes a mockery of the free speech
Amendments. The
a
end result ... is to approve
simple and readily available technique by which cities and states can with im.

.

.

this conviction

guarantees of the First and Fourteenth

punity subject

all

to the
speeches, political or otherwise,

of the local police
supervision and censorship
means
that as a practical matter
today's holding
.

.

.

.

.

.

minority speakers can be silenced in any city. Hereafter
the policeman's club can take heavy toll of a current
.

.

.

administration's public critics. Criticism of public officials
will be too dangerous for all but the most coura-

geous

....
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But while the Wallace "peace tour" influenced few minds
not already favorable, it did serve as a measure for continuing that party organization still operative across the nation.
and the substantial
Despite the dismal showing at the polls
defections of the post-election period, this spring tour indicated that it would be a grave mistake to count the Wallace

Progressive Party out as long as American foreign policy
remained in dispute, with "peace" a crucial issue. Moreover,
with an economic recession beginning, and unemployment
already becoming a serious problem in the "indicator" areas
of New England and upstate New York, it seemed as though
the Wallace crusade might be about to acquire new converts
from a source denied it by 1948's prosperity the ranks of the
domestically discontented.

But while the testimony and tours offered by the Wallace
Progressive Party in the spring of 1949 closely paralleled their
preconvention campaign of 1948, happenings within the
party fold were soon to blot out those rather feeble rays of
hope. First, came another crushing repudiation at the polls
in New York's Twentieth (Manhattan) Congressional District

Sol

where the

Bloom was

seat long occupied by the late Representative
at stake in a
year earlier
special election.

A

American Labor Party candidate had scored a sweeping
victory in a Bronx by-election, thus lending considerable
support to party morale. During this year and this district,
however, the special election proved a damaging blow to party
hopes of resurgence. Nor could Progressive spokesmen
the

ascribe the defeat to "ganging up" by the other three parties
involved (Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals), as had
been the case in several fall contests in the metropolitan area.

In a four-cornered race, a third-party candidate was the victor,

but he was the candidate of the Liberal and Four Freedoms
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. The ALP nominee, Dr.
parties
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Annette T. Rubinstein, ran a sorry
of the total vote. 1
per cent

And

last, garnering only 6.6
while the special conditions

had prevailed

to aid the Isaacson Bronx
victory a year
not
were
earlier
repeated in this predominantly Irish section,
still the returns were disappointing. For the third
party had

that

conducted a vigorous campaign, once more bringing in its
name speakers, Henry A. Wallace and Vito Marcantonio,
to assist the local candidates.

Disheartening as this defeat was, its damage to party hopes
was slight compared with that rendered by the growing inthat appeared as the summer of 1949 wore on. The
indications that all was not well within the ranks of the

ternal
first

rift

third party's remaining faithful
with the coolness reported in

had come

New

earlier in the

year

ALP

between
chairman, and Eugene

York's

Representative Vito Marcantonio, state
P. Connolly, New York County chairman. Warren

Moscow

was spokesreported in the New York Times that Connolly
man for a faction opposing the "continued open participation of

Communists on the ground

that the future of the

ALP

lies with the future of the national Progressive Party and that
the Communist bridge hurt the Wallace candidacy immeasurrumors indicated that
ably in the last national election." Other
and unnon-Communist
militant
O. John Rogge,
leftwing

ALP

contender for the office of surrogate in 1948
was up in arms following reports of "vote trading" in a
Harlem area that had aided the Marcantonio candidacy at
successful

his expense.
1

Results in the Twentieth District election,

May

17, 1949, as

pub-

York Times, May 18, 1949, were: Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr. (Four Freedoms-Liberal), 41,146, 50.9 per cent;
30.1 per cent;
Benjamin H. ShaUeck (Tammany Democrat), 24,352,
William H. Mclntyre (Republican), 10,026, 12.4 per cent; Annette
T. Rubinstein (American Labor Party), 5,348, 6.6 per cent. A year
earlier, Eugene P. Connolly, the American Labor Party candidate,
lished in the

New

had received 15,727 votes
Twentieth.

12.6 per cent of the total cast in the
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Nor was the Connolly-Marcantonio split long in reaching
the surface. With a
municipal election pending, and Marcantonio ready to run for
Mayor, Connolly refused to accept the
state chairman's
designee for the post of Borough President
of Manhattan. Instead he declared his own
candidacy for the
thus forcing the ALP into a primary battle. With
hopes
of victory in the fall election
already slim, it was clear that
the real issue at stake was future control of the Labor
office,

Party

New York County the immediate target. A
ensued. When the smoke had cleared
away fol-

organization, with
bitter battle

it was found that the Marcantonio slate had
triumphed by an overwhelming 5 to 1 margin.
The defeat at the polls of the moderate Connolly faction

lowing the September primary,

meant

that Vito Marcantonio

had now acquired virtually unNew York State branch of the

challenged control of the entire
third party.

This achievement was
closely followed by rumors of an
impending Wallace-Marcantonio split. The Congressman had

been urging the former presidential candidate to enter the
special

New York

State senatorial election occasioned for

November, 1949 by the resignation of old line New Deal
Senator Robert F. Wagner. It was
expected that Wallace, on
the basis of his 1948
Empire State showing, would run a
strong race, thus lending support to Marcantonio's mayoralty
candidacy. When Wallace declined repeated urgings that he
enter the lists, it seemed that he
might be on the verge of a
break with the party organization in New York.

These rumors were only partially controverted
by a speech
of the former Vice President at Madison
Garden on
Square

the third anniversary of his 1946 address in the same arena
that had marked the initiation of the
"fight for peace." In
his remarks Wallace indicated an
increasingly critical attitude toward the Soviet Union,
noting pointedly that the "welfare state" cannot be achieved
by "police state methods."
Moreover he warned, "... if
anyone should try to use
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the Progressive Party for Communist Party purposes, be
would be doing the cause of peace a distinct disservice.*'
Nevertheless, he promised his full support for Marcantonio in

the mayoralty race.

The

following night at a dinner in Wallace's honor, the

Congressman announced

that there

would be no

state ticket

because:

We deem it important to win the municipal election

.

.

.

such a victory can be achieved only by following a policy of
concentration which was adopted by the National Committee of the Progressive Party. For the ALP to nominate

would detract from the policy of concenwould
and
tration
only diffuse our strength from the important major objective of winning in the municipal cam[state candidates]

paign. [Italics supplied.]
this bow in the direction of the national party, it apthat
the Wallace-Marcantonio rift had been either
peared
originally exaggerated or presently healed. This view was

With

seemingly substantiated by a two-day meeting of the National
Committee in Cleveland at which "Marc" was named head
of a campaign committee to plan for the 1950 congressional
At the same time Wallace's views were embodied in a

races.

combat what the Progressives termed a
crisis."
economic
"growing
surface appearance of unity was not
this
Nevertheless

six-point plan to

heightened by the single speech during the course of the
mayoralty campaign which the former Vice Presi-

New York

dent delivered in behalf of

ALP

candidate Marcantooio.

While Wallace declared that "Marc" had advanced the cause
t4
of peace and understanding and disarmament in a war-mad
world" and bore the Progressive banner in this race, still the
fact that Wallace spoke only once in the course of the campaign seemed significant.
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However,

it

was only

after the

November

election in

which

Marcantonio, while running well for a minor-party candidate,
was defeated (receiving 356,423, or 13.8 per cent as against
Wallace's 423,424, 15.2 per cent in 1948) that a marked
coolness between Wallace and leftwing

officials of

the party

he had founded became quite apparent. Informed observers
including Helen Fuller of New Republic predicted a gradual
parting of the ways that would put an end to the party in less
than a year.
It was, however,
nearly a year before Wallace

finally

divulged some of the reasons for his growing dissatisfaction
during the summer and fall of 1949. First, he said, reports

reaching him throughout 1949 from Communist-dominated
Czechoslovakia had gradually convinced him that political
cooperation with the Communists was impossible. Second,
he had become increasingly aware that, with few exceptions,
it

was only the extreme

leftists

who had remained

fully active

in the Progressive Party following the 1948 election. Third,
he deplored the continuing and even increasing use by these

leftwing groups of tactics that tended to drive

groups on whose support Wallace

felt

away the very
a lasting party must be

constructed.

The Peekskill incidents involving Paul Robeson were typical of the sort of activity which, in his view, served to
permanently alienate large segments of "Protestant middle class
America" which he had hoped to attract to his Progressive
Party. These Peekskill events began in August, 1949 when
a group of veterans' organizations in that Hudson
Valley
undertook to prevent a scheduled open-air concert
by
Negro baritone Paul Robeson for the benefit of the Civil
city

Rights Congress (a group listed as "subversive" by the Department of Justice). When the veterans "paraded" in mass

formation back and forth in front of the park entrance to
prevent the Robeson audience from entering or leaving, a
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riot
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occurred

injured.
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were overturned and several people

The concert was

called

off.

In the words of Milton Flynt, commander of Peekskill Post
274 of the American Legion, as quoted in the New York

Times:
concert
objective was to prevent the Paul Robeson
think
that
was
reached.
our
and I
hapAnything
objective
was dispersed was
pened after the organized demonstration

Our

up to
blamed on the

the individual citizens and should not be

entirely

patriotic organizations.

This rather warped view of the proper function of a
assailed in the
organization was almost universally

patriotic
days after the incident

both by national leaders of the

veterans' groups involved

and by

tecting the rights of

even the most detested

all

citizens interested in pro-

and peaceful expression of their views.
As the New York Times commented

Sympathy

for Paul

Robeson and

to a full

editorially:

his followers, after their

near Peekskill last Sunday was not ininterrupted concert
to mobilize "20,000 strong" this
threat
their
creased by
for the anti-Coma
Sunday and their protest against permit
or
another
munist veterans to stage
parade. But sympathy
Mr.
case,
the
with
do
to
lack of sympathy has nothing

Robeson has a
sing and,

if

his followers peaceably,
right to assemble

he wants, make a speech

The

truth

is,

threatened except when those
"hateful" to the majority.

Not content with

.

.

.

of course, that civil rights are rarely

who

claim them hold views

similar verdicts indicating wide disap-

proval of the veterans' actions, Robeson, supported by

much
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of the

left

wing of the

concert would be held

Sunday with

his

own

groups replied in kind

New York
that he

City ALP, vowed that the
would be back the following

protection. The Peekskill veterans'
that they, too, would be back. With

the stage seemingly set for a battle royal, Governor Thomas
E. Dewey ordered all available state police to the scene.

Local poHce officers from the near-by communities were deputized into a total force of nearly one thousand.
This mobilization proved adequate to keep the groups
some 15,000 persons Robeson-ites, Communists,

apart as

ALP

members, Wallace-ites, and

liberals

merely interested in

personally protesting against suppression of free speech
filed into place. The concert
proceeded with only a few minor
disturbances.

Once

the performance

ended, however, the

police force proved insufficient to patrol the roads leading
from the grounds. Mass stoning began as the audience departed, bus and auto

windows were shattered, and a total of
145 persons (according to impartial reports) were injured,

several seriously.

Widespread protests by such groups as the American Civil
Union against the local officials' handling of both
policing and prosecution led to an eventual order for a grand
jury probe by Governor Dewey. The report filed by a

Liberties

Westchester County "blue ribbon" group the following year
concerned itself primarily with what it felt was a carefully

planned Communist use of Westchester as a proving ground
for mass

mobilization tactics.

Moreover

it

attacked the

ACLU
had

for an earlier report in which this
nonpartisan body
ascribed the riot to local anti-Negro and anti-Semitic

sentiment as well as to anti-Communist
animosity, and in
which it had charged that local and county police "permitted
the assault upon the Robeson
insupporters." More
objective

quiry indicated a clear-cut violation of civil liberties on the
first occasion
by the veterans' groups alone, but a substantial
contribution to the second riot

by the

attitude

and conduct
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of the Robeson-ites. Despite the complete legality of their assemblage, their "we dare you" approach, when coupled to
the "you're on" response of the veterans had led to the sec-

ond bloody affray.
While Wallace publicly deplored violence of

the sort ex-

hibited here, resulting in restrictions of freedom of speech
and assembly, he later privately criticized the intemperate

speeches and actions on the part of his more extreme followers calculated to hurl a virtual challenge to interference

He

was particularly critical of threats such as
that voiced by Robeson that his group would, if denied adeand violence.

quate police protection, take the law into its own hands.
At the same time the Peekskill violence was erupting in

New

York, there was evidence elsewhere of a growing rift
between the moderates and the extreme leftists of the Proand gubergressive Party. In New Jersey, state party leader
natorial candidate

James Imbrie

flatly

refused to accept the

New Jersey Communist Party in Ms
campaign. In Washington, Senator Glen H. Taylor's complete
return to the Democratic Party was heralded by a White
House conference with President Truman. Indicating that his
views on administration foreign policy had not changed, the
Senator commented, according to the New York Times:
proffered support of the

wish I could go along with the President [cm foreign
as well as on domestic policy]. It would be much more
it out of
my head that we cao't get
pleasant. I can't get
I

The Presialong with the Russians and make agreements.
a
dent believes in tough foreign policy.
of 1949, there were
Coupled with these various incidents
that
in
1950
other indications early
Henry A. Wallace was on
the verge of a complete break with his Progressive Party. IB
both speeches and committee testimony it seemed that

Wallace was adopting a position that was primarily
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vidualistic, rather than reflective of a party stand. Thus, on
the very day that a party program looking forward to the
1950 elections was being issued from the National Committee

in the name of
Secretary C. B. Baldwin (previous reports
had been in Wallace's name), the erstwhile presidential nominee was delivering an address to a church group in which,
completely ignoring party affairs, he dealt with the much
broader over-all problem of the need for an
understanding
between communism on the one hand, and capitalism and
Christianity on the other.

Shortly thereafter the former Vice President voluntarily
appeared before the House Committee on un-American Ac-

defend his personal position and reputation against
hurled
that he had been
charges
responsible for wartime
of
uranium
to
Russia.
shipments
Regardless of his justification

tivities to

and motivation

in this matter,

it

was rather unique for the

spokesman to be appearing in such a role. For
this marked the first time since the
inception of the "fight
for peace" that Wallace had utilized
congressional
third-party

testimony

method of personal defense against the unrelenting attacks on him rather than as a national forum for his
party's
as a

views.

In the face of these internal difficulties a second national
convention was called to Chicago in
February, 1950 by the
National Committee of the Progressive
Party to adopt a comprehensive program and a plan of action for the coming fall
congressional elections. Most observers, however, expected
that the
assemblage would develop into a final showdown

between the leftwing and the
remaining rightwing elements
in the party, with Wallace's continued
membership and leadership at stake.

Some 1,200
ruary 24

in the

delegates

from

thirty-five states

gathered Feb-

drafty expanse of Lakeland Auditorium. The
duel
anticipated
began at once as Wallace opened proceed-
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an address reported by W. H. Lawrence of the New
York Times as an "attempt to remove the Communist label

ings with

from the Progressive Party."

He

proceeded to

assail

"with

the foreign policies of both the United States
equal fervor"
and the Soviet Union, which he claimed, "stand out as the big
brutes of the world."

Each in its own eyes rests on high moral principles
but each in the eyes of other nations is guided by force
and force alone.
Indicating that he was not urging a purge of party ranks
"because of past or present labels," Wallace said flatly that
the third party couldn't tolerate "organized factions or
in the party
groups" within its ranks, and that Communists
couldn't be permitted to place first emphasis on any allemust convince the people, said the
giance to Moscow. We

former Vice President, that

We

are fighting for peace, not because any foreign power
wants us to fight for peace, but because we understand
the deep needs of the American people and the world.
Our principles are vastly different from those of the

Communist Party. We do not believe in the one-party system of government for the United States. Our philosophy is
not based upon the principles of Marxism or Leninism. Our
is based upon reform by constitutional and demo-

program

cratic processes.

We

believe in progressive capitalism not

socialism.

The

Progressive Party stands for

civil liberties

Civil liberties, like peace, are indivisible.
liberties in

Eastern Europe, but

we

recognize that except

in the case of Czechoslovakia there has been
tradition

on which

no democratic

to build.

We

their party; we have ours.
Communists that peace with Russia is

The Communists have
agree with the

for all

We believe in civil
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We

but that doesn't make us Communists.
agree
possible
with the Democrats and Republicans that capitalism can

be made to work

but that doesn't

make us Democrats

or

Republicans.
to keep America
Offering a ten-point program designed

from

"falling into

monopoly fascism, war and communism,"

the former presidential candidate called upon the party to
abandon its present "narrow range of support" and to become "a new broader forward-looking party." Having thus
the assembled delegates, Walplaced the issue squarely before
lace departed for Des Moines, Iowa, to await the verdict of
the convention in its remaining sessions.
The following day a protracted floor fight ensued over the

The battle between
proposed Wallace planks on the Soviet.
left- and rightwing groups ended only when it was announced
Vito Marcantonio was in agreement with
that
Representative

Wallace on the issue. With the left whig thus brought into
line, the two camps were apparently reconciled, and the following statement was written into the 1950 Progressive platform:
Progressive Party recognizes that while the United
and the Soviet Union have both made mistakes in
foreign policy, these two great countries can rise above

The

States

their respective shortcomings, to work together fruitfully
for international peace and cooperation.

We
want

are not apologists for Russia, but in so saying, we
understood that our supreme objective is one world

it

an understandpeace, and to that end it is essential that
and the Soviet
States
between
the
United
be
reached
ing
at

Union.
This language seemed to temper considerably the more
vigorous tone employed by Wallace in his address. Nevertheless, he indicated from Des Moines that the platform was
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"generally satisfactory" to him and substantially in accord
with his demands.
In addition to these foreign policy pledges, the Progres-

1950 platform reiterated the domestic planks adopted
1948 convention. As for the strategy to be employed in
fall campaign, the party indicated that it would concen-

sives'

at the

the

trate

"in

parties

selected areas where the candidates of the old

offer the voters

no

real choice

and where a victory or
will help unite and

balance-of-power vote for our candidates
strengthen the Progressive forces."

By comparison with the
delphia in the summer of

first

national convention at Phila-

1948, this Chicago assemblage in

mid-winter 1950 clearly indicated the state to which the
had been reduced in the intervening two
party's fortunes

some three thousand exuberant singing
from
forty-seven states, there were less than half
delegates
that number, representing thirty-five states, at Chicago. Instead of the buoyant enthusiasm of two years earlier, hanging over their heads was a pall produced by their failures and
by the basic disagreement in their ranks. Whereas in 1948
non-Communists and Communists alike had seemed in basic
agreement on most major points of policy, this time evidences
of a growing rift were termed an "uneasy truce" between right
and left; this was to later prove a short-lived attempt at final

years. Instead of

reconciliation.
at Philadelphia had
unions, at Chicago it had

While labor representation
to the leftwing CIO
the vanishing point. Gone

been limited
dwindled to

from the chair was Albert

J. Fitz-

who had served
gerald, United Electrical Workers' president
as permanent chairman at Philadelphia. And gone from the
were the members of his once third largest CIO union.
For the UE itself had been torn asunder in the intervening
unions and leaders
period by the CIO's "purge" of leftwing
who had violated national policy to support Henry A, Walfloor

lace in 1948.

But, while this second national convention of the Progres-

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948

302

and strains that had
clearly the stresses
a still substantial
was
there
also indicated that

sive Party

showed

developed,

it

structure available for future campaigns. After all, this was
not a presidential year, a national party in an off-year was a

and the actual elecnovelty on the American political scene,
future.
tion date was some nine months in the
Consequently

was hardly to be expected that interest would be at the
same fever pitch earlier reached in Philadelphia. Time
alone would determine whether this was the first step in the
it

in a gradual departy's fight back, or merely another stage
cline.

Despite the appearance of unity attained at Chicago, events
during the early part of 1950 indicated a continuing coolness
between Henry A. Wallace and the party he had founded.

While the former Vice President continued to call for a
Truman-Stalin meeting in the interests of world peace, and
while he continued to press for such measures as an International Development Corporation to invest in the "basic
economy of the underdeveloped and over-crowded areas of

the world for the specific purpose of increasing world output,
stimulating world trade, and satisfying human need," his
addresses were becoming more and more expressions of individual position rather than party pronouncements.
In fact, portions of one radio address indicated a virtual

abandonment of the party
upon the American people
clubs

...

States

by

organization, as Wallace called
to

form "Progressive Capitalism

for the purpose of saving capitalism in the United
making it serve the people rather than exploit them."

Moreover, while the third party once again resorted to congressional committee testimony for publicity purposes as it
had in 1948 and 1949, it no longer presented the former Vice
President as

its

spokesman. Hearings of the House Committee

on un-American

Activities considering the

proposed

Wood
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and Nixon bills (whose features were later embodied in the
McCarran Act) saw Progressive Party opposition led by
Professor Thomas I. Emerson of the Yale Law School.
Meanwhile, from New York came word that Wallace had
once again declined to become an ALP nominee in a state
this time for the governorship of the
Empire State
but that nevertheless the party was planning to run a gubernatorial candidate to maintain its legal status. Thus, as late as
June, 1950, it seemed that there was little prospect of a clean

contest

break between Wallace and his Progressive Party. Rather

seemed that

their association

it

would weaken gradually through

no clear point of separation.
All this changed overnight with the invasion of the Republic

the course of time, with

of (South) Korea by North Korean Communist troops and
the decision of President Truman, quickly backed by the
U.N.'s Russian-less Security Council, to oppose the aggression
with armed force. The National Committee of the Progressive

New York

its
policy toward the
reached
the
Committee
objections,
the decision to press for the admission of Red China to the
United Nations and the return of the Soviet Union to the

Party met in
situation.

to consider

Over Wallace's

the conflict
Security Council as prerequisites for ending

Their conclusion was:

With the

effectiveness of the United Nations restored

the
through the admission of the government of China and
to the council table,
Union
of
the
Soviet
return
consequent
the Security Council will be in a position to take measures
to preserve the peace.

Meanwhile, Wallace had been in touch with Secretary Genbeen given
Trygve Lie of the United Nations and had
access to U.N. reports coming in from the thirty-eighth parallel. There was no longer any doubt in his mind as to the
eral

nature of the conflict or Soviet intentions.

When the Commit-

Wallace: Quixotic Crusade

304
tee refused to modify

1948

statement in line with his views, the

its

former presidential candidate refused to go along, countering
with a public statement of position.

want to make it clear that when Russia, the United
States and the United Nations appeal to force, I am on
the side of the United States and the United Nations. Unhave prevented the attack by
doubtedly the Russians could
the North Koreans and undoubtedly they could stop the
I

attack any time they wish.
I hold no brief for the past actions of either the United
States or Russia but

when my country

United Nations sanctions that war,
country and the United Nations.

I

is

at

am on

war and the

the side of

my

But while declaring his support of the American-United
Nations position, the former Vice President at the same time
warned:

The United

States will fight a losing battle in

Asia as

based on exorlong as she stands behind feudal regimes
bitant charges of land lords and money lords. Russia is

bomb as long as she
using a mightier power than the atom
to get out from under their ancient agthe
helps
people
But we

in the

United States have a

still
mightier
for the people. I refer to our
power
modern technology and our huge reserves of capital, when
and if applied to solving the problems of poverty and

gressors.

if

we

will only

use

it

hunger.

For the first time in its brief history the Progressive Party
was faced with a substantive difference over policy. For the
first time it became possible to single out those third-party
members willing to follow the Russian-inspired decision for
war and against the United Nations rather than continue to
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back the Wallace program for peace and support of the United
Nations. For the first time since the overnight reversal of the
Communist Party line with the 1941 German invasion of
Russia, it became possible to separate American Communists
and pro-Communists from non-Communist dissenters and

on a definite policy basis.
that he would wait for rank-and-file
indicated
Wallace
supto
develop within party ranks. Should this
port of his position
anti-war elements

fail to materialize,

thus leaving the National Committee deci-

sion as the official policy of the

Progressive Party, he would

Opposing camps were quick to
respond. The Communist Party press turned on the man who
had been its darling since September 15, 1946, and assailed
him in no uncertain terms. Editorialized the Dally Worker:
resign as the party's leader.

The thinking and policies which dragged Wallace into
the position supporting an aggressive colonial war were
indicated when he attacked the Communists some time ago
and sought to equate Soviet and Wall Street

policies.

When

Stalin accepted Wallace's bid for negotiations
with the United States, Wallace was denounced by the Wall
Street buccaneers

vilified

and the cold warriors of Washington for

Now

Wallace has joined these same forces who
and traduced him throughout the period of the cold

his pains.

war.

On the

other hand, non-Communist leaders of the Progres-

Both O. John Rogge
and James Waterman Wise of New York announced their
agreement with his stand as did James Stewart Martin and
Dr. John E. T. Camper in Maryland. Professor Thomas I.
Emerson of Connecticut, who had cast one of the two proWallace votes in the National Committee, announced that
he was in wholehearted agreement with the former Vice
President on Korea, even though he was unable to join him
sive Party rallied to Wallace's support.
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in support of a "status quo" neutralization of

American naval

Formosa by

forces.

In the course of the following weeks, the mail reaching
Wallace indicated a substantial majority of the party rank and
file in favor of the
position he had adopted and in opposition
to the National Committee. Despite this, most of the state
party committees endorsed the national party stand. In Con-

necticut a two-day convention of one hundred delegates
adopted a resolution condemning Wallace for his support of

the United Nations action. In Maryland, announcement of a
similar state party stand came from executive secretary Harold

Buchman,

man

rather than from chairman

Martin.

Buchman was quoted

Camper

or vice chair-

in the Baltimore

Sun

as

saying of Wallace:
I feel

he made a valuable contribution to the subject of

peace [before

his stand

on the Korean

I regret his failure to
agree

actually a

compromise of

all

crisis].

with the resolution which

is

the divergent positions in the

Progressive Party.
I hope the course of events will convince him of the correctness of the stand of the majority.

In

New York,

zation,

now

the third party's most
important state organifirmly in the hands of Representative Vito Marc-

antonio, censured Wallace. But signs of dissension were clear
as former Representative Leo Isaacson announced that he

would accept the ALP gubernatorial nomination tendered
him only if he would be assured of Wallace's support. On the
West Coast, 150 delegates to an Independent Progressive
Party state convention in Sacramento tried to straddle the
issue, adopting what the New York Times called a "conspicuously guarded stand."
But this was not an issue that could be straddled.

were drawn. Convinced that the

still

The

lines

active party officials
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a viewpoint originating in the Kremlin rather
represented
the
than among
party's followers, Henry A. Wallace decided
final
break. As he remarked later, he could see
the
now on
of his associates placed Moscow ahead of the
United Nations, and that others whom he felt were clearly
non-Communist had been in association with the "partyliners" so long they seemed to have soaked up similar views.

that

many

In a two-paragraph note to party secretary C. B. Baldwin,
so long his personal associate, Wallace revealed his decision.

In view of the actions recently taken by the national
committee of the Progressive Party and the various state
committees, I am convinced I can more effectively serve
the cause of peace by resigning from the national committee

and the executive committee

of the Progressive Party.
letter as my formal resigthis
take
You will, therefore,
nation from the party.

In a later message, prepared for Pathe Newsreel, Wallace

expanded somewhat on

this brief note.

from the Progressive Party because I felt the
the United States and the United Naparty should support
war.
tions in the Korean
My mail convinces me that fully
of
the party is with me but I also
file
half of the rank and
know that the top leadership is almost 100 per cent against
me. Therefore I could no longer serve the cause of peace
It had become clear to me
through the Progressive Party.
States and the United
United
the
for
that victory in Korea
the road
first
essential
Nations was the absolutely
step on
I resigned

in the long run is far more
we fight and after we win
while
both
important is planning
Asia. Only through
the
of
to gain the friendship
people of
we
can
and
Asiatic friendship
prevent successcooperation

to peace.

ful

The second step which

Russian aggression. The

common man

is

on the march
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It is our job to
help that march to exand
enrich
human
values, not to destroy them. In
pand
action this means a program of economic help to a united
Korea by the UN after the war stops. We can and must do
all

over the world.

a better job than Russia in helping the common man to
help himself all over the world. This is the only possible
road to safety for the United States, the United Nations,
for your children and my children. I still
hope Russia will
cooperate with us through the United Nations to help the
march of the common man to become constructive not
destructive.

But the

first brief notice had served as death warrant for
whose cause he had served ever since he had announced its formation on December 29, 1947. For without
the man around whom the "fight for
peace" had centered,
around whose views workers of both right and left
wings
had been hitherto able to rally, the Progressive Party was obviously doomed.

the party

already depleted ranks were immediately subjected to a
that left them bare of
virtually all except the
disciplined "party-liners." From all across the nation, those
Its

mass exodus

non-Communist

liberals

still

their resignations. Professor

in the party

Thomas

began announcing

Emerson had already,
on August 3, taken his departure. With the Wallace announcement, countless others Martin and Camper in Maryland, Corliss Lamont in New York, and
practically all the
non-Communist name figures followed suit. Admitted former Communist Lee Pressman, accused
in
by the
I.

press

1948 of leading the "left-wing,
pro-Communist policies" of
the party, announced that he was
resigning from the ALP beits
policies now reflected those of the Communist Party.
The consensus of opinion was that the
party had been so
weakened by the constant defections ever since 1948 that it
no longer possessed an organization whose control was worth

cause
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The Communists, pro-Communists, and otter
"party-liners" who remained in the no-longer-Wallace Pro-

contesting.

gressive Party were left to pluck its bones at will.
Only in New York, where the ALP still possessed a wellgrounded firmly established ward and precinct organization,
was there disagreement with this view. O. John Rogge, who

had previously taken such a firm stand in support of Wallace's
policy position, announced that he thought Wallace was making an error in leaving rather than pressing for the adoption of
his views within the party. Rogge was confident that with the
former presidential candidate as a rallying point for the
weakened forces of the right it would still be possible to take
over from the extreme leftists. Former Representative Leo
Isaacson indicated that he, too, while agreeing with the Wallace policy views, would not resign from the party, but would
continue to press from within for modification of

its attitude.

Those who supported this Rogge-Isaacson position soon
found just how hopeless was their task. At a sparsely-attended
National Committee meeting the following month in Chicago,
Rogge saw his call for a special national convention to review
the party's position on foreign policy defeated by a decisive
41 to 2 vote.

It

thus

became

evident that the scattered remains of the

in the hands of the extreme
third-party venture were at last
the
deathbed
leftists. On its
organization had finally sucalmost
to
their
cumbed
complete control; it had been "nar-

rowed" in accordance with their earlier hopes to the point
where they were clearly supreme. But theirs was the control
and the supremacy of a party that no longer boasted Henry
A. Wallace, former Vice President of the United States, as
its leader; of a party that no longer could claim spiritual
with American Progressives of the past. With Wallace
affinity

elements gone, the Wallace
gone, with the native Progressive
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Progressive Party had faded from the American political
scene, leaving behind only a crimson shadow.
Where once it had stood proudly on the ballots of forty-

now only scattered remnants, either captive of or
addicted
to a Communist Party line (despite an occaclearly
five states,

sional remaining non-Communist leader) were visible. Such
was the case in California, in Connecticut, in Maryland, and
in a few other states. Elsewhere the third party had vanished,
leaving hardly a trace. Only in New York where the American Labor Party had preceded the Wallace Progressive Party
by some eleven years were there indications that the rightwing elements still fought on within the party challenging
the increasing one-man control of Vito Marcantonio and his

fellows of the farthest

left.

And

even in the Empire State, the "triumph" of the extreme leftists was to prove both hollow and short-lived. Shorn
of the support of Henry Wallace and many of the moderates, the party's 1950 gubernatorial candidate, John T. Mc-

Manus, received only a little more than 200,000 votes, in
more than half a million received by Wallace
two years earlier. And in this same election, the "unbeatable""
Marcantonio came to the end of the congressional trail io

contrast to the

his

own

date,

Eighteenth District, falling before a coalition candi-

James G. Donovan, backed by Democrats, Republicans^

and Liberals.
Within half a dozen years both Marcantonio and the state
but not before he
party he had helped found would be dead
too had ultimately come to the
of
the
parting
ways with the
Communists in the party's ranks. In 1949 with "Marc" as its
mayoralty candidate, and Wallace still in the fold, the ALP
had polled more than 350,000 in New York City. Four
years

later with Clifford T.

same post,
it could do no better than 54,372. A
day later, "Marc" resigned as state chairman, blasting the Communists for their

McAvoy

as candidate for the
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Single

Mayor Robert Wagner instead of the
and prophesying:

support of
inee,

The

ALP

will

ALP

nom-

become more and more a pressure group
It will become more and more a

with the issue unresolved.

mimeograph machine
it is

is

rather than a political party. This role

inherent in the present house divided

inescapable,
condition of our party.

clearly on the wall, and the 1954 gubercampaign wrote "finis" to the history of the American Labor Party as a legal political entity in the state. Its
candidate, once again John T, McManus, this time received

The handwriting was
natorial

not up to the legal

only 46,886 votes

for retention of the party

name and

minimum

of 50,000

place on the ballot But

Vito Marcantonio had not survived to see his party succumb,
for in August, at the age of fifty-one, he had passed away.

ALP

was delayed nearly two years, but in
J, Hawfey annoirnced its
its decline to the cold war and to
ascribing

Interment of the

state

October, 1956,
final dissolution

chairman Peter

the loss of labor support. Significantly, however, the Communist Party in the United States had decided a month earlier

on a new "party line" to renew its independent fight OB the
"too much reliance" oo
grounds that it had previously placed
the Progressive Party venture.
In the meantime there had been

little

to

show

nationally for

once 1950 had raised the unaraproniisabk
third-party efforts
barrier between the extreme leftists and the much
policy
moderates. The attempt to wage a
larger majority of party

second presidential campaign in 1952 went almost unnoticed.
From the ranks of California's Independent Progressive Party
came Vincent William Hallinan, San Francisco lawyer, to
on the tattered, shrinking, now crimson-hued banner.
carry

A

thirty-state

campaign tour with running mate Mrs. Char-
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little more than fringe votes
the
across
nation, with nearly half concentrated
140,023
in the Empire State. So vanished the last remnants of Wal-

lotta Bass,

was rewarded with

all

Like the ALP in New York, the national
dominant figure of Henry A. Wallace, died
not with the bang of Korea, but with a fading whimper at
America's polling places.
The prophetic words of Fiorello H. La Guardia once more
resounded in the minds of those who watched the final rites:

lace's crusaders.

party, bereft of the

The new progressive movement, when it comes, will
come from the Main Street of thousands of Prairie Junctions,

and not from Union Square

in

Manhattan.

CHAPTER

Road

to

13

Disenchantment

IN 1947 a motley array of crusaders had taken to the thirdparty road. Hopes had been high, theirs was a vision of a
better world
a world of peace, freedom, and abundance. By
their
the end of the trail, their hopes had been shattered
independent political path had become a road to disenchantment disenchantment for the candidates, disenchantment
for their fellow politicians, disenchantment for the followers
of whatever motivation and persuasion, disenchantment for
more objective viewers of the American political scene.
For Henry A. Wallace, with his vision of a broad people's
party to wage the "fight for peace" on behalf of the common
man, the blow was most shattering of all. For he had staked

a reputation based on a lifetime of service
his reputation
on the outcome of his personal crusade
the public interest
And only
against the Truman-doctrine style of foreign policy.

in

most limited sense was there achievement of his basic
an alternative to
that
the people might have a choice
goal,
the bipartisan get-tough-with-Russia policy. The people had
their choice, and they rejected it in no uncertain terms.
But the factors accompanying the defeat were far more
hi the

in the immediate sense
tragic than defeat itself. For victory
of a triumph at the polls had never been expected. Instead,
the hope had been to demonstrate a substantial discontent
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discontent with the abandonment of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
foreign policy, discontent with the termination of the Democratic Party's New Deal outlook. Embarking on the third-

party course without the firm backing of either farm or labor
segments had seemed foolhardy from the beginning. Indeed

had been early labeled "quixotic politics." Nevertheless, a
major show of support for a third-party venture had been maneuvered by long-time friends and trusted advisers to convince the former Vice President that he must make the political sacrifice. But once he had been convinced, once his
decision had been announced, many of these friends and advisers had rapidly retreated to the storm cellar of political
him as the campaign
conformity. Others turned their backs on

it

progressed.
of a losing

one of the

Nor

Henry Wallace soon discovered
or even worse, a hopeless

that the waging

political

campaign

is

real tests of friendship.

did the people themselves, the

common man

in

whom

he placed such reliance, respond in any numbers to his call.
Faced with more imminent domestic issues, the American
voter turned his back on the "remote, unrealistic" national
scene. Faced with a third-party promise of negotiations with

the Russians, he found increasing signs of Soviet intransigence
throughout a complex hostile world. Faced with the prospect

of a

Dewey Republican victory, he turned to the lesser evil
an always human, newly vigorous and hard-hitting Harry S.
Truman. At least he turned in terms of a small plurality of
the scant 51 per cent of qualified voters who actually took the
trouble to go to the polls
thus casting a quavering mandate
for a Fair Deal program that was to be so little realized.
But the ultimate in disenchantment for the man who had

\j

so increased the stature of the vice
presidency in his many
the man who as
Secretary of Agriculture

wartime services

had been both the experimenter and creator of a model administrative order, the man who had been the
philosopher

Road

to Disenchantment

spearhead of the

New

Deal
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was not the anticipated though

untimely termination of his political career. Rather it was
the smearing of his entire record, the
attempt to cast into
the
of
a
lifetime
in the service of
disrepute
accomplishments

humanity.

No

de

la

Mancha

in his earlier
jousts,

the disillusioned victim of those

who had

he became

earlier

urged upon
him this third-party course of action.
The ultimate post-Korean capture of the party he had
founded by the extremists of the left came almost as an anticlimax to the quiet, graying, friendly man who had attempted
to

embody

in practice the

most basic tenets of his fundamental

Christianity.

To Glen EL

Taylor, too, the Progressive Party path had**

proved a road to disenchantment Far more the practical politician than his running mate, he had nevertheless made his
decision, not

on a

politically rational basis,

but on the basis

of conscience. Realizing the likely sacrifice of the "best job
[he'd] ever had," he too had hoped to stir the coosckoce erf
the American public by his part in the crusade. But the public

had cast him

in the buffoon's rote

TV

a role that

boy"

could cast

that of a "singing

much

cow-

better. Seeking, per-

haps, to use the Communists for the advancement of a mone
democratic capitalistic society, he found that they had used

and destroyed him

in the process.

For

his ^feftwing" asso-

an association viciously misrepresented to the voters
of Idaho in his fatal 1950 primary battle returned to haunt

ciation

Taylor.

A

similar fate lent disenchantment to

sionals"

who had taken

many

other **profes-

to the third-party road. Rerforf

Tugwell, Elmer Benson, "Beanie" Baldwin

all

Guy

enlarged with

ended with the added
reputations tarnished, political careers
embittennent that it had been in a hopeless cause. Even Vito
Marcantonio, that long-time tightrope walker erf the extreme
and
left, came ultimately to the end of the rope
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to the point

What

-

where he could follow the "party

of the crusaders themselves

those

line"

1948

no longer.

who had em-

barked with hopes so high, with naivete and amateurism blazoned so clearly on their shields, on this holy war for a more
peaceful world? Disillusionment was the lot of all public
of
rejection, hostility in an ever increasing period
conformity.

Economic sacrifice, the loss of jobs, the scorn of neighbors
was in store for many. But even worse was the public reaction
a crystallization, a hardening of
that greeted then* endeavor
opinion against the ideas they advocated, the solidifying of

support for a peacetime militarization which they fought. Not
only was the fifteen-billion-dollar defense budget soon to
climb to the permanent forty-billion-dollar level, but the

peacetime draft which they opposed as "un-American" was
to become so accepted a part of the scene that Congress could
easily re-enact

it within short
years as "noncontroversial."
the Communists emerged among the disenchanted.
Their "superior understanding" of American history had once
more led them astray. The universe of America had proved
.'

Even

larger than the world of Union Square. And even in New
York, the balance-of-power position so carefully built over

the years by the American

Labor Party was soon

in ruins

about their heads as they pursued their policy of narrowness
and exclusion to its logical and suicidal conclusion.

But there was still a broader aura of disenchantment to
who watched as more objective outside observers.
Those who viewed the bipartisan foreign policy with grave
reservations
the same reservations attached to any demo-

those

cratic policy adopted without discussion,
opposition, or presentation of alternatives
saw as the ultimate outcome of 1948

a minimization and termination of opposition to the ChurchillTruman-Dulles "line." Indeed the mere presentation of contrary views

moved

"un-American"

into the

activity.

realm of treasonous or at least

The witch-hunting

of the postwar

period became more and more pronounced, with

political for-

Road

to

Disenchantment
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tunes sought and found by opportunistic self-seekers willing
to whip the hysteria into ever greater frenzy.

Nor was

the damage limited to the realm of the politically
Free
active.
speech everywhere on campus, in lecture hall,
in
classroom and city hall all across the nation
at city desk,
fell

prey to the

hostility

unleashed by shortsighted political

demagoguery. Conformity was advancing inexorably, moving
on to overwhelm not only the positions abandoned by the
Wallace crusaders but those still occupied by their adversaries
of the ADA and the Democratic Party. The unleashed tide
failed to distinguish between liberal friend and foe. Under its

wave went those who had looked

to

1948 as the beginning of

a realignment of the parties into more meaningful
based groups.

And

issues-

waiting hopefully for "the coming erf a
third party/* the Wallace experience was bitter confirmation
of the insuperable barriers in the way of any group hoping to
to those

still

emulate the British Labour success. True, the ballot oi>stacles
had not proved as impassable as expected for a party launched
in sufficient time with adequate breadth and organization to
provided it was
to pick up a degree of undercover support from a major adthe financial
versary hoping to profit by its presence. True,
of
voluntarism
the
hurdle had been well overcome by
unique
been
observed
as
had
the fundraising ventures, but
only
zealous craHenry A. Wallace could get away with it only

wage a

ballot drive

all

across the land

able

saders were likely to respond to such persuasion.
the Progressive Party had
Organizationally, however,
the political tinexclamation
point to
merely added another
More than zeal,
a
machine."
beat
to
ism "It takes a machine
to
ambition, and the willing support of amateurs is necessary
structure.
a
of
establish even the foundations
lasting party
Above all, success at the polk and favorable conditions erf

the times exist as the bare minima on which a lasting organibe built. The Jim Parleys, who had claimed that
zation

may
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given time and workers they could build viable machines without patronage, had never been faced with that dire necessity
either in

New York

or nationally.

^ The third-party path on which the crusaders had embarked
with such high hopes had then become the road to disenchantment by the end of 1950. But were there any contrary
minor
signs to be observed along the way? Like many another
party of protest, the Progressives had served both immediate
and less visible long-range functions. From the short-range
partisan standpoint of the Democrats, the Wallace party temporarily attracted the albatross-like "Communist issue" that

was to prove so damaging only four years

later.

But beyond

that, the domestic shift of the Truman administration and the
beginning of the attacks on the "no-good, do-nothing 80th
Congress" a Congress in whose first session the minority

Democratic Senate leadership and House rank and file had
sided with the majority were clearly attributable, in part at
least, to the

1947

threat of labor

idle one.
gists.

saw

Wallace attraction for old line

and

New Dealers. The

liberal defections

had not been an

Nor had it gone unnoted by Democratic Party strate-

time in American history, a minor party
stolen
in the very midst of the
its thunder
campaign,

For the

first

rather than four or forty years later. In unexpected fashion,
the philosopher of the New Deal had served to father the Fair

Deal of his opponent.
Foreign policy, on the other hand, provided no similar instance of an equally remarkable, radical, and rapid policy shift
by Harry S. Truman. Containment remained the dogma of
the day.

And yet, in his

had been covered

1949 inaugural, once established polmajor (but now forgotten) first

in the

icy
three points, the President came to point four.
thrill ran
the
rain-chilled
crowd
in
Plaza
as the victothrough
Capitol

A

rious candidate announced a plan of technical assistance that,
save for its bilateral nature, might clearly have been
inspired
on
by the dismissed cabinet member who had kept
insisting

Road
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the need for an American foreign policy promoting the interests of people, rather than governments.

From the vantage point of

a decade

later, the

ultimate con-

Henry A. Wallace to American foreign policy
had emerged as even more pronounced. A different time, a
tributions of

different President, a different Premier

all

these were obvi-

ously true. And yet the rapid shift within a short year from
the continued containment and non-negotiation of a Dofles
to the summits

come

his

and

visits

of an Eisenhower

own Secretary of State had much

who had

be-

of the Wallace hue

about them. (Indeed, the illness-aborted display of 1955 with
Geneva summit had convinced the erstwhile Republican

its

Wallace to return to his

first

party

at least for the

1956

presidential campaign.)
And IDA the International

Development Authority so
"Mike" Monroaey and so unexpectedly adopted by the administration in early 1960 was
clearly a refinement of the 1949 Wallace proposal for a simlong espoused by Senator A.

ilarly

named

S.

multilateral approach to the problems

erf

those

nations with great need, but less than smind" bankiag collateral, for capital development The renewed interest during
the late 1950's of so

many Democratic

Senators and OCHI-

k

a
gressmen in a return to multilateral assistance, and
assistrather
than
mflitaiy
changed emphasis upon economic
ance,

was reminiscent of

the speeches ten years earlier of the

former Vice President His very words **We shall never be
able to rely upon allies bought with CHIT arms" became the
basic argument of many
the Truman doctrine.

who

at

an

eaifier time

had supported

1959, the American poicy of "firmness** toward
lost support not only in ckmestic circles bet
in the mind erf its coauthor, foraer Prisae Minabroad
even

By

late

Russia had

Winston Churchill, who, citing "changed
of the concept
supported British abandonment

ister

ica

its

And fa Amerwho had

fipn supporters remained a handful of those
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its formulation
Truman, Acheson, Dulles,
and Harriman. Policy planner George Kennan the "Mr. X"
had moved completely over to a "disof its earliest defense

participated in

engagement"

position.

the "fight for peace" of Henry A. Wallace had been
vindicated in a sense. Under different sponsorship, under

-.And so

circumstances, with more amenable princithe more urgent threat of the H-bomb, his
basic ideas were being adopted by way of ushering in his

more favorable
pals, and under
"Century of the

Common Man." The

road to disenchantment

to have another turning; in the long run, Wallace's crusade would prove to have been more than just

had proved
quixotic.

Appendix

TABLE

1

1948 STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFYING PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL CANDIDATES FOR PLACES ON BALLOTS *
I.

PETITIONS

A. Required Number of Registered Votertf Signatures Determined by Percentage of Vote in Prior Election for
Specified Office

Arizona

2

of vote in
election
least

California

10

last

gubernatorial

(from each of

at

5 counties),

of vote in

last

gubernatorial

election.!

Connecticut

of vote in

1

last

presidential

election.

Georgia

5

Indiana

% of 1

Michigan

1

Nevada

5

of registered voters,f
of vote for Secretary of State
in last election.

to

4

of vote for Secretary of State
in last election.

of vote in
election.
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last

congressional
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TABLE
Ohio

1

(continued)

1

of vote in last gubernatorial
election (to qualify inde-

15

of vote in last general election (to qualify as third

pendent electors).
or

Oregon

5

Pennsylvania

% of

1

party).
of vote in last congressional
election, t
of highest vote for any state
office in last election (State

Judge

South Dakota

2

1947).

of vote for Governor in last
election

pendent)
or

(qualify as inde.

of vote for Governor in last

20

election

(qualify

as

third

Vermont

1

party).
of vote for Governor in last

West Virginia

1

of vote in

election.
last

presidential

election.

Number of Registered Voters' Signatures Determined by Statute

B. Required

Arkansas
Colorado
Delaware

no

specified

number
500

Illinois

25,000

750

250 in each of 3 counties,
at least 200 from each of 50

Kansas

2,500

counties (of 102).
separate petitions for each of
8 electors.

Kentucky

100

Louisiana

1,000

not

affiliated

party.

Maine

1,000

with any major
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OTHER METHODS
A. Change of Registration
California

1% of voters in last gotxanatodal dec-

Florida

5%

tiocut

of registered voters.*
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1

(continued')

B. Miscellaneous

New Mexico

any group may name slate.
formal organization and filing,

South Carolina

print

Mississippi

and

distribute ballots at

polling

places,

Texas

formal organization.

* This table was assembled
primarily from newspaper sources. The
New York Times, January 2, 1948, published a summary as compiled by the Associated Press. This was corrected in the light of
later reports

and information. The most recent scholarly works in

the field at the time were an article by Joseph R. Starr, 'The Legal
Status of American Political Parties," American Political Science Review, June and August, 1940, and a compilation, "Legal Obstacles to
Minority Party Success," published in the Yale Law Journal, July,
1948.
t Alternate methods provided.
$ Law amended in course of 1948
electoral

nominees to

file

campaign to allow

presidential

without meeting formal requirements.

TABLE

2

COMBINED TOTALS OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
FOR THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND THE NATIONAL
WALLACE-FOR-PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
Adjusted Total,
or "Actual"

Total

Contributions *
Progressive Party
National Wallace-for-

$

President Committee
$

382,825.12

$

491,090.84

578,370.47

789,188.65

961,195.59

$1,280,279.49

Adjusted Total,
or "Actual

Total
*

Progressive Party

Contributions f

Expenditures
$ 535,050.13

Expenditures
490,385.61

$
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Appendix
Total

Adjusted Total,
or "Actual"

Expenditures

Expenditures

National Wallace-forPresident Committee

813,532.67

769,71730

$1,348,582.80

$1,260,102.91

Refund of
*

Expenditures
$ 152,920.24

Progressive Party
National Wallace-for-

President Committee

254,633.55
$

Net Expenditures

407,553.79

941,029.01

Surplus f

20,166.58$

$

20,176.58

*

Figures as filed with the Clerk of the House.
t These figures were arrived at by
breaking down the party's "Refund of Expenditures" item as follows: "Admissions less than $100"

and "Sale of Campaign Material

at Cost" were added to contribu"Advances," "Redeposits," "Exchanges," and "Reimbursed Expenditures" were deducted from expenditures.
tions;

The $10 discrepancy

from what appears to be an incor"Refund of Expenditures'* for the Progressive Party during the period Oct. 29-Dec. 31, 1948. The reported
t

arises

rect addition in the report of
total

is

$51,523.43, but the figures submitted actually total $51,-

533.43.

TABLE

3

REPORTED CONTRIBUTIONS BY ASSOCIATED GROUPS TO
THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND TO THE NATIONAL
WALLACE-FOR-PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
Labor
Fur and Leather Workers Committee for Wallace,
Taylor, and Progressive Candidates

$5,000.00
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TABLE

3 (continued)

Labor
Independent Political Committee of the
Greater New York Council
Committee for Wallace, AFL Food, Hotel and

1,425.00

Restaurant Workers

1,000.00

PAC

(Local 1139, Minneapolis and Chicago
Joint Board, IFLW)

Labor Committee

FTA-CIO

for Wallace,

New York

500.00
500.00

City

Wallace Committee, Philadelphia

500.00

Labor Committee for Wallace and Taylor,
Local 430

100.00
$9^025.00

Nationalities

Armenians for Wallace
Greeks for Wallace
Irish-American Committee for Wallace
Italian-American Committee for Wallace
Lithuanian Wallace Committee
Romanians for Wallace
Russian Club for Wallace
Serbian-American Committee for Wallace

$1,648.00

443.20
100.00

300.00

200.00
120.00

100.00

309.00

Slovenian-American National Council

1,887.00
100.00

Ukrainians for Wallace
Yugoslav-Americans for Wallace

200.00
$5,407.20

Progressive Citizens of America
California Chapters

New York

(PCA)
$1,350.00
1,298.90

Chapters

Other Chapters

1,456.00

$4,104.90

Women-for-Wallace
Greater

New York

Branches

$

782.85
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DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
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TABLE

4 (continued)

State

Puerto Rico

Montana
Note: These totals represent only contributions from the
various state parties and committees. Other group contributions
will be found in Table 3.
* Wallace electoral slate did not
appear
f
vote in presidential elections.

on

ballot.

No

TABLE

5

CONTRIBUTIONS AND ADMISSIONS REPORTED IN THE PRESS
FOR RALLIES AND DINNERS

Date
(1948)
Jan. 18

Place

Feb.

Chicago
Minnesota

Apr. 10
Apr.

Chicago (2 rallies)
Midwest, East

RALLIES
Attendance

Admis-

Contri-

sions

butions
$

16,000

$ 15,000.00

12

May 17
May 21
May 30
June 25

*

70,000.00

(10 rallies)

May

3,300.00

20,000.00

10,000.00

New York

(Madison
Square Garden)
'Los Angeles
San Francisco
Denver
Philadelphia
(Shibe Park)

June 26 Washington, D.C.
Sept. 20 New York (Yankee
Stadium)
Oct. 27
New York (Madison
Square Garden)

50,000.00

31,000

30,000.00

20,000.00

40,000.00

5,000.00*

3,200

25,000

60,000.00

22,000.00

60,000
19,000

*

78,000.00

52,000.00

23,000.00

24,000.00

$196,000.00 $326,300.00

*
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Grand Total

$752,000.00

* Identification of
separate figures impossible for Admissions

Contributions.

and
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TABLE

6

COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES BY NATIONAL GROUPS AND
A LOCAL GROUP
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Appendix

*

Figures for the expenditures of the Progressive Party (national)

and National Wallace-for-President Committee from Consolidated
Surplus Statement prepared for national headquarters.
t Figures for the expenditures of the Progressive

of Columbia taken from report
Kept. 1987.
trict

filed

TABLE

Party of the Diswith the Clerk of the House,

7

PERCENTAGES OF STATES' VOTES RECEIVED BY 1948
WALLACE PROGRESSIVE PARTY
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TABLE

*

7 (continued)

Progressive Party did not appear

TABLE

on

ballot.

8

COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGES OF STATES' VOTES
RECEIVED BY SOME MINOR PARTIES

1948

333

Appendix

National Percentage

5.7

2.3

16.85

29.6

8.63

Sources:

Percentages of states' votes cast for all minor parties, 18641936, from
Cortez A. M. Ewing, Presidential Elections, p. 128.
Figures for La Follette Progressive Party, 1924, from Kenneth C.
MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924, pp. 274-75.
Figures for Roosevelt Progressive Party, 1912, from Political Almeat&c
for 1948, pp. 276-77.
Figures for Populist (People's) Party, 1892, from John D. Hicks, The
Populist Revolt, p. 263.

Y

Not yet admitted

to

Union.
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TABLE

9

VOTES RECEIVED BY PROGRESSIVE PARTY CANDIDATES,

NOVEMBER

2,

1948
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Appendix
Votes for Votes for
Votes for
Wallace- Progressive Progressive

Number of

Sources:

of the Presidential and Congressional Elec-

Statistics

2, 1948, compiled from official
Graf under the direction of
William
by
of the House of RepreClerk
R.
Roberts,
Ralph
for all states except New Mexico.
sentatives

tions of

November

sources

State of

New

Mexico,

Official

Returns of the 1943

Elections, compiled under the supervision of

Romero, Secretary of
*

No

senatorial seat

was

State,

at staie.

Alkia

Bibliography

INTERVIEWS
WHILE THE
listing of
of those

all

following does not purport to be a comprehensive
personal interviews, it does serve to indicate some

men and women who

tune and recollections.

To them

gave most generously of their
the author

is

indebted for

much

material on the organization of the Progressive Party and on
other groups related to the 1948 campaign of Henry A. Wallace.

Mr. John Abt, Chief Counsel, Progressive Party.
Mr. C. B. Baldwin, Campaign Manager for Henry A. Wallace
and Secretary, Progressive Party.
Miss Charlotte Carr, former Assistant to Mr. Sidney Hillman in

CIO

Political

Action Committee.

Mr. Barney Conal, Chief Field Organizer, Progressive Party.
Miss Hannah Dorner, Director, Independent Citizens' Committee
of the Arts, Sciences and Professions.
Professor Thomas I. Emerson, Yale Law School, Chairman,
Connecticut Wallace-for-President Committee and gubernatorial

candidate of the People's Party in Connecticut.

J.
Fitzgerald, President, United Electrical Workers, Cochairman, Progressive Party, and Chairman, National Labor
Committee for Wallace and Taylor.
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